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COLERIDGE

Philosophical Lectures, 1818-1819



SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, 1818-19

Painted by Thomas Dewett

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURES

OF

SAMUEL TAYLOR
COLERIDGE

Hitherto Unpublished

Edited By

KATHLEEN COBURN

LONDON

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Painted by Thomas Phillips, R.A., in 1818-19.

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To the Memory of
Miss Daisy Mackarness
and the
Reverend G. H. B. Coleridge,
two members
of the Coleridge family
gratefully remembered
for their help
and for themselves.

But assuredly the way to improve the present is not to despise the past; it is a great error to idolize it, but a still greater to hold it in contempt.

S.T.C., Lecture IX

Äusserten wir oben, dass die Geschichte des Menschen den Menschen darstelle, so lässt sich hier auch wohl behaupten, dass die Geschichte der Wissenschaft die Wissenschaft selbst sei. Man kann dasjenige, was man besitzt, nicht rein erkennen, bis man das, was andre vor uns besessen, zu erkennen weiss.

GOETHE, Vorwort zur *Farbenlehre*.

We said above that the history of man presents man, and we can say likewise that the history of science *is* science. We cannot truly know our own knowledge until we have seen what others knew who went before us.

PREFACE

THE present work has been carried on strictly in the Coleridge tradition: beset by difficulties arising from unforeseen obstacles, interrupted by the pursuit of related and unrelated matters, and delayed by editorial procrastination and the difficulties inherent in the subject itself.

It has long been known that from December, 1818, to March, 1819, Coleridge delivered two lectures each week: on Monday evenings a course on the history of philosophy and on Thursdays a literary course. The latter has been discussed and the existing material for it presented by Professor T. M. Raysor in his editions of *Coleridge's Shakespearian Criticism* and *Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism*. Of the former little was definitely known till 1934 when the *verbatim* reports reappeared. These had been referred to in 1895 by E. H. Coleridge in his edition of Coleridge's *Letters*, but though he then had the lecture reports in his possession, they were, for a time, lost or mislaid. Dykes Campbell, who knew about the lectures, did not know of the reports, close friend though he was of E. H. Coleridge. My first enquiries were fruitless. And no editor or biographer of Coleridge has made use of them. Yet not only are they the only existing *verbatim* accounts of any of Coleridge's lectures that approach completeness (having been reported in shorthand and transliterated by a professional reporter); they record his only public course of lectures on philosophy and they comprise his one attempt to discuss western philosophy as a whole, historically. The more closely I studied the reports the more conviction grew that publication of them would be of value not only to Coleridgeans but also to those interested in the history of ideas.

Coleridge himself intended to publish them. He wrote to Southey,

"Mr. Frere *at a heavy expence** (I was astonished to learn thro' Mrs. Gillman from the scribe himself, at how heavy an expence!) has had my Lectures taken down in shorthand.

* W. B. Gurney received for parliamentary reporting two guineas a day, and one shilling a folio for his transcripts.

"It will be of service to me: tho' the Publication must of course contain much that could not be delivered to a public audience who, respectable as they have been (scanty, I am sorry to add) expect to be kept awake—I shall however God granting me the continuance of the power, and the strength, bring them out—first because a history of *Philosophy* as the gradual Evolution of the instinct of Man to enquire into *the Origin*, by the efforts, of his own reason, is a desideratum in Literature and secondly, because it is almost a necessary Introduction to my *Magnum Opus* in which I had been making regular and considerable progress till my Lectures, and shall resume, immediately after."

So the publication of the Philosophical Lectures is another of those paving stones on Coleridge's road of good intentions. His failure to produce his own edition is most regrettable for reasons which will be obvious to any reader; the still outstanding gaps would have been filled in, repetitions would perhaps have been deleted, casualnesses of style would have been corrected, and perhaps some major omissions would have been supplied. Yet however short an editor must now fall of Coleridge's own edition, an attempt at a careful text seemed worth making, and was begun late in 1934.

When, some time later, permission was obtained to photograph and edit Coleridge's collection of notebooks, it was at once evident that considerable work would have to be done on them first, in order to sift them for material bearing on the lectures. The transcribing and ordering of the memoranda in the notebooks, a very large undertaking in itself, was slow, for various reasons chiefly connected with the war; when it became clear that no edition of the notebooks could be completed while the war prevented access to certain related manuscripts, I turned back again to the Philosophical Lectures, this time with the indispensable supplement of Coleridge's own preparatory notes for them, mainly in Notebook 25. These, with the Frere reports, and with Coleridge's marginalia on the German history of philosophy he used as a reference work for the course, provided a compact group of closely related manuscripts on which it seemed possible to work through to a definite edition of the lectures, even in Canada, in wartime more than ever remote from the original sources.

The text was not simple in the editorial problems it presented. The reporter, who was fallible, comes in as a middleman between author and editor and necessarily introduces some unknowns. When errors are apparent—and perhaps when they have not been so to me—there are at least three possibilities: Coleridge made a mistake, perhaps a slip of the tongue which he would have caught in writing; or the reporter mis-heard; or he mis-transliterated his shorthand. Fortunately the reporter was professional, and does not appear to have tried to correct Coleridge. Nor have I corrected either of them without authority; and, except for minute and obvious slips, I have indicated the changes. I have tried to heed the strict warnings, direct and implied, of all sound editors from Caxton to Mr. Percy Simpson, who revere the text and suspect all hints of emendations arising in the editorial brain as Mephistophelean in origin until they are proved otherwise; yet I have felt at times that the margin between sound deduction and guesswork was uncomfortably narrow. I dare say I have not dealt with all the hazards to the satisfaction of everyone. I have tried to produce an intelligible text and to stick to Coleridge. To do so involved at times his principle of the reconciliation of opposites and made consistency impossible.

Another embarrassment, familiar to all editors and students of Coleridge, was the presumption of trying to annotate omniscience. I look forward to the sheaf of corrections that “learneder clerks than I” will know how to provide. I have tried, by throwing myself on the goodwill and resources of my friends and colleagues in various departments of learning, to supply what was lacking, but I have been constantly aware of the truth of the maxim Coleridge was fond of repeating, that the first and greatest danger is the not understanding one’s own ignorance.

Pleasanter to record than the difficulties, are the compensations that go with such an undertaking as this, the generosity of owners of manuscripts and the friendly help of scholars.

I regret that this publication comes too late for the Rev. G. H. B. Coleridge to see it; to him I am indebted for permission to use and publish the lecture reports, and other manuscript materials as well, and for the identification of his father’s and grandfather’s annotations on the manuscript of the reports.

Lord and Lady Coleridge have made everything possible by giving me access to manuscripts without which the editing

could not have been done; their many kindnesses have gone far beyond complying with the importunities of scholarship. Other members of the Coleridge family, the Honourable Phillis Coleridge, the late Mrs. G. H. B. Coleridge and Mr. Alwyne Coleridge, have contributed in different ways to the ease and pleasantness of the undertaking.

To the former Principal, Miss B. E. Gwyer, and the Senior Common Room of St. Hugh's College, Oxford, particularly Miss M. E. Seaton, I am indebted for encouragement and various kinds of support. Members of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Toronto, especially the late G. S. Brett, Dr. Walter T. Brown, Dr. Jessie Macpherson and Mr. David Savan, have made many helpful criticisms and suggestions. To other colleagues, Dr. W. P. Wallace, Dr. S. H. Gould and Dr. F. E. L. Priestley, I am grateful for specific advice, and particularly to Mr. Barker Fairley who has been most generous in bringing his own wide knowledge to bear on my problems.

To Mr. George Whalley I owe a beautiful verse translation of the Bruno poem quoted in Lecture XI, and to Mr. Edmund Blunden the solution of a puzzle.

I am grateful to two classicists who, because of my ignorance of the language, repaired the Greek. They tell me it is now intelligible, though even here a consistent policy was difficult to apply.

I cannot express gratitude to others without referring to my colleagues in the Department of English in Victoria College who have given me, besides forbearance and help, that subtler kind of assistance that comes in less tangible and less easily acknowledged ways.

I wish also to record, without incriminating her in any way, that Miss Barbara Rooke by her extraordinary reading of the proofs has become the quintessential Without Whom.

The printer's careful work on this complicated text is something that I alone can appreciate.

Finally, it is a pleasure to state that grants-in-aid came, through the generosity of the Council of St. Hugh's College, from the John Gamble Fund for Research, and through the Humanities Research Committee, from the American Council of Learned Societies.

KATHLEEN COBURN.

VICTORIA COLLEGE, TORONTO, *May*, 1948.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN REFERENCES

A.P.:	<i>Anima Poetae</i> . Ed. E. H. Coleridge. 1895.
Allsop:	<i>Letters, Conversations and Recollections of S. T. Coleridge</i> . 2 vols. 1836.
A.R.:	<i>Aids to Reflection</i> 1825.
B.E.:	<i>Biographia Epistolaris</i> . Ed. A. Turnbull. 2 vols. 1911.
B.L. (1817):	<i>Biographia Literaria</i> . First edition. 1817.
B.L. (1847):	<i>Biographia Literaria</i> . Ed. H. N. and Sara Coleridge. 2 vols. 1847.
B.L.:	<i>Biographia Literaria</i> . Ed. J. Shawcross. 2 vols. 1907.
D.N.B.:	<i>Dictionary of National Biography</i> .
Eng. Div.:	<i>Notes on English Divines</i> . Ed. Derwent Coleridge. 2 vols. 1853.
E.O.T.:	<i>Essays on his Own Times</i> . Ed. Sara Coleridge. 3 vols. 1850.
Friend:	<i>The Friend</i> . 3 vols. 1818.
Letters:	<i>Letters of S. T. Coleridge</i> . Ed. E. H. Coleridge. 2 vols. 1895.
L.R.:	<i>Literary Remains</i> . Ed. H. N. Coleridge. 4 vols. 1836.
L.L.P.:	<i>Letters of the Lake Poets to Daniel Stuart</i> . 1889.
Method:	<i>Treatise on Method</i> . Ed. A. D. Snyder. 1934.
M.L.N.:	<i>Modern Language Notes</i> .
M.L.R.:	<i>Modern Language Review</i> .
Misc. Crit.:	<i>Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism</i> . Ed. T. M. Raysor. 1936.
M. Philol.:	<i>Modern Philology</i> .
Muirhead:	<i>Coleridge as Philosopher</i> . J. H. Muirhead. 1930.
N.E.D.:	<i>New English Dictionary</i> .
Notes	<i>Notes Theological, Political, and Miscellaneous</i> . Ed. Derwent Theological, &c.: Coleridge. 1853.
Omniana:	<i>Omniana</i> [Ed. Robert Southey]. 2 vols. 1812.
P.M.L.A.:	<i>Publications of the Modern Languages Association</i> .
P.W.:	<i>The Complete Poetical Works</i> . Ed. E. H. Coleridge. 2 vols. 1912.
R.E.S.:	<i>Review of English Studies</i> .
S.M.:	<i>The Statesman's Manual</i> . 1816.
Sh. Crit.:	<i>Coleridge's Shakespearian Criticism</i> . Ed. T. M. Raysor. 2 vols. 1930.
Tennemann:	<i>Geschichte der Philosophie</i> . W. G. Tennemann. 12 vols. 1798-1817.
T.L.:	<i>Hints towards . . . a . . . Theory of Life</i> . Ed. Seth B. Watson. 1848.
T.L.S.:	<i>The Times Literary Supplement</i> .
T.T.:	<i>Specimens of the Table Talk</i> . Ed. H. N. Coleridge. 2 vols. 1835.
U.L.:	<i>Unpublished Letters</i> . Ed. E. L. Griggs. 2 vols. 1932.
Ueberweg:	<i>History of Philosophy</i> . F. Ueberweg. Transl. G. S. Morris. 2 vols. 1901.
White, R. J.:	<i>The Political Thought of S. T. Coleridge</i> . Ed. R. J. White. 1938.
Windelband.:	<i>A History of Philosophy</i> . Transl. J. H. Tufts. 1905.

INTRODUCTION

WHY, one hundred and fifteen years after the death of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, should an important manuscript like the *verbatim* reports of his only course of lectures on the history of philosophy, remain unpublished? It is, indeed, the only *verbatim* account we have of any of his courses of lectures.

The answer lies in part in the wider explanation of the general neglect of unpublished Coleridge materials; in part it is to be found in special circumstances connected with this manuscript.

From December 14th, 1818, to March 29th, 1819, Coleridge delivered weekly at the *Crown and Anchor Tavern* in the Strand a course of public lectures on the history of philosophy. After a few lectures had been given he learned that his friend Hookham Frere was paying a professional reporter to take them down *verbatim* in shorthand.* The fact that this was done and that transcripts were made, has long been known, but so far very little attention has been paid to this interesting manuscript. Perhaps Coleridge's references to the lecture course as "a necessary introduction to my *Magnum Opus*" was enough to damn it in some eyes. J. H. Green's editor, for example, considered that much-talked of work "a mere matter of moonshine". Or possibly the neglect of the philosophical lectures is simply another evidence of the common tendency, even among Coleridge's enthusiastic admirers, to suppress the philosophical in his work as being of less general interest to students of literature. The earliest comments certainly did not invite curiosity as to the content of the reports; it was said that they "afforded interesting proof of the conversational style of Coleridge's lectures".

But perhaps it was largely that the condition of the manuscript made the editing look formidable.

* *U.L.*, II. 246.

I. THE TEXT.

The lectures were so far lost sight of that in 1891-92 we find J. Dykes Campbell printing sketchy reports in the *Athenaeum** and pleased to prove that "at least two of them had passed beyond the 'Prospectus stage' ". He treated with reserve Allsop's references to them,† and he must have overlooked an interesting question and answer in *Notes and Queries* for May 27, 1854. C. Mansfield Ingleby asked if Mr. Green was fulfilling his "solemn trust" by preparing for publication several of Coleridge's works thought to be in manuscript in his possession, and he mentioned specifically the "History of Philosophy". Green replied:

"The work to which I suppose the writer alludes as the *History of Philosophy*, is in my possession. It was presented to me by the late J. Hookham Frere, and consists of notes, taken for him by an eminent shorthand writer, of the course of lectures delivered by Coleridge on that subject. Unfortunately, however, these notes are wholly unfit for publication, as indeed may be inferred from the fact, communicated to me by Coleridge, that the person employed confessed after the first lecture that he was unable to follow the lecturer in consequence of becoming perplexed and delayed by the novelty of thought and language, for which he was wholly unprepared by the ordinary exercise of his art. If this *History of Philosophy* is to be published in an intelligible form it will require to be re-written; and I would willingly undertake the task, had I not, in connexion with Coleridge's views, other and more pressing objects to accomplish."

When Green died, the manuscript of the lectures, which for convenience may be called the Frere manuscript, was left with other Coleridge manuscripts to Derwent Coleridge and by 1895 was in the possession of his son, Ernest Hartley Coleridge.‡ In the 1930's the first attempts to find it were unsuccessful, and it was

* Dec. 26, 1891, and Jan. 20, 1892. He reproduced the reports from the *Literary Gazette*, and the *Champion*. See p. 81 and note 1.

† Allsop, II. 218-19.

‡ *Letters*, II. 698.

tentatively suggested by the late Rev. G. H. B. Coleridge that the Frere manuscript might have disappeared in the ill-fated trunk that in 1895 left London and never reached Torquay. However, lurking at the back of a cupboard in his library, it eventually came to light. With his kind permission it is here used as the primary text.

In addition to the Frere manuscript there are some useful supplementary manuscripts: the notes Coleridge prepared for the lectures, his marginal annotations on a German *History of Philosophy* read for the same purpose, and another series of very brief reports of the lectures now in the British Museum, MS. Egerton 3057. The *Prospectus* of the course, and the *Chronological and Historical Assistant* printed for the audience, are here reprinted on pp. 66–80. The manuscripts I shall describe in the order of their importance.

THE FRERE MANUSCRIPT.

Green's remarks about the condition of the Frere manuscript in his hands, made twenty years after Coleridge's death in extenuation of what appeared to be dilatoriness on his part, require modification. These *verbatim* reports are more than "notes"; they are far from being "wholly unfit for publication", and it is too much to say that they "require to be re-written". It is true that the reporter provided practically no punctuation, rarely even the full stop, and the whole needs to be set out in paragraphs. There are many gaps, usually but not always indicated by spaces, some short ones for proper names and technical terms—the reporter was no scholar—and some long ones for considerable passages. But collation of the Frere manuscript with Coleridge's notes shows that the reporter,* despite errors and omissions, did a very tolerable job. Green's letter, quoted above, describes some of his difficulties. As well as being unfamiliar with Coleridge's subject—or subjects—

* William Mudford, assistant editor of the *Courier*, who attended the lectures and announced them from week to week in his paper from December 7 to March 27, thought the reporter "was no worse an artist than Mr. Gurney himself" (*Canterbury Magazine*, Sept. 1834). It would be W. B. Gurney, the parliamentary reporter, grandson of the founder of the Gurney system of shorthand. An examination of this system does not, however, shed any light on the errors nor help with the omissions. The old spellings suggest that the reporter was no stripling, e.g. "chuse", "antient", "atchieve", "compleatly"; the spellings are not consistent, and confirm the suspicion that there may have been two amanuenses, but not, I think, two reporters.

he was taken aback by Coleridge's unexpected turns of thought and vocabulary. Sometimes he missed single words because they were difficult ones, like "auriety",* or because Coleridge mumbled, e.g. "infant" sounded like "intense",† or because he dropped his voice.‡ Mistakes in hearing or in transliteration led to some howlers Coleridge would have enjoyed: "magician" for "mathematician",§ for instance. There may have been two amanuenses, or else what looks like a second is the one suffering from tiredness, but all the reports are clearly and carefully written.

The lecture series consisted of fourteen lectures of which the Frere reports cover all but the first and last. For the first lecture, December 14th, I have not been able to discover any other accounts than those given by Dykes Campbell in the *Athenaeum*, a report in the *Courier* and a report in the *New Times*. For the last lecture, March 29th, we have Coleridge's notes and the report in British Museum MS. Egerton 3057, both described below.

Coleridge, who annotated other people's writings so freely, unfortunately left no mark on the Frere manuscript, though he intended to make emendations and additions and to publish it.|| Nor did Green annotate it.¶ Derwent Coleridge jotted down comments here and there, enough to indicate that publication was considered but that he probably concurred in Green's decision to postpone it. Possibly he once thought of undertaking the task himself; at any rate he marked two or three passages for deletion, presumably on grounds of decorum and dignity. In Lecture II, for instance, Coleridge's garbled version (or the reporter's?) of:

Big fleas have little fleas
Upon their backs to bite 'em;
Little fleas have lesser fleas
And so *ad infinitum*.

would have gone out, had Derwent Coleridge been editor. His son, Ernest Hartley Coleridge, was more enthusiastic. He made a few suggestions for filling in gaps, some of which have been

* XII. p. 340.

† III. p. 118. In XII one finds "causes" for "gases", "history" for "industry", "genial" for "keener" (pp. 341-3); in II. p. 93, "wicked" for "witty" hilarity.

‡ XII. p. 341. § IV. p. 158. || *U.L.*, II. 246.

¶ *Contra* an early guess in my article, *R.E.S.*, X.40. (Oct. 1934).

gratefully adopted. More than that, he took Lecture IV (by him incorrectly numbered III because of the missing report of Lecture I) and, perhaps to see what he could make of the text, wrote it out in full with emendations. Unfortunately he did not make much use of the manuscript remains that would have helped him and that over-rule some of his painstaking guesses.

THE AUTOGRAPH LECTURE NOTES.

The most important of the accessory manuscripts, the *sine qua non* of the editorial work, in fact, is the notebook in which Coleridge wrote one hundred and twenty-three pages of lecture notes. Possibly if Green and Derwent Coleridge had not either overlooked it or underestimated its value, their attitude towards publication of the lectures might have been different. In a brown leather-covered notebook numbered 25,* containing memoranda that range from part of a Greek Grammar to medicinal recipes, from notes on theories of colour to Biblical exegesis, and written from 1805 to 1819 and possibly later, are most of the notes for the philosophical course.

They were written from week to week for each lecture, sometimes bearing the date, always with the coming lecture distinctly in mind. That is to say, they were not merely casual memoranda. Usually each lecture is begun on a fresh page in the notebook, and the notes at first are in a clear steady hand. Often towards the last page or two the writing is larger, more hurried. Of what the notes tell of Coleridge's methods of lecturing more will be said later.

Not quite all the notes are in NB. 25. MS. Egerton 2801 in the British Museum contains part of the material for Lecture II (ff. 22-25), for Lecture VII (ff. 226, 32, 33, in that order), and for Lecture VIII (ff. 26-31). For some reason or other these notes were written on scraps of paper instead of in the notebook though they are clearly connected with it.† They were part of the lecture preparations, and are to be distinguished from the occasional use

* The notebooks were not numbered by S.T.C. but by someone later. Mrs. Gillman? E. H. Coleridge?

† See the beginning of Lecture II and notes. There is some reason to suppose that some of the MS. fragments on loose pieces of paper in the British Museum MSS. may be on leaves or parts of leaves torn out of the notebooks. I do not think that is the case in these instances, but proof is impossible to obtain.

in the lectures of sporadic notes, as for instance, the use in Lecture XI of an earlier note in NB. 18 on St. Teresa.

MARGINALIA ON TENNEMANN'S *Geschichte der Philosophie*.

Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann wrote his *Geschichte der Philosophie* in twelve volumes published at Leipzig from 1798 to 1817. Green brought eleven volumes back with him on his return from Germany in 1817 and Coleridge left a liberal sprinkling of what Lamb called "usury . . . annotations tripling their value" on them; they are now in the British Museum. It is perfectly clear that he read Tennemann in preparation for the lectures. The list of names and dates given in the *Chronological and Historical Assistant* is a translation, edited and added to, of Tennemann's historical tables;* the notes refer several times to Tennemann, and in the lectures Coleridge often makes use of him for dates and references. In Lecture III he damns Tennemann with what he considered very faint praise indeed, as "the very best writer on philosophic history we have hitherto had". Plagiarism is not in the question. With the ardent rather than critical Kantianism of "the Tinny man" as he called him, he was in fundamental disagreement very often; nor was he content in small details with Tennemann's inferences, but followed up footnote references for himself, as for example in Lecture III, p. 120. See note 15.† And he often mixed with Tennemann's dry indigestible mass of documentation, lubricants from a deep uniquely Coleridgian well of information and insight. But the German historian, dull, laborious, biassed compiler that he was, writer of a prolix and inflated prose, provided Coleridge, nevertheless, with the work of reference he needed and with what he himself was incapable of bringing into order. He gave him a chronological table of names and events, and a systematic presentation (instead of the chaotic wilderness of memorandum books) of references and quotations.

The comments on the *Geschichte der Philosophie* not only supply some of the omissions of the reporter, but throw considerable light on Coleridge's views.

* In the R.E.S. article referred to above, I gave some examples of close similarity in phrasing, dating, &c. The late Professor Muirhead agreed that the connexion was beyond doubt.

† See Lowes, J. L., *Road to Xanadu*, *passim*, on this habit of Coleridge.

B.M. MS. EGERTON 3057.

MS. Egerton 3057, in the British Museum, is a series of very brief reports of Lectures II to XIV. They do not pretend to give Coleridge's exact words, except for a few quotations, and they are full of the reporter's own comments, those of a person not learned in philosophy. But this manuscript does supply a few missing words, it corroborates some readings taken from remoter sources, and best of all, it gives a report of the fourteenth lecture which Frere's reporter missed. It suggests, too, the effect of the lectures on at least one member of the audience.

The manuscript bears the address of Macmillan and Co., in Carlyle's hand. He evidently thought the lectures, even in this unsatisfactory form, worthy of being considered for publication.

PUBLISHED WORKS CONNECTED WITH THE LECTURES: THE *Friend*.

The lectures followed hard upon the publication of the *Friend* in December 1818. Coleridge had difficulty in completing the "riffacimento" of that work, and in the third essay of Section 2 he had recourse to Tennemann. The quotation at the head of the essay, "Ἡ ὁδὸς κάτω, The road downwards" is from Heraclitus—and Tennemann. Coleridge's first paragraph on the rise of the Sophists is Tennemann's wordier account in brief, and the second contains the sentence, "Such were Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Polus, Callicles, Thrasymachus, and a whole host of Sophists *minorum gentium*", *verbatim* from the same pages. The quotation from the *Timæus* in Coleridge's second paragraph is given by Tennemann, and the sentences that follow Coleridge's translation of it are, with variations, to be found among his Tennemann marginalia. The third and fourth paragraphs also have small points in common with Tennemann, and the remainder of the essay seems to be pure Coleridge. The fifth essay again echoes the *Geschichte der Philosophie*, as far as a long footnote in volume III, pp. 160-61* which is the *Assistant* condensed and is word for word part of the *Prospectus*. With this footnote, which is really the first announcement of the course of lectures, use of Tennemann in the *Friend* ceases.

It would be interesting to know at what date this fifth essay and its footnote were written. We should then know not only

* Coleridge's references in the lectures are always to the edition of 1818, to which I refer throughout.

something about the occasion of the plan of the lectures, but also how quickly the third volume of the *Friend* was hurried to completion with the use of the *Essay on Method* from the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*.

The *Biographia Literaria* comes into the lectures, the poor sale seeming to justify quotation from it.* And the manuscript edited by Seth Watson—after Coleridge's death—and entitled *Theory of Life*, was used in part for Lecture XII, a fact which throws some light on the controversy as to how much of that work was Coleridge's.

The principle followed in editing has been to accept the Frere manuscript as the primary text, noticing in footnotes any interesting, but not every, variation found in Coleridge's notes. Words supplied from his own notes are printed in small capitals. Omissions supplied from marginalia, Tennemann, MS. Egerton 3057, or any other manuscript or published work of Coleridge are given in brackets with the references in footnotes. When from these sources, or even from such books as we know Coleridge to have read or possessed, nothing can be found to suggest the missing words in the reports, I have supplied them (in square brackets and with the additional caution of italics) where reasonable support could be found; but where I could find no lead, instead of inventing I have preferred to leave what he called "an *hiatus lacrymabilis*".† Some verbs still elude me; and neither Coleridge nor the reporter could decide between Spinoso and Spinoza. The policy followed is, therefore, to present as Coleridgian a text as possible, even to its incompleteness.

Sometimes the reporter left no space where something obviously was missed; comparison with the notes, passages from printed works, &c., prove it. In such cases, i.e. the insertion of words where there is no indication of a gap, pointed brackets are used. But I have not always felt it necessary to treat the shorthand writer's reports with all the respect due to an autograph manuscript or even the copy of an amanuensis. Some readers will perhaps think that every correction of the reporter's errors should

* Lecture XII.

† For a warning case, see Lect. III, p. 137. The reporter wrote "you all allow with the Sophists," &c. E. H. Coleridge suggested "you will allow". The NB. shows that Coleridge was really talking about Athens being "then all alive with the Sophists", &c.

have been indicated and the nature of the errors made clear. I can only say that his are the gross ones of a person uninformed as to philosophical terms and names, that they are frequent, in spite of a generally faithful reporting, and that though I have not changed his report where mere oddity appeared—that may well have been Coleridge—I have not scrupled to make minute silent corrections where there was no shadow of doubt, or larger ones where the notes or other materials supported common sense. Indication in footnotes of all these would have irritated the reader and would have served no useful purpose.

Any explanations other than textual are kept firmly in the background as notes.

2. THE PUBLICITY, THE AUDIENCE, AND THE LECTURER.

The course of philosophical lectures was begun like many other Coleridgian undertakings, in a welter of unfavourable circumstances, some arising from miscalculation and others simply misfortunate. By some date before November 19, 1818, the prospectuses were printed.* They announced that the course would begin on December 7. But on November 17 Queen Charlotte died, and for some reason the authorities waited several days before announcing the date of her burial. By November 23 the *Literary Gazette* still was not able to tell its readers when the funeral would be. It took place eventually on December 2, but the uncertainty was perhaps a factor in delaying the beginning of Coleridge's course, especially if prospectuses and tickets had not gone very quickly. So the lectures were postponed for a week, and the *Literary Gazette* announced on Saturday, December 12, that the course would begin December 14, very short notice for the important first lecture of a series in which continuity was of the essence. However, with two breaks, one on December 21, a bank holiday—surely another misfortune for the second lecture—and one the first week in February (on doctor's orders),† the full complement of fourteen lectures was given, the last on March 29.

* *U.L.*, II. 242. On that date Coleridge sent one to Hugh J. Rose who was connected with and later to become editor of the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana* to which Coleridge had contributed a general plan and his *Essay on Method*.

† *U.L.*, II. 243-5; *Sh.Crit.*, II. 319.

The prospectuses announced, with surely the poorest of advertising art, not an additional but an "Alternate Course of Lectures" on Thursdays, at the same time and place, on Shakespeare's plays: *The Tempest*, *Richard II*, *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, *Othello*, *Lear*. This course also was given in full, with breaks during the same weeks, and its six lectures were followed by six more, advertised in the papers after the sixth lecture.

Neither course was a financial success. Mrs. Coleridge writes in her habitual tone of self-respecting complaint to Poole, "I have had a few letters from C. lately who is in his *better way*. I am afraid his lectures were not very profitable to him, as he has not made me any remittance in consequence."* His correspondence with Mudford reveals how poor was the attendance, especially on the Mondays for the philosophical course. Mudford's notices in the *Courier* had failed on Saturday, January 2, and Coleridge wrote him on the following Tuesday. "You saw and I doubt not regretted for my sake how scanty an audience I had yester-evening, in part owing to my not having advertised the Lecture separately. You can scarcely imagine what an effect two or three lines of compliment in any respectable Paper produces on the number of my attendants."† Or he writes him again, "When I tell you that yester-evening's receipts were somewhat better than many of the preceding: and that these did not *equal* one half the costs of the room, and of the stage and hackney coach (the advertisements in *The Times* and *Morning Chronicle*, and the printer's prospectus bill not included), you will find no difficulty in understanding the warmth with which I express my sense of your kindness . . ."‡ This letter suggest that notices in the *Courier* were a gift from Mudford, and that Coleridge paid for those in *The Times* and the *Morning Chronicle*. These, with others in the *New Times*, a few early ones in the *Literary Gazette* and the *Champion*, would appear to have provided fairly generous publicity. Yet when one comes to examine these papers and the announcements closely, one is inclined to think the advertising could hardly have been worse handled.

* Potter, Stephen. *Minnow Among Tritons*, 73. She appears to imply that if Coleridge had gained anything from the course, she would have benefitted—an interesting light on Coleridge's financial relations with her.

† *U.L.*, II. 243-4.

‡ *Canterbury Magazine*, Sept. 1834, 127-8.

The Times carried no advertisements for Lectures II, III and V, the *Morning Chronicle* none for I, III, IX and XII, the *New Times* none for I, III, V, VI, VIII, IX, and even the *Courier* missed its Saturday notices for III, IV, VII and XI. In other words, subscribers to one London daily only would have been left uncertain on some Mondays, as to whether there was to be a lecture or not; and if a person had taken in all the papers, he would not have known definitely about Lecture III. The only notice of this one appeared in the *Courier* on the Saturday preceding; accustomed to a notice on the day of the lecture, Coleridge's audience could be forgiven for not going out on the cold wet evening* of Monday, January 4.

The *Morning Post* announced Lecture IV on the day for it, and then the subjects for the next three weeks of the Shakespeare course. With no further mention of the philosophical course continuing, this was almost worse than no mention at all.

The first lecture, December 14, was announced December 12, very short notice, as I have pointed out, after the postponement from December 7; and there was no notice of the postponement of the second lecture which should have come on December 21. That was a bank holiday and perhaps no notification was necessary. The announcements of it for December 28 were, at any rate, blithely lacking in apology. After this bad start, the failure in the announcements of Lecture III was particularly unlucky and must have led to discouragement of audience and lecturer alike. There followed a spate of advertising for Lecture IV.

Mudford continued his Saturday announcements in the *Courier*, possibly by agreement with Coleridge, as the *Chronicle* and *The Times* were supposedly taking care of the Monday notices. The failure of *The Times* on Monday, January 18, to announce Lecture V was the more unfortunate as on the 16th, in the same column where Coleridge's notices usually appeared, it had announced Hazlitt's course on the *English Comic Writers* to begin on Tuesday the 19th, also at the *Crown and Anchor*, Strand. Of apparent tension between Hazlitt and Coleridge at this time more will be said presently.

Thelwall, with thinly-concealed venom, had reported the first two lectures in the *Champion*. He announced that no more would be reviewed, and the explanation is not far to seek. On

* See p. 25.

January 2, in the usual announcement column, *The Times* advertised Thelwall's own rather comprehensive course for Mondays and Fridays. The advertisement must be quoted in full, for itself and by way of comparison with Coleridge's in tone.

"Lectures on Elocution and Oratory [page torn]
Poetry and the Drama and the Philosophy of English
History at the Institution for the Remedy of Organic
Defects and Impediments, and Preparation of Youth for
the Pulpit, Bar and Senate, 57 Lincoln's Inn Fields. On
MONDAY EVENING, Jan. 4 at 8 o'clock, Mr. THEL-
WALL will deliver a Scientific, Critical and Political
ORATION introductory to the Threefold Course, to be
commenced on the Friday following. The whole will be
of necessity restricted to the number of Twelve Lectures,
exclusive of the introductory oration. Subscription 2 gns
a ticket, 6 tickets 1 guinea; single admission 4s."

How could a mere poet and philosopher compete with the high-pressure salesmanship of that? Twelve lectures, with an ORATION thrown in to make a baker's dozen, and on more subjects for less money!

The town was full of lectures: Mr. Smart's "Shakespearian Readings", the "Philosophical Lectures" of Mr. Tatum which "comprehended experimental lectures on pneumatic Chemistry", another course by Mr. D. F. Walker on "Experimental Philosophy . . . illustrated by an extensive and appropriate apparatus . . . including a new and splendid Eidouranion". These last were, of course, lectures "for the general" and worth mentioning only for what they indicate of popular trends. Thelwall also catered for a different audience from Coleridge's. But both Thelwall and Hazlitt owed Coleridge something better than the rivalry of lectures on the same night in the one case, and at the same place in the same weeks in another, especially as they both knew his financial straits. However, we are in no position to judge their arrangements, being ignorant of the many small factors that may have been decisive in them. For Coleridge the competition was unfortunate.

There was more dignified and friendly rivalry for an audience on Monday, February 15, and from more eminent quarters. John Abernethy gave the annual Hunterian Oration on that date, at 4 o'clock. Coleridge attended it, and Abernethy quoted from his

Lecture VII (see p. 28 f.n.). But whether Coleridge's audience was as equal as he to two lectures in one evening is not known.

The end of the course was not quite, but almost, as uncertain as the beginning. As early as March 10 the *Courier* has begun to mention that March 22 will bring Coleridge to his last lecture. On March 20, 24, 27 and 29, emphasizing the fact with almost histrionic capital letters, the *Courier* announces the final lecture of the Philosophical Course as Mr. Coleridge's "LAST ADDRESS AS A PUBLIC LECTURER", and it will be a "Review and Application of his preceding Labours as a Public Lecturer". The same sort of notices appeared in *The Times* and the *Morning Chronicle*,* and they do contrive (perhaps the more so when they are read, as now, all together, instead of with interspaces of days between) to make one feel either that lecturing was indeed a labour the end of which the lecturer was eagerly anticipating, or that there was a slightly melodramatic appeal for a full house for the final night.

A number of factors contributed to the ill-success of the course financially, in addition to the poor advertising and the un auspicious beginning.

The weather reports in the *Literary Gazette*, and an unofficial private record preserved in the Royal Observatory at Greenwich, show the weather on those Monday nights to have been monotonously bad. The first four nights and the sixth, ninth, tenth and fourteenth were "cold" or "very cold" and either wet or misty. Of the six Monday nights remaining some were cloudy and some fine. Until the last lecture, the evening temperature hovered around freezing point, in London an indication of cold damp misery.

Nevertheless it must be acknowledged, that neither the weather nor the mourning for the Queen were enough to prevent audiences from packing Drury Lane all through December and into January to see Kean and Kemble in the new play *Brutus*† by John Howard Payne.

Coleridge found some reasons of his own for the failure. The "Christmas parties" perhaps, he writes Mudford; or again, "Ah! dear Sir! That week's break was indeed unfortunate; but, I imagine, that my ill-health and despondency that barely enable

* See Lect. XIV. p. 392.

† See the *Literary Gazette* for December-January, 1818-19.

me to give the lectures themselves respectably, but utterly unfit me for all awkward exertion and canvassing, that these joined with my solitariness, and unconnection with parties of any kind, literary, religious, or political, are the main causes of my failure . . ." However, a disinterested observer would more likely have attributed the poor audience to the restricted appeal of the subject and to the lecturer's impractical plan of delivering two courses concurrently. Forced to choose between the two, his public chose the literary one. His Shakespeare lectures at the beginning of 1818 had been his most successful and had enhanced his reputation. His philosophical works were little known, and except in a small circle, not taken seriously before 1825. The *Friend*, 1818, was just off the press, and the *Biographia Literaria* had had a very small circulation; the philosophical parts of the latter were generally thought disappointing and Coleridge later charged himself with immaturity in them. The reputation of the "Oracle of Highgate" and of the author of the *Aids to Reflection* was still to come.

In passing, it is perhaps appropriate to notice that the Comic Spirit, with devilish irony, saw fit to announce in the same *Literary Gazette* of December 12 that advertised Coleridge's lectures, the advent of Mr. Flosky. The reviewer supposed that in the portrait of Mr. Flosky in *Nightmare Abbey*, Peacock "aimed at Coleridge". Doubtless the caricature had no effect on the size of his audiences or on the lectures, but its coincidence with Coleridge's one and only effort to systematize his philosophical speculations in public lectures puts an additional drop of acid on Peacock's joke.

Coleridge's difficulties in carrying through the course were many and real. Wordsworth said on one occasion to Payne Collier, "He gained some money and reputation by his last effort of this kind which was indeed to him no effort, since his thoughts as well as his words flow spontaneously. He talks as a bird sings, as if he could not help it: it is his nature."* Wordsworth's statement supports Coleridge's sense of a certain "dyspathy" between their temperaments; but had Wordsworth ever delivered a course of lectures himself, he could scarcely have been guilty of such nonsense. The talker of Keswick, or of Lamb's Thursday evenings, was not the lecturer of the *Crown and Anchor*. The travail of spirit

* *Sh. Crit.*, II. 54.

in which the course was pushed to its close is vividly indicated at the beginning of the notes for the last lecture:

"Monday, 29th March, 1819. Fourteenth of the Phil[osophical] Course and the Last (O pray Heaven, that it may be the Last) of All. *Absit omen de morte secunda: de prima sufficiet, sit modo post obitum ἀταξία*".

As well as depressions of body and mind, other practical difficulties had to be met. Coleridge was living at Highgate at some distance from a good library and dependent for his books, to a large extent, on friends, especially Green. Green was a very busy surgeon and was not always able to fulfil expectations. Whether the following note refers to him or not, it describes Coleridge's predicament. It appears in NB. 25 after the notes for Lecture X:

"The above was a poor, I hope I shall be able to say, my worst—I flatter myself even, my only indifferent Lecture. The cause of this was that I was disappointed, and yet still waiting for, the Books necessary for the Plan I had formed—& received only one of the number on the noon of the Lecture-day! Had I fore-known this, I should have formed a different outline which I could have well realized out of my own recollections. But regret is useless—let me rather attempt compensation in the Lectures now to be given." A letter to Green dated January 16* suggests a similar embarrassment.

He launched the course with enthusiasm, but obviously with premonitions. "If I could but have a tolerably numerous audience to my first, or first and second Lectures on the History of Philosophy, I should entertain a strong hope of success, because I know that these lectures will be found by far the most interesting and *entertaining*† of any that I have yet delivered . . . ‡ And we find Hartley, down from Cambridge, reporting to Thomas Poole, February 26, "I spent the Xmas vacation with my father at

* *U.L.*, II. 699. The letter also reveals that during these days Coleridge was sitting to Thomas Phillips, R.A., for the portrait reproduced as the frontispiece to this volume.

† But in respect to the *entertainingness* of moral writings, if in entertainment be included whatever delights the imagination or affects the generous passions, so far from rejecting such a means of persuading the human soul, my very system compels me to defend not only the propriety, but the absolute necessity, of adopting it, if we really intend to render our fellow-creatures better or wiser." *The Friend*, I. 8.

‡ Allsop, I. 8.

Highgate. He was, on the whole, pretty well, and gave his Lectures with spirit. Those on Shakespeare were well attended, the Philosophical Course but so, so—he did not, however, make it too metaphysical.”*

As one looks over the list of the known and possible audience, one can't help wondering if Coleridge would not have done better to stick to his metaphysical guns. Attending at least some of the lectures were Mr. (afterwards Sir) William Hamilton,† who acknowledged deep indebtedness to Coleridge; Henry F. Cary,‡ the translator of Dante; Joseph Henry Green,§ the surgeon referred to above, and demonstrator at Guy's Hospital, to whom he had begun to dictate his *Logic*; the ardent Allsop;¶ Hookham Frere, the translator of Aristophanes, who hired the reporter; John Stoddart, whom he knew in Malta;¶ Mr. and Mrs. Gillman undoubtedly; Hartley Coleridge; C. R. Leslie,** the painter, pupil of Allston; William Collins, R.A.; and H. J. Rose who asked, at any rate, for prospectuses;†† John Britton,‡‡ who seems to have enquired about his methods of preparation; Charles Lamb, perhaps, who dined at Highgate the Sunday before the third lecture;§§ John Abernethy, the eminent surgeon and physiologist, a friend of Gillman and Green, whom Coleridge may have consulted earlier about his case.

In the Hunterian Oration already referred to, Abernethy said, “With regard to the subject of nationality, however, I wish to submit a sentence which I remember to have heard in Mr. Coleridge's lectures, to Mr. Lawrence's consideration. There can be no sincere cosmopolitan who is not also a patriot.”||| It is interesting to note the references to Abernethy in Lecture XII (March 15) and to the vitalist-mechanist controversy then raging between Abernethy and Lawrence. One wonders if Coleridge

* *Letters of H.C.*, 21.

† *U.L.*, II. 244. See Lect. IX note.

‡ *Letters*, II. 699. His account book shows that he took some friends.

§ *Letters*, II. 699.

¶ Allsop, I. 1-3 and II. 218-19.

¶ See Lecture I. p. 83 n.

** *Letters*, II. 695.

†† *Letters*, II. 693-5.

‡‡ *B.E.*, II. 166-7.

§§ *Letters*, II. 16. Lamb professed a lecture-phobia and possibly did not go, though he had complained about not having been sent a ticket for the earlier 1818 course.

||| Cf. Lecture VII. p. 236 f.n. and note 9.

knew that Abernethy intended to be present at the twelfth lecture, or whether the sight of him in the audience gave his words the turn they took, which of course raises the whole question of how far a lecture might be affected by the persons recognized in the audience.

The bungling of the advertising, especially for the first three lectures, and the filtering in of newcomers, may help to account for some of the repetitions, and for the announcement that the last seven lectures were to be considered a new course, on the history of modern philosophy.* Doubtless it was hoped that a new audience might be found, unintimidated by having missed the first seven lectures, and that a fresh start might be made with them, especially after the discouraging "week's break" that had postponed the seventh one.

Mudford thought the lectures too long for the general public and begged Coleridge to shorten them, to which suggestion he received the following reply:

"I thank you for your kind and at all points most judicious letter. In my last night's lecture I had pre-determined to avail myself of it—yet, still exceeded. I will try hard that my next Monday's shall be within the limits, which I fully agree with you, is the utmost that a lecturer ought to inflict on a subject demanding any catenation of thought."

Next Monday's may have been Lecture IV, which is somewhat shorter, but there is no point at which the lectures become consistently briefer. They must have taken about an hour and a half or more to deliver.

Crabb Robinson has too exclusively been consulted as representative of Coleridge's listeners. His comments on other lecture series are mixed, and he did not attend the philosophical course. His prejudices and Coleridge's were too disparate, and even opposite, to allow congeniality between them. Payne Collier said of Coleridge's lecturing,

"He was not generally a rapid speaker, although continuous and flowing; and when in the full tide of his subject, when his face was lighted up almost with the appearance of inspiration, it was not easy to follow him; not so much on account of his volubility, as because I

* See Lecture VIII, p. 247.

found it extremely difficult to keep my hands to their mechanical employment, and my eyes from becoming fixed upon his glowing countenance.”*

As Green’s letter quoted above tells, Hookham Frere’s reporter found a similar difficulty.

“A very experienced short-hand writer was employed to take down Mr. Coleridge’s Lectures on Shakespeare, but the manuscript was almost unintelligible.† Yet the lecturer was, as he always is, slow and measured. The writer—we have some notion it was no worse an artist than Mr. Gurney himself—gave this account of the difficulty: that, with regard to every other speaker whom he had ever heard, however rapid or involved, he could almost always, by long experience in his art, guess the form of the latter part, or apodosis, of the sentence, by the form of the beginning; but that the conclusion of every one of Coleridge’s sentences was a *surprise* to him. He was obliged to listen to the last word.”‡

The reporter of MS. Egerton 3057 was on the whole enthusiastic, if not always quite comprehending. “This highly interesting lecture,” he [or she?] writes, of Lecture IX; or, “that did Mr. Coleridge in an interesting manner treat the history of the various causes, which have drawn men from their own minds to the contemplation of external objects”, (Lecture XII); and in the same lecture, “Mr. C. commented beautifully upon the free agency of man”. On the other hand, of Lecture X, the one which Coleridge confessed to himself was the worst he had ever delivered this reporter says, “This lecture was devoted by Mr. Coleridge chiefly to the restoration of letters and to the reformation in the church, but from the manner in which it was treated it contained much less interest than the subject appeared to embrace. The cursory history of these times with an occasional levelling on the principal personages was all Mr. C. attempted.”§

* *Notes and Queries*, July 22, 1854.

† Possibly Gurney did report both courses, though there is no reference to such reports of the Shakespeare course. It seems likely that the manuscript referred to the manuscript of the Philosophical Course, though the statement if applied to the Frere manuscript is exaggerated.

‡ *Canterbury Magazine*, Sept. 1834, 131.

§ For other comments see, under Lecture I in the text, the report by Mudford in the *Courier*, and by Stoddart in the *New Times*, and under Lecture XIV, the report from MS. Egerton 3057.

In an interesting answer to an enquiry as to his method, Coleridge has described his lecture preparations. Allowing something for human vanity, the description is borne out by what we see when we put the notes and the lectures side by side. (What other lecturer has ever been caught at such a disadvantage?)

“During a course of lectures I faithfully employ all the intervening days in collecting and digesting the materials, whether I have or have not lectured on the same subject before, making no difference. The day of the lecture, till the hour of commencement, what of the mass before me is best fitted to answer the purposes of a lecture, that is, to keep the audience awake and interested during the delivery, and to leave a sting behind, that is, a disposition to study the subject anew, under the light of a new principle. Several times, however, partly from apprehension respecting my health and animal spirits, partly from my wish to possess copies that might afterwards be marketable among the publishers, I have previously written the lecture; but before I had proceeded twenty minutes, I have been obliged to push the MS away, and give the subject a new turn. Nay, this was so notorious, that many of my auditors used to threaten me, when they saw any number of written papers on my desk, to steal them away; declaring they never felt so secure of a good lecture as when they perceived that I had not a single scrap of writing before me. I take far, far more pains than would go to the set composition of a lecture, both by varied reading and by meditation; but for the words, illustrations, &c., I know almost as little as any of the audience (that is, those of anything like the same education with myself) what they will be five minutes before the lecture begins. Such is my way, for such is my nature; and in attempting any other, I should only torment myself in order to disappoint my auditors—torment myself during the delivery, I mean; for in all other respects it would be a much shorter and easier task to deliver them from writing.”*

* *B.E.*, II. 166-7.

Lecture II, the first for which we have both notes and report, provides corroboration. On December 26, 1818, Coleridge wrote a note in NB. 25 which shows him reading and disagreeing with Creuzer on the *Mysterics*.^{*} The lecture notes proper begin on the next page, presumably December 26 or 27, or, as he suggests to Britton, December 28. The marginalia on Tennemann, too, were preliminary work before the actual organization of the lecture. Illustrations were sometimes extempore, but often they were the illustrations and references that habitually recurred to him in association with certain subjects, e.g. the cave of Trophonius.

Coleridge's rationalizations about the superiority of unwritten (not unprepared) lectures are well known. Payne Collier reported in *Notes and Queries*:[†]

"Coleridge said that for his first lecture at the Royal Institution he prepared himself fully, and when it was finished he received many high-flown but frigid compliments, evidently, like his lecture, studied. For his second lecture he prepared himself less elaborately, and was much applauded. For the third lecture, and indeed for the remainder of the series, he made no preparation, and was liked better than ever, and vociferously cheered. The reason was obvious, for what came warm from the heart of the speaker, went warm to the heart of the hearer; and although the illustrations might not be so good, yet being extemporaneous, and often from objects immediately before his eyes, they made more impression, and seemed to have more aptitude."

But one cannot help feeling that if there were those who discouraged the preparation of lecture notes, they were mistaken. The best lectures are on the whole those for which notes and references were ready. They are best not only in that the materials are more systematically treated, but best in style.

And yet Coleridge's lecturing style is not so vivid, personal or commanding as the style of his written notes. Faced with an audience he tends to become stiff, general, and dry. For instance, "barbarous jaw-breaking jargon of the formulæ" becomes, in Lecture VI, "the usual incantations"; the anecdote [of Hartley or Derwent?] "Who made God? Mama!" referred to in the notes,

^{*} Lecture II, note 11.

[†] July 1, 1854.

did not enliven the lecture; and the phrase, "the hours of fear, conscience, &c." full of dramatic meaning to any reader of the outpourings of self-accusation in the notebooks and marginalia, is toned down in the lecture to "troubled his mind and made him anxious". Not only does he lose some of the terseness and sharpness of the notes; he becomes at times meandering and general on points which his notes could well have substantiated.*

It would be unfair to judge his lecturing style entirely from the Frere manuscript, with its occasional gaps, and lack of punctuation; but the reporter of MS. Egerton 3057 says what we can sympathize with when we look at the end of Lecture VI.

"Mr. C. expatiated at length on this happy period [the introduction of Christianity]. I note it only as a remembrance for I cannot follow him in his clear and beautiful exposition of this glorious event."

"My prose writings," Coleridge says, speaking of his style, "have been charged with a disproportionate demand on the attention; with an excess of refinement in the mode of arriving at truths; with beating the ground for that which might have been run down by the eye; with the length and laborious construction of my periods; in short with obscurity and the love of paradox. But my severest critics have not pretended to have found in my compositions triviality."

The humourless self-defensiveness of the last sentence, a trait that mars some of Coleridge's best work, raises the point of this and other personal disclosures in the lectures. In Lecture X, for instance, we suddenly hear him vindicating himself, as if to Wedgwood or Wordsworth or Southey, when he refers to John of Ravenna as having left no written works. "He *lectured*—But O what works did he not leave in the minds of his auditors!"

Lecture IV carries a rather unusual number of personal overtones. "Plato was a poet of such excellence as would have stood all other competition but that of his own genius as a philosopher."† The notebook adds in brackets, "Sir H. Davy". But Davy for some reason was not mentioned in the lecture, and in

* To take but one example, see Lecture IX. p. 275, f.n. As the footnote shows, Coleridge could have made a much stronger point about the aim of the Schoolmen—which, it must be said, he had just stated very clearly—had he quoted Alcuin's dedication of his works to Charlemagne referred to in the notebook.

† P. 158 and f.n.

any case the author of the *Dejection* ode cannot hide behind the author of the *Ode to St. Michael's Mount*, however great Davy may have been in other respects. Even more conspicuously autobiographical and apologetic is the passage on happiness and misery, illustrated by the reference to the drunkard.* "Every drunkard that lifts with trembling hands his glass to his lips and even sheds tears over it, knowing the anguish it will occasion, is proof against it. [The thesis that ignorance is the source of all vice] . . . Not a single ray of pleasure beforehand, but the daily round of habit from behind, *that* presses on the human mind." The glass certainly contained laudanum, and the hearts of some of the audience must have been wrung.

In the same lecture, the reference† to the "infamy of detraction" and his desire to avoid it, even though the subject, Socrates, was well out of harm's way, has a distinctly personal ring about it. This gathers force a few pages farther on‡ with what I take to be a reference to Hazlitt, "a man of great notoriety in the present day as a critic". In the famous *Edinburgh* review of *Christabel*, thought to have been by Hazlitt, Coleridge had certainly suffered "the infamy of detraction". And on the date of this fourth lecture, January 11, Hazlitt in the role of critic had been brought forcefully to Coleridge's attention. His course of lectures on the English Comic Writers (a repeat performance) had been announced that very day in the *Morning Chronicle*.

Nothing is more futile than to try to create literary rivalries either in the present or in interpretations of the past, and one hesitates to suggest that either Coleridge or Hazlitt felt themselves in competition. I certainly do not wish to magnify a mole-hill. But if they themselves admitted no rivalry, other people were less restrained. In the *Champion* of January 10—the day before the lecture just referred to—Thelwall had the effrontery to suggest that Coleridge in his delineation of Hamlet "accords with, *if he has not availed himself of*, the opinions of Hazlitt and of another Lecturer [Thelwall himself] whose disquisitions on the character of Hamlet during the last season, excited very popular attention" (the italics are mine). But Thelwall may have had in mind another blast from the opposite direction, one that had appeared in the *Courier* after Coleridge's January 28 lecture on

* P. 150. † P. 148. ‡ P. 152.

Lear.* After stressing Coleridge's originality and combination of poetry and philosophy, the article goes on to say,

"In the present day he leaves competition far behind him. He has none of the glib nonsense of Mr. Hazlitt; no tinkling sentences of pretty phraseology, where big words ramble along without meaning, till the reader stares and wonders what it can be that is so utterly unintelligible. Mr. Hazlitt evidently never read a play of Shakespeare through, and the style in which he criticizes him, always reminds us of Bradbury, the clown, dancing upon stilts, where a great clatter, ungainly labour, and violent distortion, are substituted for agility, ease, and elegance . . ."

Both reviews strike us now as ridiculously partisan and we cannot belong in either camp. But Hazlitt's lectures and Coleridge's overlap with curious frequency: while Coleridge was giving his Shakespeare lectures of 1811-12, Hazlitt began his on the *History of English Philosophy*; when Coleridge's prospectuses were out for his early 1818 series, Hazlitt began his on the English poets,† ending on March 16 with a eulogy of Coleridge all in the past tense. "And shall I, who heard him then, listen to him now? Not I! That spell is broke; that time is gone forever; that voice is heard no more." Yet Coleridge was not dead. He had just finished, three days before, his most successful course of lectures. It is perhaps not surprising if Coleridge did feel a sting of some kind when, later in the same year, after a successful round of lectures on *The English Comic Writers*, November 1818-January 1819, at the Surrey Institution, Hazlitt should have chosen to repeat them immediately at the *Crown and Anchor*.

There was another newspaper item which may or may not have been connected with Hazlitt; certainly if Coleridge suspected Hazlitt, bitterness far more than appears in the lectures must have brewed below the surface. An article, unsigned, headed "Mr. Coleridge" appeared in the *Morning Chronicle* of December 29, the day after Coleridge's second philosophical lecture. Because of its length, and because it strays too far off the subject of the Philosophical Course, I print it as an *Appendix* (see pp. 467-8).

* Not Feb. 4. Cf. *U.L.*, II. 244.

† Hazlitt's plans may have been formed first. The point of priority is hardly worth following up. All I mean to suggest is the effect of these facts on Coleridge's lecturing.

Attention has not, I think, been drawn to it, and it has a place in the tiresome case of Schlegel *vs.* Coleridge as interpreters of Shakespeare. Now Hazlitt had severed his formal connexion with the *Chronicle* in 1814, and may have had nothing to do with this article. He had written a paper for the *Edinburgh Review* on "Schlegel on the Drama" nearly three years before, and in his essay "Whether Genius is Conscious of its Powers" he claims to have "done more than anyone except Schlegel to vindicate the *Characters of Shakespear's Plays* from the stigma of French criticism". This certainly shuts out Coleridge. But whether the *Chronicle* article was Hazlitt's or not, Coleridge may easily have attributed it to him. In any case it helps to account for his renewed defenses at this time against charges of following after Schlegel.* It may also account for some of the signs in the lectures of irritation with Hazlitt.

And so Coleridge, excited and uncertain, hoarse sometimes, discouraged by the thin audiences, his eye brightening as he saw an Abernethy in the room, leaning on the loyalty of his old faithfuls and new disciples, stood up and opened the thick brown notebook. Lamb described him in the summer of 1818. "The world has given you many a shrewd nip and gird since that time, [Christ's Hospital days] but either my eyes are grown dimmer, or my old friend is the *same* who stood beforc me three and twenty years ago, his hair a little confessing the hand of time, but still shrouding the same capacious brain—his heart not altered, scarcely where it 'alteration finds'."†

"The clerical looking dress . . . the youthful-coloured cheek, the indefinable mouth and lips, the quick yet steady and penetrating greenish grey eye, the slow and continuous enunciation and the everlasting music of his tones—all went to make up the image and constitute the living presence of the man", his nephew, H. N. Coleridge wrote in the *Quarterly Review*.‡

It is impossible now to appreciate what effect "the living presence of the man" must have had on the lectures and their reception. Anyone who knows the heightened impressions of a manuscript read aloud of an evening by the author, and the same manuscript read to oneself in the cold light of morning, may well

* See *Sh. Crit.*, I. 18-19; II. 306, 325.

† Dedication of Lamb's *Works*, 2 vols., 1818, to S.T.C.

‡ Quoted in *Coleridge the Talker*, Armour and Howes, 143.

be aware of the difference. Reading the lectures now, one has to endure dullness, repetition, digressions, generalizations without substantiation, over-emphasis, gaps, and infuriating circumlocutions. The lectures admittedly are often disappointing in the extreme; to take a serious instance, Schelling is really brushed aside. In a sense, Coleridge fell between two stools. He wanted to make philosophy accessible and palatable to a wider audience than he got. Yet for some of his audience, a Hamilton, for instance, and an Abernethy—and for posterity—he would have done better to have plunged deeper. For a popular audience he should have been simpler and more systematic. As it is he can be accused of being both superficial and difficult. And yet, with these inducements, the reader is invited to plunge on.

Coleridge is often his own most damning critic. Apropos another occasion, he wrote, "Instead of a covey of poetic partridges with whirring wings of music . . . up came a metaphysical bustard, urging its slow, heavy, laborious, earth-skimming flight over dreary and level wastes". The reader will feel at times that he is following a metaphysical bustard and crossing some deserts; it can be promised him, however, that he will also come upon the sacred river and, now and then, the measureless caverns. In addition, as I try to show in the subsequent critical section of this introduction, the journey will take him close to "the animating principle", as Coleridge himself might have called it, of one of the great minds, not only of England and not only of his own time, but of a mind that makes one think of the greatest, of Goethe and of Leonardo.

3. THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

ONE CONCENTRATING PRINCIPLE.

Coleridge invited to his philosophical lectures "persons whose acquaintance with the history of philosophy would commence with their attendance on the Course." For their benefit he wished to consider philosophy, not as a collection of names, dates, and doctrines, which would be neither intelligible nor rememberable, but "historically . . . as an essential part of the history of man". He wished not so much to state the facts of the sequence as to describe the process in terms of cause and effect. Part of the aim of the *Lyrical Ballads* had been, "to trace the

primary laws of our nature"; the aim of the Philosophical Lectures was, in the language of the *Prospectus*, to discuss the "origin and primary laws of the World, man included (which is Natural Philosophy)" and "Human Nature exclusively (which is Moral Philosophy)", and "the sufficiency of the human reason to the solution of both or either", which, he might have added, is epistemology. It is interesting to notice that in all the preliminary materials, *Prospectus*, *Assistant*, and newspaper announcements, the word "metaphysics" is sedulously avoided. It is a safe guess, from Hartley's letter quoted above, and from defensive passages on his "metaphysics" in the *Friend* and elsewhere, that his intimate circle considered that his chief danger lay in being "too metaphysical". So we find Coleridge trying to be simple, dealing in wide general expositions, avoiding the minutiae of controversy, omitting even much of the detailed and the specific that he had prepared in his notes. The lectures therefore lack some of that incisive criticism that elsewhere in his work startles us into the recognition that we are in the presence of a very acute mind as well as a very copious one. As I have illustrated in Section 2, the at times irritating generalities were not lazy, nor due to vagueness or thinness of material; they arose from a mistaken pedagogy, or perhaps just from lack of understanding of or ability to meet the ordinary mind in a public lecture room.

An equal and opposite distress, perhaps greater to the reader of the lectures than to auditors caught up in the flow and under the spell of the speaker, is that in order to grasp Coleridge's views it is necessary to understand them first. This is a difficulty not peculiar to Coleridge's work. He says himself in Lecture III that sometimes "it is necessary for a man to have discovered by other means the truth of a particular position in order to learn with certainty whether a prior writer [Pythagoras in this case] has or has not taught it". If Coleridge's audience had some advantages in catching the references to subjects of the day and allusions to local controversy, they also suffered from not having his scattered works before them, from not being able to study his many statements, partial and confusing as they often are, of his general position, as well as his particular tenets in logic, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, politics and theology. Thelwall may be excused, in an otherwise unforgivable review of Lecture II in the *Champion*, for complaining that he could find no "one con-

centrating principle", and that Coleridge's philosophy was a collection of inspired fragments. But fragmentary, "atomic" as Thelwall calls it, is just what Coleridge's thought is not. Were it so he would long ago have been better understood, and probably systematically arranged and edited with a proper index and cross references. The very comprehensiveness of his thought has an organic character that makes it a never-ending process of "involution and evolution".* Because of his unceasing effort to grasp knowledge whole and the ever-widening circles of awareness that make him accept the fact that this is impossible, because of the relentless drive of his need to integrate the multitude of the parts of experience into a unity, not merely as an abstract pattern for a philosophical system but as a basis for understanding man's life, because, indeed, of the interdependence of all the parts in the picture of the whole, we are defeated when we try, from less commanding heights, to make clear to ourselves his meaning.

In an interesting study of Coleridge entitled "Metaphysician or Mystic", J. H. Muirhead, after asserting Coleridge's consistent "allegiance to the 'critical way' of the Kantian theory of knowledge in spite of his rejection of its dualism in favour of a dynamic theory", goes on:

"To this [the dynamic] theory of reality, both natural and spiritual in terms of creative activity Coleridge added the conception of the principle of that activity as the *nisus* towards individuality. . . . It is on the grounds of the hold he had of this essentially rational and synthetic principle . . . that I should still claim for his philosophy, whatever its defects in detail, that it is in a true sense metaphysical rather than mystical. Coleridge was prepared (as who is not?) to admit that in the end *omnia in mysteria exeunt*. But he was also prepared to maintain that it is only by following our reason that we are able to discover when we come to that end, and to protect ourselves against the mistake, not to say the arrogance, of drawing the line where it happens to suit our prejudices."†

The philosophical lectures support Professor Muirhead; and in fact, the unity of their theme can be appreciated only on the basis

* Note on Tennemann, VI. 64.

† Coleridge: *Studies by Several Hands*, ed. E. Blunden & E. L. Griggs, 196-7.

of his contention. Not only does Coleridge assert very definitely the necessity for a distinction between natural and non-natural or supernatural knowledge, but he is clearly eager to push the former as far as human capacity can carry it. He may have set those limits somewhat nearer than, in this Marxian, Freudian, Einsteinian era, many of us should now do; if, in his personal anxieties and need, especially in later years, he was wont to claim too much for the thither and not enough for the hither side of the boundary, nevertheless in the lectures, and in much of what he wrote at any rate till the mid-twenties, his concern for what lies on the hither side of human nature and knowledge was positive and real.

I do not wish to try to do for Coleridge what Ritter did for Plato, i.e. de-Platonize him. Nor do I mean to commit the ironical error of making Coleridge out to be one of the naturalistic philosophers he spent his life combating. The perturbed spirit would surely come from the grave crying out for revenge against such a foul and unnatural murder. But I do suggest that a study of the lengths he was willing to go in "natural philosophy" has not been made, that the lectures as well as many passages in published and unpublished works suggest that it should be made, and that such a study would reveal Coleridge's real powers of insight, prophecy and influence. It is undeniably true that Coleridge has a place in the Platonic metaphysical tradition and that the Platonic Idea, critically and transcendently interpreted, coupled with a voluntaristic psychology and ethics, was the fulcrum of his thought; and it may be true in this Platonic connexion to say with Professor Muirhead that "like both his great masters, Kant and Plato, he was unaware of the revolution in men's minds for which his own thought, more than that of any other writer of his time and nation, was the preparation".* It is also true, and insufficiently recognized, that in what he called "natural philosophy" and "moral philosophy" and the problem of "the sufficiency of the human reason to the solution of both or either", Coleridge displays the real acuteness and originality often vaguely attributed to him.

The central theme of the lectures is that the history of philosophy provides a series of object lessons in the truth that both free philosophical speculation and religious belief arise out of human need; philosophy satisfies that need up to the limits of human

* Muirhead, J. H., *Coleridge as Philosopher*, 255.

knowledge, religion beyond those limits to the limits of human faith and will and beyond these to divine grace. Not only are philosophy and religion reconcilable; it is essential that the bounds of each should be clearly defined. From failure to make this distinction, both natural knowledge, e.g. under the schoolmen in the Middle Ages, and religious faith, e.g. under the influence of the Neoplatonists, have suffered. Coleridge therefore wishes to clear the way for a sound acceptance of both, to win the intellectual respect of the scientists in his audience for religious belief, and to remove the fears of the devout that science and philosophy lead only to scepticism. Everything is related to this reconciliation. Whether he deals with the history of ideas, or the systems of philosophers, or his own "dynamic philosophy", or the relation of ideas to social morality, or philosophy to art, or language to society, the fundamental hypothesis is the same. Human powers—of sense perception, of understanding, of reason, of faith—are continuous but distinct. Reason and faith, thought and feeling, must be distinguished; analytical must be disentangled from immediate knowledge, the conceived from the imaged, the logical from the real; all are regarded not only as possible and legitimate but as necessary and conjunctive. All knowledge begins with hypotheses, with the assumption of the possibility of knowledge itself, with the possibility of a relation between subject and object; it ends, for Coleridge, ultimately, in belief, in a moral imperative, in the relation of the knower to the ultimate Object-Subject. But in between the beginning and the end lies knowledge, and Coleridge insists on the importance of both admitting and extending its boundaries.

THE HISTORY OF IDEAS.

He intends in this course of lectures to consider philosophy "historically, as an essential part of the history of man, as if it were the striving of a single mind, under very different circumstances indeed, and at different periods of its own growth and development; but so that every new direction should have its cause and explanation in the errors, insufficiency or prematurity of the preceding, while all by reference to a common object is reduced to harmony of impression and total result".* An individual philosophical system will be considered only "as far as it is a living

* *Prospectus*, pp. 67-8. Cf. *Misc. Crit.*, 146, for his description of three kinds of history.

movement in the progress of human philosophy". "Take from History its impertinences", he says in a MS. note,* "and it differs from the *Pilgrim's Progress* only in the coincidence of Proper Names with those of the particular Time and Country". His philosophy of history† enables him to see the development of philosophical thought as an organic growth to which the natural laws of cause and effect apply, and which must be seen in the wider context of the whole life of man, i.e. in relation to social, political, and religious institutions and ideas, economic conditions, the state of science and the arts, as well as to individual thinkers with private as well as public incentives. He does not make that mistake for which Windelband is recently taken to task by Mr. George Boas,‡ of interpreting philosophers "as expressive of certain ages", as mere reflections of the "tendency of the times" instead of as active participants in them. He is simply less interested in the systems of philosophers as systems than in the vitality and growth of ideas themselves§ taken in the larger sweeps. Why, for instance, is he interested in the ancient pagan mysteries? Because "the mysteries and mythical hymns and pæans shaped themselves gradually into epic poetry and history on the one hand, and into ethical tragedy and philosophy on the other".|| In Coleridge's opinion, the Dionysian and other cults supplanted the early polytheism of the Greeks, which gave way because it was intellectually and morally infirm; and in their turn and for the same reasons, the mysteries were overthrown by—though they were preparation for—Socratic and post-Socratic developments.¶ He is concerned not only with the changes that have come about in men's thoughts, but with *why* they have come. Philosophy is treated as a human enterprise, indigenous and explicable. Christianity itself is treated, philosophically speaking, in this way. In a notebook entry of 1810 we find this memorandum:

"Had the Christians failed, a kind of Christianity would and must have prevailed. Compare Julian with

* MS. Egerton 2800, f.169.

† He used the phrase in the *Friend*, III. 239.

‡ In a chapter on the "History of Philosophy" in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. Y. H. Krikorian, 135-6.

§ Cf. Lecture V. p. 177.

|| *On the Prometheus of Aeschylus*. L.R., II. 333.

¶ Cf. Nietzsche's view that Dionysian culture was strong and heroic, post-Socratic feeble and rationalizing.

even the Antonines—much more with Scipio or Augustus, Plotinus, & Porphyry with Cicero or with Plato himself. Metaphysics ceased to be a science of speculation: It had already become an art of life, a discipline, a religion!—The very Priesthood assumed an hierarchical form, as of a mundane Religion. The Jupiter & his Brothers, & Sons, & Daughters, were no longer *local* Divinities—Neither was this *altogether* imitation of the Gospel; but the same necessity which favored the rapid spread of Christianity, acting on the minds of all men, in consequence of the vast extent, heterogeneous components, & despotic government of the Empire / Each of these three causes strong separately—how strong conjointly!—”

And in Lecture VI (meant to be the last of the lectures on pre-Christian thought), eclecticism is treated as the exhaustion of rationalism and naturalism, the dead-end of mere speculation accompanied by social decline. Christianity was the answer to intellectual and emotional starvation, and the antidote sought by a bewildered humanity to superstition's substitutes for religious faith. At the same time, Coleridge sets himself against the anti-Hellenic view of men like Warburton, that Greek paganism was adverse to Christianity in tendency; he sees Christianity rather as the fulfilment of ancient thought, both Greek and Hebrew. He is of course equally opposed to Gibbon and the eighteenth century rationalists in their contention that Christianity was a part of the barbaric invasion which, having put out the lights of ancient culture, introduced the Dark Ages. Greek and Roman philosophy died of intellectual inanition and the social decadence that was at once part cause and part result of it. All seven lectures of Part I of the course stress the unity of ancient civilizations all in one way or another working towards the first century *Anno Domini*. In Christianity, he thinks, are reconciled Greek speculation and Hebrew imagination, Greek mind and Hebrew morals, Greek form and Hebrew matter, Greek discipline and Hebrew urgency, Plato and Isaiah. Christianity is the supreme example of the principle of trichotomy, the reconciliation of opposites* in a new dynamic force.

* See Snyder, A. D., *The Principle of the Reconciliation of Opposites in Coleridge*. Ann Arbor, 1918 (No. IX of *Contributions to Rhetorical Theory*, ed. F. N. Scott).

Coleridge may often be in error in matters of chronology, e.g. in his dating of the mysteries, which is highly questionable, or his dating of the Indian caste system. Knowledge of archæology and anthropology was very elementary in 1818, and even for the facts of biography of later eras Coleridge is not an authority that would leap to mind for factual reliability. For the facts one can go to the Tennemanns of the world. For the comprehensive comprehending sweep, the eagle flight from one high peak to another, one follows Coleridge.

"The Alchemists [are the] true founders of chemistry."* "Natural magic . . . appears to be nothing more than a want of experimental philosophy."† Or, of the Sophists, "the Latitudinarian system in its first birthplace in Greece".‡

"The theory of the modern zoo-magnetists"? "Completely developed by Algazel."§

"Tennemann does not appear aware of the Swedenborgianism of the Ancients."||

"The arithmoi of Pythagoras were evidently the very same as the Ideas of Plato."¶

Ancient and modern empiricism (Anaxagoras and Locke), ancient and modern materialism (Democritus and Hobbes), ancient and modern pantheism (Plotinus and Schelling), ancient and modern subjective idealism (Antisthenes and Berkeley), ancient and modern scepticism (Pyrrho and Hume)—the more they change the more they are the same thing. If anything the ancients are preferable in most cases, because more original and imaginative and because unlike the moderns, most of them are not afraid of inconsistencies. Coleridge is convinced that the moderns, preferring system to subtlety and comprehensiveness, seek out their philosophy to conform to a prevailing sceptical dogma, as exemplified, say, in Gibbon.

THE OCCULT.

Coleridge's real interest in natural knowledge, and in making clear the distinction between natural and "revealed" truth can

* Lecture II. p. 104 f.n. † Lecture X. p. 296. ‡ *Friend*, III. 111.

§ Note on Tennemann, Vol. VIII. 401.

|| The reference was to Melissus; a note on Tennemann, I. 190.

¶ Lecture II, note 46.

be well illustrated by his treatment of the occult and of language.

The ancient rites of the mysteries, Eleusinian, Orphic, Cabiric, the daemon of Socrates, the familiar of Pythagoras, the oracles, witches and witchcraft, the Cabala, animal magnetism, all these, if we knew enough, would yield, he thinks, to a natural explanation. All depends on a nearer insight into the self, the fringes of consciousness, the accumulation of the subconscious,* the relation between mind and body, the influence of one person on another by the power of suggestion, auto-suggestion. The lectures only hint at the astuteness of his psychological approach and give no clue to his wide reading on these matters. But in the interest he displays in them in the lectures the two causes he has at heart are joined—an extension of knowledge and a firmer foundation for belief.

The creator of the fear-driven Ancient Mariner, and of the bewitched Christabel, the dreamer of opium dreams and nightmares, the lonely self-analyser of the notebooks, knew something about the peripheries of the conscious mind; he knew that from those territories came ghosts and apparitions to haunt the waking intelligence. He knew that what went on “below consciousness”—he used the phrase—was a *terra incognita* the illumination of which he eagerly desired, especially as a possible clarification of the mind’s failure to guide the “Will”, as a help towards self-control. (Was anyone in his day, except Goethe, so desperately conscious of the split between intelligence and emotion?) In a field in which he recognized ignorance and the need for knowledge, and in which various phenomena, e.g. animal magnetism (hypnotism), the daemon of Socrates, pooh-poohed by the wise, answered dimly to some personal awareness, he was unwilling to dismiss as imposture or fantasy any unexplored evidence, however much the common-sense men might laugh it out of court.

The connexion with his religious interest is clear. Disbelief in supernatural religious rites, e.g. the oracles, or in miraculous events interpreted as inspired, led to the discrediting of the whole religious attitude, to a more fundamental scepticism. But if “magic” could be shown to depend on the operations of natural law, then its practitioners, e.g. Pythagoras, could be exonerated

* See Lecture III, note 31, on the daemon of Socrates.

from charges of imposture and the true supernatural was left untouched, whether the miraculous incidents were validated or not. Scepticism about them becomes scepticism about phenomena only, and need not jeopardize religious faith in the divine government of the world. (Coleridge always contended that belief in Christianity could not be made contingent on belief in the New Testament miracles.) It had sometimes been argued that disbelief in the black magic of witchcraft implied disbelief in miracles, and in fact, in religion. Easy belief in witchcraft, either in its old forms or in the new form of animal magnetism, and the persecutions of believers by unbelievers, were alike anathema to him, and in his view they were both signs of those sorts of superstition which stood in the way of real faith. He dissociates himself in Lecture VIII from the neo-Platonic theology of the Eclectics, as displaying an enthusiastic credulity essentially superstitious. At the same time, in Lecture IX he pleads for an intelligent appraisal of something that looks equally fantastic but is based on the operation of natural chemical law, the work of the Alchemists. In spite of confusions of mind and erroneous assumptions—quite different from superstitions—they were working more or less blindly towards modern chemistry.

As well as the desire to keep clear the difference between struggling new knowledge and fantastic belief, we see in Coleridge's approach to the contemporary zoo-magnetism or mesmerism a more aggressive interest. Here, possibly, in manifestations investigated by such unimpeachable scientists as Benjamin Franklin, were signs of the control of body by mind; there was also evidence of connexion between certain bodily states and obscure mental processes. Now Coleridge, like any addict, was very conscious of subterranean forces in himself that defeated him. In one sense his whole life was a battle between those and more conscious forces, a constant heart-breaking warfare much in evidence in the notebooks. So that when he read Kluge's *Magnetismus*, or even old John Webster's folio on *The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft*, and met case histories of neuroses and psychoses that today would be classed as schizophrenic or manic depressive, he met things he knew of in his own dreams and anxieties and in his knowledge of human beings; his insights, based on a psychological realism far ahead of his time, have the quality of prophecy. His interest in the occult, then,

far from being an escape into fantasy or old wives' tales, was an attempt to deal intelligently with the remoter areas of experience. It is refreshing to find (in a recent number of *Polemic*)* the phrase, "psychologists from Coleridge to Freud".

LANGUAGE.

In the philosophical lectures we find Coleridge in good linguistic form, coining new words, defining old ones, and insisting on "desynonymizing".† Was he the first in English to combine in the word "romantic" the ideas he does combine in it in Lecture X?‡ If so (my own conviction remains open on the point), it is not a matter of great importance since such usage was familiar to German writers. But if Coleridge aided the introduction of the word into England in the compound senses of "Gothic"- "inward"- "striking"- "primitive"- "genial"- "imaginary"- "superstitious" in which he uses it here, he was providing future critics with ammunition that they have not been slow to use against him. The word "aureity"§ is his invention, though not one that can be said to have achieved popularity. His interest in words leads him, when not under the necessity of inventing, to distinguish, or to explore and expose precise meanings, e.g. "calorific" and "heat",|| "abstraction" and "generalization",¶ "happiness" and "pleasure",** "regret" and "remorse",†† "imitation" and "copy",‡‡ "compelled" and "obliged".§§ The distinctions he had in some cases made before, and some of them he owed to other writers perhaps; some of them are reminiscent of Kant. But the main point is that Coleridge sees that men can be duped and enslaved by the words they themselves use and he wishes at all times to expose "the visionary sophisms by which men might through the medium of words impose false momentary convictions on each other".|||| His investigation into what people mean when they talk about "facts" in Lecture X is of course much more than

* *Polemic* No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1946.

† The N.E.D. attributes the earliest use of the word to him.

‡ See Lecture X, note 6.

§ Lecture XII.

|| Lecture III.

¶ Lectures V and XII.

** Lecture III and note 34.

†† Lecture XII.

‡‡ Lecture X. §§ Lecture V. |||| Lecture V.

a discussion of a word, but it is interesting that Coleridge here tackles the problem by questioning the word.

The word "existential" as opposed to "logical", in Lecture IX is of interest for itself and for some connexions.* The *New English Dictionary* attributes the first use of the word as applied to logical propositions to Sir William Hamilton in 1865, though the use is not the same as Coleridge's here. Coleridge goes on to distinguish existence from essence in connexion with the scholastic definitions. Hamilton was one of Coleridge's students who expressed a deep indebtedness to him, and he attended this course of lectures. If he was present at this particular lecture and heard Coleridge on the schoolmen, he may owe something to Coleridge for the attitude he took to them in his *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature* where he said, "To the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what precision and analytical subtlety they possess."† The statement is a terse summary of Coleridge's chief claim for the schoolmen. And his high evaluation of their work as performing a clarifying function for language, irrespective of their theological views, is an indication of his interest in language itself and its importance in communication. Nothing shows this more clearly than his treatment of Occam, of the general sceptical trend of whose views he was well aware.

In a letter to Allsop when the Prospectuses were out for the course, Coleridge says,

"Few and unimportant would the errors of man be, if they did but know, first, *what they themselves meant*; and, secondly, what the *words* mean by which they attempt to convey their meaning; and I can conceive no subject so well fitted to exemplify the mode and importance of these two points as the History of Philosophy treated as in the scheme of these lectures . . ."‡

Words, he says, are "the instruments of communication, are the only signs that a finite being can have of its own thoughts and . . . in proportion as what was conceived as one and identical becomes several, there will necessarily arise a term striving to

* Lecture IX, p. 276, note 30.

† In the establishment of connecting links, it is interesting to notice that J. S. Mill used this sentence of Hamilton's as a motto for the first book of his *Logic*.

‡ Allsop, I. 8.

represent that distinction".* It is therefore necessary to "desynonymize terms", in fact such a process is conterminous with human enlightenment. It is true that distinctions in the meaning of words go with distinctions in thought and feeling that are often one with moral nicety also; distinguishing meanings will help in distinguishing between truth and error, good and evil. But this leaves Coleridge still on rational ground, does it not? And is not our concern with language today governed by similar considerations?†

"In disciplining the mind one of the first rules should be, to lose no opportunity of tracing words to their origin; one good consequence of which will be, that he who does so will be able to use the *language* of sight without being enslaved by its affections. He will at best secure himself from the delusive notion, that what is not *imageable* is likewise not *conceivable*. To emancipate the mind from the despotism of the eye is the first step towards its emancipation from the influences and intrusions of the senses, sensations, and passions generally. Thus most effectually is the power of abstraction to be called forth, strengthened and familiarized, and it is this power of abstraction that chiefly distinguishes the human understanding from that of the higher animals—and in the different degrees in which this power is developed, the superiority of man over man mainly consists."‡

The concept must be distinguished from the image, the core of rational meaning from the peripheral sensations and emotions, or in modern terms, the assertive in language from the emotive. In a reference in NB. 18 to the "philosophy of language" he says it "ought to be experimentative and analytic of the elements of meaning—their double, triple and quadruple combinations, of simple aggregation or of composition by balance of opposites."§

Language is for Coleridge a living and changing thing for which, as for other forms of life, no atomic theory is satisfactory. It is not, like the tribal associations of the Goths, a federation of separate units; it is organic, an interweaving of elements, like the

* Lecture V. pp. 184-5.

† Cf. Stuart Chase, *The Tyranny of Words*, to give one instance only.

‡ Coleridge on *Logic and Learning*. 126-7.

§ Published in *A.P.*, 204.

Greek state.* Therefore it must, at its best, be governed by the "order of thought" and its vitality must not be over-ruled by the dead hand of a merely mechanical grammar. The connexion of his linguistic theory with his theory of imagination is clear and consistent, as indeed it is with the whole "dynamic philosophy". He views as one of the main obstacles to clarity of thought, as one of the main sources of confusion in politics, religion, literary criticism, society at large, the widespread inability to think *thoughts*, to think in relations. Men, without realizing the limits they impose on their imaginations, insist on thinking in pictures, in concretes, accept the "tyranny of the senses", indulge in a form of idolatry. But is it quite the whole truth to say as Professor Willoughby does, in a very illuminating paper,† "All the time he is haunted by the desire to find everywhere the working of the mind of God; and in his linguistic as in his literary criticisms, religious conviction is always lurking in the background." It is true that Coleridge everywhere seeks God. But if the remark be taken to mean that this always prevents him from being disinterested, I suggest with the greatest respect for my betters that his attitude to the contribution of the scholastics is a good answer.‡ Though a bigoted Protestant at many points, he is able to get behind the contempt of the eighteenth century and his contemporaries for the rationalizations of Roman Catholic theologians and to make an astute estimate of the importance of their positive contributions to language and logic. They tried to harmonize reason and religion in the wrong way, he thinks. Reason cannot be subordinated to authority from outside. But in their attempts they "from the beginning and progressively were emancipating the mind from its unquestioning Slavery to an ignorant Priesthood, waking the desire for an intelligible Faith and accustoming the Reason to a sense of its own inherent Rights, and to a confidence in its own powers".§ And Occam, the most radical of the nominalists who denied universals as having any reality except in language, is the greatest of them

* Lecture X, p. 290, note 3.

† L. A. Willoughby, "Coleridge as a Philologist", *M.L.R.* Vol. XXI. No. 2. April, 1936. On this subject see also J. H. Hanford, "Coleridge as a Philologist", in *M. Philol.* Vol. XVI. 1919; and J. Isaacs, "Coleridge's Critical Terminology", in *Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association*, Vol. XXI.

‡ Lecture IX, and Lecture X.

§ Comment on Tennemann, IX. p. 43.

for Coleridge; he is "the true transitional mind". Might not the phrase be well applied to Coleridge himself as a philologist?

THE PHILOSOPHERS.

The lectures, critical and historical in aim, do not pretend to formulate Coleridge's own system; an exposition of this he had already begun to dictate to Green. Of the *Logosophia* the history of philosophy was to be the first section, and the lectures were to be the basis of it. It was to be "a philosophic compendium of the history of philosophy from Pythagoras to the present day with miscellaneous investigations on toleration and the obstacles to just reasoning. No such work exists, at least, in our language; for Brücker is a wilderness in six huge Quartos, and he was no philosopher, and Enfield's *Abridgement* is below criticism."* The remark is interesting in view of Hegel's use of Brücker, and true in that there was no comprehensive history of philosophy in English. It is also descriptive of an introduction to Coleridge's own thought. We do see, from his attitude towards the philosophers from Pythagoras onwards, from the points at which he feels it important to plead for toleration, and from the references to what he considers the obstacles to just reasoning, a path cleared towards his own positive constructions.

The historical consideration of philosophers in public lectures was in itself something of an innovation. True, English philosophy and philosophers had been dealt with by Hazlitt in a course of lectures in 1812. But had anyone in England in Coleridge's lifetime had the temerity to give a course of public (not university) lectures on the ancient, mediaeval and modern philosophers? Is it safe to suggest that perhaps half the names he mentioned were heard of by half the audience for the first time? Who among them expected to hear about Duns Scotus, or Erigena or Occam, or Reuchlin, or Agrippa? Or how many of them had any real notion of the scholastic controversies or had read any of the works they produced?

In the *Statesman's Manual* Coleridge complained of the contemporary neglect of the philosophers before Plato. These he dealt with even disproportionately, perhaps on this account. Dismissing Thales as a physicist and no philosopher, he hailed Pythagoras as the first. He commends Democritus for attempting to overcome

* *L.L.P.*, 245-6.

the dualism inherent in atomism, and Zeno for releasing the mind from "the tyranny of the senses"; though their basic assumptions he considers unsound. For Anaxagoras, whom he considers the Greek Locke, he has less sympathy than for any of the pre-Socratics. It is the Pythagorean numbers that interest him, as symbols of ideas, indicative of the powers of the mind that are constitutive and, as such, one with the laws of the created universe. Pythagoras is for him a Platonist before Plato. Mind is an act for Pythagoras as Coleridge interprets him, and an Idea is its law, as it was for Plato, not a result.* Pythagorean symbolism provides for a union of subject and object in this creative activity. Pythagoras is also a case for toleration and the old prejudices against him should be examined. He (and Socrates later) are defended against charges of imposture with regard to their daemons and their so-called supernatural influence on people. If we knew enough about the medium in which animal magnetism works, enough of what lies below consciousness, of "the indistinct recollection of past minute, and perhaps at the time unconscious experiences",† we might understand these phenomena. There is less than no point, he thinks, in imputing questionable personal motives to men intellectually so great, especially considering our own ignorance on these matters. Socrates represents for Coleridge the pinnacle of classical humanism, the moral limits of pre-Christian thought. Socrates' moral weakness is the source of the limits of his intellectual influence, though some of his doctrines, Coleridge felt, were not far from Christ's teachings.

Plato and Aristotle comprise and divide philosophy between them, every philosopher being either a Platonist or an Aristotelean. Their systems, in accordance with the announced plan of the lecture course, are not presented in detail; but, broadly speaking, Plato is treated as the poet-philosopher whose doctrine of Ideas has been a creative force down through the ages, the intellectual force behind the fine arts, the basis of the most satisfactory reconciliations between reason and religion, and (since Coleridge lived before the fashion of blaming Plato for Mussolini and Hitler) between the ideal free individual and the ideal state. Aristotle, on the other hand, is the father of induction, the scientist-philosopher, the intellectual source to which can be traced

* "What is a thought," Coleridge asked, "but 'I' thinking?" (Unpublished note).

† Lecture III, note 31.

materialism, empiricism, associationist psychology, utilitarian ethics, and even, as one discovers in Lecture V, the philosophical-philological-ethical decline that issued in the French Revolution and in Bonaparte.

Some of the Tennemann marginalia on the distinction between Platonists and Aristoteleans throw some fresh light on this classification of Coleridge's (best known perhaps in its parodied version in Lamb's "Two Races of Men"). Coleridge writes,

"Divide Mankind into two very disproportionate parts, the Few who have and have cultivated the faculty of thinking *speculatively*, i.e. by reduction to Principles; and the Many who either from original defect or deficiency, or from want of cultivation, do not in this sense, think at all: and you may then, according to my belief, subdivide the former class, the illustrious Minority into two species, scarcely less disproportionate in the comparative number of Individuals contained in each, viz. the born Conceptionists, the spiritual children of Aristotle, and the born Ideists, or Ideatae, the spiritual children of Plato."†

It must be pointed out here that for the division of all thinking men into Platonists and Aristoteleans, Coleridge is probably indebted to Goethe, though in the face of his own objections to editorial habits of easy attribution (See Lecture X) one hesitates to be very definite about it. Moreover, in a jotting in NB. 14 which is undated but belongs pretty clearly to the spring of 1810, he makes the division in another form:

"Only two *Systems* of Philosophy—(sibi consistentia) possible. 1. Spinoza 2. Kant, i.e. the absolute & the relative, the κατ' ὄντως ὄντα and the κατ' ἀνθρώπων. Or 1. ontosophical. 2. the anthropological."

It scarcely needs to be said that Coleridge's views on Plato and Aristotle were fully developed by the time he read the *Farbenlehre*, but I suspect that Goethe's sentences acted as a catalytic agent in Coleridge's mind.

The *Farbenlehre* was published in 1808. Coleridge's first reference to it is in the summer of 1817 in a letter to Tieck, though

* In the German sense, and as Coleridge used the word in Lecture XIII, see p. 390.

† Note on Tennemann, VIII. 130. The remainder of it is given in note 20 to Lecture V.

it is not absolutely clear from the letter whether he had read it himself or was discussing a point (connected with Newton) raised by Tieck. But it appears likely that either Tieck or J. H. Green brought it from Germany that summer, and Coleridge had certainly read it before Lecture V of this course on January 18th. In a letter to Green dated January 16 he is anxious to borrow Green's copy for "a passage in the preface in which he compares Plato with Aristotle, etc., as far as I recollect, in a spirited manner". The passage is not in the preface but in the historical survey that follows it. Here Goethe says that Plato and Aristotle were the first to build up anything like real systems of thought, and that their systems being preserved in their many writings, it has followed that the world "insofern sie als empfindend und denkend anzusehen ist, genötigt war, sich einem oder dem andern hinzugeben, einen oder den andern als Meister, Lehrer, Führer anzuerkennen".* Goethe then goes on to say that this division shows itself clearly in the commentators on the Scriptures, in the handing down of traditional knowledge in general, and that in fact the centuries may often be characterized as dominantly Platonic or dominantly Aristotelean. He suggests that it is a step forward to hold both men in equal honour, as Raphael did by placing them opposite each other in his famous mural. Goethe's development of his idea is casual, limited compared with Coleridge's, and it is clear that he has more sympathy with Aristoteleanism than Coleridge.

However that may be, the suggestion was one that was certain to attract Coleridge. In 1816, in Appendix E of the *Statesman's Manual* we find he had written,

"Whether Ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant, or likewise Constitutive, and one with the power and Life of Nature according to Plato and Plotinus . . . is the highest *problem* of Philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature."

But his first application of the Platonic-Aristotelean division to all thinkers appears to be in his comments on Tennemann. The reading of Tennemann, as I have shown above in Section 2, is closely related to the lectures and can be dated in 1818, or at the earliest, 1817; in other words, after or concurrent with the

* The world "in so far as it appears feeling and thinking, was obliged to adhere to one or the other, to recognize one or the other as Master, Teacher, Leader."

reading of the *Farbenlehre*. There are in the Tennemann marginalia eight or nine references, direct and implied, to the division, enough I think to indicate that Goethe's suggestion penetrated deeply into Coleridge's thought, and that as he read Tennemann with it in mind, philosophers were divided, for better or for worse, into Platonic sheep and Aristotelean goats. From here on, Coleridge's comments on philosophers become more consistent with one another and with this critical formula.

The indebtedness to Goethe here is typical of Coleridge's borrowings. It will be seen from the quotations above that Coleridge carried the distinction much further and to deeper levels than Goethe; he gave it philosophical content. This is because Coleridge borrows only when his own thinking has reached almost the same point as his creditor's, so that he feels able fully to enter into the other's thought, indeed more fully than the propounder very often; he sees its further implications and applications and makes it his own by loading it with his own accumulated knowledge. Here, to mention one instance only, he adds to Goethe's Platonist-Aristotelean the other antithesis of constitutive-regulative, arrived at possibly some seven years before. But the earlier idea was only lightly held, undeveloped, until it felt the impact of Goethe's stimulating phrases. Who has not had a similar experience? Coleridge's own description of this same process at work in his other borrowings, e.g. from Schelling, should be taken seriously.

One more point in this connexion. For all that the distinction as he applies it is, so far as the Aristoteleans in general are concerned, an invidious one, Coleridge is always emphatic about the greatness of Aristotle himself; in fact he takes Tennemann, whom he views as an Aristotelian, to task, for what he considers a disparagement of Aristotle's intelligence. And elsewhere he said,

"Yet what a mind was Aristotle's—only not the greatest that ever animated the human form!—The parent of science properly so-called, the master of criticism, and the founder or editor of logic! But he confounded science with philosophy, which is an error. Philosophy is the middle state between science, or knowledge, and *sophia* or wisdom."*

* *Fraser's Magazine*, August 1835. "Monologues of S. T. Coleridge."

When he comes to the Epicureans and Stoics in Lecture VI the attack is the same; a rebuttal of their naturalistic ethics. Their fundamental error is identical, their denial of the divine government of the world and of man, and their refusal to base metaphysics and ethics on such a belief. Their failure, made clear by the routing of their theories by the sceptics on purely rational grounds, prepares the way for Christian affirmations.

The treatment accorded Plotinus is interesting; it is unusually adverse for Coleridge, and at first sight close to Tennemann.* The Tennemann marginalia are not uncritical, however, though more enthusiastic, and there is no essential contradiction with the lectures. Coleridge's publicly-expressed views in Lecture VII, do enforce Professor Muirhead's point that Claud Howard (*Coleridge's Idealism*) and A. E. Powell (*The Romantic Theory of Poetry*) attribute too many of Coleridge's ideas to Plotinus. It is true that this lecture does not present the whole of his attitude to Plotinus. He was trying to do a particular thing in this particular place. Here the pantheistic aspects of Plotinus and the irrationalities that pantheism can lead to, are set over against the reasonableness of Christianity. Those irrationalities in Plotinus Coleridge never denied or defended, but he generally gives the impression of distinguishing more sharply between Plotinus and his more extravagant followers, Proclus and Porphyry, than he does here. He was glad, I think, of an opportunity to modify the position he took in the *Biographia Literaria*: perhaps he had learned something from the reviews of that work. At any rate, his treatment of Plotinus in the lectures helps to support the contention expressed above, that Coleridge was no mystic. On a loose sheet of paper between the pages of Tennemann we find the following note:

"P.S. to my Note, in the 2nd part of the VIIIth Volume in vindication of the Mystic Philosophy against Tennemann, and in which I describe it as divisible into three parts, as its constituents, I do not propose the third [the fruition of God] as a *ground* or source of *evidence*, but as an *Aim*, not as a *Principium Sciendi*, but as the Prize and Crown—But a Crown is not ejusdem materiae with the Head. . . . *I am not therefore exposed to the charge, which Tennemann brings against Plotinus, and which he states as differencing his Philosophy in toto genere from that of Plato, that*

* See Lecture VII. pp. 241-2, and note 20.

the former places the principle and evidence of his system in a something diverse from Reason, and not amenable to the forms of Dialectic, i.e. the Logic of Ideas". (Italics mine.)

As the lectures proceed into the Christian era, we are given a view of the function of the early Christian church in the dispersal of ideas, a view new in Coleridge's day, perhaps original with him. Tulloch says in his *Movements of Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, "The idea of the Church as the mother of philosophy and arts and learning, as well as the nurse of faith and piety, was unknown."

His enthusiasm for the schoolmen must have rung at least as strangely on the ears of his audience. The chief service done by these men, he thinks, was one of clarification, especially of language and logic, as discussed above. He complains often against Tennemann's treatment of them, though Tennemann was much more respectful than most of his contemporaries.

"Contrast the contemptuous abuse of the schoolmen with the admiration expressed of Pomponatius—and then recollect the true philosophic merit of Occam in his exposure of these "Species" and these "Starry Intelligences" which are all Gospel still with Pomponatius."*

There are many similar animadversions against Tennemann and the tone used often surprises us by suggesting how near Coleridge felt to the schoolmen. He thought that whereas Neoplatonism offered superstitious belief, sometimes in rivalry to Christianity, the schoolmen, with the quantum of faith already prescribed, tried within these limits (and sometimes beyond them) to justify belief to the reason. Though doomed to failure, their rationalizing activity was at least healthy.

Perhaps one of the most surprising things in the lectures, considering their date, is the passage on Occam. Though Coleridge himself favoured a Realist position (in the Realist-Nominalist controversy), and though he himself, like Bertrand Russell in a recent paper,[†] could not give up universals, he saw that the triumph of Occam in that controversy was a fortunate development because it made easier the steps to experimental science and Francis Bacon. Bacon was the antidote to the abstractions

* Coleridge's note on Tennemann, IX, 68.

† *Polemic* 2. March-April, 1945.

of the schoolmen when an antidote was needed. "The Dark Ages", for all their intellectual defects and limitations—and Coleridge realized them clearly—were a useful stage in the development of philosophy as a whole. Coleridge's astute appraisal was well ahead of his time. Hallam, whose *View of the State of Europe in the Middle Ages* appeared in 1818, offers nothing in his chapter on "The State of Society", in which he discusses scholasticism, to equal Coleridge's judgments in Lecture IX. In fact, Coleridge may be referring to Hallam in Lecture XI, or to Brückner, when he says of Aquinas, Scotus and Occam, that "those who have never read their works are ever the most apt to accuse and speak with contempt of [them]". Hallam confessed that he had not read the schoolmen, but had based his comments on those of Brückner, who makes a similar confession. It is apparent that an age which made it seem permissible for an historian who had not read them to condemn the scholastics on the assertions of another historian who had not read them (and to admit the same in print), needed to be shamed into greater respect for these philosophers.

The large arcs of Coleridge's thinking are nowhere better illustrated than in the analogy he draws between mediaeval and modern slavery at the end of Lecture IX. "What is slavery?" he asks, and answers as his own enslavement of another sort taught him. "Hopelessness", he says, is the real essence of slavery.* And so "slavery" is a word the application of which is not confined to negroes or to mediaeval serfs; it may even be applied to the life of children in England in the enlightened nineteenth century. He roundly condemns the "contemptuous superiority of modern times" while the industrial slavery of children from six to fourteen years of age for thirteen to fifteen hours a day is permitted in the cotton factories. The intellectual parallel between the subordination of the schoolmen to the Church, and the unthinking subservience of "modern times" to the orthodox materialist and

* For other examples of how his own sufferings and weaknesses were turned to account in his insights into the experiences and thoughts of others, see Lecture X where in his apology for Agrippa, the spinner of speculative schemes, he described "ambition, and that confused state of mind in which (>in) extreme anxiety a man will think and wish on a thing till at length he conjures up a belief that he can attain it"; or Lecture XI when he describes from his own self-knowledge Theresa's "inward confusion", "sudden aridity", "under-whispers of temptation" and the deadening psychological effect of physical privation or pain on the "inward goings-on of . . . thoughts and sensations", and, in Lecture XI, the therapeutic importance of physical activity.

associationist empiricism is not laboured but it is, I think, implied. Several times throughout the lectures Coleridge suggests that there is a co-relation between prevailing philosophical tendencies and the structure of society. Obviously, Hobbes and Locke were to blame for "the Cotton children".

He thought Lecture X the worst lecture he had ever delivered; perhaps it reads better than he felt it sounded. The sections on Reuchlin and Agrippa, two humanists insufficiently known to this day, the references to Petrarch and the alchemists, the comparison of Erasmus and Voltaire, the sympathetic psychological treatment of Rousseau as well as of Luther, make it an unusual one. In his discussion of the later Middle Ages and the period of the Reformation, both here and in Lecture XI where he deals with Bruno and Boehme, "great men unjustly branded",* we see that Coleridge is aware of the stirrings of scientific and philosophical thought which fail to achieve their appropriate results; he thinks they fail from the lack of a sound psychology.

"During the whole of the Middle Ages and almost down to the time of the Restoration of Charles the Second, we discover everywhere metaphysics, always acute and frequently profound, but throughout estranged from not merely experimental physics generally, but from its most intimate connective, experimental psychology; while from the Restoration we have the opposite extreme, namely experimental physics and a truly enlightened though empirical and mechanical psychology estranged from and in utter contempt of all metaphysics."

The summary could hardly be terser.

Coleridge's admiration for Francis Bacon, and his insistence on squaring it with his Platonism is well known from the *Friend*. In spite of Bacon's anti-Platonic utterances, he thinks him fundamentally a Platonist. "Plato . . . often denominates Ideas living Laws in and by which the mind has its whole being and permanence; . . . Bacon, *vice versa* names the Laws of Nature, Ideas."† Lecture XI presents a similar view, suggesting that whereas Plato's chief interest lay in the ideas, in the mind and its operations, Bacon's lay in the workings of the laws of nature in the physical world; it is largely a question of emphasis. The

* *L.R.*, IV. 422.

† *Method*, 46.

unfortunate consequences of the Baconian emphasis are described in Lecture XII, the one on dogmatical materialism. Just in passing, it may be worth notice that Coleridge is unusually discriminating in the way he distinguishes between a man's thought and intentions, and the social consequences and distortions by others of his system. Democritus, Plotinus, Spinoza, Rousseau, even Locke, and Bacon, are all cases in point.

The main interest of Lecture XII is not, however, its announced theme, so much as some details. One point of interest is the skilful summary of Spinoza's views, based on a solid knowledge of Spinoza's writings in an age when he was generally spoken of with abuse by theologians who probably had not read him, or at most had read the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. For a popular lecture, to an audience brought up on antagonism to Spinoza, Coleridge chose his remarks with judgement and care. But even more striking is it to see Coleridge actively engaging in one of the important scientific discussions of the first quarter of the century, the vitalist-mechanist controversy which after John Hunter's death divided his students, like Plato's, into two schools. Coleridge naturally defended the vitalist position. But the noteworthy aspects of his discussion are not so much his conclusions, as the knowledge of scientific developments he displays and his conduct of the argument on a logical and epistemological basis, even though it all ends, as he thought philosophy (and religion) should, in an ethical imperative.

Throughout the attack on materialism one does well to remember, especially in view of the lecture to come, that Coleridge often attacked subjective idealism with similar logic. The most succinct statement occurs in an unpublished note in NB. 27.

"A position which occurred to me 20 years ago as an objection to idealism (as Berkley's &c) recurs with additional weight to me as often as I think on the subject. Idealism & materialism are both grounded in the impossibility of intermutual action between things altogether heterogeneous—and here again it is assumed by both parties that *perception* is but a sort of, or at least an immediate derivation from, *sensation*—so that the changes or modifications of the percipient's own being are exclusively the objects of his perception. But is not this gratuitous? Is not sensibility just as mysterious,

equally datum haud intellectum, as percipieny?—If I assume, as I have a far better right to do because all men do so naturally, that percipieny *in genere* is an attribute of the soul, and that sensation is nothing more than a species of perception modified by the object (just as colors, and sounds difference it, while they realize it) which in this instance is the percipient's own existence, all is clear."

The short measure given Kant and Schelling, especially the evasive treatment of the latter, and the complete blank where Fichte should have been, will be to most readers perhaps the worst disappointments in the lectures. Nor can I here enter into a detailed account of all Coleridge's reading of these men's works and his comments on them. The list is of formidable length and worth a study in itself. There is no doubt about the thoroughness of his reading, often minutely attentive, and the acuteness and originality of much of his criticism of the German philosophers. Had he been reproached for skimping on Kant and Schelling in the lectures, he would probably have resorted to his announced intentions in the course—not to deal with individual philosophers so much as with the history of thought as a whole. He could reply that whereas in Lecture XII he was expounding, against materialism and mechanism, the vitalist theory of life, of a dynamic force antecedent to organization, so in Lecture XIII he is expounding, against empiricism, a vitalist theory of knowledge, of the Idea as antecedent and necessary to knowledge from sense data. Therefore in Lecture XIII he deals with the subject-object problem; with the "abuse of the Idea" by Descartes and Locke; Leibnitz's superiority to Locke in his affirmation of the activity of the intellect. Indeed, at the close of this lecture, Coleridge resorts to moral approbation of Spinoza, Leibnitz and Kant, and theological disapprobation of Schelling and Schellingism, and scarcely touches on the systematic thought of the two last at all. After his enthusiasm for Schelling in the *Biographia Literaria* not two years before, how could he dismiss him as a post-Kantian neo-platonic pantheistic Roman Catholic? There is plenty of evidence of Coleridge's ability to do something very different and very much better, enough evidence to make his failure here irritating. One senses a lack of candour, something being withheld, and not gracefully, from a public audience.

Tentatively, in the hope that more detailed work on Coleridge manuscripts may clear up the point, I suggest that behind the obvious difficulty of making Kant and Schelling simple enough for a polite public lecture lay a more complex one. He could not deal adequately with Schelling, for whom he had expressed high enthusiasm in private and in print, nor with Kant, about whom he had always been more reserved, because he was changing his mind about them. And this process was assisted, and also for the moment beclouded a little, by Goethe's suggestive division of Platonists and Aristoteleans.

In 1810 Coleridge's Kant is a relativist, even though he is admired and used in the *Friend*. His theory of knowledge is valuable; but in December 1817 Coleridge writes that he "rejects Kant's stoic principle".* On Schelling he had drawn heavily in the *Biographia Literaria*, and he and Green from 1817 on made Schelling one of their first subjects of study together. Yet the marginalia on Tennemann show that though Coleridge had fundamental reservations about the critical philosophy of Kant, he had even more firmly articulated objections to Schelling. "I need not inform you, my dear Sir," he writes to Green in Green's own copy of Tennemann, "that I am no Schellingian."† And Fichte and Schelling are referred to as "neo-Kantian Antikantians". Kant had, I think, risen in Coleridge's admiration the more he studied him (the various marginalia show several readings of some works) and Schelling had declined.‡

Then how was this state of affairs to be reconciled with the useful Platonist-Aristotelean distinction? For Kant was a relativist and an Aristotelean, and Schelling an absolutist and a Platonist. This was embarrassing and may have led to one of the re-readings of Kant. But it made it difficult to speak with clear conviction in the lectures. Incidentally, it can be taken for a saving grace in Coleridge who often too rigidly applied what became a favourite formula—one which defied or ignored, sometimes, the subtleties

* *Letters*, 680-4.

† It is true that 1818 is only a probable date for this note. There are some later comments on Tennemann. 1820, 1824 and 1827, but far the greater part of the annotating was done in 1818-19. For the remainder of the note, see pp. 427-8.

‡ "O I begin to be sick of all post-Kantian philosophers," he wrote in the margin of Schubert's *Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaft*. One of the annotations on this work is dated February 18, 1819.

and contradictions in men's thoughts—that he never managed to fit Kant into it exactly.

If Goethe's suggestive phrase was momentarily a cause of awkwardness in dealing with Kant and Schelling, there was another real anomaly to be overcome also. In a letter of December 1817 Coleridge said to Green, "I thought the contents of the Letter* would convince you, that I am no Zealot or Bigot for German Philosophy taken without comparison—tho' I shall always hold it my duty to teach folks, as far as in me lies, to bow to their betters—and in my conscience I think (*speaking of the last 50 years*) the very worst German work of speculative philosophy or psychologic observation better than the best that has been produced in London or Edinburgh (i.e. Great Britain: and Ireland, in as much as 0 does not interfere with any numerical calculation)".† This was a confidential declaration, not one to be made in a public lecture perhaps, especially in lectures where the relation between natural and non-natural knowledge, between reason and religion, was a central theme. For it was just at the point at which Coleridge conceived philosophy to end and religious belief to begin that Kant and Schelling appeared least acceptable. Coleridge objected that Schelling began with an abstract One, a religious belief, and that all his reasonings were consequent on that assumption. Like Plotinus, he thus left the door open to a whole troop of lesser conceptual deities after the pantheistic pattern. But within an unacceptable framework, Schelling was to Coleridge often more acceptable, psychologically, than Kant. Kant's "stoic principle" was too restrictive of emotion and imagination to allow for the full exercise of personality that Coleridge demanded, especially in religion and art. Schelling's abstract One was too little and too much. So were Kant's Reason and his Categorical Imperative.

Coleridge did not find a way of treating Kant and Schelling with the mixture of admiration and adverse criticism, of detailed and broad approval and disapproval, of praise relative to other contemporaries and qualifications relative to the "dynamic philosophy", that he sought. It would have taken a less weary man than Coleridge at the end of this double series of lectures, and it would have required very close lecture preparation, to have dealt with Kant and Schelling in such nice balance. It

* *Letters*, II. 680-4. † *U.L.*, II. 212-13.

would be especially difficult if one's own views were not entirely certain.

It is difficult to summarize Coleridge. It will be clear to readers who get beyond this introduction that Coleridge had a great deal to say in these lectures, and that through them all runs the effort, sometimes successful, sometimes not, to arrive at conditions of harmony between heart and head. The marriage of reason and emotion was one that he spent his life in trying to effect. To this end he approaches by every possible road the "dynamic" synthesis. The mind must be active, ~~not~~ "mere lazy looker-on" as it is for Newton. "Any system built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system."* Whether he is discussing poetry and imagination, logic and abstraction, physiology and life, philosophy and Ideas, or religion and the Will, the principle is the same. In these public lectures his particular concern is with the reconciliation of philosophy and religion.

"This I shall hope to shew: that as religion never can be philosophy, because the only true philosophy proposes religion as its end and supplement, so on the other hand there can be no true religion without philosophy."†

And perhaps in conclusion no better statement could be found than in a memorandum in NB. 18, of uncertain date. (I retain Coleridge's punctuation.)

"What was the origin of philosophy? That I mean which first impelled, rather say, which first impels, the minds of men to philosophize? For those only do indeed philosophize who do so from original impulse or inborn necessity. Is it not to raise the chaos of our confused knowledge & opinion into Science where it moves and at least into clear & distinct conception? If so, the impulse recognized and understood, i.e. the motive, prescribe the end and aim=den Zweck, of genuine philosophy; and the end furnishes a test. The result of such a philosophy must be its success in this its aim: it must explain to us not only the delusions to which we are subject as individuals, and which betray themselves to

* *Letters*, I. 352.

† *Lecture VIII.*

suspicion from their mutable, local, and personal character—rising in certain ages and under certain circumstances, as of Despotism, Ignorance, Vice, Disease, or the passions—swelling or ebbing in correspondence with the waxing and waning of these—& in certain others ceasing, or giving place to others—not only these must Philosophy explain to us, which she must do in her preliminary cathartical discipline,—and proving her truth by her power in making these delusions to cease & vanish / for if they be shadows & phantasms of Darkness, & Philosophy be Light, how can they co-exist?—She must likewise explain to us, and bring into distinct and harmonious conceptions all those feelings, convictions, & instincts vital or spiritual, which all men possess as men, which we cannot lose altogether without losing our human nature, or pretend to despise without introducing a discord & contradiction between the principles of Thought & those of Action, which ought to be in closest harmony. A genuine philosophy will manifest itself therefore by its perfect congruence in *substance* with the catholic creed of Human Nature—quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus—and by shewing the beauty and rationality of this creed, and thus elevating opinion into surety even where it is not susceptible of certainty, allying faith to reason, and enabling the latter to describe its own boundary Lines, and itself stand as the Usher in the Portico of the Temple/”

And farther down he adds,

“I do not like that presumptuous Philosophy which in its rage of explanation allows no xyz, no symbol representative of the vast Terra Incognita of Knowledge, for the Facts and Agencies of Mind and matter reserved for future Explorers / while the ultimate grounds of all must remain inexorable or Man must cease to be progressive. Our Ignorance with all the intermediates of obscurity is the *condition* of our ever-increasing Knowledge.”

The last sentence is one which all editors of Coleridge must surely reiterate, in hope.

PROSPECTUS
OF A
COURSE OF LECTURES, HISTORICAL AND
BIOGRAPHICAL,
ON THE
RISE AND PROGRESS, THE CHANGES AND FORTUNES,
OF
Philosophy,
FROM THALES AND PYTHAGORAS TO THE PRESENT TIMES;
THE
*LIVES AND SUCCESSION OF THE DISTINGUISHED TEACHERS IN
EACH SECT;*
THE CONNECTION OF PHILOSOPHY WITH GENERAL CIVILIZATION;
AND, MORE ESPECIALLY, ITS
RELATIONS TO THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY, AND TO THE OPINIONS,
LANGUAGE, AND MANNERS OF CHRISTENDOM, AT DIFFERENT ÆRAS,
AND IN DIFFERENT NATIONS:

BY
S. T. COLERIDGE, Esq.

Logical subtleties and metaphysical trains of argument form neither part nor object of the present Plan, which supposes no other qualification in the auditors of either sex than a due interest in questions of deepest concern to all, and which every rational creature, who has arrived at the age of reflection, must be presumed, at some period or other, to have put to his own thoughts:—What, and *for* what am I made? What *can* I, and what *ought* I to, make of myself? and in what relations do I stand to the world and to my fellow men? Flattering myself with a continuance of

the kind and respectful attention, with which my former courses have been honored, I have so little apprehension of not being intelligible throughout, that were it in my power to select my auditors, the majority would, perhaps, consist of persons whose acquaintance with the History of Philosophy would commence with their attendance on the Course of Lectures here announced. When, indeed, I contemplate the many and close connections of the subject with the most interesting periods of History; the instances and illustrations which it demands and will receive from Biography, from individuals of the most elevated genius, or of the most singular character: I cannot hesitate to apply to it as a whole what has been already said of an important part (I allude to Ecclesiastical History)—that for every reflecting mind it has a livelier as well as deeper interest, than that of fable or romance.

Nor can these Lectures be justly deemed superfluous even as a literary work. We have, indeed, a History of Philosophy, or rather a folio volume so called, by STANLEY, and ENFIELD's Abridgement of the massive and voluminous BRUCKER. But what are they? Little more, in fact, than collections of sentences and extracts, formed into separate groups under the several names, and taken (at first or second hand) from the several writings, of individual philosophers, with no *principle* of arrangement, with no *method*, and therefore without unity and without progress or completion. Hard to be understood as detached passages, and impossible to be remembered as a whole, they leave at last on the mind of the most sedulous student but a dizzy recollection of jarring opinions and wild fancies. Whatever value these works may have as books of reference, so far from *superseding*, they might seem rather to *require*, a work like the present, in which the accidental influences of particular periods and individual genius are by no means overlooked, but which yet does in the main consider Philosophy historically, as an essential part of the history of man, and as if it were the striving of a single mind, under very different circumstances indeed, and at different periods of its own growth and developement; but so that each change and every new direction should have its cause and its explanation in the errors, insufficiency, or prematurity of the preceding, while all by reference to a common object is reduced to harmony of

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impression and total result. Now this object, which is one and the same in all the forms of Philosophy, and which alone constitutes a work *philosophic*, is—the origin and primary laws (or efficient causes) either of the WORLD, man included (which is *Natural Philosophy*)—or of Human Nature exclusively, and as far only as it is *human* (which is *Moral Philosophy*). If to these we subjoin, as a third problem, the question concerning the sufficiency of the human reason to the solution of both or either of the two former, we shall have a full conception of the sense in which the term, Philosophy, is used in this Prospectus and the Lectures corresponding to it.

The main Divisions will be, 1. From Thales and Pythagoras to the appearance of the Sophists.—2. And of Socrates. The character and effects of Socrates' life and doctrines, illustrated in the instances of Xenophon, as his most faithful representative, and of Antisthenes or the Cynic sect as the one partial view of his philosophy, and of Aristippus or the Cyrenaic sect as the other and opposite extreme.—3. Plato, and Platonism.—4. Aristotle and the Peripatetic school.—5. Zeno and Stoicism, Epicurus and Epicureans, with the effects of these in the Roman republic and empire.—6. The rise of the Eclectic or Alexandrine philosophy, the attempt to set up a pseudo-Platonic Polytheism against Christianity, the degradation of Philosophy itself into mysticism and magic, and its final disappearance, as Philosophy, under Justinian.—7. The resumption of the Aristotelian philosophy in the thirteenth century, and the successive re-appearance of the different sects from the restoration of literature to our own times.

This Course will be comprized in Fourteen Lectures, to commence on Monday evening, December 7, 1818, at Eight o'clock, at the CROWN and ANCHOR, Strand: and be continued on the following Mondays, with the intermission of Christmas week.—Double Tickets, admitting a Lady and Gentleman, THREE GUINEAS. Single Tickets, Two GUINEAS. Admission to a single Lecture, FIVE SHILLINGS.—An Historical and Chronological Guide to this Course will be printed, price Sixpence; which, together with Prospectuses and Subscription Tickets, may be procured at Mr. Steel's, Law-stationer, 12, Chancery-lane; Messrs. Taylor and Hesse's, Booksellers, Fleet-street; Messrs.

Hookham's Library, Bond-street; and Boosey and Sons', Booksellers, Broad-street.

ALTERNATE COURSE OF LECTURES

On the Thursday Evenings, in the same room, Mr. COLERIDGE will give a Course of Six Lectures, each having for its subject some one play of Shakespear's, scene by scene, for the purpose of illustrating the conduct of the plot, and the peculiar force, beauty, and propriety, of the language, in the particular passages, as well as the intention of the great Philosophic Poet in the prominent characters of each play, and the unity of interest in the whole and in the apparent contrast of the component parts.

Thursday, December 10, 1818.—The TEMPEST, as a specimen of the Romantic or Poetical Drama of Shakespear.—17, RICHARD THE SECOND, of his Dramatic Histories.—Thursday, January 7, 1819, HAMLET. — 14, MACBETH. — 21, OTHELLO. — 28, LEAR.

Double Ticket, admitting a Lady and Gentleman, *Two Guineas*. Single Ticket, *One Pound Five Shillings*. Admission to each Lecture, *Five Shillings*.—Tickets and Prospectuses to be had, as above.

CHRONOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL

ASSISTANT

TO A

COURSE OF LECTURES

ON THE

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

FROM THALES.

1818.

In a system of Chronology, whether for historical or philosophical purposes, the main excellence is self-consistency. It is of far greater importance to be correct in the sequence, or order of succession, than to be accurate in the dates; not to mention that the one is practicable, the other not. Suppose for a moment, that through some secret inspiration, of which the author himself was not aware, a system did coincide with the real dates. It would still be out of our power to prove it; and even its greater probability

would rest wholly on its superior self-consistency. For a series of ages, the truth of each particular date must depend on the accuracy of the epoch from which the system commences; and, in profane history at least, the more distant this is, the more conjectural must it be.

The following scheme, which, and the purposes of which, are confined to the History of Philosophy, commences with the birth of Thales. Of the three different dates given by three several chronologists,—namely, 640, 629, and 594th year before Christ,—I have chosen the second, not only as a mean, but as best agreeing with his manhood being contemporary with Solon's, and with the recorded fact of his having foretold an eclipse of the sun in the fourth year of the 45th Olympiad, or 597 B.C.: thus making an interval of 322 years between the birth of Thales, and the æra in which Hesiod and Homer are generally supposed to have flourished; that is, about the year B.C. 907. In the great poems of this æra we find a language already formed, beyond all example adapted to social intercourse, to description, narration, and the expression of the passions. It possesses pre-eminently the perfections which our Milton demands of the language of poetry. It is simple, sensuous, and empassioned. And, if in the word "sensuous" we include, as Milton doubtless intended that we should, the gratification of the sense of hearing as well as that of sight, sweetness as well as beauty, these few pregnant words will be found a full and discriminative character of the Greek language, as it appears in the Iliad and Odyssey; and expressing, with no less felicity, the desideratum or ideal of poetic diction in all languages. But our admiration must not seduce us to extend its perfections beyond the objective into the subjective ends of language. It is the language of poetry, not of speculation; an exponent of the senses and sensations, not of reflection, abstraction, generalization, or the mind's own notices of its own acts. It was, in short, what the state of society was—the best and loveliest *of its kind*, but of an imperfect kind; an heroic youth, but still a youth, and with the deficiencies and immaturity of youth.

In all countries, the language of intellect has been posterior to, and the consequence of, settled LAW and an ESTABLISHED RELIGION. But, in the Homeric times, laws appear to have been extemporaneous, made for the occasion by tumultuary assem-

blage, with or without the consent of their king; whose sovereignty (or effective power) depended chiefly on his superior wealth,* though the royal title resulted from birth and ancestry,—as is always the case in countries the aborigines of which have been conquered by new settlers, who, regarding themselves, of course, as a superior race, constitute and leave an order of nobility.

Concerning the state of religion, it would be as difficult, as for the purpose in hand it is unnecessary, to speak otherwise than *negatively*. It is sufficient to see, that it neither had nor could have any bearing on philosophy; inasmuch as all the problems, which it is the peculiar object of philosophy to solve, the Hesiodic theology, or rather theogony, precludes, by resolving the absolute ground and origin of all things into night and chaos. The gods differed from animals only by a right of primogeniture:—Will, Intelligence, and Love, are an equivocal generation of Death, Darkness, and Passive Necessity. The scheme, therefore, as delivered by Hesiod, is an anti-philosophic Atheism, of which a sensual Polytheism was but the painted veil.

During the long interval from Homer to Solon all the necessary conditions and antecedents of Philosophy had been gradually evolved; the governments had ripened into Constitutions; Legislation had become a science, in which the disposition of the parts was pre-determined by some one predominant object, to which they were to be all alike subservient and instru-

*Thus Ulysses (*Od.* l. xi.) tells Alcinous, that kings must be rich, if they would be respected by their people; and the larger the estate, the more the obedience. And of himself we are told (l. xiv.)—

Ulysses his estate and wealth were such,
No prince in Greece, nor Argos, nor Epire,
In Ithica no twenty, had so much:
And, if to have it reckoned you desire,
Upon the continent twelve herds of kine,
Twelve herds of goats, as many flocks of sheep,
As many swine-houses replete with swine;
And here, upon the island's farthest end,
There be eleven herds of goats.

HOBBS' *Odyssey*;

which, homely as it is throughout and too often vulgar, scarcely falls below the point more than the other translators strain above it. In easy flow of narration, Hobbes has few rivals; and his metre in alternate rhyme is so smooth (*negatively* smooth, I mean,) so lithe, without bone or muscle, that you soon forget that it is metre, and read on with the same kind and degree of interest as if it were a volume of the Arabian Nights.

mental. Thus, in Sparta, the country as the efficient objective **SELF** of each citizen; self-sufficing fortitude in the individuals, and self-sufficing strength in the state; and, as the means to these ends, war and the exclusion of trade: in Athens, political equilibrium by the balance of artificial and physical force, so as to prevent revolution and faction, without checking progressiveness and public spirit. In this manner, the minds of men were accustomed to principles, and ideal ends: and the faculties, more especially intellectual—Abstraction, Comparison, and Generalization, the contemplation of unity in the balance of differences, and the resolution of differences into unity by the establishment of a common object; all the powers, in short, by which the mind is raised from things to the *relations* of things,—were called forth and exercised. In the mean time, the Phœnicians and Egyptians were successively the masters of the Mediterranean: and to the former, and their close connections with Palestine, it is more than merely probable, we must ascribe the institution of the Cabiric Mysteries* in Samothrace, for the influence of which, as the foster-mother of Philosophy, we refer to our first Lecture. We have only to add the appearance of individuality in conception and style, as manifested in the rise of the Lyric Poets, Thales' immediate predecessors or contemporaries, the connection of which with the awakening of the speculative impulse, will be likewise shewn, in the first Lecture, to explain and justify our choice in the point from which we have made the Chronology of Philosophy commence, and conducted it to the final extinction of Philosophy (or, at least, its long trance of suspended animation) in the reign of Justinian. The chronology of its resuscitation, with the requisite historical illustrations, includes a far larger number of names and events than could be contained within the prescribed limits; and, in addition to this, it would belong rather to the claims of individuals than to the Rise, Progress, and (as it were) completed Cycle of Philosophy itself, which will occupy the first and larger division of the Course. Should such a work, however, be desired, it will more profitably appear at the conclusion, so formed as to assist in the recollection of the several Lectures.

*That Orpheus and Jason were initiated, or that Ulysses was the founder, must be regarded as mere poetic fictions, contradictory in themselves and inconsistent with the earliest genuine Poems of Greece.

A.C.	PHILOSOPHERS, &C.	CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.
629	THALES born.	The birth of SOLON, nine years before the birth of Thales, or 638 A.C. and fourteen years before the legislation of DRACO at Athens, or 624 A.C. In 605, the first captivity of the Jews.
624	Pherecydes born.	
610	Anaximander born.	
597	Thales predicts an eclipse of the sun.	The legislation of Solon at Athens, in the year preceding, i.e. 598 A.C.
584	PYTHAGORAS born, according to Meiners and other writers; but Larcher throws back the date of his birth to A.C. 608.	593, Ezekiel the Prophet. Cræsus, King of Lydia, ascends the throne. Pisistratus usurps the supreme power in Athens.
557	Anaximenes flourishes.	587, Jerusalem taken by Nebuchadnezzar. 569, Daniel interprets the king's dream. Cræsus conquered by Cyrus, 548.
549	Hecatæus of Miletus, born.	521, Darius Hystarpes is King of Persia. 510, Hippias driven out from Athens. 539, the Phocæans emigrate to Gaul and build Marseilles. 537, the Poet Simonides flourished. 535, Thespis and the first Tragedy. 520, Confucius. The Ionians revolting, are overcome by the Persians, and Miletus taken.
543	THALES dies, and Pythagoras arrives at Croton.	
536	XENOPHANES leaves Colophon and goes to Elea.	
504	The death of PYTHAGORAS.	
500	ANAXAGORAS born. HERACLITUS is celebrated. Leucippus. ZENO, the Eleatic, born.	
494	DEMOCRITUS born; but, according to another account, not till 470, and to a third, not till 460: an uncertainty occasioned perhaps by his great longevity; rated at 109 years.	The battle of Marathon, 490; Sea-fight at Salamis, 480; Battle of Platæa, 479. In 486, ÆSCHYLUS gains the first prize of Tragedy. 480, PINDAR flourishes, dies 435, eighty-six years old.
469	SOCRATES born.	
468	PARMENIDES flourishes.	SOPHOCLES, at twenty-eight years of age, victor over ÆSCHYLUS: died 406, ninety-one years old.

A.C.	PHILOSOPHERS, &C.	CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.
460	Goes to Athens with Zeno. EMPEDOCLES, the philosophic poet, is in renown.	
456	ANAXAGORAS goes to Athens.	459, the Athenians, inflated with their successes, begin to tyrannize over the other states.
450	XENOPHON born.	EZRA, NEHEMIAH.—The ROMANS send to Athens for a copy of Solon's laws.
444	GORGIAS, the sophist, writes his work of Nature. Melissus philosophizes. The SOPHISTS, Protagoras and Prodicus, appear.	Charondas legislates at Thurium, in Italy, to which place the Athenians send a colony, including LYSIAS, and the historians HERODOTUS and THUCYDIDES. 442.—Universal peace; and EURIPIDES gains his first tragic prize, at forty-three years of age.
431	ANAXAGORAS, the first philosopher who openly taught the Supreme Mind in its unity, as the ground, cause, and governor, of the world, accused on a charge of impiety by the enemies of Pericles.	The Peloponnesian war begins, 432.—CRATINUS, the comic poet, and predecessor of ARISTOPHANES, dies.—In 430 the five years' plague at Athens begins; and, about this time, the Old Testament history finishes.
429	PLATO born.—SOCRATES becomes celebrated.	Pericles, the friend and pupil of Anaxagoras, and the patron of Phidias and the ideal arts, dies.
428	Anaxagoras dies.	
427	Diagoras Melius.—Gorgias comes to Athens, as Leon-tine ambassador: dies in 400, one hundred and eight years old.	In 424, the Clouds of Aristophanes acted.—425, HIPPOCRATES flourishes: dies 361, aged ninety-nine.
414	DIOGENES of Sinope born.	
400	Death of SOCRATES.	

SECOND ÆRA.

A.C.	PHILOSOPHERS, &C.	CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.
399	The disciples of Socrates be- take themselves to <i>Megara</i> .	Archytus of Tarentum, mathe- matician and Pythagorean.
389	Plato's first journey to Syra- cuse.	The celebrated heroic friend- ship of the Pythagoreans, Damon and Pythias.
384	ARISTOTLE born.	
377	PYRRHO born. Arete of Cyrene, celebrated as a female philosopher.	
374	Philolaus, Pythagorean philo- sopher.	
372	ANTISTHENES.	The battle of Leuctra won by EPAMINONDAS, 371.
368	EUDOXUS brings the celestial sphere from Egypt to Greece.	The elder Dyonisius dies.
364	Plato's second journey to Sy- racuse.	The battle of Mantinea, in which Epaminondas fell.
363	ARISTIPPUS the Cyrenaic.	
361	Plato's third journey.	360, Philip of Macedon suc- cessful over the Athenians; and next year over the Illy- rians.
357	Aristotle observes the moon's transit over Mars.	In 357 the second sacred war. —The younger Dyonisius expelled by Dion.—356, the birth of Alexander.
348	Plato dies: succeeded in the Academy by SPEUSIPPUS.	
343	ARISTOTLE appointed the tutor of Alexander.	TIMOLEON gives liberty to Sy- racuse.
342	EPICURUS born.	
339	Diodorus, Stilpo, DIOGENES, and CRATES, are celebrated.	
338	Speusippus dies, and is suc- ceeded by XENOCRATES.	
335	Aristotle begins to teach in the Lyceum, and founds the Peripatetic School.	The battle of Cheronæa, in 337.—Philip dies, 336, and Alexander succeeds to his throne and conquests.—He builds Alexandria, in 332; and passes into India, 327.

A.C.	PHILOSOPHERS, &C.	CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.
324	Death of Diogenes, the Cynic philosopher.	Death of Alexander.—Succeeded in Egypt by Ptolemæus Lagi, the first of the munificent dynasty of the Ptolemies, the patrons of philosophy and learning.
322	Death of Aristotle.	Euclid of Alexandria, the mathematician.
318	Arcesilaus born.	Ptolomy Philadelphus on the throne of Egypt.
314	Xenocrates dies.	Zenodotus, the first librarian of Alexandria.
312	ZENO founds the Stoic school; dies 270. Pyrrho dies.	
280	CHRYSIPPUS born.	
270	CLEANTHES succeeds to Zeno. —LYCON, Peripatetic philosopher.	
269	CRATES, academic.	
244	Arcesilaus dies, and is succeeded in the Academy by LACYDES.	
218	Lacydes resigns.	
217	CARNEADES born.	
215	Evander, of the second Academy.	
212	Archimedes killed in the capture of Syracuse.	
210	Hermippus, Peripatetic.	
207	Zeno of Tarsus or Sidon, Stoic.	Ennius, the first of the Roman classic poets.
193	Hygenus, Peripatetic.	
190	Panætius, the friend of Scipio Africanus, Stoic.	
185	Diogenes of Babylon, Soic.	Death of Philopæmen.
183	Critolaus Phaselites, Peripatetic.	
170	Metrodorus, the philosopher and painter, carried from Athens to Rome by Emilius.	Polybius, the historian.
162	Hipparchus, astronomer.	
150	ARISTOBULUS, Peripatetic philosopher and Jew. It is probable that, in this man, began the practice of interpolating ancient hymns and philosophic writings, in order to bring them into a coincidence with the Hebrew Scriptures.	
148	Satyrus, Peripatetic.	

A.C.	PHILOSOPHERS, &C.	CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.
128	Clitomachus, of the third Academy: dies A.C. 100.	
107	CICERO born.	
100	Philo, Platonist, escapes to Rome.	The turbulent factions, and the intriguing ambition of the great Roman commanders, with the general luxury and corruption, assist to degrade philosophy into mere amusement or ostentation. Those who professed an adherence to philosophy in any form, were divided into two very unequal classes: the small minority being Stoics, the great majority adopting the principles of Epicurus, in their worst interpretation.
95	Charmidas, Academic.	
85	Diotimus, Stoic.	
83	Zeno of Sidon, Epicurean.	
79	Posidonius, Stoic.	
71	Tyrannio, Peripatetic.	
62	Antiochus, Academic.	
59	Andronicus of Rhodes, Peripatetic, and restorer of Aristotle's writings.	
12	Nicholas Damascenus, Peripatetic.—From the birth of Cicero to that of Christ, the Epicurean school was triumphant; though the few noble minds adopted Stoicism.	
		BIRTH OF CHRIST
P.C.		
4	Sextus, Pythagorean.	
8	SENECA born.	
	Athenodorus, the Stoic.	
14	Philo Judæus flourishes at Alexandria.	Tiberius, Emperor.
41	Philo Judæus goes as Ambassador to Rome.	The Crucifixion and Death of our Lord and Redeemer, P.C. 32 or 33.
65	Death of Seneca.	Nero, Emperor.
	Cornutus, the Stoic, banished.	
70	Apollonius of Tyana.	Vespasian, Emperor.
81	Titus Musonius Rufus recalled from exile.	Titus, Emperor.
82	Epictetus.	Domitian.
89	Domitian banishes the Philosophers and Mathematicians from Rome.	So low had Philosophy sunk, that the terms Philosophers and Mathematicians expressed for the most part only Conjurers, Astrologers, and other vagabond professors of the occult arts.
100	Plutarch.	
122	The Gnostics known as a sect.	Hadrian, Emperor.

P.C.	PHILOSOPHERS, &C.	CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.
131	Birth of GALEN. Favorinus.	
142	Taurus, the Platonist. Apollonius, the Stoic. Basilides, the Stoic.	Antoninus Pius, Emperor.
162	Arrianus. Alcinous. Numenius. Apuleius. Lucian.	M. Aur. Antoninus.
173 189	Atticus, Platonist. Maximus Tyrius.	Commodus, Emperor.

THIRD PERIOD

193	AMMONIUS Saccas, the Master of Plotinus and Origen, forms the plan of reconciling Christianity and Paganism by means of a corrupt orientalized Platonism.	Pertinax, Emperor.
200	Clemens of Alexandria.	
205	The birth of PLOTINUS the first and greatest of the Eclectic Philosophers who committed their doctrines to writing.	Severus, Emperor.
232	PLOTINUS becomes an Auditor of the interior Doctrine of Ammonius, who imposed an oath of secrecy on his Disciples. The crime of first breaking it by a partial publication of these doctrines charged by the disciples and apologists of Plotinus on Origen.	
239	ORIGEN.	Gordianus, Emperor.
242	PLOTINUS travels into Persia.	
244	Arrives at Rome.	Philippus, Emperor.
246	Amelius, an Auditor of Plotinus.	
254	ORIGEN dies. LONGINUS flourishes.	
270	Plotinus dies. Longinus put to death.	Aurelian, Emperor.

P.C.	PHILOSOPHERS, &C.	CONTEMPORARY EVENTS.
278	PORPHYRY flourishes. The Manichean Sect.	Aurelius Probus, Emperor.
304	PORPHYRY dies.	
311	LAMBlichus flourishes. Constantine declares himself a convert to Christianity.	Constantine the Great.
325	Athanasius. The Council of Nice.	
361	Julian, Disciple and Patron of the Eclectic School.	Julian, Emperor, renounces Christianity.
400	AUGUSTINE.	
412	PROCLUS born.	
415	Synesius, Philosopher and Bi- shop.	
434	Syrianus.	
485	PROCLUS dies.	
486	Marinus succeeds. Ammonius Hermæus. Hierocles.	
490	Marinus dies.	
491	Isidorus succeeds. Damascius. Eulalius. Simplicius.	
525	Boethius put to death.	Theodoric the Goth, Emperor of the West.
529	Philosophy ceasing to be tol- erated by Justinian, Isidorus with the few other remaining Platonists find an asylum in Persia under Chosroes: who, on their determination to re- turn, obtains for them from Justinian, by a treaty, per- mission to retire to Athens, where only, and only during their life-time, Philosophy is allowed to be taught.	

LECTURE I

DECEMBER 14, 1818.

MR. COLERIDGE'S Two Courses of LECTURES commence THIS EVENING, and will be continued on THURSDAY EVENING next, the 14th and 17th of this month, at Eight o'clock, at the Crown and Anchor, Strand: the first, or Historical and Biographical Course, on the most important Revolutions in the Beliefs and Opinions of Mankind; and the second, or Critical Course, on Six Select Plays of Shakespeare, each forming the subject of a single Lecture.—Admission at the Door, Five Shillings; single and double Tickets for either Course, with Prospectuses, may be had at Messrs. Butterworth, Temple; Messrs. Steel, Law Stationers, 12 Chancery Lane; Taylor & Hessey, Fleet St.; Boosey & Sons, Broad Street; and at Hookham's Library, Bond Street.*

This lecture exists only in three meagre reports so far as we know, one brief one discovered by J. Dykes Campbell in the Literary Gazette, reprinted by him in the Athenæum for December 26, 1891, one in the Courier and one in the New Times.⁽¹⁾

From the *Literary Gazette*,† Dec. 19, 1818.

“On Monday evening Mr. Coleridge commenced a course of weekly biographical and historical lectures on the most important revolutions in the belief and opinions of Mankind

* The *Courier*, Monday, Dec. 14, 1818. There had been similar announcements in the *Courier* on Dec. 7 and Dec. 9. *The Times* ran the same announcement on Dec. 10 and Dec. 12, but on Dec. 14 confused the reader as to the opening date by saying the course would commence “on Monday evening next”. The *Morning Chronicle* ran announcements Dec. 7, 9, 10, and 14.

† The *Literary Gazette*, edited by William Jerdan, was the most prominent literary weekly in England. It published contributions from Barry Cornwall, Maginn, Miss Mitford, Alaric Watts, Mrs. Hemans, and other popular writers.

(see Advertisement in our last number) and on Thursday, another course of six selected plays of Shakespeare. These lectures are delivered at the Crown & Anchor Tavern in the Strand. That of Monday was principally introductory, showing the progressive state of civilization, and the consequently improved state of human reason. Mr. Coleridge denied that true philosophy had any existence before the days of Pythagoras, and entered largely into a view of ancient history as illustrative of the subject. There was much novelty in the manner in which he handled this branch of his theory. We can at present afford no more than this brief notice, which may however direct the lovers of science and enquiry where they may reap information in an uncommon if not an unique way."

From the *Courier*,* Dec. 18, 1818.

"This Gentleman has commenced a double series of Lectures; one on the origin and progress of Philosophy, the other on certain select plays of Shakespeare. The introductory lecture of the former course was given on Monday last, at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, and though it could only be considered as a sort of rapid development, a summary exposition, of the range which he intended to take, yet it was by no means deficient in interest or instruction. He commenced with the Philosophy of Thales, whose system, if so it may be called, he explained and illustrated with great felicity. Like a skilful, or rather, perhaps, like an honest disputant, he commenced with defining the terms he was to employ, particularly that ill-used word philosophy, which is so laxly employed in popular language, that, as Mr. Coleridge observed, he saw no reason why we might not talk of philosophical cobblers.

"We were much pleased with the way in which Mr. Coleridge pressed upon the attention of his auditors the fact, so likely to be neglected, that the first attempt of the ancient philosophers, to penetrate the origin of things by the operation of their own minds, was, in itself, a most gigantic step. The more

* The *Courier* had as assistant editor William Mudford, who appears to have taken a real interest in the lectures, and to have given Coleridge criticism and support. See Introduction Section 2. Coleridge's connexion with the *Courier* was of long standing through the editorships of Stuart and Street.

this position is analysed, the more forcibly its truth will strike us. "The subject of Mr. Coleridge's next lecture upon Philosophy will be the life and doctrines of Pythagoras."

[There follows the review of the Thursday night Shakespeare lecture.]

From the *New Times*,* Dec. 17, 1818.

"Mr. Coleridge, who has already signalised himself under so many literary aspects, commenced on Monday evening, at the Crown and Anchor, a course of Lectures on the rise and progress of Philosophy. It is obvious that a series of speculations on such a subject, might be made to embrace a vast variety of the most interesting topics, and that literature has nothing too graceful, nor science too profound, nor the habits of society too enlarged, nor the feelings of individual minds too minute, for the comprehension of this noble and original outline. Mr. Coleridge comes to this subject with the double claims of a poet and a philosopher, and it is natural to believe that he will do it all the justice that can be expected from the union of vigorous research with fervid imagination. His lecture on Monday was scarcely more than introductory, and it was occupied chiefly in definition. He commenced by disapproving of the abuse of the term philosophy [applied] to all investigations of the intellect—we thus have Chemical Philosophy,⁽²⁾ Astronomical Philosophy, etc. He restricted himself to the history of the human mind in pursuit of Philosophy, or the discovery of the *origin* and primary laws of the natural world, the moral world, and the human understanding. It was a remarkable circumstance in the pursuit of this discovery, that all nations had a sentiment of deterioration from their origin. They all looked to a remote source, more noble, powerful, and wise than themselves; their greatest inventions and their chief wisdom were referred to this god-like and remote ancestry. There was connected with this an almost universal impression of some remarkable geological change, in fact, in all nations

* The *New Times* was edited by Dr. John Stoddart. Coleridge visited the Stoddarts in Malta, and it was Stoddart who read *Christabel* (from MS.) to Scott in 1802. Coleridge thought of trying to get an article on the factory children into the *New Times*. See Lecture IX, pp. 287-8.

LECTURE II

DECEMBER 28, 1818⁽¹⁾

THIS EVENING, eight o'clock, at the Crown and Anchor, Strand, MR. COLERIDGE'S SECOND LECTURE, beginning with a brief recapitulation of the former, and proceeding to the Life, Travels, Institutions and Doctrines of Pythagoras, the proper Founder of Philosophy; with the probable states of Religion, Arts & Sciences of Egypt, Persia & India at that period. Admission 5s. Tickets for the Course with Prospectus and the Chronological Guide, may be had at Mr. Steel's, Law Stationer, 12 Chancery Lane; Messrs. Butterworth, Temple; Taylor & Hessey, Fleet Street; Boosey & Sons, Broad Street; and at Hookham's Library, Bond Street.*

In the ancient world there were two nations that seem particularly to deserve the attention of the historical critic from their opposition in character, the Hebrew race and the Greek. In the one we find a nation purely historical and theocratical. Their history is traced consistently and regularly from the earliest period; all their institutions, according to their own history, were derived not from themselves nor from any genius arising in themselves but from a supernatural agency, their very beginning supernatural, their passing into a nation supernatural, their whole legislat[ion] one with their religion. And this character continues throughout their whole history to a certain period, intensely bearing the marks of one family, and all their writers, attribute their different excellencies not to any natural faculties but to some especial inspiration; so that there does not even remain a vague tradition in the ancient Jewish writers of any man whom, in our

* *The Morning Chronicle*, Dec. 28, 1818. The same announcement appeared in the *New Times*. There was none in *The Times*. The *Courier* on Dec. 26 ran almost the same thing in its news section, not, as was usual, among the advertisements.

modern phrase, we should call a man of genius, referring thereby to his natural or acquired advantages. On the other hand we find a nation whose first historians, not to say their poets, appear with a perfection that has been a model for all succeeding times; and yet strange to say, those very men appear about as much perplexed concerning their origin as we at this present time do, and in the various criticisms concerning the planting of Greece each position has its own almost equal authorities, or what is still more common, the authority of the same writer brought against himself. But in this nation we find, after a certain period, every perfection appearing to rise out of the people and out of their circumstances. (I do not mean to say, as the Athenians said of themselves when they called themselves grass-hoppers, that they were born out of the earth.)⁽²⁾ Undoubtedly they derived their instruction, or rather the stimulants to it and the excitements of it, from various causes; but still as soon as it came into Greece it became so modified, so extremely altered by the character of the people, that it required all the researches of the learned to discover the affinity between the Greek opinions and their immediate sources, whatever they were.

One cannot help thinking, provided the mind is beforehand impressed with a belief of a providence guiding this great drama of the world to its conclusion, that as opposites are in constant tendency to union and as it is the opposite poles of a magnet and not the similar ones which attract each other, that a certain unity is to be expected from the very circumstance of opposition, and that these are, as it were, imperfect halves which, after a series of ages, each maturing and perfecting, are at length to meet in some one point comprising the excellencies of both.⁽³⁾

We *<cannot>* know in truth (when I say "know" I use the word in the sense of sound history) we cannot be said to know anything of Greece before the writings of Homer, but these themselves are an history.⁽⁴⁾ It is true that Thucydides and Herodotus, the earliest historians of the Greeks, speak of those poems as written by one man called Homer but it is equally true that Thucydides attributes the *Iliad** *<and the Hymns>* so called, to

* Lecture III suggests that Coleridge said or intended to say 'Hymns'. E.H.C. made the correction in the margin. My emendation is based on *Misc. Crit.*, 234, 405, 410; the sense seems to require it. Pointed brackets indicate an insertion where no space was left by the reporter.

the same person, which I believe there is not now a scholar in Europe that supposes to have been possible to belong to the same period. This however would not interest us much upon the present occasion were it not for a passage in Herodotus which declares, speaking of the earliest colony of the Greeks, that Greece seems to have been gradually peopled by a conflux of tribes⁽⁵⁾ but, as far as we can discover, tribes of the same race, which is concluded from this circumstance only that the conquerors, or those that came latest, introduced no order of nobility, made no distinction between themselves and those they had conquered, a clear proof that they had the same language and some marks at least of the same origination. For in all countries in Europe a nobility may be traced to the circumstance, originally, of a conquered nation, the conquerors assuming to themselves a certain superiority of course, but contriving certain distinctions from the natural love of the country they had left, to be known by it to all ages afterwards. Such is the case with Poland, such manifestly the case in Hungary and so it appears to have been in our country. From no such circumstance having taken place in Greece, though it is evident that there were waves after waves of new colonists into Greece, it seems equally clear that they were of the same origin.

Herodotus has observed that the PELASGIANS,* the first race to whom he refers, knew no Gods by name but secretly acknowledged the Gods, whom in their language they so called, because they were "the arrangers",† those that brought everything into the world, and "the separaters" of things, but that in after time persons came among them who spoke of other Gods, whom they rejected, and lastly of the God, Dionysius, or Bacchus, (which appears from plain proof to have been brought at least from Egypt)⁽⁶⁾ upon which they were advised to consult the Oracle of Dodona. And being asked whether or no they should worship their Gods by any particular names, they were answered in the affirmative. And he says from that time the Greeks began to call their Gods by name, but adds immediately afterwards, that their theogony and mythology as it existed in his time was first brought in by Hesiod and by Homer. I think I may venture to appeal to the

* Reference to NB. 25 seems to begin here. Words in small capitals are from Coleridge's notes when these are needed to fill gaps in the text.

† NB. 25: Ordinator and Asserters of all things.

natural sense of every man whether or no in such an age and with such difficult means of communication it was possible for any two poets (poets generally not being the most active sort of people in the world) to alter at once the whole religion of a people not residing in any one place but scattered over the Islands of Greece and over the Provinces of Asia Minor. Though I profess myself perfectly sceptical, neither decided to the one side nor the other of the great controversy, concerning whether the *Iliad* of Homer was a poem written by one man or whether it is a choice of an immense number of poems, written upon the same subject, strung together by Pisistratus or some other (in the same manner, though with a worthier motive than Macpherson strung together a number of Scotch poems and called it the epic poem of Temora⁽⁷⁾) but I can see no probability of Homer being a particular⁽⁸⁾ person.* Rather (what is already hazarded respecting Orpheus and Musaeus and so forth) I should say it implied a fraternity of men who had wandered through the countries, and by the charms of music, and whatever else could work upon the minds of a rude people, gradually introduced those traditions or this, properly-speaking, poetic and sensuous mode of propagating truths which Herodotus attributes to Homer. Be it so; we know well that the antiquity of Homer's poems was such as completely to perplex the first historical investigators of Greece.

The question, then, is at what time the mysteries were formed. I will not deny that many and great authorities of the moderns are inclined to suppose that the earliest of the mysteries, those of Samothrace, were anterior to Homer or at least contemporary with him, but I confess I have never discovered any sufficient proof.† On the contrary it appears to me clear that

* NB. 25 goes on: Another minor argument—is the final re-appearance of Achilles in Homer so described in the *Iliad*, as it must have been, if from the very beginning, the Poet had made it the connecting thread and anticipated Object of the whole Poem—its principle of Unity? Surely not—nor is the anticipation frequent, or continuous, or prominent enough throughout the preceding Books of the *Iliad*.

† NB. 25: I must make careful researches concerning the aera of the first institution of the Mysteries in Samothrace. I find, all scholars make it prior to Homer; but as yet I have not found, on what positive Authority—surely if in the Hymn to Ceres, this is none—the reason of the thing is against it, and the historic date of the naval mastery of the Phœnicians in the Mediterranean, which is posterior to Homer, is a presumption to the contrary, the Mysteries being clearly of Phœnician origin. Likewise, its purpose or application, viz. to counteract by Hermeneutic the Homeric Mythology—seems to imply the pre-existence of the latter.

the very purpose of those mysteries, the very interest which they excited in the minds of thinking men, was that of counteracting this popular theology which afterwards the philosophers, without exception, opposed, considering it entirely destructive of all morality.⁽⁹⁾

Here permit me to notice the tendency of a number of writings, of men deserving of all veneration, especially on the continent, to justify this idolatry.* They consider it, as they say, as the natural and the best possible means of representing important truths to the minds of an ignorant people. "How," it is said, "could these ignorant people understand abstract truths? How is it possible that it could be done but by clothing them in forms of sight and sound, and, in short, variously symbolizing them to their senses and apprehensions?" In short, it is the old papistical argument of pictures and images, poor men's books. Certainly if the matter were really so—if this was a right and proper mode of instructing mankind, and if its effects were those of progression, that by these means they would gradually become capable of less gross images and then of more and more generalization till at last they rose to correct ideas of what they were, and whence they were, and what was to become of them—we must think it strange that in our own religion, from the very beginning to the thunders of Sinai, and to the more efficient promises rather than maledictions of the Christian religion, this one object should be constantly in view: to overthrow this as the source of every thing that is wicked and every thing that is degrading. And strange it is that such men as CREUZER and other men of whose learning I speak with the highest honor and reverence, should not have asked themselves, *what came of this? Did any progression take place? Take Egypt. Did it follow that the Egyptian people, from observ-*

* NB. 25 clarifies the reference: Tho' I take as my criterion of the best Religion that which best evolves the purest morals by proposing to the People the strictest rule and loftiest Ideal, I am far from deeming this the whole of Religion—nay, I regard it no otherwise as *Religion itself*, than as I regard the Fruit of a Tree to be the Tree. In my sense of the term, it would not deserve the name of Religion, if it did not inculcate the beliefs of a divine Providence, a responsibility not confined to the Life present, and if not teach yet tend to excite, and predispose to, a sense of the Evil in the Heart of Man and a Hope, however dim and mythical, of a Redeemer therefrom. Thus but for the Mysteries Cabiri, Eleusinian etc. I should scarcely concede the possession of a Religion to the Greeks—and am little disposed to acquiesce in Creuzer's assertion, that their popular mythology was a necessary or even expedient vestibule to the doctrines of the Mysteries. Highgate, December 26, 1818.

ing and worshipping a deity, according to their account, in *<the>* Ibises, in crocodiles, and in the Nile and so forth, rose lastly to consider the whole world as a kind of language—as the painted veil* of Isis in which the Almighty was speaking to them? History shews to us the contrary. Juvenal tells us of the wars between the [Om-bites'] Gods and the [Tentyrites']⁽¹⁰⁾ Gods and shews us, as the Bible indeed has done with higher authority, all the sensuality that followed. Need we wonder that sensuality should follow from directly appealing to the senses, and instead of weaning man from that which was his fall, gradually strengthened it, and upon the same pretext (I am afraid lest the illustration that now occurs to me should be too light for the subject, but it is really such) as the old story of the man who, being extremely weary on the road, got up at the back of a coach and being told it was going the direct contrary way over the same ground he had already gone said, "however I shall be rested during the time". Most assuredly all this is utterly vain.

The true origin (and I mention this because it is quite necessary for the understanding both of the rise and of the necessity of philosophy in the pagan world) the true cause, seems to have been this, that very early in the history of mankind there seems to have been a division among them—the one attending more to their moral feeling and to the manifest good consequences of it in the world, yielded to the traditions of their ancestors and found themselves happy. Their opinions were perfectly congruous with their moral feelings and the great character of that people was that they made their hearts the interpreters of their heads.† To know that a thing was right and congruous to their moral nature they held as the evidence of its truth, and this by a most excellent logic; for unless they supposed themselves to be either infinite, in one extreme, or beasts in the other, they must believe themselves to be progressive; but whatever is progressive must have a dim horizon as well as a clear vicinity and what truth has more right to be obscure to us than that which, when we arrive at *<it>* will be the very perfection of our being, and in the bold phrase of antiquity, our union with the Author of that being.

The other race determined that their imagination, as the Scriptures properly call it, but which they deemed their under-

* The report reads "vale". Corrected by [E.H.C.]

† The reporter wrote "hands". Corrected by [E.H.C.]

standing or their reason, should be the judge of all things; and rejecting the traditions of their ancestors and history, they followed the natural leadings of the imagination or fancy governed by the law of association. They were themselves alive and that they knew, though they did not understand the mode. They moved in consequence of that life and acted. Wherever therefore they saw motion, they supposed that in some way or other there was a vital or motive power; and denying all else but the very law of mind, by which we must necessarily generalize (that is when we look at an immense number of things be impressed by that which is common to them all rather than by that which is particular to any one), they conceived that the whole world, everything, must have a motive power. When they contemplated this motive power with regard to particular individuals they called it soul, if with reference to anything which occupied a large importance and comprehended many souls, they would call it a God. But when they raised their sensuous imagination to the utmost and conceived the indefinite idea of an All, they carried on the same analogy, and the All was God. And this I am sorry to say has imposed upon many thinkers in modern times as if it were the All-things-[in]*-God of the Christian, whereas in truth it was nothing more than a common feeling: as I move, in consequence of having life, so in another way the tree shoots out, the rivers flow and so forth: and what is true of each part must be true of the whole. But with regard to any conscience, any of those attributes which properly form a religion, so far from that being felt, the very contrary was felt. It was in truth made, by a tremendous blasphemy, the cause of all evil. The thing would be well, it was said, but there was such a necessary intractability of matter that many things could not be reconciled, and at length came that curious notion which seems to have originated all, without exception, of the theogonies or theologies of the pagan nations, that good came out of evil, the better out of the worse.⁽¹¹⁾ At first it was all night and chaos. Then in the course of things, by a strange unintelligible fatality (but something must be unintelligible when men put down that <as> the mere nature of the intellect which arises from a far grander source—the depth, the unfathomable depth of the will) this was to bring forth an egg,⁽¹²⁾ which brought forth love or the organising power; and then love produced hatred, a very strange

* The report reads "and".

thing certainly; and then these two points by constantly intermingling and balancing each other produced a long series of atoms* out of which the world existed.

This is not the Greek theology merely. It is a fair account of the Egyptian, of the Indian, and of every other, but I speak of Greece because it was the only country that dared ask itself *why*. All the other countries, as the Jews for instance, had received that which they held by admission of a revelation; and all the nations besides Greece, that we know of, had received their constitutions and their opinions either by conquest or by imposture, that is by pretence to revelation. The Greeks alone stood by themselves, and having first out of limited monarchies, or rather monarchies by tradition, formed themselves (there is here a gap in history—out of what monarchies?) but so the fact is, having formed themselves at once, simultaneously, as it were, into republics (and this not in one part of Greece merely but nearly at the same time in all parts of the Peloponnesus and Major and Minor Greece) so that the same men who derived their power not from the people, who were the representatives of the reason, were designated as “tyrants”, and however beneficent in their conduct, still did not escape a certain mark of infamy.†

In Greece, legislation was the first step towards philosophy or rather it was the first dawning or appearance of it. After Lycurgus came Solon and others and then arose Thales. I have stated before⁽¹³⁾ that I did not consider Thales, as the ancients did not, properly a philosopher. They called him *sophos*, or wise man, and placed him at the head of the seven wise men of Greece, who, however according to another tradition, reduced themselves to five,‡ two tyrants it appears, having frightened them into acknowledging them among their order. In these we find, I think, three characteristics. <First>, there is an extreme, wrrry§ hilarity—I do not know what to call it. More they seem to be like a cheerful man placed among those whom he could not bring up to himself, and who was content to live quietly and happily among them and to give what knowledge he could—but if you take the coarsest

* The reporter wrote “times” and the correction was suggested by [E. H. C.].

† Coleridge was aware that incomplete sentences were characteristic of his lecturing style.

‡ The reporter wrote “three” and [E. C. H.] suggested the correction.⁽⁴⁾

§ The reporter wrote “wicked”. [E. C. H.] questioned it but did not supply the correction from the notebook.

comparisons, as given by Stanley and others in their account of their sayings and anecdotes, there is one characteristic of uncommon cheerfulness with occasionally a disguised sneer at the superstitions of the people. <Second>, in another sense they appear to have been men religious according to the best notions of their countrymen. <Third>, their morals are pure but all bordering on the prudential, never referring to the principle in the heart but always referring to the consequences; in short I think that almost every rule of prudence in life may be collected from the sayings attributed to the seven sages. I think if I mistake not that I have made a note of a few of them:

Pittacus: "Power shews the man."

"What is best? To do the present well."

Thales: "What is the strangest thing? A tyrant of a tolerably good old age."

"What is the happiest ruler? Him for and not of whom the subjects are afraid."

So Bias answered to a man who had proposed to him to drink up the sea: "With all my heart; if you on your part will promise to stop up the rivers while I am doing it."

To rascals who were praying during a storm: "For mercy sake be quiet—why should you put the Gods in mind of you? We are bad enough off already." I mention these instances of that sort of witty character which belongs to them.

To a rogue asking concerning wisdom and piety he was silent, and being asked why he did not speak, he said, "Hold your tongue, it is no matter to you."

"Better to decide a quarrel between enemies than friends, for in the latter case you are sure to make one friend an enemy, whereas in the other case you may possibly make one enemy a friend." This is strongly the character of the Homeric Ulysses, where the shrewdness of cunning is placed for what should have been morality; but throughout, in the character of the Homeric Ulysses, you find a shrewdness and reference to consequences, so: "In a good republic it is better to fear the laws and not the rulers", or according to another tradition, "To love your country, <HON>or the magistrates; but fear the law alone and in that law your own conscience."

Cleobulus: "Oh beware of the calumny of friends. Never mind what your enemy says—never be tempted to join in the

laugh of derision." Periander, when he was asked what was the best government, said, "That democracy which comes nearest to an aristocracy."

Anacharsis says, "Artists contend; <AND> that which is very strange, that those who are no artists at all and know nothing about art, are best able to determine <it.>*" I give these specimens of the character to show that it was so far from philosophic, (that is, getting to the origin and principle of things) that it was what we should naturally expect from men of a sound and healthful mind and quick observation of what was before them in life, and a facility in generalizing it and deducing the wisest remarks.

Thales, by the admission of all antiquity, was the first who, even in physics, even in natural philosophy, instead of resting with traditions, asked himself what could have been the origin of things, but I do not give him the name of a philosopher because his enquiries, such as they were, were confined wholly to material causes. And this is to be observed, that Aristotle himself, in speaking of Thales and those of his time, has said that they confined themselves wholly to material elements, while Plutarch condemns them for having mistaken principles as to the true origin of things for elements, or those first materials which appear in consequence.⁽¹⁶⁾ Still, however, the step was great, for that Thales learnt this from Egypt and so forth I regard as mere fancy, the mere jargon of the later Platonists;⁽¹⁷⁾ and for this plain reason that the causes assigned, for instance, why he made water the origin of things, has nothing in it historical—nothing historical—nothing that reminds one of the books of the Indians or the fragments of the Babylonians which we have. No, he gives you the first reasons, as we should say, or experiments or observations, which any man would be struck with. He says, while we see that all things begin in a sort of fluid state we perceive that water nourishes all things and that such and such plants though fed only with water will yet grow; and no wonder in that state of science, not knowing the composition of water and little knowing how many things might be contained in it, that when he saw things growing in water he

* Coleridge restrained himself here. In NB. 25 he had written after this sentence: *British Institution.* ⁽¹⁸⁾

At this point Coleridge skipped a page and a half of notes on Epimenides and Anaximander, returning to NB. 25 for Pythagoras. See p. 97.

supposed that it passed into earth and produced all things, and so forth. No wonder that when he had dared separate himself from tradition he should yet be able to go no further. Those are the very reasons which are assigned by Thales without the least traditional or historical character whatsoever; for the last, and all the other things which are found in him, amount to nothing more than this, that he was a very worthy good man who believed the religion of his country in the best form in which it appeared and thought no more about it, but most assuredly combined it with his philosophy,⁽¹⁸⁾ as Linnaeus⁽¹⁹⁾ and John Hunter⁽²⁰⁾ may be supposed to have done, the one with physiology and the other with natural history.

The disciples of Thales made one advance still further. Going onwards they* perceived that no one element, no phenomenon, nothing visible, could be the cause of the visibility. There must be, certainly, something unseen to be the cause of something seen, for this reason that you were *<otherwise>* no wiser than if you attributed the thing to water. Then the question would arise, what is water, and so *ad infinitum* and though you went on as some moderns would do,

“Fleas bite little Dogs and less fleas bite them. And so you go on *ad infinitum*,”†

It is merely pushing off the thing under the sophism of something less, till you have wearied out the man and then say, “Well sir, we must stop here for we cannot go further, not that we are one whit nearer the point than we were before.” This appears to have been the case with the man who endeavoured to resolve this into the distinguishable and the indistinguishable; the only thing that he could discover was that *<a>* fluid was *<a>* somewhat the parts

* MS. Egerton 3057 reads: Anaximander.

† Derwent Coleridge wrote in the margin, “? Delete”. I have been unable to find Coleridge’s version of the rhyme anywhere. Swift, in the *Essay on Poetry* quotes:

So naturalists observe a flea
Hath smaller fleas that on him prey;
And these have smaller still to bite ’em
And so proceed *ad infinitum*.

I have it on the authority of Miss B. E. Gwyer, former principal of St. Hugh’s College, Oxford, that the correct version is:

Big fleas have little fleas
Upon their backs to bite ’em;
Little fleas have lesser fleas
And so *ad infinitum*.

of which could not be distinguished by figures; it was something that had no figure of its own but constantly took that which the vessel in which it was contained, or the banks, impressed upon it. From this he* divided things into two, the distinguishable and the indistinguishable, or as he called it the finite and the infinite. But apparently *<he was>* a man staggering with a new idea and relapsing, (of which we have had some later instances even in the works of John Hunter—of a man having an idea greater than the sum total of his intellectual knowledge or that of his age was equal to) presenting it with a flash and again falling down to the common feeling of his country; or like a bird that having been limned, as it were, upon a hedge or twigs, by more than usual force of genius gets himself loose and yet still feels the lime hanging on its wings and with a sort of imperfect flutter and fright drops and again tries to rise; and *<he>* produces that which for the world is a glorious light, but for dull men a matter of endless difference of opinion and of controversy.⁽²¹⁾

These ideas, as far as they were speculative, I have introduced as the dawning of philosophy; as far as they did not refer to the mind at all, but were sought only in observation, I consider the authors of them as not yet philosophers. The man to whom the name seems due first of all was Pythagoras, something like one of the most extraordinary human beings that has ever astonished and perplexed the world. As to the oracles which announced his birth,† I mention them only as shewing the great sensation he produced, upon posterity; the more so, the more striking, because it is not certain that he ever himself wrote anything, and even what his opinions were was already matter of almost as much obscurity in the time of Plato and Aristotle as it is in the time in which we live. Now there must have been something extraordinary in that man who has filled the world with his fame in such a way that no man who has read is not familiar with the name of Pythagoras.

He was born, according to the best accounts, at Samos under particular advantages; as for instance, that he was a man of

* MS Egerton 3057: Anaximander.

† NB. 25: Pythagoras's birth oracles concerning, and the fable ascribing to Phœbus his fathership—so far significant as proving the theogonic habit out of which but with which he was *<to>* bring the mind into the philosophic. It is probable that the ascribers were Poets who meant only a metaphorical Compliment; but that it was understood literally by his contemporaries, and made matter of serious controversy in the succeeding generations, proves my position.

wealth, that it was in a town then extremely thriving as a commercial town, that he had early opportunities of conversing with mariners and, of course, early took in the desire of seeing more than a minor island could produce to him.⁽²²⁾ What his travels were is a subject of controversy on which I know no better canon of criticism than this, that where there is a general tradition and *<where>* there is neither impossibility nor improbability in the circumstance, we ought to believe it, upon the plan of the law courts: it is the best evidence we have. I therefore do not doubt that Pythagoras went to Egypt and I can see no reason why from Egypt, under the troubles of that time, he might not have gone to Babylon;* and when I have told my authority, that Prince of English solid good sense, Selden,⁽²⁴⁾ I can venture to say that I see neither in the chronology nor any other circumstance any one reason to object to his having been at Babylon in the time of the prophet Ezekiel, except that I must honestly add that I have not any one reason for it. But *<it is>* according to the tradition (which it has been latterly fashionable to deny, for what reason I know not). To those who admit that he was in Egypt, that he went

* NB. 25 shows Coleridge's detailed preparation: Of his early Life all that can be safely deduced from the incongruous biographers is, that he was the son of a man who had acquired a large fortune by commerce, and was both able and willing to give him the best education the times afforded, which then as in all the earlier periods of every progressive People was found among the Priesthood.—Of course, his early habits were those of instruction by signs and symbols—and hence both his style and the strong traits of Sacerdotalism in all his character.—Contrast between the history of Christ and Pythagoras. The Biographers of the former Contemporaries—of the latter Iamblichus.

Hence not because Diog. Laert., Apuleius or Iamblichus relate it, but because it is in itself probable, we may suppose him to have sought the acquaintance of Thales, Pherecydes, and Anaximander.⁽²⁵⁾

His journey to Egypt and commune with the priests as trustworthy as History can make it; but as to what Quantum and Quale of knowledge he learnt there; that is a question. . . .

Diogenes in his book with the ill-omened title of incredible things beyond Thule, relates that he went to the Hebrews—which Lanctantius denies, doubtless on the same grounds as it was asserted—i.e. none at all. That he really was in India I have found some reason to believe—& if so, doubtless thro' Persia.

Of his circuit in visiting all the oracles, and his initiation into all religious rites, I hope to find some explication from Creuzer. At present all I can say is that such places were the Universities of that period, and probably it amounts to no more than our relating of Casaubon or any other Eruditissimus that he visited all the Universities of Germany and France.

through Persia to India, I concede (for I conceive it may be somewhat to concede) that I have discovered what I may call "a presumptive argument" for *<it>* in the Pythagorean doctrine, with respect to all of which, except the first principles of it, I profess not to understand what has been recorded by the later Platonists. Pythagoras held that there were ten bodies or kinds of bodies in the universe according to the common interpretation, the planets then known, the moon, the sun, the comets, and so forth. These unfortunately made up but nine, in consequence of which he made up a tenth, to complete the ten, which he called "antichthon" or counter earth; and its invisibility to us he ascribed to its being always on the directly opposite side of the world from the sun. As he held the doctrine of the centrality of the sun and the motion of the planets round it, it was said this antichthon or counter-earth is in direct opposition always to our earth and consequently always invisible to it.⁽²⁵⁾

The common doctrine of Pythagoras, that is of the metempsychosis or wandering of souls from one body to another, we all know. But it is very striking that Colonel Symes* who went into Burma⁽²⁶⁾ and who in his travels never appears to have had any thought of Pythagoras or Pythagorean philosophy in his mind [*mentions*][†] the circumstance that the Burmans together with the transmigration of souls and the abhorrence of particular kinds of food, particularly beans, hold ten bodies; and in order to make out the number they hold a sort of shadow earth that was almost opposite so that it could never be seen. But it is likewise mentioned by Laertius of Pythagoras that he brought in an explanation of the eclipses.⁽²⁷⁾ This is certainly a most singular circumstance. With regard to the transmigration of souls, we may suppose it was a common feeling spread through many nations; but the peculiar circumstance of this counter-earth, joined with such a number of Pythagorean doctrines not[‡] found in Hindostan, tends, I think, to prove two things. First of all, that what the Burmans say is true, that the religion of Buddha which they profess and which has no castes, at least no compulsory ones which tend to stop the progression of mankind and to make man degraded and unprogressive

* The reporter wrote "Sims."

† The reporter wrote "when", possibly a mistake in hearing? Or possibly words are omitted, e.g. [when he came upon] the circumstance . . . ?

‡ "Now"?

(I refer to the system of castes and so forth) was the original, and that the others are derived from them. As it would be absurd to suppose that Pythagoras really passed down into Siam and Ava and so forth, I apprehend that their account is true, that such as they *are*, the original inhabitants of Hindostan *were*, and that the castes of India and the other institutions prevailing there are the natural effect of a comparatively civilised people being conquered,⁽²⁸⁾ as the Indians in the peninsula appear to have been repeatedly, by men more warlike but less civilised, and contriving every scheme possible to preserve the civilisation existing among themselves from being overwhelmed by conquests. For instance, Herodotus tells us there were castes in Egypt, but that they were after the race of the woolly-haired men;⁽²⁹⁾ it appears as if they were overrun by some conqueror, and history records such events. And the account of Herodotus that the ancient Egyptians were woolly-haired men is a convincing proof that they were overrun by another nation, and that the attempts of priests and leaders to preserve their arts and sciences founded the institution of castes in which a man was compelled to teach his child his own art and that son was compelled to follow it, certainly a mode of arresting barbarism to a certain extent, but when carried beyond that tending to evil.

The very different character of the laws in Burma with regard to the priesthood, where there are none of those ferocious institutions raising up one body of men above another and punishing the least insult in the most inhuman manner, presents the idea of a nation not conquered. When a nation is conquered it is no longer a matter of government or established power whether you shall respect your priest, or your teacher, but it is left entirely to your sensibility or sense of honor. In all such countries the priests have become powerful.⁽³⁰⁾ I hope I may say this for a philosophical purpose. It is seen throughout Europe in Catholic countries on the continent; the more powerful people take part rather with the government than with the priesthood; they enter warmly into the feelings of government to check the presumption of the priesthood on the same ground that all our ancestors before the Reformation were as anti-papistic as the best Protestant is in these days; and they were as eager to join with the government to prevent any encroachment by the priesthood. But where it becomes a matter of choice it becomes a matter of honor, and

the Catholics are most bigoted and adhere to the greatest extravagances of their system in that country in which the government happens to be Protestant. In all countries a conquest checks the power of the priesthood; and upon that ground I consider it extremely probable that Pythagoras among his travels really had been in India.

However, this is but of comparatively little importance compared with his philosophical efforts and *<achievements>* which he displayed assuredly after his return. First he left (it is said) his native country on account of the tyranny of Polycrates, not that he so much disliked being under Polycrates, who was a mild and wise governor, though not by the choice of the people, but because he saw that there would be factions and revolutions inconsistent with his purpose.⁽³¹⁾ He transplanted himself to the south of Italy, then called Magna Graeca, afterwards called CROTON, and there he began to develop the great plans he had conceived during his travels.

The mode in which he did it is certainly most exemplary. He first addressed himself to the people of all classes, to the highest first, with regard to their morals, and used every possible persuasion with great eloquence and (what all tradition agrees in) a remarkably beautiful and majestic person, which, joined to that greatest of all possible influences, the evident palpable disinterestedness of the man, enabled him to bring about a reform in their conduct and to convince them of the miseries they suffered, not from badness or wickedness but from the real state of ignorance that precluded the opening of *<the way to>* any*<thing>* better. After having made himself popular, as all disinterested men who speak to the heart of man are sure to do, he then opened a plan of education. It appears that he was requested by the people to give them constitutions, but instead of that he told them that those things were perfectly indifferent in their state. He should make no alteration in constitutions, for that if they were ignorant and incapable of self-government they must have government in some way, and if the men who governed them were no better than themselves they must be miserable; that for fools to choose wise men and vicious men to choose virtuous ones, or the majority of men to choose the man to govern them, was so opposite to nature and to the experience of all who know the manner in which fathers govern their children, men govern beasts, and to the fact that the

herd does not choose its shepherd, and so forth, that he utterly rejected this idea as factious and one that would ultimately reduce their country to ruin and slavery.⁽³²⁾

The great object was to begin with the highest and to educate them, and on this *<principle>* he opened an institution the purpose of which was to educate all that were well disposed, who felt a craving (for that is the best beginning of everything—to feel ourselves dissatisfied with what we are); all that felt a wish to be something more, (and that conjoined with a sense of duty), were invited to come to him. It appears that it became the fashion, but of the multitude of candidates he chose those only whom his observation in life, which gives to many men a physiognomic power, had selected; and those he arranged into different classes, still beginning with the moral character. The first thing was to instruct them in the government of their appetites, next in the government of their understandings by silence, thirdly in the government of their wills; and after they had passed through this severe probation then he communicated to them those truths concerning nature and their future destination which he himself professed, still directing all to the purposes of beneficence and of acting immediately upon their fellow citizens who had not been, perhaps, capable of this species of education. But it was amongst the great Pythagorean symbols so to convey truth in part as that it might make the mind susceptible hereafter of another portion. To tell truth, but so at the same time to convey it as to prepare the mind for greater truths, was the grand maxim of what may be called moral politics.⁽³³⁾

Happy perhaps it may appear that it would have been for mankind had this prospered. That in one point of view it deserved to prosper is evident from this, that by the tradition of all antiquity those who remained after its violent subversion were attached to each other beyond the love of brothers. But like all secret bands, all secret associations, it carried its own poison with it. It embraced too many things, or rather two things incongruous; the one was that of preparing a man to be governed, the other that of governing. But the ultimate object *<was political influence>*, which indeed spread to a great extent at that time, as it appears, through Magna Graeca (so that from the Pythagorean band all the cities took all their magistrates and so forth). Naturally *<they>* placed that object first. Still, there was the practical view

at a time when the speculative view *or* the practical view, each singly, might have been effectual, but both combined they were incompatible with each other. And doubtless one of the causes of the sudden destruction of the Pythagorean band (under such amicable auspices as it began) was that politics were at the head. The question was, what is to be done in this city and what in that city, and beneficent and benevolent as this was it took the men out of their proper place, namely that of working *on* not *for* the present time, but as a humble component part of a system that was to extend to all times. Of course its prosperity brought about its fall. The more honorable it was to be a Pythagorean, the more competitors there were for it. Among those men who were rejected, some probably wise men, others perhaps unwise men, some were made enemies. That was the manifest influence, though no constituted power, no positive power was pretended to; yet it was more odious for that very reason. It was a something behind the throne—to use one of our own English phrases. It was in the power of any demagogue to rouse the people at any particular time of discontent; and the greater part of them were murdered, and according to the best reports, Pythagoras himself, in the insurrection against them.⁽³⁴⁾

There is one point more in Pythagoras's character before I proceed to those doctrines worthy *<of>* noticing. We hear of Thales, Theocritus, Anaximander and Simonides contemporaries of Pythagoras, but we hear of nothing miraculous about them, whereas of Pythagoras the accounts are full of miracles that he worked: he was a prophet: he was one born of the Gods and himself a God. This is certainly a remarkable feature. I have subtracted from all those accounts everything that is found in the later Platonists. They wanted to set up a man against our Saviour, no matter where they found him.⁽³⁵⁾ They brought together all sorts of tales to shew that one of their philosophers had had inspiration, had had communication with the Deity, and was capable of attesting it by miracles. All this I put for nothing; but there does appear from Aristotle, from Plato, and what we should call grave writers, sufficient evidence that the tradition in their time was of numerous miracles worked by Pythagoras and by him communicated to EPIMENIDES and others.

With respect to the miracles which have been stated it requires perhaps almost an apology to enter into the question

except to determine whether Pythagoras had a spice* of the impostor and the mountebank, which would be no great wonder, recollecting what we have heard as to the founders of alchymy. But in the accounts there is something so very congruous with late facts which have come forward, and the admission of the thing would explain so many things in ancient history without recourse to that very undesirable saying, "Oh it is a lie—it is an untruth" and so on, that I cannot help mentioning it. If it were possible for a man of sense to believe MESMER, the supposed discoverer of Animal Magnetism,⁽³⁶⁾ one tittle beyond what his assertions have been attested and accredited by such men as Cuvier, Blumenbach, HÜFELAND, Ryve [*Reil?*],† and many others of those great men, (most of whom gave the best test, certainly, of their sincerity, by having opposed it publicly and privately for so many years with the greatest zeal in their publications, lectures, and so on, but who, as you may find in the last edition of the textbook of all the authors in Europe, have made three distinct recantations of their former writings), that though it is to the stupor of all physiology, though contradicted by all our theoretical opinions before, yet the facts are as undeniable as they are surprising.

* NB. 25.—Of the Mountebank and Charlatan in his character—a Predecessor of the Paracelsian Geniuses of the 15th Century.

And verily of his golden Thigh I dare but hope, 'tis all a Lie.

As to his taming serpents he might have learnt the art (why call it trick?) in India—and the taming of beasts is an art, of which there are some seemingly well authenticated stories, as of the Irish Peasant some 40 or 50 years ago, a man notorious in Ireland on this account.

† The reporter muddled the names badly. The NB. reads: Hufeland, Blumenbach, Gmelin, Wienholt and other men of science and honorable character, Pythagoras's miracles would admit of a ready solution, as well as his power of teaching the principle of his power to Epimenides etc. There is one and I think but one thing to be said in favor of this belief that he worked apparent Miracles, that some even of the oldest writers as Timon and Heraclides named him *Γογγύς*, a Conjuror, a Trickster. Doubtless in this as in other instances part of his miracles were but child's literal acceptations of his doctrines, parables &c. But it would not be stranger, if the Founder of Philosophy who stood—to it—much in the same relation as the Alchemists, the true Founders of Chemistry, did to Chemistry.

As it was the Genius of poetic Greece in the earliest period to transform that which must be *thought* into a something that has happened (in the literal sense of the words) taken *place*, timeless truth into historic event; so in a later period was the business of Philosophy and of the Mysteries (the nightly Penelope) to unravel the day work, and to reduce the mythic into *Laws*, sometimes openly, oftener at first in the vest[ure] of Symbols.

Those facts, as you all well know, consist in this that one human being has the power of acting upon another, under certain conditions, by the power of the will assisted by certain gesticulations. Now it is certain—I speak not as a man who has been a witness in any way but as an historical critic—that *<this>* is most assuredly a fact. Men who would be believed in every other matter, such men as Cuvier, Blumenbach, Ryve [*Reil?*] and others, have asserted things and given details which so precisely resemble the accounts stated by the ancient priesthood of the manner in which the persons that went to the Oracles were acted upon, (such as being wrapped in medicated skins, exposed to certain gases from the earth, and in various ways—particularly in one part of Plato—thrown by the power of others, by motions, into a state of sleep; in which sleep they returned answers, and those answers were afterwards collected and reported to them when they awoke, as prophecies) joined with the circumstance that the first magnetisers, who appear to have been discontented unless they had carried it to the highest extreme, brought about in too many (which has indeed occasioned laws in Germany) instances of melancholy and madness during life. This may be compared with the Greek proverb that when a man was seen moody and melancholy it was said, “Surely you have been in the cave of Trophonius and have been in the charmed sleep there”.⁽³⁷⁾ I mention it not in any degree as of perfect conviction, but as deserving of our attention more than it has hitherto received, particularly as in the miracles ascribed to Pythagoras, supposing these things to be true, there is scarcely one of them that would not admit an easy explanation. Now as according to Philodemus⁽³⁸⁾ such things were taught in the mysteries—as Philodemus’s account of the mysteries in Egypt corresponds exactly (though they were never understood before) to the statement of the facts that has been made recently, it does appear to me not improbable that Pythagoras, who went, as it appears, to all these Oracles everywhere, had for his object the acquirement of those powers. Whether trick, whether powers of acting upon the imagination, I will not decide, but only this: that if facts we all admit to be true, and if they be referable to the imagination, the imagination is an extraordinary power and very well worth looking into.⁽³⁹⁾

But now for Pythagoras as a philosopher—we have seen him as a moralist and as an educator. What then entitled him to be

distinguished from the great men of Egypt and India and those before him? This plainly, that he went back into the reason of man, and that his first principle was that that which was, in part, the effect, certainly, of other circumstances, could never contain pure truths or be the cause of them. He saw clearly that objects at a distance were different from objects that were near. He perceived very well that what he called the outward object was in part the product of his own mind. And the natural and common phenomenon of dreams,⁽⁴⁰⁾ joined with the morbid phenomenon of fever and delirium, brought still further conviction that there must be a principle in the mind productive of these things, or a third principle balancing them and producing a common third by meeting together.⁽⁴¹⁾ He appears to have been the first who had proposed this problem distinctly to himself, who sought in his own mind for the laws of the universe; and without entertaining or rather distressing you with an account of Pythagorean numbers and harmonies, it will be sufficient to state this one thing as the introduction to all the philosophers, that he began that position, the carrying on of which by Plato and the division or schism from which by Aristotle, constituted the two classes of philosophers, or rather of philosophy, which remain to this day, and if we were to live a thousand or ten thousand years ever would remain, for in this it consists.

I do not look on Materialism, on the doctrine of atoms, as philosophy at all inasmuch as it is pure assumption.⁽⁴²⁾ For instance, a man says, "If you will suppose matter dispersed all over space"—without asking himself what he means by matter or what he means by space—"and if you will only grant me that this matter has two powers"—without asking what he means by that—"attraction and repulsion; and then only grant me that by some happy accident some of those atoms"—but why should they have those properties?"—"may happen to be a great deal bigger than others"—for which no more reason can be assigned than for the laws of gravitation and repulsion—"the bodies would be projected straight forward by one contrivance and then in the larger bodies be counteracted by the other and then you would have the world". In short you have precisely this: if only the world had been from the beginning, then it would be, for it is plain that all which is now in the world is presupposed to account for the world; so that in truth this is one of those numerous

instances, in all books of materialists without exception, in which the solution is itself a part of the problem. Therefore I say I do not consider this as deserving the name of philosophy. It is an anti-philosophy arising out of a thorough coldness of the moral feeling, and the habit of looking so intensely at the external world with all the powers of the heart fixed upon it, that at last the man does not deserve to be considered merely as having self-love (that supposes a reflex); he becomes a mere lover of self.⁽⁴³⁾

But of philosophy, that which admits an appeal to the inner being, there have been and always will be two kinds⁽⁴⁴⁾: the one, that which considers the principles of pure reason as purely contemplative, and the objects of them in the external world as entirely devoid of life and moving by certain mechanical laws though those laws themselves originated in a higher principle, that is the one; the other is that which, considering that *<in>* the world *<one thing>* can act upon another but by some law of likeness, that no man would think of saying that a thought, for instance, was a shield or that his love for his sisters was north-east, for instance, of his affection for his child or his wife; that which, seeing that between things manifestly incongruous there can be no action whatsoever, concluded that what acted upon one another must be homogeneous—must be of the same kind. They therefore thought (at least Pythagoras who was the originator conceived) that that in the soul of man, which was not of the individual, which no man could call his own, but in consequence of which he was a man and without it would not have been, must necessarily be of the same nature and kind with those laws of the universe which acted upon him and which he alone was capable of beholding. He saw that the animals perceived the effects and acted upon the effects, but it was clear that they knew nothing of the laws, for even men, who were capable of reflecting, for the greater part thought little of them; and that those laws (take gravitation for instance, or any other law) were utterly beyond the reach of the senses, utterly beyond the reach of the understanding, even though all the objects of the understanding, as far as they consisted in the outward world, were to be deduced from them. He therefore supposed that what in *men* the ideas were, as we should say, those in the *world* were the laws; that the ideas partook according to the power of the man, of a

constitutive character, in the same manner as the laws did in external nature.⁽⁴⁵⁾

But how should he convey the nature of this best to the mind? And it appeared to him that he should best do it by numbers and figures. For observing that in numbers considered philosophically there was a perpetual reference to an unity that was yet infinite, and yet that in each number there was an integral or individual that still contained in its nature something progressive, that went beyond it, he conceived this was the best symbol, if I may so say, of the representation of the laws of nature considered as homogeneous with the pure reason in man.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Leading from this ground therefore, he appears to have found that all truth, all certainty must be in this; and on trying it both with numbers and with figures and perceiving that there arose from it a sense utterly unlike that which any experience however perfect could give, that instead of high probability there came at once a sense of certainty that denied the opposite, which was out of all time, out of all space, out of all accident, he is reported *<to have cried out>*—and it is the sublimest era of human nature when Pythagoras exclaimed—“Eureka”—(I have found).⁽⁴⁷⁾ For it assuredly was no less for the heathen world than to have found the principle of humanity itself, all that distinguishes us from the animal essentially, all that carries us beyond the blind present into the ever opening future. He found a something that was above time, above accident, it was drawn from the fountain of truth that was inexhaustible, and this was in man. But it was not in his *<sensations>* for he saw it; it was not in his understanding for he had not deduced it from anything; but it was in the mind. It must *be*.⁽⁴⁸⁾ I only can perceive it in this point and it is an impossibility that aught else can give me conviction.

If the sophist would say, “But why do you believe the mind?” the first answer doubtless would be, “Why should I not? And for this reason, that it is free from all causes of doubt.” But the next is this, that you are asking an absurdity, you are asking for a first to be a second. A faith I must have in something, for that is implied in the very term of “first”. That which is the ground cannot have a ground under it; and thus Pythagoras commenced philosophy in the faith of the human reason, revealed to himself by purity of moral character, the faith of that reason in its own dictates. On this plan he founded the grand system of the Deity as the

Monas; not as the one, but as that which without any numbers and perfectly distinct from numbers was yet the ground, and by its will, the cause of all numbers; and in the manifestation of the God-head he represented it by the famous triad three, while the world as a dim reflex of that was his God in the tetrameter or the four.⁽⁴⁹⁾

Doubtless since that time philosophy has been divided from science,⁽⁵⁰⁾ and I should have done wrongly if I had represented Pythagoras as having achieved that distinction. In the nature of things both must have been combined, but it is most worthy of notice that the mathematical sciences and the arithmetical upon which we pride ourselves (and which are the bulwarks against modern infidels who, denying all other certainty, are yet obliged to yield to this), did not commence, as they would have them commence, in abstraction from the senses. Though that circle has not all its radii equal, it is as good as if it had. Thus man must be taught that these sciences commenced far deeper, that it is ludicrous to suppose that Pythagoras, on finding out what his eyesight must have informed every man, that the lines drawn from the middle of a circle were pretty nearly equal, should have felt any rapture. But he felt that it could not be otherwise, that he had discovered, not merely that which was to be learnt from external objects, but that it was the law and the rule of those objects. Well might he exclaim "Eureka" when he found, in after discoveries, that applying those numbers, drawn abstractedly from his own reason, to the laws of external nature and her motions, he perceived the direct contrary to what the wisest of men had done before him, that instead of supposing the earth fixed and the heavenly bodies (as our senses shew us) moving around us, he saw by laws derived from his own reason that the sun was fixed;⁽⁵¹⁾ and further that all matter has its number; and that the external phenomena themselves were as nothing, of which no man could say they are, but only what they have been, but that they were the perpetual language of those numbers; and finally he resolved all this into a power, which to the honour of Pythagoras did not in the least partake of Pantheism, but still kept the Deity at a distance from his works.⁽⁵²⁾ This entitles this man to our gratitude.

As to the idea that Pythagoras had learnt this in Egypt, India, and so forth, and that it was part of the knowledge of those times, that may be dismissed in a very few words. Thales had

been in Egypt it appears, and instructed by the priests, and yet though he professed, as it appears, certain experimental mathematical knowledge such as a carpenter might have with us, yet still he had learned nothing of science properly so called. What the state of information must have been when Pythagoras, after having travelled through Egypt, Persia, and India, came back and was transported and offered a hecatomb on having discovered the thirty-seventh* proposition of Euclid, is a pretty good answer to those men who would suppose a high state of knowledge in scientific men who were nobody knows who. But such an idea has been carried to a most extravagant height by some of our modern contenders for Indian wisdom.⁽⁵³⁾ Was it to be supposed that Pythagoras, who had passed his life in seeking knowledge wherever he went, should when he came back express a delight amounting to rapture at the very elements of geometry if geometry had been already carried to a system? No, doubtless the state of India and Egypt was precisely what may be expressed and which the Bible fully expresses elsewhere, a state of high civilization and of all that can arise out of civilization, but without any cultivation⁽⁵⁴⁾ whatsoever. Man was in all things drawn towards his senses, brought into the bonds of society by conquest or imposture or whatever other cause. The many were working for the pride or the superstition of the few, as is shewn in the pyramids; and they proceeded as far as the outward man could do by imitation, as, for instance, the formation of the body, just as many men in the present day, the Russians, for instance, will do—and frequently those who are most incapable of anything original—and just as the New Hollanders do. They were able to do all that was done well; but the countenance, that impressive somewhat which gives the mind, in vain have we looked for any specimens of that in Egyptian architecture. Even if you go back to the remotest times and seek it between Egypt and Ethiopia, nowhere does there appear science, but all is tradition and history. It is remarkable, the earliest writers say, that the Egyptians were a very historical people; for wherever they† went they saw upon their pillars the history of their times. What those histories must be that were written on pillars we may, by consulting common-sense, easily learn.⁽⁵⁵⁾

* Forty-seventh. Coleridge's error, or the reporter's.

† I.e. the earliest writers.

I confess that in my opinion those hieroglyphics have excited a great deal more attention than anything but their antiquity could call for. What little we know after all the learned disquisitions into the properties of bodies and so forth, seems to end in a much greater probability that it was a rude invention of the first times in Egypt to represent their thoughts by images, by visual images; and that this was doubtless first of all what they call chiaro-logical. A man was put for a man. Afterwards, by some observable property in which they perceived an analogy, as for instance that a skull represented death, that emblem was employed. Afterwards as they began to be somewhat more refined by some knowledge of natural history, their further ideas were combined in a tedious game called the *μελέτη Θανάτου*,* or a meditation of death, where there is a man standing thinking—there is a man for a man—a book for a book—on the table before him is a skull, which by a natural image in all nations represents death—but on the skull a butterfly. Here you see at once there is a man meditating on death and immortality. But for the language in general, I think even Scaliger, though of a very contrary opinion himself, has brought sufficient things to prove that a great part of it was much what we have seen at Carrington Bowles's⁽⁶⁶⁾ and so forth, those curious letters written half with images—an eye to signify an I, a U and a tree to signify a yew tree, a hawk or a species of sparrow-hawk was the representative as we know for the soul, but it appears that [“ba”]⁽⁶⁷⁾ was the name of both the hawk and the soul, so exactly as in Greek the butterfly was called *psyche* and at the same time the soul was called *psyche*.⁽⁶⁸⁾ And it appears that the hieroglyphics were made up from these three sources, which of itself proves a very low state of science and how very little Greece could have properly gained from these three sources.

One other argument I think is perfectly satisfying: that all the pretended obligations of Greece to these three countries are during the period while Greece itself was compleatly ignorant; but in all that makes Greece Greece to us, we find it the great light of the world, the beating pulse, that power which was

* NB. 25 continues: A Philosopher reading in a book with a human skull on the table and on the Skull a Butterfly, a pretty instance of the composite Emblem. The Philosopher & Book are portraits—the Skull and Emblem—the Butterfly a (symbol)† Simile. [† Word crossed out.]

predetermined by Almighty Providence to gradually evolve all that could be evolved out of corrupt nature by its own reason; while on the opposite ground there was a nation bred up by inspiration in a childlike form, in obedience and in the exercise of the will. Till at length the two great component parts of our nature, in the unity of which all its excellency and all its hopes depend, namely that of the will in the one, as the higher and more especially godlike, and the reason in the other, as the compeer but yet second to that will, were to unite and to prepare the world for the reception of its Redeemer; which took place just at the time when the traditions of history and the oracles of the Jews had combined with the philosophy of the Grecians, and prepared the Jews themselves for understanding their own scriptures in a more spiritual light, and the Greeks to give to their speculations, that were but the shadows of thought before, a reality, in that which alone is properly real.

LECTURE III

JANUARY 4, 1819⁽¹⁾

There was no announcement in any paper on Monday, January 4th, the day of the lecture.* On December 31st, the date of the second lecture of the Thursday course, the following announcement appeared in the *Morning Chronicle*, and one very similar to it in *The Times* of the same date. On Wednesday, December 30th, the *Courier* ran something like it in a news column.

THIS EVENING, December 31, at Eight o'clock, at the Crown and Anchor, Strand, Mr. COLERIDGE'S LECTURE on Richard the Second, as instance and illustration of Shakespeare's Historic Drama, its scheme and distinctive character. On the Monday following, the Rise and Influence of the Sophists, in Greece; the Life and Philosophy of Socrates; the Advantages and Defects of the Socratic Method; with the two extremes of the Cynic and Cyrenaic Sects founded by his immediate disciples. Admission, 5s.

In my last address I understand that that part of the lecture which referred to the peculiar arithmetical metaphysics of Pythagoras was not fully understood and as it will lead me immediately to the purpose of the present I will take the opportunity of attempting to explain myself. There is no one among us who feels the least inclination to call a cudgel a bruise or a sword a wound or the pain. The reason is evidently this, because a cudgel and a sword are separate and distinct images to the senses. But we all of us and in all languages call the sensation heat or cold and the outward cause of it by the same names; and inevitable as this is, it has produced a great confusion of thought, not indeed in the palpable instance which I have now mentioned, but in many others; and yet as common to all nations and

* See Introduction, Section 2.

arising out of the nature of the human mind it may well be believed to refer to some important truth. We know that chemistry found itself soon compelled to frame a different word for the *cause*, to distinguish it from the *sensation* it was produced to effect: and hence we have the word "calorif" or "calorific".⁽²⁾ We know, too, that in the first edition of Newton's *Optics* he had spoken of *radii colorati*, colored rays, which he altered afterwards to *radii colorati formati*,* color-making rays.⁽³⁾ Now it appears that Pythagoras had proceeded upon this opinion, that those unknown somethings, powers or whatever you may call them, that manifest themselves in the intellect of man, or what in the language of the old philosophy would be called the intelligible world, as numbers, and the essential powers of numbers, these same manifest themselves to us and are the objects of our senses, I mean as creative and organizing powers: in short, that the very powers which in men reflect and contemplate, are in their essence the same as those powers which in nature produce the objects contemplated. This position did indeed appear to be deducible from that of the Ionic school, I mean that of Thales, that there is no action but from like on like, that no substances or beings essentially dissimilar could possibly be made sensible of each other's existence or in any way act thereon.

This involves an essential—I know not how I can avoid using a pedantic word—HOMOGENEITY†—a sameness of the conceiver (& the conception),‡ of the idea and the law corresponding to the idea. In the language of the old philosophy they would say that the eye could not possibly perceive light but by having in its own essence something luciferous,⁽⁴⁾ that the ear could not have been the organ of hearing but by having in its essence, and not by mechanism, something conformed to the air. The obstacle to the acceptance of this position§ is to be found in the fancy|| and imagination, as far as they take their materials from the senses, which constantly present the soul, the percipient, as a sort of inner more subtle¶ body, a kind of under waistcoat,

* [E. H. C.] suggested the emendation *colorem formantes*. See note 3.

† NB. 25 adds: and connaturality.

‡ NB. 25: of the concipient and the conceptum.

§ NB. 25: *grand truth*.

|| NB. 25: *sensuous fancy*.

¶ NB. 25: *thinner*.

as it were, to the bodily garment, and the mind itself as a vessel or at best a MOULD,* sometimes even as a blank tablet,† in short, to take the meaning of all inclusively, as a passive receiver,‡ *<A SUBSTANCE>* which in fact, however, as we may convince ourselves by a little self-examination, is nothing more than the craving for *<AN INNER SURFACE>*, an image *<SUPPORTING>*. We have been accustomed by all our affections, by all our wants, to seek after outward images; and by the love of association, therefore, to whole truth we attach that particular condition of truth which belongs to sensible bodies or to bodies which can be touched. The first education which we receive, that from our mothers, is given to us by touch; the whole of its process is nothing more than, to express myself boldly, an extended touch by promise.^(b) The sense itself, the sense of vision itself, is only acquired by a continued recollection of touch. No wonder therefore, that beginning in the animal state, we should carry this onward through the whole of our being however remote it may be from the true purposes of it. Therefore an image supporting something (which in itself is a contradiction, for an image always supposes a superficies and a something supported, and is asked for under the name of a substance) is construed into an agent when we can no longer boldly bring forward a thing for it; and this agent is contradistinguished from an act as if these oppositions of our human language and thoughts were really the true conditions and the very essence of our being. But to comprehend the philosophy of Pythagoras the mind itself must be conceived of *<AS AN ACT>*; and the numbers of Pythagoras and the Cabalists^(b) with the equivalent Ideas of the Platonists, ARE not so properly acts of the Reason, in their sense I mean, as they are THE Reason itself in act.

Now this the writers of the history of the[SE] philosophers have clearly not mastered,§ and I believe it is from this want of dis-

* The reporter wrote "mode".

† NB. 25: *Memorandum Book*.

‡ NB. 25: in short, as πανδεχὲς τι.

§ The NB. goes on: Now this the Kantians have not mastered, and thro' the mist engendered thro' the absence of this insight Tenneman[n] has looked at the Samian and Heraclitic Doctrines and then charged these great men with having trans-idolized forms purely subjective. Yet that this is not authorized by the writings of their great Master I both hold and affirm.

inction between the two opposite poles of all human thought, namely the objective and the subjective, that is to say, the supposed external causes and that modification of the mind itself of which alone we are conscious (which is the result of it), that has occasioned all their confusion and contradictions in the accounts of the ancient philosophers. Thus the very best writer on philosophic history we have hitherto had, Tennemann,⁽⁷⁾ charges Pythagoras and the great men following him with having turned into objective different things that were purely subjective; but the very contrary appears to have been the object of Pythagoras himself and of those who immediately followed him, namely, to shew that in essence both object and subject were united in one, that there was one principle which produced the object of perception and that the same principle at the other pole produced the contemplation of that object. Whether this be true or false, such was evidently their opinion, and it is necessary to be understood in order to the comprehension of the progress of philosophy. For in this, in truth, did philosophy begin, in the distinction between the subject and the object. How many centuries, we might say millennia, might the race of men go on without ever asking themselves the question whether the sensation, which was all to them, was one and the same with that external something which was the occasion of it? To both they gave the same names, and he who first (to use a former illustration) distinguished heat from the supposed power externally, which he called "calorif", might have been truly said to have begun philosophy; and the whole progress from that time to this present moment is nothing more than an attempt to reconcile the same. There are therefore essentially but three kinds of philosophers⁽⁸⁾ and more are not possible: the one is those who give the whole to the subject and make the object a mere result involved in it; secondly those who give the whole to the object and make the subject, that is the reflecting and contemplating, feeling part, the mere result of that; and lastly those who, in very different ways, have attempted to reconcile these two opposites and bring them into one.

It may appear to us (owing to the advantages of our education and of living in the present state of advanced knowledge that we do, in certain things at least,) extraordinary that any man should confuse the distinction between the external cause and the effect

upon ourselves; and yet in the writing of Ocellus Lucanus* the authenticity of which, as the immediate follower of Pythagoras, I reject, not from the arguments brought against it by Tennemann or the circumstance that it is in the Attic instead of Doric dialect, but because the whole tone is opposite and inconsistent with the Pythagorean philosophy of which he is a professed follower;⁽¹¹⁾ yet he, after having given some instances which were fair and which were probably parts of the traditional doctrines of Pythagoras, proceeds to carry it on (as dull men never know when to leave off at the proper time) by saying, after what he says of the different senses and the conformity to the objects, "Now honey is a particular substance. It produces an extreme sense of sweetness on the palate and everybody knows it is extremely sweet in itself." Now this confusion, or rather this strange division of the same things expressed in different words, will at once shew at least this, how natural such a blunder is to the human mind when it first begins to think, and at once establishes to me

* NB. 25 here throws some light on Coleridge's habits of lecture preparation: *This day, 3 Jany. 1819, Sunday, Highgate, I am looking thro' Ocellus Lucanus and Timæus.*⁽⁶⁾ The arguments on which Tennemen[n] decides undoubtedly on their being a post-platonic, post-aristotelian Forgery (namely, the improbability that these great men would not but in the form of quotation have borrowed several passages) weigh but little with me. Grant that the letters to and from Plato are forgeries—it is certain that they must have been forged at an early date—and consequently that at that time the authenticity of the Ocellus and Timæus was taken for granted. The evidence therefore for and against must be internal. Should it in the case of Ocellus's work be against the hypothesis of its genuineness, *then* the circumstance of its being written in the Attic instead of the Doric dialect would certainly come in aid of the conclusion, that it is a forgery—otherwise, it might be easily supposed, that our present MSS were copies of a Translation from the Doric, just as St. Matthew's Gospel having been originally Hebrew or Syro-Chaldaic is not allowed to impugn the substantial authenticity of the existing Gospel.

Now I confess that the labored proof of the eternity and imperishableness of the Universe on a mere identical position involved in the word τὸ πᾶν, and in which the point in dispute, namely, the seorsum of the deity as ἐτέρου γένους from the World, and consequently the blank postulate of Pantheism, sounds to me far too unlike the progressive detail of the Pythagorean Investigations if not inconsistent with the hyper-arithmetic Monas. Yet that fragments of the Pythagorean wisdom are preserved in it, these words among many others prove Ζῶα μὲν πρὸς ἀναπνοήν, ὄψις δὲ πρὸς τὸ φῶς, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον αἰσθητόν⁽¹²⁾—and yet the following § which proceeds in exemplification, such as that Honey which gives us the sense of sweetness is itself sweet &c implies so gross an indistinction between the subjective and objective, between the heat and the calorific, as I cannot attribute to a true Pythagorean tho' Tenneman[n] does.

a proof that this work of Ocellus Lucanus was that of an early but very rude grammarian who had taken into his head to imitate or to take upon himself the name of some great man that had been recorded by tradition.

But we will return to the progress of philosophy. Of Pythagoras I have said that we are abandoned, necessarily, I will not say absolutely, to conjecture, but to that state that not unfrequently occurs in human life, in which it is necessary for a man to have discovered by other means the truth of a particular position in order to learn with certainty whether a prior writer has or has not taught it. I wish I could as successfully and as confidently clear the character of Pythagoras from the charge of a pretended magician, and impostor, as I think I could from all charges of mere vulgar pantheism, or what may be called fanatical philosophy. He seems to me to have attempted at least the union of the two opposites which he distinctly understood, namely the objects of contemplation and the contemplative power itself.

After him, immediately after him, and according to <Tennemann's> chronology, while he was yet alive, arose the founders of the Eleatic School. The moral philosophy of Pythagoras, which Tennemann brings forward as exhibiting the INFANT* state of thinking,⁽¹²⁾ seems to me rather to prove the highest of all that has been ever attributed to Pythagoras, nay, to explain the ground of the high admiration in which his name was held by posterity through so many ages. Speculatively considered, he admitted that moral acts form an object of philosophic contemplation equally with all other acts, and he determined their law, which, in an arithmetical metaphor according to the language and symbol of his own choice, he declared to be a proportion, a harmony, a something which, containing no principle of contradiction in itself, was susceptible of becoming the law of every rational being in whatever circumstances. But this he thought of so little practical importance, that he rested the whole chance of bringing men into a moral state upon education, and on this ground: that virtue, so far from being learned by any theory, could only be known by the practice of virtue; that there was no power of educing virtue out of anything else but itself; nay, more, that there was that which is supposed in all virtue, namely an

* The reporter wrote "intense."

act of the will. But if you prefix or presuppose any act influencing the will necessarily, we see at once that it is no longer the will but an impulse, a billiard ball moving against another billiard ball, and we lose the very notion of will. In consequence of which he very wisely rested the whole upon a process of education, which in its first elements should be delivered from the Gods; in other words that it should be found in our nature, and from the constant tradition of our ancestors, guarding us against any doubt lest it should be a delusion in our minds that there was such a thing as virtue. And that once fixed, what were the means of educating it? As I shall have to speak of this hereafter I will only say that in the case of Pythagoras—with whatever human infirmity his institutions might have been mixed—yet the record of all ages, that even the fragments and relicts of the scattered societies were distinguished by sanctity of manner, intense friendship to each other, and the principle that they would love all men either for what they were or for what they might be, is a strong proof that they had proceeded upon the right ground, namely, that of deducing the true character of man as he ought to be, not, in the first instance, from the intellect* but from a higher principle, and then employing the intellect as constantly educating this and bringing it into more perfection.

Pythagoras remains to us therefore highly estimable, and chiefly as a moral character, and it is interesting to us to see the transition from the MORAL† to speculative philosophy, disjoined from the moral, in the first instance. And we return to the old difficulty of the subjective and the objective. Nor will it appear to you unnoticeable that the first school which formed itself, instead of acceding to what we might have expected perhaps at the first thought, namely that the objects of the senses should at first have overpowered the minds of men and have presented themselves‡—no—the Eleatic school⁽¹⁴⁾ (the writings of which are reduced to but a few fragments but of no sect of philosophy have we so clear and distinct notions, doubtless from the simplicity of their system) at once by what may be called a courage and

* NB. 25: Virtue can be *known, what it is*, exclusively by virtuous conduct—much less then can it be learnt by other means. (*Here* introduce from *Pest*—)⁽¹⁸⁾ this forms the transition to the Eleatic School and its contrast the Democritic.

† The report reads, “from them to speculative.”

‡ <as the only reality>?

perhaps an effrontery of the human mind, dared decide the question by rejecting all that was objective as real, and affirmed that the whole existed only in the mind and for the mind, that all the multitude of objects that appear to us are founded in delusion, and that in mind itself was to be found the sole reality of things.

Xenophanes, the founder, was born at Colophon, a city of some note in Asia Minor, coeval with Pythagoras. From thence [sic] he migrated to ELIA OR VELIA a newly founded COLONIAL town in South Italy OF THE PHOCEANS where he lived to a long old age. Without any direct master he had acquainted himself with the opinions of Thales, PHERECIDES AND ANAXIMANDER as well as those of Pythagoras, which he refers to indeed in one of the elegies which he wrote against Hesiod and Homer and the fragment of which, though not containing the *name* yet evidently referring to Pythagoras, is preserved by Diogenes Lærtius in his life of Pythagoras.⁽¹⁵⁾

And here permit me to refer to the former lecture in which I ventured, in opposition to several writers, particularly to a man of great learning, Creuzer,⁽¹⁶⁾ to place the institution of the mysteries and the Eleusinian <rites> at a lower date than that of Homer and Hesiod; for I cannot but observe that the very first effect of philosophy was a determined warfare against the gross and crude theology* which [Herodotus]† tells us was first introduced into Greece by Homer and Hesiod. Whether it was possible that two single individuals could produce such an effect over the people so scattered, some being in [Boeotia] in Asia Minor, others in the [Peloponnesus] or in the Islands, and others again in South Italy, is a question well deserving of thought, and whether it would not be more rational to some extent at least to do what all scholars have lately found themselves compelled to do with regard to the *Hymns* of Homer, so to refer the effects to bands of men, lately call[ed] Homeridae, and who may have been assembled like other persons who sung together on the same subjects. This however seems confirmed by Herodotus when he tells us that those who had been placed before Homer generally he believed to have lived after him. Now it would be difficult to conjecture whom he could mean if it was not the names of Orpheus, [Linus, Musæus]‡ and the other mystical poets who endeavoured to

* Described in NB. 25 as "the Popery of Paganism".⁽¹⁷⁾

† The reporter wrote "Theocritus". The emendation was suggested by [E. H. C.].

‡ The *Friend*, III. 231. And Lect. II p. 89.

give to the Homeric theology a more spiritual and lofty meaning.

To return to Xenophanes. The sanctity of his life is extolled by Plato and Aristotle and the same (I mention it for a particular reason) is expressed of all the rest of the disciples of these and the following sects. They were eminently good men. Zeno, the disciple of XENOPHANES, and Zeno's friend, PARMENIDES, who went together with him to Athens in the 80th Olympiad, 460 years before Christ, were probably from 25 to 30 years younger than XENOPHANES. Nearly at the same time, or a little later WE MUST PLACE MELISSUS OF SAMOS under whose command the naval victory was obtained over the Athenians. According to Apollodorus he was in the height of his celebrity about 476 years before Christ. These four illustrious contemporaries were all writers or **<IN OUR PHRASE>**, authors, Xenophanes and PARMENIDES in metrical compositions which however were more valued for their philosophy than their poetry, while Zeno and MELISSUS wrote in prose. Of these works we have but a few fragments remaining* and as I observed before, it is to their extreme† simplicity we owe our account of them.

The Eleatic system consisted in the blank denial of any true reality‡ in the supposed objects of the senses, or of any proper correspondence in external nature to the perceptions; that is they not only supposed, which it was easy to prove, that the external object could not be exactly that which it was seen to be, because the question would immediately arise, at what distance is it seen by an eye, how organized; that which is at a distance will appear round which nearer will appear square, that which appears with one shape to a perfect eye will, to an eye distempered, appear with another: no—that would have been merely that in external nature there does exist a positive correspondence; but they denied this altogether. All preceding reasoners, whether Naturalists, as I call the Ionic school, or PHILOSOPHERS, had proposed to themselves however to trace the birth and the growth of things. The problem was, whence and how things became, or, as perhaps I might say more intelligibly, how things came to be. All of them grounded their opinions on this axiom,

* NB. 25 adds: which have be[en] collected by Fülleborn and Stephani from Aristotle, Sextus, Simplicius, and others.

† NB: bold.

‡ NB: objectivity.

that from nothing nothing can come,* but the Eleatic school deduced, or believed itself <ENTITLED> to deduce, from the same axiom, the impossibility of any change, any true transition from any one thing or state to another. In other words, they reduced the argument to two positions—nothing can arise out of nothing—the first: secondly—neither out of anything can anything arise or begin to be, for this itself would be a creation. The first position they did not attempt to prove, they took it as conceded by all; the second they endeavoured to demonstrate by various turns of logic, as for example, what arises out of another must be either like or unlike it: if like, it must have like properties, and then there is merely a numerical difference between the producing cause and the product, and no reason why priority should be assigned to one rather than the other. But chiefly they endeavoured to recommend their opinion by calling into question all the conceptions of the mind that accompany our knowledge of change, and above all the conception of motion.

These sophisms concerning motion have been preserved to us.† It would be wasting time to detail them to you, and wearisome. It is sufficient to state the result, that they all proceed upon a manifest sophism which takes for granted the thing in question and requires for the objects, which are no longer phenomena or appearances (that which can appear to the senses), all the qualities of phenomena. As for instance a tortoise shall set off after a hare or a hare shall set off after a tortoise, but the tortoise shall have a yard given him in the advantage. Then the demonstration is that there must be a given portion of time in which the hare takes half the length of the tortoise; in the meantime the tortoise would have gone on a certain portion; that the hare must take another half and the tortoise must have gone on a certain period; the hare must go on halving and the demonstration is that he can never arrive at the tortoise. The consequence is this, that the very impossibility of finding an image that could present a sophism to the mind without an absurdity is a compleat detection of it. For we see at once that there was no necessity of taking the hare and the tortoise, for it was evident, upon the

* NB. 25: *nihil e nihilo*. The notes usually contain the Latin, Greek or German phrase in the original; the lecturer (often without giving the original) translates it.

† NB. 25: but the further display reserved for Spinoza,⁽¹⁸⁾ as having so much deeper an interest for us.

same grounds, that nothing could move at all by any possibility. Why, already the hare was made an absurdity, and the tortoise was made an absurdity, for they both occupied a certain quantum of space without any regard to the minimum, and consequently the hare did not move a half inch at a time in the end; but here, as the hare occupied a certain quantity of space which set at defiance the whole calculation of the philosopher, he required all the properties of phenomena when he had himself reduced space to a mere idea of the mind, which never can be apprehended or even imagined by the senses. Consequently he brought two different things into the argument, named space—or rather he punned upon the word space—he took space in the first place to mean an image presented by the imagination, and then he took it for a metaphysical possibility of motion. And no wonder that from two things so perfectly heterogeneous he could produce nothing but absurdity. This is sufficient, not to add another which has false logic in it—namely, that while he required a minimum of the one he took an indefinite quantity of the other, or allowed no minimum in the other case.⁽¹⁹⁾ As for instance, a wheel may move. Supposing the wheel to have on the top of it the letter A and at the bottom B, you may suppose it to move so rapidly that at the same moment, perceptibly by man, it shall cease to move at all and appear motionless. What does that prove? Why, that it has gone beyond the bounds of perception or imagination, and after that we are forbidden by sound sense to apply the law of phenomena to it otherwise than by analogy; but that analogy which we draw *from* the objects of the senses it would be absurd to bring *against* the objects of the senses.

This I mention as having been brought forward by a philosopher who really thought well, who having spoken the arguments of some philosophers against motion, related the story that Diogenes rising up and walking along the room said, "Thus I confute the arguments of Zeno", recited that the disciples of Zeno might have kicked him downstairs,⁽²⁰⁾ to which it might have been replied, "We understand that as well as you, and we will give you the advantage of the phenomenon of motion, but our difficulty is how to reconcile it with our reason and this is the point in which alone you are to consider these things. You are to consider them as you do the strange cases put in our old books of arithmetic or other imaginary things in the books of old

schoolmen, as exercises of the reason itself, not to be looked at for that particular case (nor is it to be supposed Zeno was that madman [Sextus Empiricus]*)⁽²¹⁾ but as a process of science, which is perfectly different, essentially different from that, and a mere record of experiment. It is an attempt of man, out of long experience in which he is perpetually floating, to arrive at some fixture from whence [sic] he can command experience." And when we consider what an elevation that is of human nature, how it rises so essentially above the animal creation, how it entitles us to be called the delegated lords of nature, and of light, fire, and the elements, and enables us to send our fleets over the elements which as individuals would destroy us in a few moments, to act on that fire which is so tremendous animals fly before it with a terror neither sword nor spear could inflict, we may well be grateful for every preparatory exercise of the mind that can lead to this. For experience can only tell us to expect the future from the past, with a perfect ignorance of all by which the future will be modified and made different from the past; it is only on science that depends the power of prophecy, that which enables the sage in his closet to foretell with a confidence grounded on the most awful of pledges, "as sure as God liveth so it will be if the laws of nature proceed as they now are".

I have a particular object in attempting to impress this on your minds, because, in the early histories of the philosophers, we meet with so many things which might excite contempt, such as to draw away our minds from the important steps which they made towards the state in which we now are. Too apt we are to confound the truth perceived with those rude illustrations of the truth which their experimental knowledge afforded to them, and where, therefore, it requires that moderating recollection what the object was for which these men were laboring, and above all that *<it cannot be the case that>* they only of all the earth labored in vain.

However there was one point assumed in the whole of this philosophy, one which appears to have been common to all the elder philosophers. For though I am myself inclined to except Heraclitus and Pythagoras, I am bound in historical fidelity to admit they were otherwise interpreted, and that it is evident that their disciples understood them according to the common

* MS. note on Tennemann, *op. cit.*, v. 354.

opinion,* which is this: they all took for granted the identity of God and the world.⁽²²⁾ This is the point which forms the true interest of this lecture, for upon it depends the whole intelligibility of philosophy hereafter. There is an evident sophism, when examined, in all the dogmatas of the elder philosophers, as far as they reason: namely, they call the world [$\tau\delta\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$][†], the universe of all, the whole, and then they deduce with an inevitable force of conviction that it must have had neither beginning nor can have ending. That is involved in it, that is evident, that nothing can come from nothing, and therefore the universe being the whole, it must have been eternal and must forever continue. But the main question, which did not occur to them, was whether or no the deity (which yet they admitted) was essentially distinct from the world or not.⁽²³⁾

Now to us, bred up as we have been, nothing can appear more easy than this. It must even appear strange that man should have confounded the maker, the Creator, and the work; and yet when Plato teaches another doctrine he expressly says it was a wisdom derived from the Gods, which had been received from the barbarous nations, whom, in another place, he calls the Holy Nations. It was an idea so bold that it does not appear that it ever did suggest itself to any human mind unassisted by revelation. We who have been accustomed from our childhood, almost from our infancy, to speak of God our Creator, and to reverence him as being infinitely above the world and altogether and essentially diverse from it, we may wonder that others should think differently. And much could I wish I had the power to impress upon your imaginations the feelings of diff[id]ence in the minds of those who were without those advantages and had not been born in Christian countries as we are. Nay, I could point out to you the state of countries, nominally Christian, in which the clergy of the country have been more attentive for their saints, their altars, and their particular worship, than to impress the great grounds of religion on the mind, and you would see not only how difficult an idea this was to form, but likewise how speedily the mind, as if wearied, falls away from it to sink into the ease

* NB. 25: (for tho' I would fain *hope* that Pyth[agoras] and Heraclitus themselves held what appears deducible from their opinions—yet the latter was not so interpreted, & the Italic school or so-called Pythagoreans were notorious for the contrary).

† NB. 25.

of sensuality and [cosmotheism].* Conceive at once that that immense universe, those thousands of worlds with all their infinite varieties of action, forms of life, destinations, births, deaths, that these all should be subject to the power, as they originated in the will, of one Being; and that that Being who possesses in itself what was a reason and by the contemplation of which we alone know what reason can be (the contemplation I say, for I speak not too boldly that the ground, the cause, the Governor of all this universe, was wise and good in the sense which men understand the word though they can never arrive at so stupendous a truth) that when it did seize hold of the mind of man it possessed it with a species of inspiration. So without other aid than that which human reason could give it appears never to have arrived at the heart of man—and yet it might seem wonderfully easy.

I wish to give a striking instance of what the human reason, of itself, I will not say *could* arrive at but I speak more safely of what it ever *did* arrive at; for there is not a more frequent delusion, or one that it was more fashionable about a hundred years ago, in the time of the Chubbs and Morgans,⁽²⁴⁾ more frequently to bring forward—what they called “natural” proofs of religion, the object of which was to shew the inutility of Christianity, that it was of no value; and it is astonishing with what coolness they proceed[ed] to give demonstrative proofs, which no man could reject, of the being and attributes of God and a future state. It might have been a matter of surprise that the philosophers of old did not arrive at this; that they were extremely puzzled that when Simonides was asked the question, he required day after day to solve it;⁽²⁵⁾ and that the arguments which they bring forward independent of revelation the philosophers of old would have treated either with abundant contempt or as mere proofs of what they admitted, namely that for every motion in nature there was a motive power, that when a man said he could prove [*a fate or power with control*] over the person but not the intention, they would say, “All the [*same thing!*] Just as bees in a beehive all pursue one object.” And from thence [sic] would produce a system of [*either panhylism or hylozoism*][†] which alone could have been derived from such argument. While the arguments of a higher

* MS. note on Tennemann, *op. cit.*, VIII. 95: “the crass & sensual Cosmotheism of the Hindoos”. See pp. 127–8 below.

† Based on a note on Tennemann, *op. cit.*, I. 216.

kind go into pantheism which again instantly brought round the effect of [*polytheism*]. And when we find that history attests the statement that there was but one nation upon earth that did for any time resist the seduction of [*polytheism*] and that nation only by a miraculous interposition of providence, we must be blind with conceit or ignorant of history not to feel that the very first foundation of what we call "natural religion" is in truth revelation, that natural religion is a word without [meaning].* [*Polytheism*] is the result of <worshipping> nature and such it has been shewn in all ages and the effect of [*polytheism*][†] in all ages has been, in the under states of life, cruelty and brutality, in the higher states selfishness and sensuality. Here there is no doubt that <in> good men (for thank heaven there is a glorious inconsistency in human nature; through the mercy of our Creator, a man's head will frame this and that cobweb, but his heart will whisper better things, his moral feelings will wish them and he will contradict himself, and with the common sophistry try to reconcile the one with the other; and thus it is with the natural influence of pantheism, or the belief of God as identical with the world) there will be moments when the reverence of that something which instinctively we must conceive of as greater than ourselves, and when all the aggregate of things that we behold will excite feelings of devotion and awe, and these will produce fragments of true religious feeling but for a few philosophers; while mankind at large are better logicians, made so by their animal nature, and will in the very same moment be sinking into the worst escapes and the blindest superstition accompanied with the most accursed moral practices.

We have in this work which I have now before me, an extract from a great poem of India where pantheism has displayed its banners and waved in victory over three hundred millions of men; and this has been published in England as a proof of sublimity beyond the excellence of Milton in the true adoration of the supreme being. It is an address to the pantheistic God. Compare it with the feelings you have all been taught in your catechism.

"Oh Mighty Spirit behold the wonders of an awful countenance [with] troubled minds. Of the Celestial bands [some] I see [fly to thee for refuge; whilst some, afraid, with joined hands

* The reporter wrote "name".

† MS. Egerton 3057.

sing forth thy praise. The Maharshees, holy bands, hail thee, and glorify thy name with adoring praises, the Roodras, the Adeetyas, the Vasoos, and all those beings the world esteemeth good; Asween and Koomar, the Maroots and the Ooshmapas; the Gandharvs and the Yakshas, with the holy tribes of Soors, all stand gazing on thee, and all alike amazed! The worlds, alike with me, are terrified to behold thy wondrous form gigantic; with many mouths and eyes; with many arms, and legs, and breasts; with many bellies and with rows of dreadful teeth! Thus as I see thee, touching the heavens, and shining with such glory; of such various hues, with widely-opened mouths, and bright expanded eyes, I am disturbed within me; my resolution faileth me, O Veeshnoo! and I find no rest! Having beholden thy dreadful teeth, and gazed on thy countenance, emblem of Time's last fire, I know not which way I turn! I find no peace! Have mercy then, O God of Gods! thou mansion of the universe! the sons of Dhrutarashtra, now, with all those rulers of the land, Bheeshma, Dron, the son of Soot, and even the fronts of our army, seem to be precipitating themselves hastily into thy mouths, discovering such frightful rows of teeth! whilst some appear to stick between thy teeth with their bodies sorely mangled. As the rapid streams of full flowing rivers roll on to meet the ocean's bed, even so these heroes of the human race rush on towards thy flaming mouths. As troops of insects, with increasing speed, seek their own destruction in the flaming fire; even so these people, with swelling fury, seek their own destruction. Thou involvest and swallowest them altogether, even unto the last, with thy flaming mouths; whilst the whole world is filled with thy glory, as thy awful beams, O Veeshnoo, shine forth on all sides! Reverence be unto thee, thou most exalted! Deign to make known unto me who is this God of awful figure! I am anxious to learn thy source, and ignorant of what thy presence here portendeth.

Kreesna.

I am Time, the destroyer of mankind, matured, come hither to seize at once all these who stand before us. Except] thyself."*

* From *The Bhagvat-Geeta, or Dialogues of Kreesna and Arjoon*; in eighteen lectures with notes. Translated from the original, in the Sanskreet, or ancient language of the Brahmans, by Charles Wilkins, Senior Merchant in the service of the honorable the East India Company, on their Bengal establishment. London, MDCCLXXV, 91-3. The reporter caught a few words at the beginning, and the last word of the passage Coleridge read.

Now this is said, and it is published by the authority of the East India Company I find (for which certainly we are much obliged to them, for it is a very interesting poem) but with a declaration "I should not fear to place in opposition to the . . . 1st and 6th [Books of our own Milton, highly as I venerate the latter, the English translation of the Mahabharat.]"* That however is a piece of taste.⁽²⁶⁾ But the result is more serious and to us I think more comfortable, namely, that in the utmost attempts of a pantheistic philosophy to reduce religion to any objects of the senses, or any object to be apprehended by men, (and that is more than the indistinct conception of the whole) the infinite or a something that works like gravitation, works without any consciousness. This it gives in the most striking manner; and when we find how anxious the ancient sages of India were with this opinion to impress a belief of an unity (for that the reason of man of itself necessarily tends to do) and yet to bring it down to the practical and moral point so as to make it the subject of influence on the will or moral being, they were distracted into the most ridiculous forms, we begin to pay some compliment to those theologicians who, by dropping the one part in *<the>* thing and hiding it altogether from the multitude, presented only to them fairies and [phantasms, impersonations, avatars,]† and for every object presented to them a sort of life, and passions, and motions attending it, which affected themselves. For that, be assured, is the utmost height human nature has arrived at by its own powers; that first of all the highest and best of men felt by an impulse from their reason a necessity to seek an unity; and those who felt wisely, like Plato and Socrates, feeling the difficulties of this, looked forward to that Being, of whom this necessity and their reason was a presentiment, to instruct them, and expected with reverence and hope that an instructor would come. But with regard to the others, it fell into a multitude of forms so that at length the theologists themselves were weary of counting them, and it has become a matter of dispute whether there were twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty thousand of the Roman and Greek deities.

This however must not be said without, in some measure,

* From a letter of Warren Hastings introducing the above work to the Chairman of the East India Company, printed as a foreword.

† See Muirhead, J. H., *Coleridge as Philosopher*, Appendix C, 284.

retrieving the character of Zeno, Xenophanes and others from whose history I have been led to this digression. There are found in their fragments, opinions which proceeded from the heart rather than the system, and everywhere you perceive that their object was noble. It was an excess, it was an extreme, indeed, but it was from an honorable impulse and with a praise-worthy object. Men were entirely under the tyranny of their senses. They <Zeno and Xenophanes> attacked the very first elements of the senses; they endeavoured to convince men of their fallacy and how little in themselves they could be relied upon; and so far they shook the great superstition of human nature and prepared for better things. And all that we can expect from our fellow creatures collectively is not that they should do the whole, which must be ever left to providence who educes good out of evil and wisdom out of folly, but that they should, in one division of the army or in the other, be working towards it. And thus it is these noble opinions, this inward piety even contradictory to their opinions, this shock which they all expressed, at the degradation of the objects of human admiration by the poets,* has preserved them from the name of Sophists, this I say and this alone; for I have only to mention the opposite to the scheme of the Eleatic School of Zeno, namely Democritus and LEUCIPPUS and the system of atoms, to exhibit the true occasion of the Sophists as far as they were occasioned by intellectual causes.

Democritus⁽²⁷⁾ took the direct opposite system to that of Zeno. Instead of rejecting the objective, instead of placing all reality in the mind itself and in what he called the whole, he placed the whole in the outward object and in the parts, and consider[ed] that he had two things to solve. The first was the impenetrability of things, if there were to be parts. For if there was to be no [im]penetrability, where was to be the end? We should go on from little to less and from less to less and so forth. And at the same time, <there was> the power of composition. Both these he discovered, as he imagined, in the notion of an atom. An atom was to explain two things which experience had shewn him in nature: the first was that things were divisible, that they were capable (as a thought is not) of being dissolved into parts and separated one part from the other; and the next is their resistance, their power of cohesion. In order to do this he combined the two notions of hardness and

* Hesiod and Homer, cf. Lect. II. pp. 88-g.

separability in supposing matter to be a composition of atoms. If he was asked why there was a resistance made to matter by matter, why one subject opposed another, he referred it to the impenetrability of atoms. If he was asked why matter was capable of being divided, as, for instance, anything being crushed, the answer was the same—the atoms are divided from each other though they themselves are indivisible.*

Something however was required *<to explain>* why these atoms came together at all, how they came to connect and form essence. In order to *<explain>* this he was obliged to imagine, that is to invent, a *power*, the very thing which he had been anxious to avoid, which he called gravity, a something which was no longer either an atom or any thing capable of being conceived of by the mind, but a notion altogether borrowed from what he found within himself, namely, the sense of power. And out of this came the whole notable system of material or mechanic philosophy, I mean, permit me to say, the mechanic philosophy taken as the base and groundwork of human knowledge in itself; as instrumental it cannot be too highly valued. But it began with a perfect fiction, as complete a dream as ever formed any imagined image, for if you made it of any size [and a particular degree of hardness, why not of some other size or hardness]?† And if this is to be answered, it must be, "By a miracle"—that is by a power, but of a different kind, having preternaturally given it a degree of hardness which, though essentially it would not have had, yet, by that act of power, it was chosen to possess—thereby directly introducing what it was wished to avoid.

And even when they had this fiction upon which the whole was grounded, what was to be done with it? The atoms would remain harmless atoms, as harmless—I wish all nonsense was equally so. No, there must be another datum given, namely, that they were to have two powers, attraction and repulsion, to attract and to repel, and that the result of this should be another power, gravitation. *There* was a second violent assumption, but the third is most wonderful of all, for all this would do nothing but by accident. One atom was larger than the rest, consequently having a larger force, and that being the case it is as easy as can be—it is only to see how things are and then put that as the cause by which they

* The reporter wrote "irresistible".

† Based on a note on Tennemann, *op. cit.*, III. 12.

came to being. It is sufficient if you call the sun the largest atom and the stars smaller atoms, and apportion the degrees of attraction and repulsion and it is as easy as can be. It is only to make three perfectly arbitrary and contradictory positions and the whole is done. All that can be lamented is that so much time should have been wasted, for it is simply saying, why the truth was that the causes of things were what they were, and something or other must have been, and that something or other must have been the cause. No more is gained, for no man can understand more by an atom than by something, no man can understand more by attraction and repulsion placed in an atom than by something or nothing, and so on; for this reason, that the moment he comes to explain the words, he refers only to certain appearances which are generalized under those words, and if he means more than that he travels out of the system. The case comes to a power altogether unmechanical, which is necessary for the first step of every mechanical system,* exactly as every man making a machine goes on the presumption of gravitation and would laugh if you asked him what machine that was. He would say, if it was so, there must have been another gravitation, and so on *ad infinitum*, for a machine never could originate its motion in any mechanical principle.

Still it is observable that Democritus himself was none of the modern atheists, none of the materialists. His reason, indeed, out of two difficulties, or of two absurdities I may say, may have chosen the one. He chose materialism instead of Spinosism,⁽²⁸⁾ and therein he made the better choice, because by leading men more to exercise their senses, and to acquire experience concerning the bodies in nature and her operations, he then led us to science; and in all ages therefore his name has been and deserves to be venerated, and his feelings show him entitled to it. The very absurdities which he labors through in order to produce an object for the hopes and fears of men, his contrivance of a particular kind of spherical atom out of which time was made, which was to be different from the atom of matter, his notion that those atoms could not be divided or dissolved, his notion that certain effluxes which came from and produced gods and demons which (whatever their origin) were beings of high perfection, in short all the religion that could be produced on this principle, that the

* The reporter wrote "reason".

effect was more noble than the cause, all this Democritus did with hearty good will.*

But still the consequence of these struggles of human reason with itself, the calling in question on the part of his school and that of LEUCIPPUS [of the *νοούμενα*]† and attempting to originate them in the objects of the senses, on the one hand, [*ἐν φαινόμενα* ; and on the other] the denial of motion, and in short all of those things which it is not in our power to disbelieve however we try, on the part of Zeno, had produced a sceptical turn in the minds of men in that upon which the state of society must always depend, namely the tone of mind. The better educated man had to prepare [a counterbalance]‡ for the extraordinary victories in which the Athenians joined with the other Greeks but in which the Athenians preserved their [*independent character*. *The*] splendid victories, the romantic character of those victories, the constant appeal to them in the orations before the people, joined with the democratic government and the lessening ascendancy of the gentry or higher classes over the populace, luxury increased rapidly by a new communication with Persia and the East through the rich commercial towns of Minor Asia, with luxury, selfishness and a disposition to enjoy life rather than think about it, made an admirable ground for a system which in point of intellect was not much different or much worse than had gone before; but was utterly different by its object, which was that of loosening the human mind from all control except from that of a calculation, which was left to every man's own choice, what degree of enjoyment he was likely to have from this or that mode.

Various have been the pictures given us by Plato, Aristotle and SEXTUS EMPIRICUS,§ but I know none equal in fidelity and liveliness to that given by a Jewish writer whose work is in the *Apocrypha* under the name of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, where speaking of these sophists he said,⁽²⁹⁾

* NB. 25: The result of the atomic system plainly atheistic—but herein Democritus in one extreme as Zeno in the other, distinguished from the Sophists, by the contrary being their wish, object, and inward Belief. This shewn in Democritus's peculiar atoms for the Soul.

† The *Friend*, III, 115.

‡ *Ibid*.

§ A case of mis-hearing? The reporter wrote "Plato, Aristotle and other Sophists", which is engagingly un-Coleridgean. The NB. gives the reading above. Possibly Coleridge actually said: by Plato and Aristotle of the Sophists. See the *Friend*, III. 112-3.

"For they said, reasoning with themselves but not aright, 'Our life is short and tedious and in the death of man there is no remedy: neither was there any man known to have returned from the grave'."—The first thing is reducing all things to the mere experience of the senses.

"For we are born at all adventure: and we shall be hereafter as though we had never been: for the breath in our nostrils is as smoke, and a little spark in the moving of our heart:

"Which being extinguished, our body shall be turned into ashes and our spirit shall vanish as the soft air,

"And our name shall be forgotten in time"—sufficient to shew that from all the objects of the senses we have nothing but corruptibility. And why should we suppose we are formed (*for eternity*)? Not merely because we have life and spirit—so has a tree in its way, so the beast, and yet they die, they pass into ashes, and their spirit, whatever it is, blends into the common air, into that great Abyss which the religious men call Deity. And there is an end of it. But still, the mind of man aims for pre-eminence, and even in that state too noble to be utterly debased by such opinions, he wishes to live in his children, he wishes to live in the recollection and blessings of his posterity. "No," the sophists say, "our name shall be forgotten in time, and no man shall have our works in remembrance, and our life shall pass away as the trace of a cloud, and shall be dispersed as a mist that is driven away with the beams of the sun and overcome with the heat thereof.

"For our time is a very shadow that passeth away; and after our end there is no returning: for it is fast sealed, so that no man cometh again.

"Come on therefore,"—this is the natural result, and excellent good logic, too, according to this notion, "Come on therefore, let us enjoy the good things that are present; and let us speedily use the creatures like as in youth.

"Let us fill ourselves with costly wine and ointments: and let no flower of the Spring pass by us:

"Let us crown ourselves with rose buds, before they be withered:

"Let none of us go without his part of our voluptuousness; let us leave tokens of our joyfulness in every place: for this is our portion, and our lot is this." Then the writer, with a beautiful insight into human nature, shows how closely cruelty follows

on sensuality and that hardening <of> the mind which sensuality in all its forms is most sure to produce. "Let us oppress the poor righteous man, let us not spare the widow, nor reverence the ancient grey hairs of the aged.

"Let our strength be the law of justice: for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth. Therefore let us lie in wait for the righteous; because he is not for our turn." If this should appear to be a picture drawn from an enemy, permit me to give you the evidence of a sophist in his own words; and I will trust to your recollection to compare them with the part of the scripture which I have just read.

["By nature, the worse off is always the more infamous, that namely, which suffers wrong; but according to the law it is the doing of wrong. For no man of noble spirit will let himself be wronged; this a slave only endures, who is not worth the life he has, and under injuries and insults can neither help himself nor those that belong to him. Those, who first made the laws, were, in my opinion, feeble creatures, which in fact the greater number of men are; or they would not remain entangled in these spider-webs. Such, however, being the case, laws, honour, and ignominy were all calculated for the advantage of the law-makers. But in order to frighten away the stronger, whom they could not coerce by fair contest, and to secure greater advantages for themselves than their feebleness could otherwise have procured, they preached up the doctrine that it was base and contrary to right to wish to have anything beyond others; and that in this wish consisted the essence of injustice. Doubtless it was very agreeable to them, if being creatures of a meaner class they were allowed to share equally with their natural superiors. But nature dictates plainly enough another code of right, namely, that the nobler and stronger should possess more than the weaker and more pusillanimous. Where the power is, there lies the substantial right. The whole realm of animals, nay the human race itself as collected in independent states and nations, demonstrates that the stronger has a right to control the weaker for his own advantage. Assuredly they have the genuine notion of right, and follow the law of nature, though truly not that which is holden valid in our governments. But the minds of our youth are preached away from them by declamations on the beauty and fitness of letting themselves be mastered, till by these verbal conjurations the noblest nature

is tamed and cowed, like a young lion born and bred in a cage. Should a man with full untamed force but once step forward, he would break all your spells and conjurations, trample your contra-natural laws under his feet, vault into the seat of supreme power, and in a splendid style make the right of nature be valid]* among you." This I believe is the earliest, so it is the best, exposition of right as it is disjoined from duty. I wish we heard less of it in the present day.

That this was not a mere accompaniment of a debauched state but that it was truly and effectually a working agent in precipitating its fall, we have every testimony that history can give us; and as if the Almighty, either by direct interference as in the case of the Hebrews, or by particular providence, never left man wholly without an aid in the worst times (and if he refused it, left him wholly without excuse) at that time and in this age was Socrates born, whose whole life was one contest against the sophists, but who yet marked the necessity of revelation by an intermixture of weakness, nay even of sophistry, in his own mode of contending against them. He did the best it was <possible>† for unassisted man to do. He lived holily and died magnanimously, and He who judges us by the love in our hearts when we have in the hour . . . we may safely look for our reward.

He was a man (if I may speak of him as a man and as far as we can learn of his biographer Xenophon or the more suspicious representations of Plato, who however is very faithful in his portraits) [one who]† generally appears to have possessed a fine and active but yet not very powerful imagination—an imagination instrumental and illustrative rather than predominant and creative; but beyond all doubt what characterized him was—pardon the play on words, the UNCOMMON‡ excellence of common sense. Naturally and by observation he excelled in this and cultivated it. There was in his character an exquisite balance, an equilibrium and harmony of all the various faculties, so that everywhere his mind acted§ by a sort of tact, as it were, rather

* Quoted by Coleridge in the *Friend*, III. 100–2, from the speech of Callicles in the *Gorgias*, identified by the reporter's catching the last two words of it.

† [E. H. C.]

‡ The reporter wrote "human". [E. H. C.] questioned the "play on words" as from that reading he might well do. NB. 25 removes the difficulty.

§ NB. 25 adds: totally.

than arithmetically* or by examining the process. This without genius would have been the character of a wise, natural, unaffected man; but Socrates doubtless possessed genius in a high degree,⁽³⁰⁾ a peculiar turn for contemplation, not for the purposes of physical truth, but in aid of prior truths or anticipations found in his own nature by meditation. He meditated, observed the goings on of his mind, started questions to himself; as far as by himself he could decide them he did, but then modestly went forth among mankind and still questioned everywhere how far general experience authorized him to generalize those truths. His genius too, and this turn for observation arising from meditation, was thereby distinguished from that of Xenophanic observation.

This turn for meditative observation was connected in him, as we find it in others of our times, with a species of humour and keen perception of the extravagant, the irrational, the absurd; and with the freedom of a republican city it led him frequently into good-humoured conversations with his fellow citizens (*in a city*) THEN ALL ALIVE† with the sophists and with their disciples. So hard is it for virtue to wrestle with vice or good sense with folly without receiving some stain on its outward garments, it cannot be denied, I fear, that from this practice he fell at times into the very errors he was opposing. At all events, by his example he gave currency to a mode of argument which may be as easily, perhaps more easily, adapted to delusion than *<to>* sound conviction. It has the misfortune at least, by entangling a man in a number of questions the answers to which he does not anticipate, of leaving a final conviction, as if the man were cheated INTO A conclusion though he could see no HOLE afterwards to escape from it. But with minds truly ingenuous nothing is more desirable than this method of leading the mind to a consciousness of its own ignorance by degrees, and of securing every step behind before there was any undue progress forward. These are the faults and excellence of the Socratic mode as they appear to me.

But this was not all. All these qualities would not of themselves have formed a Socrates. He had, and in that all of his contemporaries and all who followed joined, a deep, nay what our enlightened men of the present day would perhaps call a

* NB. 25 reads, instead of the remainder of the sentence: in the first instance discursively.

† The reporter wrote: "you all allow". [E. H. C.] suggested "you will allow".

superstitious, and earnest piety, which disposed him to the reverence of the unknown, whatever it was, nay even to a reverence of the best signs* of it (however he might disapprove of them) which secured his fellow creatures from being merely as the beasts that perish. He was in every sense of the word a religious man, and as the natural result of religion, combined a firm love of his fellow creatures <with his love of truth>.

I should be thought to have omitted a very important or at least interesting part of the disquisition if I did not say a few words on the d[a]emon of Socrates.⁽³¹⁾ He thought himself, and asserted himself to be, accompanied by a d[a]emon as he called it. It gave him no light, no insight; it was as evidently not conscious, for it never decided on the right or wrong of any action but it was a PREVENTIVE WARNING, OR presentiment† which, whenever he was about to do that which would be injurious either temporally or morally, withheld him. Nor was this all, but in a passage where he endeavours to explain it, if that indeed may be called explanation which commences with a full acknowledgement that it was utterly inexplicable to him, that he was as much surprized and unable to account for it as those who related it, that it had an influence upon those around him, he introduces an instance of a young man‡ who had been a sensualist⁽³²⁾ who had declared he had heard from others the doctrines which Socrates had taught and was disposed to ridicule and laugh at them; that when he heard them himself he was impressed, not intellectually by an insight into the truth, but in a manner he could not account for; but when introduced to Socrates he felt a change in his mind, a predisposition to receive the truth, so utterly different from anything which a pleasing appearance could produce or impress upon him as to induce him with the belief that there was something divine. "Nay," says Socrates, as if he were preparing for credulity which his love of truth would not permit him to avoid exciting, "nay, I have known my friends, by being in the house where I was, to feel suddenly on my

* Symbols?

† The reporter wrote, "precentive preventive prcsentiment". [E. H. C.] was puzzled, naturally, but unable to emend.

‡ NB. 25: He relates of Thucydides that he felt himself strangely persuaded not only by Socrates' words but by his presence—nay, by being in the same house, but most experientially when he happened to be in contact with him—Incredulity and Credulity. (The notes now begin to be hurried, sparse and written in a larger hand.)

entering it an influence on their minds which they had not in the moments before been conscious of, and an influence of its own kind." As I am utterly incapable of explaining this fact I mention it only to express one conviction of mine, that it is always easy to say, "I do not understand it, and till I have the means of so doing here I will rest unless there be some manifest conviction brought to me of either intentional or unintentional imposture." It is easy to say with Gibbon there is a middle state [between self-illusion and voluntary fraud,]* and bring Socrates as an example. This is easily said. But where are the proofs of it? What is there in Socrates's whole character which should lead him to assert it, if false, without deriving any consequences from it, without any wish to excite a sect? Instead of referring it to any inspiration, to declare it inexplicable, to have mentioned it as wishing to have it explained?

I say general truths are good things in themselves but must be applied [cautiously]† or else they would come from being generals to mere nothings.⁽³³⁾ I say I cannot pretend to limit the powers of Providence. I can on the contrary see very substantial motives for the supposition that while God acted directly upon the chosen nation, as preparing a receptacle for that religion which was to spread over all mankind, He did not in the meantime wholly abandon those who were hereafter to be taken into his church; but in other ways, so distinguishable from the truths of revelation and the miracles that accompanied it, as not to hazard the least confusion, and yet a sufficient pledge that his Providence was universal and that wherever there was a heart that truly loved Him, there His assistance was given, either by the means of nature or by inspirations of which we are not capable of judging.

The clamour of the sophists against Socrates, and his death (or what it might be truly called, his martyrdom) I will not detail to you. You must be all acquainted with them from childhood. It is sufficient to state that in his philosophy he had the design, and he certainly produced the effect, of making the moral being of man the especial and single object of thought and of human institution. Disheartened by the gross incongruity of the

* Gibbon, E. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chap. L. (Bury ed. Vol. V. 401.)

† The reporter wrote "casually". [D. C.] emended.

opinions of the elder philosophers, seeing no good arising at that time, perhaps despairing far too early of any good which might arise from their physical, astronomical and astrological speculations, he said, "Whether these things be true or not and whether anything or nothing is to come out of them, still men must be men before generally they can receive any advantage. Our great object at present is to render ourselves susceptible of any truths for good purposes which God may hereafter grant us. The proper knowledge of mankind is man."* Consequently all his reasoning, and I may add all his sophistry, tends to this one point, to withdraw the human mind from all other subjects as of main or important interest till it had entered into that, the last, the most important. Before his death and his condition—the state of his own moral being (from the influence of Socrates, from the celebrity if I may say so of his death, from the hasty repentance of the Athenians afterwards) this undoubtedly produced on the pagan world a greater effect than any other single event can be supposed to do; it undoubtedly did draw the mind of Plato and others to more and more speculations concerning the heart of man; and then at last the whole came to be this, that with the better and profounder kind it excited an anticipation of some clearer knowledge which doubtless prepared greatly for the reception of Christianity; in the lower orders, who were incapable of understanding these abstract speculations, *<it>* still produced a sense of their necessity which made them receive Christianity with gratitude and with fervor.

This must be stated as a defect, likewise, as indeed is the case in the writings before the time of Socrates, and even in a number of the dialogues of Plato himself: there is a confusion arising from the word 'happiness'.⁽¹³⁴⁾ Happiness† is every where stated as the aim of man, the last aim; but with Socrates as with the writers much later than he—indeed, hitherto—no proper distinction has been made what is properly meant by happiness. And if it were required of me to attempt to impress upon the minds of others the importance of words and the truth of old Hobbes's maxim, that how easily from mistakes in words men fall

* NB. 25 continues: This he too rashly (those at least who heard him) interpreted exclusively & to an exclusion or contempt of theoretical knowledge. (*Has happened in still higher cases*).

† NB. 25: Eudaimonism.

into mistakes in the most important things,⁽³⁶⁾ I know not a more impressive instance than this of the word 'happiness'. There are four perfectly distinct states. We need only appeal to our own consciences to know their distinctions, namely: that of a bodily [appetite],* in other words a perfect correspondence of the external stimulants to the frame to be stimulated, producing an aggregate of bodily pleasurable sensations; the second, a certain joyousness, [gladness, laetitia, *Εὐφροσύνη*],† as where Pythagoras discovered the proposition that made him cry out 'Eureka',⁽³⁶⁾ and this every man who has intellectual light will refuse to consider—I do not consider—analogue to the pleasure of eating venison or enjoying anything else bodily. He calls it 'intellectual pleasure' forgetting he must find something in common . . . The third is a speculative point which arises from the consideration of our extreme dependence upon external things. That a man has reason to congratulate himself on having been born in such an hour and climate under such and such circumstances and under such auspicious circumstances, this the ancients called [*Εὐτυχία, Εὐδαιμονία*].‡ That is when the Gods were favorable to them, and we call it 'happiness' when things happen well; the fourth I cannot otherwise express than in the words of the liturgy as "the peace of God" which every man who has had an approving conscience must know. How infinitely it is degraded from being combined in one [*genus*] with eating and drinking or whatever follows!

Now Socrates was constantly vacillating.‡ At one time things were to be revered and honoured for their utility, which at times meant the quantum of agreeable sensations; sometimes other things were evil and then it signified an intellectual harmony. At other times he has a still higher flight and he speaks with true piety of blessedness but again relapses and considers this but another mode of pleasure. The consequence of this was shown <by> his disciples immediately. I am not speaking of those who became so eminent in themselves as Plato and Aristotle, for

* MS. Egerton 3057.

† NB. 27.

‡ The notes are very sketchy: But his own system unsteady as to Eudaimonism—this explained. And then the two extremes of Aristippus, the Cyrenaic, and Antisthenes the founder of the Cynic—both in reality having the same object, viz. the quantum of pleasurable sensation; but calculating differently.

they are subjects each of a separate consideration, but of Aristippus and Antisthenes.*

⟨*Antisthenes was*⟩ a poor man of a morose constitution originally, who understood from Socrates that happiness consisted in independence—in the being free from all the anxieties after pleasure, and equally with the others made pleasure or the absence of pain their happiness; and from thence founded the sect of the cynics which threw off . . . denied all the civilities of life and the courtesies because they led to falsehood; and in short ⟨*he*⟩ became a mendicant friar, under pretence of morality covering an intense selfishness, and evidencing it by two things: the gratifying of human malignity by perpetually sneering at the vices of others, and maintaining himself by the booty gained from this gratification.

On the other extreme arose Aristippus, who was a man of rank and fashion and of cheerful temper, and he consider[ed], as was very fairly deduced from it, that with regard to pleasure the question is, not what sort but how much. For if it is pleasure why ask what sort it is? That is dependent upon accidents. One man may say, "I delight in Milton and Shakspeare more than turtle or venison." Another man, "That is not my case. For myself, I think a good dish of turtle and a good bottle of port afterwards give me much more delight than I receive from Milton and Shakspeare." You must not dispute about tastes. And if a taste for Milton is the same as a taste for venison there is no objection to be found in the argument. At least it is perfectly clear that if they are all different species of pleasure the question of what kind it is must be referred to the accident of the organs which are to be the means of conveying it; and the only result which is universal to all men is how much of it there is.

Therefore from the laxity of the Socratic moral with regard

* The last paragraph of notes for this lecture is interesting biographically, though not much used for the lecture: Antisthenes was first a Scholar of Gorgias—but having probably a good heart that could not bear trifling with & a stern temper, forsook him for Socrates; yet still retained the love of Paradox from his first master—and he was poor. Aristippus on the other hand was rich, or as we should say, a man of rank, fashion and good standing. Aristippus with a large portion of Socrates's good sense, Antisthenes with more of Socrates's moral Depth.

And conclude with the reconciliation of the two by subordination as by ΠΕΤΑΖΖΙ⁽⁸⁷⁾. Why did I dare say *reconciliation*—it is one indeed, but only by Warfare and Conquest—the reconciliation of a broke-in Horse to his Master.

to the subject of utility, and out of that to the word "happiness" EUDAIMONISM and the system which has been since called [*Hedonism has sprung.*] All the sophists whom Socrates had done so much to destroy reappeared in a short time, and the name of the Epicureans, no longer sceptical [*but dogmatic, is chiefly associated with a*] degraded idea, and with it the corruption and sensuality which first produced the utter downfall of Grecian greatness and Greek liberty. Then did they pass over to avenge the Greeks on their conquerors the Romans, and to produce the same effects in a more disgusting form, till the time came when human nature presented one of the most hateful objects human nature could do, namely a power upon earth, a nature above animals with superior powers to do *<good>*, yet exerting all those powers to cultivate the very worst passions with the very worst objects of the beasts that perish. Such was the point that history gives it of the system of pleasure as the great object of morals, and which has been now speciously called the calculations of utility upon the sound basis of self-love.⁽³⁸⁾

LECTURE IV

JANUARY 11, 1819⁽¹⁾

THIS EVENING, 8 o'clock, Crown & Anchor, Strand, MR. COLERIDGE'S LECTURE on PLATO and PLATONISM, in connexion with the Fine Arts and with Christianity. On the Thursday following, Shakespeare's Macbeth. Admission 5s.*

An indolent man lying on his sofa and yawning is said to have exclaimed [*"Utinam hoc esset laborare"*].† "I wish this was being at work." Something like a similar feeling I may express. I wish that the subject of philosophy were as amusing to us as it is important; but we must take it as it is, consoling ourselves with this, that every pleasure that is procured by attempting at something beyond. . . .

In the important stage in the history of philosophy on which we are now standing, it will be convenient to take a rapid review of what I have hitherto laid before you. I began with Thales or the Ionic sect and shewed that these differed from their predecessors and were therefore entitled to be mentioned as forming the path, the transit to philosophy, rather than *<as>* philosophers themselves—by seeking for the origin of things in their own observations and in the force of their own understandings, instead of deriving them from history and religious tradition. The good which this exertion of the human intellect brought with it appeared in the immediate followers of Thales himself. They had already detected two great truths neither of which has yet been used to the full extent and which, like many truths of the elder

* *The Times*, January 11, 1819. The same announcement appeared in the *Morning Chronicle*, the *New Times*, the *Morning Post*. The *Courier* carried a similar announcement on January 9.

† NB.21 (*A.P.7.*)

mathematicians, are to produce their effects thousands of years after them: first, that the final solution of phaenomena cannot itself be a phaenomenon; and next, the law that action and reaction can only take place between things similar in essence. Such were their merits.

Pythagoras, the proper founder of philosophy, proposed the whole problem, the attempt to solve which constitutes the philosopher, namely the connexion of the visible thing, the phaenomenon, with the invisible thing, under a cause common to both and above both. Unfortunately our knowledge of the particulars of this great man and his opinions is and must remain matter of conjecture. In other words with him, as with others in history, we must have discovered the truth ourselves by other means, before, out of the mass of traditions, assertions, and fables, we can discriminate what really was Pythagorean, and that it *was* Pythagorean.⁽²⁾ After him philosophy split immediately into two sects, the Eleatic, under Zeno,⁽³⁾ who allowed the world to possess no reality BUT IN THE MIND, and the Corpuscular, under Democritus,⁽⁴⁾ who allowed NO REALITY TO THE MIND BUT AS A RESULT OR EFFLUX FROM THE body, the ultimate ground of which body he placed in atoms. Then arose Anaxagoras who in many respects resembled our own LOCKE.⁽⁵⁾ He attempted and in part did reconcile both parties; he introduced the *Nous* or supreme mind, but he still retained matter and he still retained [spirit]* as acting upon matter, and from the mind he deduced all in matter that was [formed]†—proportion, aptitude and so forth.

In this matter he reconciled the best feelings of men inwardly and of a moral nature, with their feelings having reference to outward morality; but he did not solve any of the difficulties. For if he was asked what becomes of this matter after you have taken away the properties, he would be at a loss to decide the question. For a thing without any properties at all is tantamount to nothing. Were he asked, what property is essential to matter? What is the meaning of the word you use? And as you take two powers, first matter and then intellect, and the one independent of the other, how do you explain the possibility of the action of the one upon the other? To all this Anaxagoras would certainly have no answer to return, and the fact is, that

* E. H. C.

† E. H. C. The reporter wrote "found".

while it did honour to his heart to have secured in his philosophy an object for the best moral feelings of mankind (and in itself most advantageous, inasmuch as philosophy cultivated in parts is much better than philosophy not cultivated at all) by securing an object for the contemplation of the human mind when dwelling on its own highest faculties, still I say, so lame was the system of the world which he brought forward that not only Aristotle, but Plato himself complains of him that his *Nous*, or supreme reason, was a mere hypothesis to solve a few impossibilities but never introduced when he could do without it. As long as ever mechanical causes could explain the thing, so long the *Nous* was not heard of; when a miracle was to be worked, then only, when he had no further reason to give, this *Nous* was introduced.

This matter has certainly led the way to those who, beginning with an acknowledgment of the Supreme Reason, attribute it so much to second causes that it becomes a matter of wonder what was remaining to the first cause, or wherein the necessity of it could consist. For if matter, in itself, without reason and without benevolence, could by any positions into which it might be placed act wisely and act benevolently, common sense would say, "if now it is possible why not always possible?" The very answer to that would imply immediately the very contrary, namely, that it was not possible. For it is evident that it *<a first cause>* cannot be incompatible with matter universally, with every particle the matter may be supposed to have for any given time. It is very true that taking any one particle of matter it could not be supposed to originate in itself; but that this must be derived not from anything out of matter but from matter itself, is implied in the very supposition that matter has it, and that therefore it is a property not at all contradictory to matter but that which may be connected with it. Therefore I say that Anaxagoras provided a scheme which had some disadvantages and some advantages. It had sundry advantages, inasmuch as for those who did not think very deeply it offered no outrage to their moral or religious feelings, and on the other hand it was better than the Eleatic School, the Idealists, because it left a world of observation open to the mind and was at least neutral if not favourable to experimental philosophy.

From these disputes, however, (for I cannot say that his doctrines had real influence upon society, but that while the good

man prided himself upon his consciousness that there was a Supreme Reason, the bad man took advantage of the logic of what he ought from his own principles to have concluded) though I say I cannot find that he produced any great effect on society, that, whatever it was, seems to have given way to the corruption of manners introduced by the sudden prosperity and ambition and democratic fury of the Greek states. Had the whole progress of philosophy been confined to the history of Greece, I should not hesitate in affirming that it had been an evil for mankind, if only for this reason: that it was, joined with that corruption, the principal cause of the origin of the sophists, men who no sooner had discovered that the reason and the reasoning faculties had power in themselves but they abused it to the worst purposes of the worst passions, namely, as I have shewn in a former lecture,⁽⁶⁾ to unsettle all the moral feelings, all that bound man to man, upon the score of a crude speculation which was then beginning only to found itself. From the corruption of morals and manners doubtless the sophists began, though like worms they not only increased the putridity that produced them but made it additionally contagious. Yet it was from the reputation that preceding philosophers had gained, it was from the confusion of mind produced from the opposition of the sects—the Eleatic, who denied all credit to the senses and the sect of Democritus, who placed all in the senses—that these men borrowed their armour. The state of things as presented to us by history is shocking, perhaps nothing in history, to a reflecting mind, so shocking; for you find states enjoying every blessing of heaven in a lovely climate, with competency of life, high guides of nature, those highly cultivated with objects of patriotism that still tended to expand, each mind nearer* falling into a sympathy with the whole—a dignity derived even from an unhappy source, but then common to the whole world, that of slavery: and yet instead of aught moral that should have followed this, the historians represent them as utterly false, incapable of all trust, cruel in their private life and debauchees, and in their public life open to every man who could bribe them, either on the one side by money, or on the other by that worst of all bribes to a corrupt people, the flattery and gratification of their pride and their rapacity.

* E. H. C. suggested 'never', not much help; but this is perhaps one of those sentences that put Crabb Robinson to sleep.

In this emergency Providence vouchsafed to raise up Socrates who, attributing the unsettled state of his countrymen in great part to the application of the mind of those who ought to have been their instructors and who were best fitted both morally and intellectually to have become such, attributing it, I say, to their application to objects which he deemed placed beyond all but conjecture, namely the organisation of things and the laws of the world, and in part to the neglect which thence arose in the media of the intercourse between man and man, namely language and the connexion of thoughts,* Socrates lived and died in the unwearied effort to convince his countrymen that the proper object of mankind was the knowledge of man. And again, in his modes of impressing this truth† he endeavoured to teach all with whom he conversed that it was idle to argue without previous definitions of the terms used by the disputants, and that the only way to arrive at a just definition was by a fair induction of all the particulars‡—which could not be gained but by looking at them without prejudice and with a mind weaned from its selfish passions.

But I endeavoured to shew and I believe proved, in my former lecture, that Socrates himself was not free from the errors which it was his object to oppose⁽⁷⁾ and (I must not say that without adding) to his imperishable glory did oppose, in so many and in such important points. For little, and with a poor spirit, does he estimate the merits of a great man by the mere quantum of direct truth which he happens to teach first, or detract from that merely by the quantum of error with which that truth was mingled through human imperfections and the state of the times in which he lived. No, these are but small and comparatively trifling portions of a great man's merits. It is to have awakened an idea, to have excited a spirit, to have opened a road and to have given the first impulse to it. He is working in hundreds in after ages who are working in his spirit, and to him they will all, in proportion as they possess his genius, give praise and honor. Not that this and that was done well, or this or that erroneously, but

* NB. 25: imperfect and tricking logic of the time.

† NB. 25: by his own example.

‡ NB. 25 contains the parenthesis: the definition being more or less perfect according as the induction was more or less sufficient. Thus, ex.gr. the *fuga vacui* were as good a generalization as the law of gravitation had it been equally co-extensive with the facts.

that it was done at all; that it was attempted, that the path was opened, that the light was given, that the impulse was provided—the power of doing this constitutes the power of a great man. I could not mention the name of Socrates with anything that resembles detraction without saving myself from infamy by this explanation.

The Socratic method, safe in his hands and in those of men as pure* as himself, was certainly too† near to a sort of special pleading, by not presenting the whole at first to the person who was to be converted‡ but entrapping him into concessions as to the result of which he was to be kept in the dark. This I have mentioned chiefly for its historic importance, for in his hands, as we shall see hereafter, it was admirably adapted.§

There is a greater defect, that which admits of no compliment, though all that I have said before fully applies to it. He began to think deeply of that which men ought really to exist in and to pursue. He seriously proposed to himself and to his fellow-citizens the question, what is the *summum bonum*—what is that highest good, that ultimate aim to which all the detail of our efforts and of our withholdings are to be considered as instrumental, as secondary, as mere means. Now here there does certainly appear in the Socratic doctrines a considerable vacillation. Socrates appears to have felt it, not without considerable irritation natural to a good mind which had not yet perfectly cleared the doubt. He says, “I devote to the furies the man who first made the distinction between the useful and the honorable;”⁽⁸⁾ but it was not a man that made the distinction—it was human nature that had made it. It was the conceptions of human nature, it was all the circumstances in contradiction to the higher destinies of men and which were constantly making conquests wide and near moving all nations, I may say, which had made the distinction before him, and which with an imperative voice still continued, amidst the shouts and triumphs of wickedness and the groans of oppressed

* NB. 25: and sane-minded.

† NB. 25: near akin to the Sophistic, and secured the victory to the best Special-pleaders.

‡ NB. 25: the convertendus.

§ NB. 25: even without any improvement, to the purposes and persons which Socrates had in view—namely to make your knowing man conscious of his ignorance. —And in all cases it requires only a previous statement of the conclusion to which you would lead your auditor.

virtue, amidst all that was good in the good, and all that was evil in the evil, called aloud, yea with the most piercing of all invocations, that of inward prayer to the Unknown Being, unknown yet wished for, did it call, till He who alone could give the answer to it appeared in his Son and introduced the decision by the voice of revealed religion.

The great point which Socrates laid down was this, that ignorance was the ground of all vice and therein of all misery, and that knowledge on the contrary was the source of all virtue and therein of all happiness. To this object he constantly tended, but it was evident to a thinking man that either it was an argument in a circle, or it led to the destruction of the very essence of virtue. For if he meant, which he could not, that no man does a crime knowing it to be a crime and knowing that its effect will be a disproportionate one to the misery, to his future being, compared to the gratification he immediately receives from it, it is notoriously false. Every drunkard that lifts with trembling hands his glass to his lips and even sheds tears over it, knowing the anguish it will occasion, is a proof against it. No, it is impossible as the whole experience of the world shews. It is not an ignorance of the effects that will arise from it, but to get rid of the pain arising from the want of it, and that just in proportion as the pleasure declines, so the temptation, as it is called, or the motive, becomes equal; then does the good,* become most tremendous.⁽⁹⁾ Not a single ray of pleasure beforehand, but the daily round of habit from behind, *that* presses on the human mind. It could not be taken, therefore, in this sense. For we all know, we are so well persuaded in our own mind, that what we call criminals are aware at the time they commit the crime both of its criminality and of its consequences to themselves, that wherever we can make out a fair case of complete ignorance, we acquit the being of guilt and place him either as an idiot, or a madman, or as by law we do, as a child. So little is it possible that in this sense vice can originate, properly speaking, in ignorance. But if on the other hand Socrates meant that vice was not possible, was not compatible with the clear perfect insight into the very nature of the action of the soul, and such a commanding idea to the mind as comprises a perfect

* Possibly Coleridge means here that the positive idea of good, the necessity of having in mind some ideal good, is most important at that moment when desire for present comfort and fear of future consequences are felt to be in equilibrium.

science, how is this to be given? For his great doctrine was that it could be taught. The only answer to be made was: it must be given to a mind predisposed to it. And hence he uses the word *apatheia*, not *ignorantia*, for ignorance. This is merely a concession of the point in dispute, for then there is something attached to knowledge and the condition of it, not knowledge itself, which is necessary to make this knowledge efficacious or influential. So that in truth we see that knowledge without this is without avail. And therefore the foundation of virtue must be laid in something to which knowledge indeed is highly natural, which in its general effects must lead to knowledge, but which in itself is a higher principle than knowledge; <it must be> placed, namely, in the will, if I may venture to use such a phrase, and in that religion which is innate in man only because it is felt by the very necessity of it.

In his own logic, therefore, he failed, for the whole, as we shall see presently, consisted and first led to a just system of reasoning. Now in all just generalization the genus or kind ought to contain the essential of each species, and not a mere quality common to the species, either accidentally or because that quality is universal; as for instance if I were to generalize trees from their uprightness, or from their VISIBILITY or any number of different trees by the accident of their having the same color. Thus again, if I were to generalize sugar and sugar of lead because they have the same color, both are sweet to the taste, both look exactly alike, both are crystallized, both frangible to the touch, but the one being nutritious and the other a deadly poison, every man would admit with me that I should have made a false generalization.* Now some error like this Socrates seems to have fallen into in the groundwork of his argument, namely, that pleasure is the ultimate object of all our pursuits—or as we should now say, “happiness, oh happiness, our end and aim” and so forth. It will be instructive to ask whether pleasure is properly capable of being designated <as the object>† of all the pursuits of men, whether it is a fit generalization, whether I have a right, for instance, strictly speaking (for I am now not talking for common life but with an attempt at least toward philosophy) have we a right I say, to talk in one word of the pleasure of a good

* NB. 25: (here, if at all, the fourfold division of pleasure, intellectual satisfaction, bliss, and happiness, from the two pocketbooks, L and Y)—(16).

† E. H. C.

conscience and the pleasure of a good dinner, as a similar good? Because both are what a man would rather wish than avoid? Is that a sufficient generalization, or more so, in truth, than the circumstance of the shape and taste of the sugar and the sugar of lead? I seem to myself to feel the contrary.

And just before I came here I lit on an old pocket book which for years had been thrown by, and in it there is a conversation which I had at Keswick with a man of great notoriety in the present day as a critic.⁽¹¹⁾ I having expressed my convictions to this purport, he answered that he saw no greater impropriety in calling that particular state of being which we experience from an approving conscience, *this* pleasure, and a different state of being which we possess during the gratification of any appetite, *that* pleasure, than in pointing to brandy and saying, *this* fluid, and then to water and saying, *that* fluid. "In other words," I replied, "you contend that pleasure is a general term, in short the *genus generalissimum* of whatever is desirable for our nature, even as you make pain the general term of the contrary?" "Even so," he said, "and why not?" I answered, "For three reasons. First, because according to your own confession we already possess such a term in the word 'good'. Pleasure therefore in this sense becomes a mere lazy synonym, whereas it is the business of the philosopher to desynonymize words originally equivalent, therein following and impelling the natural progress of language in civilized societies. 'I wish,' we say, 'that such a thing were as pleasant to me as I know it to be good.' 'This medicine is exceedingly unpleasant, but it is very good for me.' Thus you make the same confusion as if you were to use 'wine', which is the general term of all fermented liquors procured from grapes, as a synonym with 'fluid'. You may call burgundy and claret *this* and *that* fluid, but what if you were to call the seltzer and the Bath waters *this* and *that* wine. That is the true sophism. You use that which is not properly general, but universal, and you apply it as if it were general. You use 'pleasure' in the same sense as a man would do who, having called burgundy and claret *this* and *that* fluid because the genus was known to be the same, should proceed to call the Bath and seltzer waters *this* and *that* wine, in spite of the known essential differences between them. But thirdly, and of most importance, there is an equivocation in the main word of the definition, viz. *desirable*, by means of which you assume all that

ought to be proved, and prejudice the very point in dispute between us. For *desirable* means either that which actually I do desire, or that which I know I ought to desire, though perhaps I am not virtuous enough actually to will it. 'Oh if this were but virtue,' might the voluptuary say while embracing an enamoured wanton. You preassume, I say, that *Good* is nothing more than a reflex idea of the mind after a survey and calculation of agreeable or delightful sensations included within any given time, the whole of our life for instance. Now this I utterly deny. *I know—intuitively know*—that there is a power essential to my nature, and which constitutes it human nature, the voice of which is I ought, I should, I ought not, I should not, and that this voice is original and self-existent, not an echo of a prior voice—I mean the voice of prudential self-love—but the very source out of which self-love itself must flow. And I am a wicked man, I feel myself say, if I call that good which I feel I desire, instead of endeavouring to desire that only which I know to be *good*. If you answer, 'I do not understand what this good is which determines what is desirable, instead of deriving its meaning from it', we are both in the same predicament; for it is *the Peace of God* which passeth all *understanding!* But if you persist in telling me that you are conscious of nothing in your nature which gives any meaning or correspondency to what I have said, and that my words are no more than articulated sounds that knock loudly at the portal of your ears and when you open it there is *nothing*, if this be indeed the case, as God forbid it should, but if it really be so, I can only say I pity you from my inmost soul. There is a point which is above all intellect, and there are truths derived from that point which must be presumed, and which, if a man denies, we say it is not the question whether you can or cannot conceive a straight line or a curved line, or that two straight lines cannot include a space; for that, society entitles me to tell you, 'You do not understand my words or you wilfully tell a falsehood'. There is a will, a consciousness of something which, independent of desire, dictates what is desirable; and when such principles are denied you may at least candidly say, 'We differ on principles,' and charitably think that that man must be made a better before he can be made a wiser man."

This vacillation sometimes inclined, and more frequently inclined, to the moral side, at other times seeming at once to incline to the prudential, and by prudence to win over and bribe

advocates for virtue. Socrates seems to have proceeded even with the same temper which we are told was attributed to him with some tenderness of reproach by an Indian Philosopher, Calanus⁽¹²⁾ who speaking of [Socrates, Diogenes]* and other great men, said that they were men of great parts and wise men, but they paid too much obedience to the laws; which could only mean, in teaching truth they were too favourable to the prejudices and customs of those around them, alluding doubtless to their toleration of idolatry. The results were seen immediately. Could there be a doubt of the truth of my statement it would be answered, as I stated before, by the circumstance that immediately after the death of Socrates, and while his memory was preserved in equal love and veneration by all his disciples, they split into three parts. One, who took the side of virtue and who understood Socrates in the highest sense, namely Antisthenes, founded the Cynic School,⁽¹³⁾ but with a perverse spirit refused all compliance with the very means of virtue, and compelled virtue, as it were, to turn out of doors her best householder, prudence . . . if by any means it might scan any. And *<a second group followed>* Aristippus† who took the principle of self-love, and (as a man who felt in himself, in the enjoyment of good health, good fortune and high connexions, that he was doing no great harm in the world, and thought, as many men of the kind have, that to live well and comfortably was the great end of life) he founded a system, since repeated by a French philosopher, that the ground of all morality was self-love, but that well calculated.⁽¹⁴⁾ In short he left to every man to determine whether virtue or vice would be likely to be most agreeable in the long run, with only two small defects in the argument. The first was *<the doubt>* how far this system was likely to prepare in the mind any great harbour for that which was to render self-love well calculated—whether the motives you could address to a man in good health, and so forth, in life, and in the enjoyment of the pleasures of life, to urge him to the difficult task of thinking, reading, meditating, denying himself those pleasures, sacrificing that, and so forth, *<would prove effective>* when all that you had to tell him was at last, “Go on just as you are now, only, as you go on, look round you a little”. “Naturally,” *<he might reply,>* “I try to do that, but I may die tomorrow and my

* E. H. C.

† MS. Egerton 3057 inserts: founder of the Cyrenaic.

[motto]* is: a short life and a merry one." This is one tremendous defect in that system; and the other is that it precludes that very thing in *<man>* which man is made for. In the name of wonder what is it? Is reason given us to be nothing more than instinct? Instinct guides the animal safely to choose the food which is healthful, to reject that which is injurious to it; it guides it in building its nest appropriate to its wants; everywhere it governs it with regard first to its own safety, and secondly the preservation of its species. If reason is to be the mere substitute of this, for this is all self-love, can it pretend to an equality with instinct? How comes it that man should be such an unfortunate being as to be stripped of that which leads, according to this system, to his highest good and gives him no compensation whatever by any further objects? Instead, therefore, of his looking on his reason as an advantage, he must necessarily look on it as a curse of nature, subjecting him to endless wanderings, to superstitions, to every species of bewilderment from which animals are secure. If he would be at peace with his own mind and with the Providence that placed him here, he must say, "My nature has been placed above instinct. There is a faculty given to me under conditions, and those conditions observed under which it was given, will enable me to reconquer for myself, as a part of my own nature, all that which nature has given me in the form of instinct; but even there I should have had *<only>* my labor for my pains were it not that all that this instinct could give me is but the step, the ladder, to something infinitely higher."

Yet I say, these two, the Cynic and the Cyrenaic sect, the sect of those who menaced and frowned upon all the social comforts and all progress of civilization, and that which flattered all and every individual in it, did the disciples of Socrates divide into, with the exception of XENOPHON, AESCHINES, & OTHERS, who appeared TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO the true OBJECTS† of their master in this especial thing; first, they avoided all speculative things, all natural philosophy, except in subjects of experience; and second, their morality was derived according to experience, and applied according to experience, which as it fell into

* E. H. G.'s correction. The reporter wrote "mode".

† NB. 25: Their great Master's objects—practical Morality. Prudence or the Economy of Life—and the application of these principles to the existing evils of States and Individuals.

such hands as Xenophon was applied most admirably, but *principles* of morals and religion you will seek for in vain. And for our present time their writings are of most importance to us as they furnish us with a test of what in the writings of Plato is Socratic; and this the more so in Xenophon, from a fact which was generally believed by the ancients, and according to my own feeling not slightly CONFIRMED* by certain parts of Xenophon's own writing, that he was at enmity with Plato himself. Consequently wherever we find the same sentiments attributed to Socrates as are in Plato, the same substance of reasoning, we may fairly conclude it to be Socratic. Then, the ordonnance† being Plato's, I do not find any reason myself to suppose there was any serious or intentional deviation from the doctrines of Socrates to be found in Plato,⁽¹⁵⁾ no difference but through the manner in which it was given. And in this sense I understand the story related concerning Socrates, who of the two dialogues of Plato published before his death, had said, "how many fine things this young man has attributed to me which do not belong to me!" But had this regarded any essentials of Socrates's doctrines, had there been anything in the doctrines of Plato contrary to them, Xenophon would have noticed and resented it, and this not having been done I think we may fairly rely on the works of Plato as containing the true opinions of Socrates. I say this because I shall have afterwards to shew my opinion (paradoxical as it may be) that the works of Plato contain the opinions of Socrates, but they by no means convey the opinions of Plato. I do not mean that they convey different opinions but they do not convey the peculiar opinions of Plato.

Plato! I really feel, unaffectedly, an awe when I mention his name—when I consider what associations are connected with it, that it is the characteristic of ages and men, that they love and honor the name of Plato. This great man, for he truly was such, was born at the commencement of that wide-wasting Peloponnesian war ⁽¹⁶⁾ which was the true source of the destruction of Greece as far as Greece was to be destroyed, that is as far as Greece was a phenomenon in the world. An affecting <CONSIDERATION> it is that even when it was in its very height, in its utmost

* The reporter wrote "confined".

† The reporter wrote "ordinance". E. H. C. suggests "while the ordonnance is Plato's, the ideas are Socratic. I do not find," etc.

excellence, and producing those ideals of moral excellence in all the objects of thought, in all the great principles of government, in all that is to convince and elevate the mind—the fine arts, and the preparations at least, for religion, at this very time this destruction was already beginning and pre-announced; as if to say: for this alone was it created, a phenomenon which if it had been of long endurance would have been utterly mischievous, appointed for a particular purpose, the hot-bed to present impulses for all after-generations, but not to be imitated, but to be mimicked only to the degradation of itself. Such appear to me to have been the republics of Greece. They were the producers of all that men were afterwards to follow, to perfect, to diffuse, but arose out of a state of society which nothing but that fulness of genius *<and>* that paucity of life which is, as it were, insensible to deformity and to pain, could have rendered tolerable; and which we, looking at coolly, cannot but fall into the same feelings as [Polybius when he attributes the ruin of the Greek states to the frequency of perjury which they had learnt from the sophists to laugh at as a trifle. Thus they justified any expediency]* and at the same time the utmost caprice of immorality and cruelty. But at the time, too, was the man born who above all others deserved to be called the prophet and the preparer for the new world to which his writings, and still more his spirit, had led; and it is for something better, and yet for *<a>* something better against which the local polytheism of Greece and Rome struggled for a while, but at last was forced to give way to the higher evidence of, Christianity, for which I have historical evidence to prove that Platonism at least predisposed the most effective means.

Plato was born† a man of rank descended on the side of his father from the famous Codrus, the ideal of a patriotic king, while his mother descended from a brother of the great Solon. He was wealthy, as an Athenian at least, and who can blame him in taking a pride in his ancestry?—which is apparent in his writings—but still (as if genius dwelt in that descent) eminent as a poet, orator, statesman. May we not rather wonder that this man with such advantages took no part in the politics of his country, he, so eloquent, so gifted by nature personally, and by fortune in circumstances? Surely here at least we may admit the presence of

* Adapted from the *Friend*, III. 123.

† NB. 25: 3rd year of the 87th Olympiad.

a higher genius, and not improbably the poetic in the first instance. For Plato was a poet⁽¹⁷⁾ of such excellence as would have stood all other competition but that of his being a philosopher.* His poetic genius implanted in him those deep impressions and the love of them which, mocking all comparison with after objects, leaves behind it thirst for something not attained, to which nothing in life is found commensurate and which still impels the soul to pursue.

His tutor Cratylus under whom he studied the philosophy of Heraclitus, and HERMOGENES† gave him all the knowledge that was then to be obtained, but in his twentieth year he attached himself to Socrates who soon mastered his whole esteem and affections, though it is plain the opinions of Socrates were not commensurate with the whole of his genius. After the MARTYRDOM OF SOCRATES, Plato fled to Megara where Euclid⁽¹⁹⁾ taught, a disciple of Socrates. Thence he travelled to Italy, Cyrene, a famous colony of the Greeks in Africa, to Egypt and to Sicily. One of the chief objects of his travels was (and of this we have ample authority) to acquaint himself more particularly with the Pythagorean philosophy and its sources. In the same spirit he formed his intimate friendships with ARCHYTAS AND TIMAEUS THE LOCRIAN.⁽²⁰⁾ Both were and continued to be Pythagorean and both men of high rank and estimation in their country. The fame of ARCHYTAS as a MATHEMATICIAN‡ we learn from Horace,⁽²¹⁾ and Plato HIMSELF speaks of TIMAEUS⁽²²⁾ AS A MAN OF THE PROFOUNDTEST PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHT AND AS THE MOST DISTINGUISHED IN HIS NATIVE STATE for rank, property, and the MAGISTRACIES HE HAD BORNE. It is worth notice, too, that Plato brought back certain writings of the SCHOLARS OF PYTHAGORAS with which Aristotle enriched his library.⁽²³⁾ I mention these facts because I may as well say, if I were to give my conception of Plato's character, as far as any great man's character can be conceived of comparatively, I should say that it was a combination of Pythagoras with Socrates§—the good sense of Socrates and the moral objects

* NB. 25: but that of his own genius, as a philosopher (Sir H. Davy).⁽²⁴⁾

† The reporter wrote "Hermodorus". NB. 25 adds: who instructed him in the principles of the Eleatic school.

‡ The reporter wrote "magician".

§ MS. Egerton 3057: The good sense and moral precepts of Socrates with the metaphysical sentiments and the best doctrines of Pythagoras—and to these we may add the Physics of Heraclitus. [The last 'we' may be editorial.]

he had especially in view, but not as Socrates did, limiting it to the human being, but with a full impression that to understand any one thing well we must at the same moment be struggling to understand the spirit of the whole.

On Plato's return from Egypt he visited Sicily and FORMED THE ACQUAINTANCE OF DION, AND AFTER SUNDRY PERILS, TO WHICH HIS OPENNESS EXPOSED HIM FROM THE ELDER DIONYSIUS, THE TYRANT OF SYRACUSE, he arrived again at Athens where, either in his own garden or in a gymnasium or place of exercise in the suburbs, he formed the great philosophic school which from that place has been called the Academy. His lectures* were of two kinds, popular and scientific, or EXOTERIC and ESOTERIC.⁽¹⁴⁾ The object of this disparity? First of all we are to remember the fate of Anaxagoras who would have lost his life had he not fled, and of Socrates who had <not> fled. In a republic, where the mob were to be the judge, a man's innocence was of little avail. It was simply as <IF> we should say, the daily papers have expressed such and such a feeling for or against a man. Prejudice was their judge, jury, and executioner. No wonder if the philosophers felt themselves bound, in the strict sense, to be prudent and reserved, if it was only to spare their countrymen the guilt of repeating the murder of a Socrates. But there was another motive likewise, and this is in more especial connexion with my present purpose. He wished to diffuse as much knowledge, among all who were desirous of any, as they were capable of receiving, and then out of those to select such minds as had manifested a peculiar susceptibility and therefore were worthy of being selected to undergo, as the criterion, a certain moral discipline rendering them capable of being those to whom Plato could say the truth without conveying falsehood. I do not believe that there was in Plato, at least, (whatever there might have been in the mystries) the least desire of withholding any truth from those who were capable of receiving it, but that there did dwell on his mind a sense of high responsibility not to do mischief and arm fools with fire under the pretence of conveying truth. He would not set the temples of his native country on fire, simply to bring about—what? The destruction of something imperfect for that which was fiendish. But it was with him as it is with nature in the beech tree, as I have somewhere observed;⁽¹⁵⁾ she retains the old leaves upon the


* NB. 25: as were those of his scholar Aristotle after him.

tree through the winter till the new ones arise, and, as the slow buds prevail and push off the old ones, at the time that their successors are already there to take their places. For be assured that dry leaves for human nature are better than mere nakedness. Here, *<in Athens>* interrupted *<ONLY>* by the voyages to SICILY WHICH his love for Dion and his zeal for CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM PROMPTED, he lived in an even course to a good old age and died in his eighty-first year.

What remains of him are his works and his spirit. I have already dared to say that his works convey to us a full and adequate idea of Plato's eloquence, of his exquisite dramatic talent, of his powers of producing a perfect model of conversation among men of rank (worthy of that rank by the objects concerning which they conversed), that they present the perfection of all that can be wished for in style, in presentation of images in the form in which truth can be presented. And I believe too that they convey with little, perhaps with no exceptions, what Plato thought, only not all that he thought. Floyer Sydenham has given so perfectly just an account of the style of Plato's *Dialogues* that it would be idle in me to attempt to give you a better, and it is so clear it is well worthy of your attention.⁽²⁶⁾

"The most general division of his writings is into those of a sceptical and those of a dogmatical kind. In the former nothing is expressly proved or asserted: some philosophical question is considered and examined; and the reader is left to himself to draw such conclusions, and to discover such truths, as the philosopher means to insinuate. This is done, either in the way of enquiry or in that of controversy and dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such dialogues as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that is done either indirectly by involving them in difficulties and embarrassing the maintainers of them; or directly, by confuting them. In the way of enquiry proceed those dialogues whose tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; which is effected either by exciting to the pursuit of some part of wisdom, and by shewing in what manner to investigate it; or by leading the way and helping the mind forward in the search. The dialogues of the other kind, namely the dogmatical or didactic, teach explicitly some kind of doctrine: and this they do, either by laying it down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the way of reason and of argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered,

sometimes by the speaker himself magisterially, and at other times as derived to him by tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of teaching, used by Plato, proceeds either through analytical reasoning, resolving things into their principles, and from known or allowed truths tracing out the unknown; or through induction, from a multitude of particulars, inferring some general thing, in which they all agree. According to this division is formed the following scheme, or table:



“The philosopher, in thus varying his manner, and diversifying his writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain the reader with their variety; nor to teach him on different occasions, with more or less plainness and perspicuity; nor yet to insinuate different degrees of certainty in the doctrines themselves. But he takes this method, as a consummate Master of the art of composition in the dialogue way of writing; and from the different characters of the speakers, as from different elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or from different ingredients in their mixture, he produces some peculiar genius and turn of temper, as it were, in each. Socrates indeed is in almost all of them the principal speaker: but when he falls into the company of some arrogant Sophist, when the modest wisdom and clear science of the one are contrasted with the confident ignorance and the blind opiniativeness of the other, dispute and controversy must of course arise, where the false pretender cannot fail of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him

only is sufficient, if there be no other persons present; because such a man can never be confuted, in his own opinion; but when there is an audience round them, in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, there is the true philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain Sophist must be convicted and exposed. In some dialogues Plato presents his great Master mixing in conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. When these persons happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, there is occasion given to the philosopher to call forth the latent seeds of wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the inquisitive genius of such dialogues: in which, by a seeming equality in the conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; and that of the disciple is encouraged; and by proper questions the mind also is aided and forwarded in the search of truth.

“At other times the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved understandings, and of more enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering the reasons of things. For to such an audience, with all the demonstration possible in the teaching it; truth is due. Hence, in the dialogues composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative, or demonstrative genius; it is of the analytical kind, when the principles of mind or of science, the leading truths are to be unfolded; and of the inductive kind, where any subsequent truth, of the same rank with others, or any part of science, is meant to be displayed. But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which kind is the doctrine of outward nature being only hypothetical, and a matter of opinion; the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional, and a matter of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctive, and the matter of obedience; the air of authority is then assumed; in the former cases the doctrine is traditionally handed down to others, from the authority of ancient Sages; but in the latter, it is magisterially pronounced with the authority of a Legislator. That this turn may be given to such dialogues with propriety (and with justice to the character of the speakers)* the reasoning

* Inserted by Coleridge.

Socrates is laid aside, or he only sustains some lower and obscure part; while that, which is the principal, or the shining, part is allotted to some other philosopher to whom may properly be attributed a more authoritative manner; or to such an antiquary* as may be credited, or may be deemed to have received the best information; or finally to such a statesman or politician as may fairly be presumed best qualified for making laws."

Such is a very fair account of the Platonic *Dialogues*. And this appears to me to have been the object of Plato—to have published for the advantage of all his countrymen that which being studied by docile minds would lead them to seek further. All that could be safely entrusted to men at large he, under the name of Socrates, and as I have before proved, truly representing his opinions, has given us in the most enchanting form, but all as the introduction to something. His objects were, first of all, to destroy the sophistic mode of reasoning, all those false modes of conception, all that want of true induction and of the faculties and habits of true induction which indisposes a man's mind for receiving the truth. This might be called the PROPAEDACTIC part of his dialogues.

He then proceeds to give in various dialogues the best examples of truth, pursued either scientifically, by assuming some truth which has been admitted and from thence deducing the consequences, or analytically, by taking the fact and dividing it into parts, shewing that it itself confuted what had been deduced from it. This might be called the logical part of his writings, the disciplinary of the intellect; and I believe till the time of Lord Bacon there existed nothing to be compared with it. For everywhere is the principle that in the mind itself must you find the ground of the question, but that it is from induction and from nature alone that you can receive the answer.

And lastly his great object was to take, without deciding the† question, the morality of Socrates, as it was truly applicable to the best purposes.

Hence the whole of the substance, if I may so say, of Plato's purpose, may be said to be contained in four of his dialogues—the *Theatetus*, [the *Sophists*, the *Politics*,]‡ and the *De Republica*. In the *Theatetus* he has exposed the sophists principally, but at the same time interwoven <his argument>‡ as in others of his works,

* Sydenham wrote "antiquarian". † to? ‡ E. H. C.

with a fair statement of the opinions of preceding philosophers, which indeed he has not neglected, nor any fair opportunity in any of his dialogues, as if equally willing to do justice to them and reserve proper praise for himself; that he might state, as it were, "so far have my predecessors gone". [*In the Sophists*] he proceeds by a continued exposition of the acts of the Sophists with a rejection of the same and introducing the plain dictates of common sense in their stead. In the *Politics* he considers the application of morality to the highest point in which morality can be shewn in merely practical life, and with reference only to the present state, scarcely† in that of an enlightened statesman. This he carries on in detail in the *De Republica*, a dialogue admired by all the great men of former ages, and I fully believe by all the truly great men of the ages since. Here we have all that good sense and wide induction can give—not with regard to the practical (for he would greatly mistake the *Dialogues* who supposed Plato believed, that Plato thought, it all practical) but as *Ideas*, known to be unapproachable as to realization, but they were to be a polar star, guiding a man's mind by approximation. And there he stopped. The tradition was that he had written a dialogue entitled 'The Philosopher', but it was admitted that it was never published. The truth is that I believe Plato would have baffled his own purposes had he done so. There he stopped. In one of his dialogues, indeed in more than one, he has taken care to shew what he intended—namely by pointing out the defects which the highest experience of practical life, as merely practical, could give, by even a *tone* of detraction, (but for which he makes Socrates apologize), by placing [*the practical*] so much below the ideal which he calls the philosophic, that the question must then needs suggest itself, what then is the philosopher? You have raised us to a great height, you have presented it in all its [*grades and varieties*] yet you shew us that this is imperfect and is below the final aim of a man. What is the philosopher? So again, with the great proposition of Socrates, namely, with regard to ignorance. It is ever said, ignorant indocility is the cause of all evil, and knowledge <the cause> of all good, and <that> philosophy is the only way of attaining that knowledge.

But what this philosophy is, you look for in vain in the

* E. H. C.

† E. H. C. emends: namely in the life and character of an enlightened statesman.

writings of Plato—I mean—what [*uniquely and characteristically*] that is. And if a man should take up the writings of Plato expecting to find the proper system of Platonism, he will feel himself much in the same state that our amiable countryman—our sweet poet and scholar, Gray, seems to have found himself after a most laborious and elegant abstract of the writings of Plato.⁽²⁷⁾ He found excellent good sense, prudential wisdom, for it is wisdom, and the true practical morality; and the few passages that could not be brought under this description he honestly declares himself, that not being one of the initiated, were utterly incomprehensible to him. And very few they undoubtedly were, with the exception I think of a few pages of the [*Symposium*]* and his juvenile work the *Phaedrus*.⁽²⁸⁾ If then, as my sons said to me very properly, “If then it be true that the doctrines of Plato that constitute the proper Platonism are not to be found in his own writings, I pray you where are we to find them?” And it requires more courage than I can exert without some little distress, to answer the question when I say: first of all we may find something of them, something in the few fragments that are preserved in his immediate successors, such as [Speusippus]*; and likewise more in the writings of the neo-Platonists, in the Roman Empire, provided we go to the perusal of their writings aware of their object, and in proportion as this was their object, and with a tact capable of discovering the passages where such an object would have another ulterior object (I mean opposing and setting up a rival to Christianity). I should trust more to [Plotinus]*⁽²⁹⁾ than to any writers who were determined enemies to Christianity, such as [Iamblichus and Porphyry],* and in the writings of [Proclus],*⁽³⁰⁾ who seems almost to have given up the cause of paganism as lost, I should trust him according to the authorities he quotes. But yet from all together I think that such a knowledge of Plato’s great principles might be gathered as would be capable of being presented to one who had pursued philosophy, in a form that would leave him no doubt that he had apprehended their true meaning. But for us—I cannot pretend to enter into this process, nor would it be a part of my business which is the history of philosophy.

I must speak of that which was really influential in Plato, and which none will deny to have originated in Platonism who

* E. H. C.

does not deny the coinciding testimony of all antiquity. It is this: in common with others but more expressly and purely than any, he taught us to seek the principles, that charm and spell by which nature is to be invoked in reason itself, but with filial awe [and, "as it were the great Mother's knee", to seek]* the confirmation of those principles of nature by induction. But above all, this is what I mean: he taught the idea, namely the possibility, and the duty of all who would arrive at the greatest perfection of the human mind, of striving to contemplate things not in the phenomenon, not in their accidents or in their superficialities, but in their essential powers, first as they exist in relation to other powers co-existing with them, but lastly and chiefly as they exist in the Supreme Mind, independent of all material division, distinct and yet indivisible. This is expressly asserted by [Plato],† and it is the very essential of Platonism when he says that that which exists in the perfection of distinctness and yet without separation, either from another or from the supreme cause, is an Idea.⁽³¹⁾ What can such an abstract notion as this produce, it may be said? What can such a shadow give of formless truth? If it be a truth, bring it forward. For that very reason, were there no others (as there are many and better) did it produce a great effect. The human passions and human energies do not clothe my natural humanity‡ with any distinct palpable visible forms. The mind always feels itself greater than aught it has done. It begins in the act of perceiving that it must go beyond it in order to comprehend it; therefore it is only to that which contains distinct conception in itself, and, thereby satisfying the intellect, does at the same time contain in it a plenitude which refuses limitation or division, that the soul feels its full faculties called forth.

Such is the origin of all the great ideas on which [*the Nous of Plato*] works. How the grand Idea of the Universe worked in him before it found utterance! In how many obscure, and as it were oracular, sentences, in what strange symbols did it place itself! All great and bold ideas in their first conception, in their *<very>* nature are TOO GREAT FOR UTTERANCE. [The dawn of an Idea]*—it is a glow without light in which light gradually forms itself. Our

* E. H. C.'s emendation. source or justification for which I am unable to find

† E. H. C. But more likely. "Plotinus"?

‡ The reporter wrote "close on my natural variety". E. H. C. emended.

present mode is from light to bring out smoke, to begin with the separate and finite, the distinct, and out of that come to what? Confusion. And if we are rescued from it—only by resting contented with shallowness. If I be required to mention facts I think that this will be the most convincing: I speak of the connexion of speculative opinion, especially of *<the>* Platonic Idea with the fine arts.⁽³²⁾

At the first awakening of mankind out of the barbarism which followed the subversion of the Roman Empire the [Peripatetic Philosophy]* was predominant; it was [remarkable]† for the divisions and sub-divisions—whatever Aristotle might have thought is not for the present subject—but as the doctrines existed in the Schoolmen they were outlines traced, indeed, by stiff lifeless divisions and sub-divisions ad infinitum. Compare the paintings of [Raphael]* [with those] [of the early Viennese School in which for a picture with its alterations of light and shade we have a mere]‡ superficies and still outlines, wonderfully vivid at times but no life; every figure was imprisoned within its own outline. As soon as Platonism began to dawn with [sublimity]§ then arose [Giotto, Cimabue]* and the others who, with all the awkwardness of composition and stiffness of outline of their predecessors, gave such a bewitching grace that one remains in looking at the pictures in perfect astonishment how such a feeling of grace could be conveyed through such media. We wonder, we do not laugh at the stiff lines and the awkward form, and instead of it we find a presence we cannot explain, an expression of something that is equally pleasant to you as in the works of Raphael, without that which can equally explain.

I remember when I was at [Pisa]§ a picture (of one of those old painters who rose just at the time Platonism began to produce its effects in Italy, and to actuate the minds of men) which was the effect of the appearance of Death on all men—different groups of men—men of business—men of pleasure—huntsmen—all flying in different directions while the dreadful Goddess descending with a kind of air-chilling white with her wings expanded and the extremities of the wings compressed into talons and the only group in

* MS. Egerton 3057.

† E. H. C.

‡ MS. Egerton 3057. The sublimity of a Dante? See *Table Talk*, I. 179–81.

§ E. H. C. See Lecture V, p. 193.

which there appeared anything like welcoming her was a group of beggars.⁽³³⁾ The impression was greater, I may say, than that which any poem had ever made upon me. There, from all the laws of drawing, all the absence of color (for you saw no color—if there were any you could not see it, it was gone) it was one mighty idea that spoke to you everywhere the same. In the other pictures the presence of an idea acting on that which was not formed was evident, because the forms there outraged all notions of that which was to be impressed, had there not been something more; but it was the adoption of a symbol which, though not in as polished a language as could be wished for, which though in a hoarser voice and less tempered modulation, uttered the same words to that mind which is the source of all that we really enjoy or that is worth enjoying.

We may find that *<enjoyment>*, too, in the gratification which of all others is the best symbol *<of the Idea>* perhaps, for it is, as far as sight is concerned,* formless, and yet contains the principles of form so that in all civilized language we borrow the *<NAMES OF THE ELEMENTS OF>* proportion from it—I mean music. It is an innocent recreation and produces infinite Joy†—while the over-busy worldlings are buzzed round by night-flies in a sultry climate. If we sink into music our childhood comes back WITH ALL ITS HOPES AND ALL ITS OBSCURE REMINISCENCES AND WITH IT FAITH, A RELIANCE ON THE NOBLE WITHIN US ON ITS OWN TESTIMONY. WE FEEL OURSELVES moved so deeply as no object in mortal life can move us except by anguish, and here it is present with Joy. It is in all its forms still Joy.⁽³⁴⁾

We feel therefore that our being is nobler than its senses‡ and the man of genius devotes himself to produce by all other means, whether a statesman, a poet, a painter, a statuary, or a man of science, this same sort of a something which the mind can know but which it cannot understand, of which understanding can be no more than the symbol and is only excellent as being the symbol. It is this same spirit which, still craving for something higher than what could be imagined in form, (this value have

* NB. 25 is simpler: How an Idea acts on the mind we may perhaps best learn from that which is as far as sight is concerned.

† NB. 25: Truly it is an innocent, affecting Delight which we have in pure sounds—an infantine Joy. While over-busy worldlings buzzed round as by night-flies, O then to sink into the cooling fountain of sightless Sounds. ‡ NB. 25: circumstances.

the images of form as far as they make us forget ourselves, and become mere words unnoticed in that which they convey), which works in all men more or less, and which assuredly in the higher classes of society in Greece and Rome did that which their own humble feelings and their own solace and affections did for the lower class of mankind, namely, prepare them to be more and more dissatisfied with a religion which presented nothing but forms, the symbols of which were to be found either in crude [*physiological*]* speculations or [*im*]moral vices; <and this same spirit> still led them to look first to a purer ideal with a desire of connecting with it (which is equally taught by Plato) reality, and which Plato himself, or at least Socrates, told us could only be done by the Realizer, by Him who was the fountain of all and who in the substance superseded the shadow—I mean the <Founder of the>† Christian religion.

* The reporter wrote: phylological speculations—our moral vices. E. H. C. suggested: crude physic and logical speculations—or immoral vices, etc. cf. Lect. V, p. 176.

† E. H. C. This is the lecture E. H. C. transcribed and emended. I have drawn on his suggestions where the report is incomplete, but he went farther in re-writing some passages than I have seen any necessity to record.

LECTURE V

JANUARY 18, 1819⁽¹⁾

THIS EVENING, Eight o'clock, Crown and Anchor. Strand, Mr. Coleridge on the Life, Genius and System of Aristotle; his Influence on the Plans and Policy of Alexander the Great; with Proof that all consequent Philosophy is to be resolved, either into that of Aristotle, or that of Plato. Mr. Coleridge will conclude his Lecture with the Influence of Philosophy in General on the Character and Welfare of Nations. Admission Five Shillings.*

I have often noticed in conversations I have had with men, thinking and unthinking, an universal assent to the proposition that there is a moral government in the world—that things neither happen by chance nor yet by any blind agency of necessity. Those persons to whom I allude will readily and cheerfully admit that not a feather falls from a sparrow's wing but forms a part in a grand system—and yet if you apply this principle, namely that of a design and final cause in every thing, beyond the exact limits which they have been accustomed to draw, "It is a[n im]possibility". "The man is a fanatic", and so forth; nay it is well for him if his orthodoxy be not suspected. If for instance, you speak of an event such as Christianity in which every human being is interested (and I might add more, by the authority of the Apostle, in which the whole creation is interested), if you confine your observations to the history of the Jews and the ecclesiastical history as far as they know it, it is well; but if you presume that the same Providence is at the same time working

* The *Morning Chronicle*. Jan. 18, 1819. There was no notice of this lecture in *The Times* of this date. nor in the *New Times*. A briefer notice appeared in the *Courier* of Jan. 16.

over the whole of the world as far as we know it and that Christianity was not welcomed in one direction only, but that from North to South and from South to North, from East to West and from West to East the whole march of human affairs tended to that one centre in which all men were equally concerned and interested, and apply this principle in any particular, there is immediately a sort of sudden connexion in their minds that you have introduced *<something>* between Christianity and the world that they have not been accustomed to; they raise a sort of paganism *<as an objection>*; a kind of heathenism is felt. Far otherwise were the feelings of the first Christians. They gladly—and I appeal to the writings of all the Fathers of the Church—they gladly applied all the workings of Providence out of polytheism to this one end. When they addressed themselves to the Gentile or polytheistic nations with the same warmth and with the same force as they did to the Jews, *<they>* derived *<what they could>* from their particular institutions and their particular prophecies. I mention this to justify the importance I have attached to the appearance of Platonism in the Greek world.

Of Plato himself I have spoken in my last lecture; *<I shall now speak of>* the scholars of Plato, I mean the immediate scholars of whom we have records, Speusippus, Xenocrates, POLEMO and CRANTOR. The history of his scholars has been variously divided,⁽²⁾ by some into four or five academies, by others into three, but I think by the most rational into simply the first and second academy which in truth, historically, almost (the latter I mean) belonged to Plato. The true division is this, that to the time of Arcesilaus the Platonists assumed and asserted a dogmatic tone such as their keen perception of the truths which they taught amply justified. As manners were debauched and those who called themselves philosophers—and by their talents were certainly sure to attract attention, and to appear, at least, to deserve it—as soon as these began to fall in with the age, and modified by it, began themselves to modify it, then the fashion began, apparently justified by certain parts of Plato's writings, to be sceptical upon all occasions and say, "This is indeed my opinion: there are such and such probabilities for it, but all these things are opinion, and as to certainty it would be impolite"—for that in reality is the basis of it—"to assert this". For depend upon it, no man ever in reality speaks of anything with warmth that concerns his permanent

being with a feeling of scepticism at the moment. He gives the full force of his conviction, at that moment—admitting, however, that he may be fallible, that he does not wish to impose this on the minds of others, and that his very dogmata must be divided into two kinds, namely: the one respecting circumstances in which, however warm his present convictions are, he still has had experience of having had convictions equally positive altered, the other of opinions which say, “Were I to be convinced they were false after I had once entertained them, I cannot myself deny that my inmost nature has suffered a dissent and deterioration which makes it utterly inexplicable how I could have ever had a thought concerning *<that>* which I now doubt.” For no man will believe it possible that a simple wheel in a machine, existing only in that machine, could have a conception of that whole—never.

We may therefore truly say that the division between the two schools of Plato which alone deserve to be mentioned is this, that the first great men proceeded in the firmness of their conviction of their ends—they had higher notices, deeper intuitions, than that which mere logic could supply—abundantly willing to acknowledge that in their modes of proving them they might have been defective. The second sect which began with Arcesilaus flattered the pride of those about them by acknowledging a mere opinion, that it would be impolite in good company to suppose that every man ought to do it or that you should be so ungenteel as to say to a man, “You are a rogue, Sir, you are a villain confessed, if you do not do this”. For if there be nothing infallible in nature, if honor, if honesty, if to do to others as you would be done by, are not infallible, what becomes of your own modesty, of your own tolerance? Nothing remains for you to tolerate; there remains no distinction, no criterion upon earth. Man must be mad not to acknowledge the fallibility of his nature, the fallibility of his judgment; but he must be still more mad, I may venture to say, if he pretends even to the compliment of being deceived when he himself admits that there is no ground of judging at all and that therefore neither deceit nor conviction can possibly exist. Every man who admits that he may be deceived admits at the same time that there is a something upon which he cannot be deceived. Doubtless *that* he will not find in his own individual reasoning, but he will find it in that principle which is above reasoning,

in his moral nature, (and as long as he remains in any degree what he ought to be) in the contradiction which he finds in certain errors within his own moral nature.

Now I say passingly that this distinction, the only profitable one, of the two academies, should be kept in mind by all readers of Cicero, for otherwise it will be impossible to understand his various applications of the word *academicus*; that the distinction likewise receives a kind of interest from the history of Brutus, who, we are told, was a follower of the academy. And certainly in his death and the last speech attributed to him⁽³⁾ (no honorable one did we not remember he was a Platonist of the school of Arcesilaus, namely a Sceptic) and in the pusillanimity in which he gave up all hope because a battle ended amiss and in the suicide by which he ended his life in contradiction to the doctrines of his master, this would be inexplicable if we did not refer to the corruption which had taken place coincident with the general corruption of morals and of moral feeling. The teachers, on the contrary, of the first academy, appear faithfully to have taught their great master's philosophy, and to have been eminently conducive to the diffusion of it, not by any addition or *<ESSENTIAL>* alteration, but by that by which a great idea can be taught gradually, that is by considering it as a germ which cannot appear at any one moment in all its force but will gradually separate the plenitude of its contents into distinct parts, and, in proportion to the distinctions that arise, will require new and appropriate terms.

It is *<true>*, and let those who exclaim against jargon and barbarous terms and every new and original mind that appears before them, let them recollect that the whole process of human intellect is gradually to desynonymize terms, that words, the instruments of communication, are the only signs that a finite being can have of its own thoughts, that in proportion as what was conceived as one and identical becomes several, there will necessarily arise a term striving to represent that distinction. The whole of the progress of society might be expressed in a dictionary, in which I do not say that we should have the practical means of doing so, but it is *<within>* possibility, that *<in>* a dictionary might be expressed from the first and simplest terms which would satisfy all the distinction that occurred to the first men, while as they perceived that other things and yet other things, which they had grouped in one mass, had each their distinctive

properties, when they had experienced the evils arising from confusing them, there would arise a motive for giving a term for each as warning and safeguard; and the whole process of society, as far as it is human society, depends upon—it may sound as a paradox but it is still a very serious truth—the progress of desynonymizing, that is, the feeling that there is a necessity for two distinct subjects which have hitherto been comprehended in one. Perhaps I may not make myself understood. I will endeavour to illustrate it by one instance. Even so late as the time of Charles the First and the Republic of England, the words “compelled” and “obliged” were perfectly synonymous. Hobbes and other men of his mind took advantage of this one term and contended therefore, that as everybody acknowledged that men were obliged to do such and such things, and that if a man were *obliged* it was synonymous to say he was *compelled*, there could never arise anything like guilt. For who could blame a man for doing what he was obliged to do since he was compelled to do it. This fortunately puzzled only a few minds but it convinced only those who wished to be convinced, whose crimes and bad conscience found a consolation in this; while the innocent, puzzled, began to say, “There is a defect in our language”. In this instance they are two perfectly different things and every man feels them to be different, and the best way is to use the word “obliged” when we mean what a man ought to do, and the word “compelled” when we mean what a man must do whether he likes it or not. And with this single clearing up of the terms the whole basis fell at once, as far at least as *that* argument was convincing.⁽⁴⁾

This was the merit, as it appears from the records, of the immediate followers of Plato—they improved the terminology, and we have the according testimony of all antiquity that they did not add anything to Plato’s doctrines. I mention this because I propose to build something upon it.

Speusippus, the nephew and immediate successor of Plato, deserves especial honor from us on other accounts as the first man who attempted an encyclopaedia in the genuine sense of the word; that is, a co-organization of the sciences, as so many INTER-dependent systems, each having a specific life of its own but all communicating with philosophy as the common centre OR brain, if I may say so, by means of a philosophic logic <OR DIALECTIC,>

as the great sympathetic nerve leading to it. A scheme similar to this is attempted at the present time and I wish it all success on account of its scheme.⁽⁵⁾ This of itself was a grand conception and a strong proof of the influence of the Platonic philosophy on the minds of those who attended to it. For to impress the importance of knowledge, of various knowledge, for different men, was itself a great benefaction, but to present the idea that all possible knowledges were but vital parts of some one knowledge which comprehended them all, as in the germ, and to which they were all referable and from which they all derived unity and in that unity light and true insight, this was truly a magnificent conception, and this we owe to the light of Plato as reflected from his immediate successor Speusippus.

But more than this—I have spoken of the unwritten dogmata of Plato, of those which he would not publish and which were peculiarly, and which alone were, his own. A strong light, I say, is let in upon the sacred recesses of this interior doctrine, at least a component part we may say, which in addition to a few others from a few other sources will almost suffice for some future Cuvier, Abernethy or [Hatchett]* in metaphysics to make up the whole system and reproduce the Platonic philosophy for us as it then existed. This fragment has been preserved by STROBÆUS.† I refer to the passage in which we are told that the intelligential powers, by the Pythagoreans and Anaxagoras called the *Nous*, (the *Logos* or the *Word* of Philo and St. John) is indeed indivisibly united with, but yet not the same as the absolute principle of causation, THE PATERNAL‡ One, the super-essential Will; nor yet, though indivisibly One with, is it the same as the energy of Love, the sanctifying spirit so sublimely described in the Apocrypha under the name of the Wisdom of Solomon, remembering that *Σοφία*, Wisdom, is the term which the Fathers of the Church made peculiar to the Holy Ghost. If we connect§ this with the UNANIMOUS testimony of the ancients, that Speusippus added nothing to his master's philosophy, or the testimony that his true philosophy was not written or found in his public works, every scholar

* The notes mention only Cuvier. But see Snyder, *Coleridge's Treatise on Method*. 81, and the *Friend*, III. 180-1.

† The reporter wrote "Trebellius", a slip of Coleridge's tongue, or the reporter's error.

‡ The reporter wrote "that eternal".

§ NB. 25: collate

acquainted with his works will find here a proof, I flatter myself, assuredly a strong presumption, of the truth of the seeming paradox maintained by me in my last lecture, that Platonism would be sought for in vain in the *Dialogues* of Plato himself—which I believe to have been all preparative, predisciplinary, tending to kindle the desire for the philosophy itself in the few minds thereto called, tending to remove the obstacles and most fitting to foster the growth of the wings of such minds fluttering, as it were, on the edge of the eagle's nest;⁽⁶⁾ and yet, for other minds, invaluable in themselves as treasures of practical knowledge for men destined by nature and their own purpose exclusively for active life, and for the duties of society.

On the same ground we may derive from Xenocrates, Speusippus's successor, the proof of another assertion which I hazarded, namely, that the true idea of Plato's genius and system is to be found in the union of Pythagoras with Socrates, that is the union of the speculative physiology of the eldest philosophers, with the moral (it has been lately called now 'anthropology'),⁽⁷⁾ the HUMANITIES,* of the Socratic reformation. The elder philosophers took the whole world as the object of their philosophy, with the inadequate means joined with other worse causes; the sophists availed themselves of that insufficiency to introduce a principle subversive of all our best moral feelings. Socrates rose as a reformer and in the heat of reform he confined all philosophy to the knowledge of our own nature; "the proper knowledge of mankind is man". Plato, his great disciple, perceived that this were true if it were possible, but that the knowledge of man by himself was not practicable without the knowledge of other things, or rather that man was that being in whom it pleased God that the consciousness of others' existence should abide, and that therefore without natural philosophy and without the sciences which led to the knowledge of the objects without us, man himself would not be man. Therefore I say that Plato united the elder philosophers with the philosophy of Socrates, and this is proved to us not only by the little which the ancients record of Xenocrates, namely that with the Socratic words he united the Pythagorean, but by both Xenocrates and Speusippus, and likewise by two other followers who have been recorded, GRANTOR and POLEMO who

* The reporter wrote, "anarchy".

following that, maintained: firstly,* the immortality of the soul, as the best and worthiest ground of hope, and purity of the conscience in combination with a faith in that immortality as the securest source of consolation: THE finite nature of the material world as the proximate cause, but by no means as the absolute origin of pain and imperfection in the world: and lastly, the reconciliation of man, and in the human being, of the whole creation, with the Deity, as the only remedy of those evils. These doctrines I say were taught by them zealously, dogmatically, positively, and in such a way as to form such a contrast with the doubtful tone expressed on all these points in the *Dialogues* of Plato himself, as to render it utterly irreconcilable with the assertion of antiquity that they in no way deviated from their great master but by the hypothesis which I had the honor of submitting to you in my last lecture, namely, that in the now published and extant writings of Plato we have not the Platonic system but only the preparation for it; and such a preparation as for those who are not disposed to go further would be in itself of great and invaluable gain.

The nature of the subject I am sure will convince all my intelligent auditors that it does not rest with me altogether whether it is more or less interesting. I must as an historian give you the steps—that is to say the important steps—of the progress, not of the life of philosophers, but of the life and growth of philosophy itself. And here is a proper place for discussing the question (which has been often agitated, and I am sorry to say generally very little to the honor of Plato's character) why, no doubt having been entertained as to the marks of superiority of Aristotle's genius to that of the men whom I have now mentioned, Speusippus, Xenocrates and their schoolfellows, Plato should yet have preferred Speusippus as his successor, passing by the mighty Stagyrte. Some have said it is [*thus*] explained: Speusippus was his nephew, and Plato did this from natural affection for his family, which is certainly a very plain and sensible way of explaining the matter; only we must forget in the meantime that we are talking of Plato. Others have told us that Plato saw Aristotle's great powers and talents and that he envied him. I will not condescend to answer that objection. Others again have attributed it to some private pique between them or

* The reporter wrote, "fully".

quarrel,* which is not otherwise worthy of notice than as it furnishes an opportunity of noticing and guarding against that abominable vice of vulgar minds (which, if they are really in the rank to which they belong, if they appear what they are, do no harm at all any more than the common blackguardisms which are heard in the streets, but) which unfortunately takes place at times in *<the>* minds *<of those>* who for a little while are lifted up to an apparent possession of the second or third seats in existing reputation. These men have a mighty fancy and produce a great popularity for the time by convincing their hearers or their readers that their betters are not a whit better than themselves, that they have just the same bad passions; and nothing can be more delightful to a man of that disposition than to read that Shakespear was as foolish as himself, or the pleasure of finding that Shakespear was a fool here or Milton made a great blunder there;⁽⁸⁾ in short, "He had a few accidents that lifted him above other men in reputation, but in truth, put him out of that situation and he was just such a fellow as I am. Not what I ought to be, just what I am when I am what I ought not to be."

This is most striking in the comment which I have seen made on the writings of great men and I have traced that no work was ever immediately popular which did not appeal in some degree to this kind of worthless detraction—having the courage to schoolmaster great men, to admit their amazing genius, but at the same time to point out the [*contemptibility*][†] of it, that they were great fools,—“that they were eminent men cannot be denied in some respects, but at the same time . . .”—that their most important actions were guided by the dirtiest means which every man is ashamed of!

The same thing may be observed in the history of painters. The great Michael Angelo speaking as a man of great genius would ever speak, looking firmly at the ideal and what was excellent in itself, the permanent, said of Titian, “That man alone deserves to be called a painter because like nature he has

* At this point the notes read: Turn to the blank leaves of Tenneman[n]. (Possibly the anecdotes came in while he was finding the place; at any rate they anticipate his own notes two pages further on.) The tendency of vulgar minds, and third rate Authors, to attribute their own low passions to great Intellects—Mich. Angelo ✕ Titian—Rafael's feelings—Benvenuto Cellini, how prophetic in his praise & contempt. (The Tennemann marginalium) is given in note⁽¹¹⁾.

† The reporter wrote “compatibility”.

operated most powerfully by the most powerful agent, namely, that of color in all its combination with passion. But it is a pity that he had not learnt to draw, to design, that he had not paid more attention to the power of lines." At once Michael Angelo "envied" him—it was a business of "detraction"; because the man was discriminative he was instantly "detracting".⁽⁹⁾ And often have I observed that in real life *<when>* a man shall give a fair character of one whom he admires and looks up to, and in order to reserve himself from the charge of flattery, he points out that part which he has not attained, that alone shall be brought forward as a proof the man "envied" the other. Such is the spirit, which has a bad effect because it prevents men from communicating with men. How well, therefore, should we attend to and love those anecdotes which are recorded, for instance of Raphael, who when Michael Angelo came into the Farnesian Palace at Rome which he was at that time painting, and finding fault with something Raphael had done or was about to do, Raphael asked, "How would you do it?" He said, "I cannot tell, but give me a bit of pencil or a bit of chalk. Something like this," and he drew a head and they parted. Day after day went on and still Raphael did not finish this. At length when the whole was done he was asked why this part remained in the state in which it was. "Forbid it, Heaven," said he, "that I should dare alter a line of the divine Michael Angelo." And there it remains to this day.

So is it men of genius feel towards each other, and the moment you perceive the slightest spirit of envy in a man be assured he either has no genius or that his genius is dormant at that moment, for all genius exists in a participation of a common spirit. In joy individuality is lost⁽¹⁰⁾ and it therefore is liveliest in youth, not from any principle in organization but simply from this that the hardships of life, that the circumstances that have forced a man in upon his little unthinking contemptible self, have lessened his power of existing universally; it is that only which brings about those passions. To have a genius is to live in the universal, to know no self but that which is reflected not only from the faces of all around us, our fellow creatures, but reflected from the flowers, the trees, the beasts, yea from the very surface of the [*waters and the*] sands of the desert. A man of genius finds a reflex to himself, were it only in the mystery of being.

If I were asked to conjecture the reason which determined

Plato in the choice of his successor⁽¹¹⁾ and which seems so much to have interested antiquity, I should not disguise my belief that Plato saw early in Aristotle's mind all indeed that was mighty, powerful, expansive, and yet an unfitness for certain more spiritual parts of his system and therefore in coincidence with his own principles he withheld them. For what should we suppose that a good and great man would do? Aristotle had been incapable of following Plato to a certain height. He did not attribute this to any defect in his own mind but he believed the fault to have been in an extravagance of his master's genius. If Plato were convinced of this doubtless he would have become an Aristotelian, but he was not; he remained firm in his intuitions and he believed the point of difference between him and Aristotle to be of an essential importance, in short to be fundamental. Could Plato, remaining convinced of the superior truth of his own system, have named as his successor a man who had proclaimed his dissent from it and was labouring to put another system in its place? Or if from personal admiration of Aristotle's superior talents he had done so, what effect I pray, could this have had but that the old scholars who adhered to their master Plato would have naturally followed Speusippus, who likewise with them adhered, and a new sect would have taken possession of the old place and the old sect* of a new place? Speusippus would have taught in the *Lyceum*, Aristotle in the groves of *Academeus*.⁽¹²⁾ So little is it in the power of the individual will to alter the necessity of things.

The essential difference of Aristotle from Plato is to form the remainder of this address. Conformably with my plan I am briefly to give you the life of Aristotle.⁽¹³⁾ He was born in Stagira, a border town between Macedon and Thrace, in the first year of the 99th Olympiad. HIS FATHER, NICOMACHUS THE PHYSICIAN AND CONFIDENTIAL FRIEND OF AMYNTAS KING OF MACEDONIA, EARLY LEFT HIM AN ORPHAN; BUT CAREFULLY EDUCATED BY PROXENUS AT ATARNA, AND IN THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE 103rd OLYMPIAD he went to Athens where during the course of twenty years he attended the school of Plato. Such a man, with such advantages! How could it be but he must have proved an Aristotle? After the death of Plato he returned <TO ATARNA> in company with Xenocrates, his fellow scholar, or as the Greeks call it [*συμμαθητής*],

* The marginal note on Tennemann is less formal: The old Meetingers would have erected a new meeting.

UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ITS RULER, HERMIAS, after whose tragic fate Aristotle was called by Phillip of Macedon to be the tutor of Alexander <THE GREAT>. On the accession to the throne, DECLINING TO ACCOMPANY HIS PUPIL ON HIS PERSIAN EXPEDITION, BUT RECOMMENDING CALLISTHENES IN HIS STEAD, HE BETOOK HIMSELF once more to Athens and founded the school in the Lyceum there, from the shady walks and alleys of which his philosophy and its ADHERENTS OBTAINED THE NAME OF Peripatetics, or walkers-about. Before his death he was compelled to flee from Athens in order to avoid an accusation of offending the religion of the country, in short to avoid the fate of Socrates before him.

It would be unpardonable in me considering the different lessons that have been taught in one of our most eloquent historians, indeed I may say two, (I allude to Gibbon⁽¹⁴⁾ principally, and likewise to Hume⁽¹⁵⁾ in spirit) I say—with my opinions, I could not answer it to myself if I avoided taking notice of the boasted tolerance of the ancients with regard to religion. The tolerant spirit of polytheism we hear <of> for the purpose of contrasting it at all times with the dreadful intolerance of Christianity; and truly, tolerance they did exert when they were exceedingly amused and delighted with what they tolerated. They tolerated with wonderful equanimity ARISTOPHANES' *Frogs*, in which he brings Bacchus and Hercules and so forth into the shades and makes himself merry with all the vices and with all the caprices of their gods. Wonderfully tolerant they were with the *Birds* of Aristophanes,⁽¹⁶⁾ which consists in this that two old men flying from the abominable persecutions of [*Alcibiades*] having heard of a Kingdom of Birds, repaired thither, and on being admitted began to spread the poison of it in the new state to which they were come, and proposed that the Birds should set up against the gods, and at the same time establish themselves as the supreme monarchs by keeping the gods from being fed, intercepting all the sacrifices and the odours from the burnt offerings, and on the other hand keeping men under their subjection by preventing the rain and the sun and the other influences. This in every age and with the grossest <details> to <such> a degree that it is perfectly surprising to imagine that an audience could have borne the established religion of their country to be exposed, with every the keenest insult, to the contempt and reprobation applied to all the holiest names of their images before whom their

sacrifices were daily offered. This was indeed tolerated, received with delight and crowned with applauses: but when Anaxagoras taught that there was a supreme Mind who would call them to account for all this waste of their devotional feelings, he was obliged to fly; and when Socrates, though in the most tolerant (and almost timid) form conceivable, led even to the great truths which, being told, this diabolical system of polytheism must necessarily have fallen, he was poisoned; and when Aristotle, with a much less pure philosophy, yet still held that there was a One Power to which all others were answerable, he called for his illustrations of it and they were so little compatible with the interests of the priests of heathenism at that time that he did not rely even on the favor that he stood in with the greatest monarch of the world, but was obliged to fly away to save his head from these tolerant enlightened Grecian republicans. The truth is—let us never degrade ourselves by any pretence of that kind—we are none of us tolerant but by a great effort, except when we are *<not>* interested. When we are deeply interested in any concern, then let us try to be tolerant and pray hard for it, but do not let us degrade the name of *<tolerance>* and pretend to be tolerant about things in which we do not care a pinch of snuff whether it is one way or the other, and then boast ourselves to be the enlightened age. I have been oftentimes amused with the triumph that has been made over our ancestors, those men persecuting each other upon some point of baptism, or some controverted opinion with regard to some religious point that we know nothing about, and happy it is we live in such an enlightened age; but I find those men, when a lawsuit comes forward, when a tax or ought that interests themselves appears, whether an election business or whatever it is, if it interests them, what becomes of toleration? Let us despise such; let us not pretend to be superior to our ancestors.⁽¹⁷⁾

I must trouble you with one further observation because it arises and is in itself indeed an instructive point: for when I mention that Antisthenes was obliged to fly to save his head from the fury of the popular prejudice about his religion, that upon the same principle poor Roger Bacon was thrown into a dungeon, as they say; and we are certain it was so with Galileo (because he knew a little more than other people, and that of itself, if it was not impiety against the better Being, is always taken as impiety against the mob, and just as much in the present time

as it ever was, for I do not find we are so much wiser in that respect); but those very people who drove away Aristotle had repented concerning Socrates. They were ashamed, thoroughly ashamed, of those who had put to death that great and good man. In order to shew it, to record it, to make it imperative upon posterity, they had built a temple to Socrates and the repentance of the Athenians. But as soon as another Socrates came, there was another murder to be committed. The prejudiced of one age are condemned even by the prejudiced of the succeeding ages: for endless are the motives of folly, and the fools join with the wise in passing sentence on all motives* but their own. Who cried with greater horror against the murder of the prophets, than those who likewise cried out on the most awful occasion, Crucify him! Crucify him! Those who pretend to preach up such doctrines as: there is no need of impressing this truth or that truth on the present enlightened age, it is pedantry to suppose that the present enlightened nineteenth century should do so and so, are the basest flatterers of mankind. The wise and the virtuous are always few, and it is by <the> few only that the world is progressive. Depend upon it, the majority of mankind, till Christianity is more widely diffused in its essence, will ever be enjoying the conveniences of the advantages of the wisdom of the few, but the wisdom itself it is absolutely mob-adulation to attribute to them.

This which I have mentioned is all that is known or credibly recorded of this great man's life†—if indeed we except Alexander the Great's suspicions of him, which he did not live to put into action, as (of all our worthy men!) he ended in the final breaking up of an over-stimulated and inebriate spirit. But as so great a mind deserves, if it were only conjectural, the tracing of its growth, we may say and say with probability that from his father, an eminent physician, young as he was he had acquired a taste for natural history which distinguished him so much throughout. For this we are warranted to say by the common experience of mankind, that the deep impressions <are> made in the earliest periods of our life by what we look up to and admire. A severe student, he seems to have been to Atarna, from one circumstance, that he was first induced to go to Athens and make himself a

* Modes? The *Friend*. I. 100; see next note.

† NB. 25: Crucify Him—quote from the *Friend*. Vol. I. [Cf. the *Friend*, I. 73–8].

‡ Aristotle.

scholar of Plato, from the report that Plato possessed the best philosophic library at that time—probably a perfect<ly> unique. For though the works of the poets were in all hands, I will not say compared with the modern times since printing was invented, but as far as they can be supposed to have been published in an age when manuscripts only were used, yet philosophic writings were rare; and to this circumstance we are to attribute the frequency of the forgeries of them. In this manner he acquired what we may call another characteristic of him as distinct from the ancient philosophers, his wide and extensive learning. Alexander's favor, too, had enabled him to form the greatest library of his own that a private man at that time possessed relating to objects of natural history, with a splendour which has been since unexampled. And this was the second point of Aristotle's character, namely, experimental knowledge of which he was assuredly the father; and I believe there is no intelligent professor of any of the natural sciences that, fairly reading the works of Aristotle, has not expressed a wonder that the man who first broke up the ground should have proceeded so far, or not made his acknowledgments for that which, though it appears little in the further progress of the science, is immense in itself: namely, the drawing, the general scheme, the mode of thinking, the plan of generalizing, by which alone a multitude of facts can be brought under one point of view. Thus I have said that Aristotle's character consisted first, in his wide knowledge of all that had been brought before him, secondly, of his experimental knowledge or his attempts to add from the great source of knowledge, Nature, that which could be added thereto. I have only to add, in order to complete his character and the sources of it, the dialectic habits and the inductive logic to which during twenty years he had been familiarized in the Platonic school, and which had prepared in a mind so capacious and so predisposed, the spirit, first of observation, secondly of discrimination, and thirdly of abstraction and of generalization.

It will not perhaps be deemed tedious by you if I endeavour to desynonymize those two words, abstraction and generalization. By abstraction I mean the general faculty or power of the human mind to attend to any one impression of the senses, a part only of a multitude, as being alone to the particular purpose of the mind. This faculty, for instance, <of> overlooking in a multitude

of horses what each horse has particularly and drawing from it a general notion of what all the horses have distinct from all the other animals—I should call the abstracting power. When this same power is exerted for the purpose of forming classes, so as to fix upon some one thing which a certain number of animals, we will say, or plants, have peculiar to themselves, which no other has, however many other points there may be in common, then we call the same faculty generalization. That is to say, generalization cannot possibly exist with *<out>* abstraction, but abstraction may exist without generalization.⁽¹⁸⁾

These seem to me to have been the grounds of Aristotle's genius. How much he learned and continued to learn under Plato the fact itself that he remained twenty years a regular auditor is assuredly sufficient to prove. Yet doubtless he had already determined, and his master had known that he had determined, on a different point of view* from that of the Platonic. And why should not [*these co-exist*]?† One man stands on one point and another on another, the objects seen are the same. They vary only according to the point of perspective; so that the one man had the power of increasing the field of vision, and though the other would not venture to mount to the height on which he stood because he thought it giddy and insecure, he would surely have the advantage of that increase of objects and would be grateful for it. And in this point I think Aristotle stood to Plato grateful for the number of facts, conceptions, possibilities, which his ever-flowing invention presented, but like an original genius, still bringing them within his own plan of interpretation, grateful for his master's facts and yet still working upon them to bring them into his own construction. The point, therefore, for us to consider is wherein consisted the difference between the point of view of Plato and of Aristotle, for I am sure that you can neither expect nor wish that in the course of an hour and a half I should give you the whole particulars of the Aristotelian philosophy. I am only concerned to do it, by my plan, as far as it is a living movement in the progress of human philosophy.

Plato sought in that which is above our senses, he sought

* NB. 25: (the reflective, namely, but from the objects constantly supplied, the same in both points (Plato's the *constructive*)—Logic either Science or Art—or rather both—and in both the Art or Science of thinking systematically).

† The report reads: this consist.

in the thinking power itself, and still further, in the power of will revealed to us by our moral being, the solution both of the supersensual, that is our moral and intellectual being, and the sensual or the objects of our senses. Aristotle, on the contrary, began with the sensual, and never received that which was above the senses, but by necessity, but as the only remaining hypothesis by which it could be brought within the conceivability of the human mind. In other words, Plato began in meditation, thought deeply within himself of the goings-on of his own mind and of the powers that there were in that mind, conceived to himself how this could be, and if it were, what must be the necessary results and agencies of it, and then looked abroad to ask if this were a dream, or whether it were indeed a revelation from within, and a waking reality. He employed his observation as the interpreter of his meditation, equally free from the fanatic who abandons himself to the wild workings of the magic cauldron of his own brain mistaking every form of delirium for reality, and from the cold sensualist who looks at death as the alone real, or life of the world, by not considering that the very object was seen to him only by the seeing powers, and what a little further consideration would have led him to deduce, that that which could make him see it must be an agent, and a power like his own, whilst that which was merely seen, which was purely passive, could have no other existence than what arose out of an active power that had produced it.

It would be unfair to charge Aristotle with wilful perversion of Plato's meaning, at least wilful in that sense of which the mind can be conscious, though we all too naturally, perhaps, where we do not understand a thing, think and speak of it with less respect than it deserves.* It is undoubtedly a fact that all who believe in the doctrines of Plato must believe at the same time that Aristotle has misrepresented Plato's conception or thought; but that he grossly misunderstood Plato's words⁽¹⁹⁾ or that he made Plato mean something monstrous in order to substitute Plato's own meaning as his own, this I can never believe. The difference between Aristotle and Plato is that which will remain

* NB. 25: Aristotle could not have so misunderstood Plato's words as Tenneman[n] would believe. [From this point the three pages of notes remaining for this lecture are written in a quick careless hand. They are not closely followed in the lecture, but used in a back-and-forth way.]

as long as we are men and there is any difference between man and man in point of opinion.⁽²⁰⁾

Plato, with Pythagoras before him, had conceived that the phenomenon or outward appearance, all that we call thing or matter, is but as it were a language by which the invisible (that which is not the object of our senses) communicates its existence to our finite beings. We need, for instance, no sort of language to communicate our thoughts to ourselves. One thought communicates itself to another in the same mind without any sensible intermedium. But as there is individuality in the world arising out of free agency, and as each individual has will, there arises a necessity that there should be an intermedium by which one mind should be distinguished from another mind different from it; and in addition to that, by which one thought communicates its existence to another thought in the same mind. Now Plato argued that, as there was that power in the mind which thinks and images its thoughts, analogous to this was the power in nature which thought and imaged or embodied its thoughts, in consequence of which he resolved the ground of all things into the dynamic. But the power regarding the external phenomenon is intelligible only in proportion as the power which produced and manifested itself thereby was understood.

Aristotle on the contrary, affirmed that all our knowledge had begun in experience, had begun through the senses, and that from the senses only we could take our notions of reality. The objects of the senses, therefore, he declared to be the true realities of nature; and with regard to those things which are invisible he resolved them into certain harmonies, into certain results, and so forth. As however this would necessarily have led to atheism and an utter destitution of all religion and all morality, which it was least in the mind of Aristotle to produce, he was obliged to admit that *in* this reality, but not as *distinct from* it, there existed, as he called it, an ENTELECHIE, that is, a power which contained in itself, as it were, a capability of producing all that should be derived from it independent of time. I do not know how I can better explain the notion, (which a great Cardinal is said to have raised a Demon* up in order to explain,⁽²¹⁾ that is, the Aristotelian ENTELECHIE,) than by saying: "I am now standing, but no one doubts I have the power in me of sitting, that I have the power in

* NB. 25 reads: the Devil.

me of lying." Now this something, which is equally the principle of my power of standing, or sitting, or of all my various actions, and which in all those various actions is one and the same, Aristotle called the ENTELECHIE. If he were asked whether it was the same or not with the phenomenon that was produced, he would say 'yes'. But the consequence was this, that the supreme ENTELECHIE must necessarily be the same with matter, and no way properly called its judge, or in any other manner its master or lord than as the principle of gravitation of this earth, which arises out of the complex ENTELECHIE of all its atoms, can be said to be the lord of its motions round the sun. No wonder therefore, that in different ages there should be so many disputes whether Aristotle was a pious theist or an atheist; and I firmly believe the truth would be found this, that Aristotle wished that he was attached to a system and that he was a good and a religious man. Out of his system he wished to educe all that was religious and all that gratified the moral feelings; and if he did not perceive the inconsistencies of the sophists by which he connected that system with those conclusions, it is only a proof that the greatest of men have too great a love for systems of their own creation. Nor need we wonder when the same error has been carried on through a series of philosophers whom it would have been the last degree of uncharitable calumny to suppose are irreligious;⁽²²⁾ for there is, thank Heaven, a glorious inconsistency in this *human* nature, in which what is good, when driven from the head, takes place in the heart and still finds its operative place in the whole man. This is metaphysics however.

Whatever they* were, they are noticeable to us only as far as it was the first way in which, plainly and distinctly, two opposite systems were placed before the mind of the world. One, whether or not, in order to arrive at the truth, we are in the *first* place (for there is no doubt among thinking men that both must be consulted—the question of priority is the point) whether or not in the *first* place, and in order to gain the principles of truth, we are to go into ourselves and in our own spirits to discover the law by which the whole universe is acting, and then modestly to go forth and question this, that and the other, how far it will give a favorable response to our own individual conception of that truth; or whether on the contrary we are to regard,

* The metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle?

with Aristotle, the mind as being a blank or empty receiver, distinguished from it indeed by a strange and mysterious propensity of being filled—a sort of intellectual *vaso vacuo* which is to receive, here and there from this individual and the other individual, a multitude of notices, which this same blank tablet, this same empty vessel, is yet to generalize, to assert and finally to present to itself as a reality, precisely in the same way in which children might be made to mistake a projected image from a mirror, in the air, for the real cause of that mirror.

This I say is the first noticeable thing about Aristotle, but I can no otherwise call it his merit than that as he gave it the highest perfection which it has ever received; and I will venture to challenge any scholars acquainted with the subject to show me, from the time of Lord Bacon to the present day, any one opinion not in itself too absurd for an Aristotle to have conceived, any one opinion upon which they themselves pride themselves, which is not to be found in Aristotle, with all the arguments which they have brought forward for it more ably and more systematically *<presented>* than it has ever been since that time. There are but two possible philosophies, that is seekings after wisdom, for as to the trash which comes out from a bad heart acting upon a vain and coxcombical head it is not deserving of attention. That which a man must call a person a bad man to listen to with patience, ought not to be considered as a matter of grave discussion; the point is when you hear any such thing to say, "Sir, we differ in our premises: I am an honest man: if you tell me, Sir, for instance, that a Nero and a [refined Antonine]* are just as good, or that an assassin is no more worthy of punishment than the dagger with which he commits the crime, I should say at once you miss the grounds of all reason: go learn your catechism: be a better man and it is possible you may be a wiser one." At present it is impossible to reason with men who deny [*the natura naturans*] without which they would be scourged out of nature as monsters. But in all that have in any way conceived the human mind sensibly and honestly, as far as the pursuit of truth is honorably entertained, there I say, I have found nothing, either in the doctrines of association and the various modes in which they have been applied to the different pursuits and actions of men, or in the schemes of generalization, which had not been antici-

* The *Friend*, II. 226.

pated by Aristotle, and in most instances without the errors and the absurdities that in many cases have <later> accompanied them.⁽²³⁾

Putting that aside, great was his merit in his metaphysics of having framed what may be called a dictionary for the world in a grand scheme* that he drew the generic terms upon, the laws upon which the generic terms were to be formed. Grand too was this, that having been logically exercised upon a variety of the most important subjects of human thought in the schools of Plato and joining with Plato as an honorable man in indignation at the increasing influence of the sophists, he began then to abstract the science of logic itself. He first of all assuredly brought forward to men, not merely in practical examples and instances, the mode of reasoning rightly, but he abstracted from all this the forms of all coherent thinking. He discovered the law of it. He shewed as clearly as any man who has acquired, for instance, the science of fortification, how he must necessarily build, what angles he must necessarily make, for such and such reasons, and because such and such objects it will have that will infringe upon it, and have such and such properties. So Aristotle first of all determined what were the laws common to all coherent thinking, and therein he founded not only the science of logic but with it he made general throughout all the civilized world the terms of connexion: 'we', 'me', 'our', 'us', our 'ands', and our 'these', and our 'therefore', and so forth. So familiarly we hear them from infancy that we have no idea of the advanced state in which we stand by those connexions. But take an oriental writing and see how thought is put on thought with little other connective than 'ad' for 'and'. Compare it with the organized spirit of our writings till the new French writings, which aimed at destroying all the connexions of thought, as the same philosophy strove to destroy all the connexions of society⁽²⁵⁾ and domestic life. I say if we think of this,

* NB. 25: The Topics (or mode of detecting and correcting Sophisms) probably his first book—that on the Soul, or Psychology his last, excepting the *πρὸς ἐμμενέας*, in which it is referred to. But the corrupt state of his writings and its cause—

The *δασκῆσις λογικὴ* in Plato's school, joined with the increasing influence of the Sophists, led to the Science of Logic itself—i.e. to the Abstraction of the forms of all coherent thinking, and the discovery of the Law. This too quite Aristotelean. a particulari ad universum, a concreto ad abstractum.—

So his Ethics before his Politics—the Metaphysics still later—and his Psychology. (The proper study of Mankind is Man) among the latest. (").

and could be witness of the effect which it produces every hour of our life in our conversation with children, in our influence upon servants, we should feel a proportionate gratitude to that great man who first presented to us the science of our own thinking and therein first reduced to law and to foresight (for all law contains in itself the power of foresight) all the visionary sophisms by which men might, through the medium of words, impose false momentary convictions on each other.

This was accordingly quite in the character of Aristotle and could scarcely have proceeded from Plato, for Aristotle, as I have said before now, was an abstracting and generalizing power in the world. He still proceeded from the particular to the universal, from the concrete to the abstract; so it is no wonder that in his ethics which followed there are still the abstractions from the actions of men and from their consequences that end at last, not in morality, but in a discreet prudence and enlightened self-love. From this he proceeded, increasing his generalizations to *panethics*⁽²⁶⁾ in which he found a proper safeguard; for there all that might have been amiss in his philosophies or ethics found its place. For *panethics* consists in reconciling the whole by a generalization of the relations which take place between each and each in their individual relations, and between the relation of the whole to them all. I need say nothing further on this than that one of the greatest statesmen of modern times, Mr. Burke, has spoken the highest praise of Aristotle on this point⁽²⁷⁾ and that all great statesmen have acknowledged that from the *Politics* of Aristotle we derive, not only a better knowledge of all the states of Greece than their historians could have given us, but likewise the grounds of all the possibilities under which states can exist; and in this a dim prophecy, but yet a panegyrical one, of our own happy constitution.

I have but one thing more to say, namely, that we should <not> look with a charitable mode of judgment upon the immediate works of Aristotle in our present state of knowledge, if we did not apportion the proper merit to the Grand Scheme* rather than to the extension in all its parts. Every truly great mind is to be

* The remainder of the notes for the lecture are clearer than the lecture itself; not all were used: The general scheme of *Distinction*, and of strict pertinence *ad hoc*, the operative excellence—we must not exact in the first attempts the perfection of execution. O it is thus we must judge of great men, as *powers*, of which they as Mr.

considered in two points of view, the first in that in which he may be said to exist universally, to act upon all men in all ages; and that is the grand idea which he first originates, the grand form and scheme of generalization.† And the next is, when quitting the part of the architect, he himself becomes one of the labourers and one of the masons. There you will find in him the imperfections, of course, of every human individual; and while you give him every praise where he succeeds you will never permit it to detract from his merits where he fails. When the great Capella, from the meditation on the Pythagorean harmonies and numbers, drew forth the scheme of the motion of the planets and their distances,⁽²⁸⁾ what a petty mind must it be to say, "Still he did not calculate such and such a distance accurately", or, "He left such and such a thing to be done by those who followed him". Aye, that was his merit. He gave the principle of life as a ruling power and then, sinking into an individual, formed himself

Aristotle or Mr. Plato are the Commoners. They are men and they are Immortals.

But this more especially applicable to Aristotle whose mighty mind was the Camp-Master of the Sciences—laid out the districts—that he did more, so much more, is the wonder!—

Aristotle's mind in the highest degree Objective, and tho' familiar with the Subjective still contemplates it as Objective—Plato's originally Subjective and widely acquainted with the Objective, but which yet he strove to contemplate Subjectively.

Aristotle made Philosophy and Science *One*—Knowledge out of the last grounds to which Analyses can lend the *Stuff* given by the senses. Plato *contrary*—Hence all proper knowledge is confined to objects of the Senses—and the belief of self-subsistent *Beings*, not sensible,—and the resolving of all so-called into results of the sensible—but it was impossible for such a man to be satisfied with $0 + 0 = 1$ —under a mere[?] organization, necessarily rose his famous *Entelechie*, *principle* of the potential—which a Cardinal is said to have called up the Devil to explain.

Another consequence of his denial of the Plat. or Pyth. Dynamic was a hint he could only define the faculty by the *Objects*—instead of determining from the nature of the Faculty what (as far as the perception or conception itself were concerned) the Object must necessarily be.—Hence the endless shades of discrimination and consequent superfluity—of orders and classes of things—Yet still he could not but feel this necessity—i.e. of a god as the true object of Philosophy—but inconsistently or else as the common *Entelechie* of all the parts of the Universe—which amounted to nothing on his mere *generalizing* scheme.

So in physics—Plato—Substance and Accident—(i.e. co-existence, and necessarily result of inter-action)—Aristotle into Substance, Forms, and Privation. The reason, that Aristotle's God was the abstraction, Substance—Plato's Super-Mundum.

† Organization?

a part of the mighty impulse which was to move on for ages without end.

I should be happy if your patience is not exhausted to say a little on the subject of philosophy in general with regard to its influence on society. It has been commonly supposed—I will not say the same as, but certainly under a terribly suspicious relation to—alchemy or conjuration or something or other. *<Or>* only this—"It may be very innocent, but as to any utility or influence on society, it is a matter out of the question; you may go through all the streets of London and enquire at every shop in vain for any philosopher, or anything that philosophers have done, that was useful to the happiness of mankind". I again do think somewhat differently from this and I will not give you a philosophical reason but an historical one for it. I cannot but feel, when I look through modern history, a powerful coincidence of sundry things with great events of society in which we are interested. As for instance, I find, to begin with a point I touched on in my last lecture, that during the prevalence of the corrupt Aristotelian philosophy which had passed into endless distinctions and classifications, the fine arts partook of the same influence—wiry outlines, surfaces imprisoned in the outlines without depth, without force. It was in painting what mere verbiage would be in literature, and that *<even>* with the drawing of the true genius of Giotto and the six other masters whose works are preserved at the cemetery of Pisa⁽²⁸⁾; where [*art is united*] with philosophy, there the outward form was more than indifferent. It seemed, like the Platonic matter, to be untractable; and yet there was the power felt, and with the power the grace and the life and the influence of Platonic philosophy. This was under the auspices of Lorenzo the Magnificent and of Leo the 10th, with [*Cosmo de Medici*] and others, carried to its height for the time, and the great men, the Raphaels and the Michael Angelos appeared. There the mighty spirit still coming from within had succeeded in taming the untractable matter and in reducing external form to a symbol of the inward and imaginable beauty. We feel it to this day. We feel it for this reason, because we look at the forms after we have long satisfied all curiosity concerning the mere outline; yet still we look and look and feel that these are but symbols. Full worthily have they expressed themselves. Why, having seen their outlines, why, having determined what they appeared to the eye, do we still

continue to muse on them, but that there is a divine something corresponding to *<something>* within, which no image can exhaust but which we are reminded of when in the South of Europe we look at the deep blue sky?⁽³⁰⁾ The same unwearied form presents itself, yet still we look on, sinking deeper and deeper, and therein offering homage to the infinity of our souls which no mere form can satisfy.

With the progress and the decline of philosophy came, exactly as in the history of philosophy itself, the Eclectic school, the men who without any forming principle within were to select the best from everything. They were to make the Helens from all the different beautiful women they were acquainted with, the nose from one, the eye from another and the forehead from another, and in this manner they were to put together the lifeless fragments,⁽³¹⁾ the egg-shells to make the living germ of the phoenix; and they succeeded to a certain extent. We had fine academic forms and they stood in a kind of middle state which will always please certain minds congenial with them, and this I should call the age of [*Eclecticism*].

The Eclectic philosophy was followed by the merely mechanical in which, in truth, the atoms (to which they were obliged to admit certain special qualities) brought together, produced a result and that result led to nothing excellent. On the contrary the very principle was that the effect of outward form or symbol was more noble than the cause which produced it; and accordingly for nearly half a century or more we had your fine inveterate portraits, and in statuary your great marble wigs, which led a man to say that they could not have looked more inveterately stupid in real life than they did upon the canvas or in the marble.

This was the real state of the arts during the predominance of that kind of philosophy. But at length what was the mark of a better taste, flatteringly for us, arose with Sir Joshua Reynolds; and it is no slight confirmation of my opinion that it is recorded that in evil days, and with every obstacle around him, he had drunk deeply of Platonism, at least of what is best of all the vital feelings of Platonism, in his early youth *<and>* since that time. And now I am happy to see and feel that men are craving for a better diet than the wretched trash they have been fed with for the last century; that they will be taught that what is sound

must come out of themselves, and that they cannot find good with their eyes or with their ears or with their hands, that they will not discover them in the crucible or bring them out of a machine, but must look into the living soul which God has made His image, in order to learn, even in fragments, what that power is by which we are to execute the delegated power entrusted to us by Him. And I feel more *<strongly>* when I think that in the country where this mechanic philosophy was predominant, and most idolized, it presented a most fearful but a most instructive lesson of its consequences. We have only to put one word for the other, and in the mechanical philosophy to give the whole system of the French Revolution.⁽³²⁾ Here are certain atoms miraculously invested with certain individual rights, from the collection of which all right and wrong is to depend. These atoms, by a chance and will of their own, were to rush together and thus rushing together they were to form a convention, and this convention was to make a constitution, and this constitution then was to make a contract, a very sound contract, between the major atoms and the minor ones that the minor should govern them, but that the major should have a right to knock them on the head whenever they chose; and if there was any quarrel the major atoms were to assume the power of repulsion, suspending then the power of attraction, and dance the old Hay over again till they formed a new convention, which was to form a new constitution, which was to make a contract, which was to give them the same inherent rights of doing wrong whenever they chose. What can be the consequence of this?

Then look at us—what are we in ourselves? If we look at our hands, our limbs, they are marvellously composed, but did we compose them? Is not the whole power of the universe concerned in every atom that falls and takes its place as a living particle there? But yet after all, what are we? Can man, if he does not raise himself above man, above his individual self, contemplate himself as aught but an animal, different from other animals by having a bewildering self-conceit instead of instinct? If he is not man, if he is not a living part of the universe, capable of partaking of the universe, and finding himself then *“only”* when he does partake in it, let us throw aside all our pride, all our boastfulness of the image of God. How can that be so, which considers only the paltry particle and which knows nothing of a whole but as it

is produced out of a collision of these nothings, which is to make the marvellous integer out of so many thousand noughts? No. Depend on it, whatever is grand, whatever is truly organic and living, the whole is prior to the parts. That man is unworthy of being a citizen of a state who does not know the citizens are for the sake of the state, not the state for the sake of the immediate flux of persons who form at that time the people. Who does not know what a poor worthless creature man would be if it were not for the unity of human nature being preserved from age to age through the godlike form of the state? Who does not carry it further on, and judge of all things in proportion as they partake of unity? Who *<does not>* judge of the democratic elements as far [*as the claims of each*]* by the individual [are as much as possible compatible with the claims of all as individuals, and with those of the commonweal as a whole]?† Who does not reverence monarchy, as far as it again tends to draw the mind to the feeling of the one, and the magnificent power in the one, and reverence in the universe? Who does not again feel the same elevation of mind in contemplating rank, high birth, aristocracy, as principles of preeminence, as the thread of cohesion, [*as binding all together making us look on our country at present*] as our very own, and on future ages as our reversionary property? It is this, the principle of unity, and that derived from within, not from the objects of our senses, (which deprived of the interpreting power from within are but an alphabet run mad, are in reality only a tendency like matter itself to be divided and divided *ad infinitum*) that unity in which we have to thank our better nature that though we may perish without end, we cannot utterly cease to be.

* Based on *Remarks on Sir Robert Peel's Bill*, 1818, 20.

† *Ibid.*, a direct quotation.

LECTURE VI

JANUARY 25, 1819⁽¹⁾

CROWN AND ANCHOR, Strand, the SUBJECTS of Mr. COLERIDGE'S LECTURE for THIS EVENING, (8 o'clock). STOICISM, Epicureanism, and the Sceptics; the rapid Ebb of Philosophy which had now appeared in all its forms, and its Dead Low water at the birth of our Saviour; and lastly Christ contemplated as Philosopher, and Teacher of Philosophy; as the union of its truths and the supplement of its inherent imperfections; with the Monday lecture following, the first half of the Philosophical Course will be concluded with the Philosophy, improperly so-called, of the Greek Egyptian or Eclectic, Philosophy as the Plagiary and Rival of Christianity from Hadrian to its final disappearance under Justinian. Admission to any one lecture 5s; but tickets for the seven lectures comprising the re-appearance of Philosophy in Christendom, from the rise of the Schoolmen to the close of the French Revolution, may be procured at the room on Monday & Thursday evenings; single ticket £1, double ticket 30s.*

It will I conceive be the best arrangement of the subjects of this evening's discourse if, somewhat changing the order in which they had appeared in the advertisement, I begin with the Sceptics, for the purpose of taking up what otherwise I should find no place for and in truth is not of great philosophic consequence, the history of the Megaric school. Of these we have little more remaining than the names of the teachers and founders, Euclides or Euclid, his scholars Pyrrho, Stilpo and Cliomachus, but above all DEODORUS, surnamed the Atheist, and Pyrrho,⁽²⁾ the founder of the Sceptics and therein linking on to our immediate subject.

* The *Morning Chronicle*, Jan. 25. With slight differences the same notice appeared in *The Times*. The *Courier* in its notice of Jan. 23, introduced some slight additions.

All those men flourished between the 95th and the 120th Olympiad, that is to say from about three hundred and ninety-nine years to two hundred and seventy years before our Lord. From all the accounts we have received the school appears more probably disputatious* than philosophic. Timon, himself a Sceptic, talks of THIS the PARENT SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM in no very honourable† phrases, for he says in three of the Greek hexameters, which among others have been preserved of his what would have been to us invaluable poems, "But I care nothing for these trifles nor for any that belong to them, not <for Phaedo>‡ whoever he may be, nor yet for the litigious Euclides who struck the inhabitants of the school of Megara with RABIES of disputation".§ In short it was at once an art and a passion with them. Still however, something is to be said; EUBULIDES, who wrote against Aristotle, was a man who is deemed to have done good service to the science of logic, and we are informed by Plutarch that his book of sophisms, or as we should call them conundrums, were merely logical exercitations⁽⁴⁾—which indeed, before I met with this passage in Plutarch, I believed to be the case with the conundrums of the greatest stoics.¶

The object was to guard the minds of the young pupils against the force of equivocation, of double meanings lying hid under the same word,⁽⁵⁾ so that an argument or a deduction drawn from one meaning shall be perfectly correct but from the other shall be perfectly fallacious; yet this may, by the artifices of words, be so disguised that you may trace from a sophism, which is not only what we call a bull,⁽⁶⁾ on to the finest paralogism, what has set nations at war with each other and has disturbed the last century with factions; yet the same sophism shall be at the bottom of both, and the difference only is that the one is more happily disguised than the other by words arising out of associations and out of the nature of the subject. Now they thought, and permit me to say I fully agree with them, that no more happy

* NB. 25: eristic.

† The spelling in the reports is not consistent, e.g. as to the "or" and "our" in such words as "favour", "honour", "honourable"; "connexion" and "compleatly" appear to be a matter of mood.

‡ Diog. Laert. II. 107, quoted in Tennemann, II. 135n.

§ NB. 25: Dr. Franklin's character of the Edinburgh Alumni⁽⁷⁾. [Coleridge—not the reporter I think—omitted the humour.]

¶ The reporter wrote "poets".

mode could be perceived of putting the mind on its guard against this delusion (which all history shews us has been of such vital importance to men) than by presenting an absurdity palpable at first sight, where the scholar has no temptation of being misled or actually believing the thing to be so, but yet all his ingenuity is exerted to discover where the fault in the argument lies. As for instance, when a man says "I lie", he either lies or he does not lie. If he lies, he tells the truth, and if he tells the truth, he lies—a sort of conundrum. Every man knows at once the thing must end in nothing, that it is an absurdity, and yet it will not suggest itself at once to every mind where the logical defect is, which in this case, for instance, would be that here a poetic or passionate use of a phrase is substituted for a logical one, that when a man says "I lie" he uses the present tense figuratively, in order to determine the extreme recency of what he has said; and the sophism consists in the man having used bad grammar and saying "I lie", which is referable to the past, as a positive act of immediate consciousness; for if he said "I lied" the argument would drop. And yet be assured there have been sophisms as gross as that in reality, which, yet a little better disguised, have been productive of all the bad passions that can agitate the human mind, and of all the consequences that follow from such passions when men have swords to argue with instead of merely a pen or their tongues.

DIODORUS deserved mention, too, for his labors in desynonymizing words.⁽⁷⁾ He began with the assertion that properly speaking there are no synonymous words, and this perhaps, applied to a homogeneous language like the Greek, may be very nearly true. Applied to a language derived from many sources, such as is the English, it certainly is not strictly true, and a very ingenious work on the subject, by Mr. William Taylor,⁽⁸⁾ I believe labors under the mistake that, substituting what ought to be and what is desirable for what actually is, he has assumed that no two words really are synonymous. I should say that certainly there are several, many in our language, and I believe that the more we move forward in knowledge, the more of such we shall discover. We shall with every new, permanent, and just distinction be obliged to use the word in one sense only, which unwittingly we have before used in many. The instance that now suggests itself to me is that of "obliged" and "compelled".⁽⁹⁾ Before the time of Charles the First the words

were used as perfectly synonymous till Hobbes, having drawn an argument from this, that as a man who was "obliged" was "compelled" and that a man that is compelled cannot be responsible, and consequently there can be no real essential distinction between vice and virtue, men were "obliged" to look about them; and they found they used one word to express a compulsion from without, that which a man cannot prevent, and another to express *<that>* which he ought not to do, and *<that>* which he is obliged not to do, but by no means compelled to do or omit. Then we began to use the words with a very important difference attached to them, and this having come into our language, and being that *<to>* which we are all bred up from infancy, to discourse, it becomes common sense. For often as I have questioned myself what the exact meaning of the words "common sense" is, I can find no other explanation than the following: when that which had been in the schools, and was communicable only by a technical language, in consequence of its compleat correspondence with the inward and outward experience of all men, becomes a part of the general language, so that men by the mere mechanism of language can think as a man can do sums, by a carpenter's rule, then it becomes what we call "common sense", which is an ever varying thing. What is philosophy in one age is common sense in another, and vice-versa; so that when that which belongs to a few becomes the inheritance of all (who are not diseased or pitiably below their fellow creatures) in the state of society which they enjoy in common, then philosophy perpetually acts as the pioneer and purveyor of common sense. The more industrious philosophy is, the larger the sphere of common sense, for whenever philosophy is so intelligible that all men admit it, it becomes then a part of their common thoughts and common language. And every man now can say, "Common sense dictates to us that the small speck we call this earth is not the centre of the whole universe round which the other stupendous bodies move, but it itself goes round the larger orb; and this to an extent of which we are unaware". This we are almost all taught. You will scarcely find a person in this country ignorant of the truth of what was thought such uncommon sense, even absurd, in a time so recent as that of Charles the Second, so that Sir Thomas Browne, one of the ablest men of the age, declared it to be such uncommon nonsense that it was a proof there was no

idea so absurd but some philosopher had taught it.⁽¹⁰⁾ This has become the common sense of the village, and of the cottage. Such is the protruded state of progression in society, and it applies not only to thoughts but to words, which on all occasions a man may observe.

Words are things. They are the great mighty instruments by which thoughts are excited and by which alone they can be *<expressed>* in a rememberable form. And delightful it is to listen to the common people, hear them in the streets, overhear them when they are conversing with each other, and particularly at any moment when they are interested or animated, and you may count on your fingers word after word the history of which you can trace and find. How familiar words are with them and how appropriately used which but a century ago were placed as pedantic and fit only for the schools! In some instances even to abuse, I grant, but what is there in human nature without abuse?

We ought not to quit that subject without remembering how much we owe to the institutions of Christianity. How clear it is that the history has been this: from the schools to the pulpit, and from the pulpit, not by any long circuit but directly, to the common people.⁽¹¹⁾ And their degree of intellect does not so much, in this country at least, depend upon the quantum of their opportunities with regard to books or to conversation, as it does to the zeal and the interest that they feel in their own permanent concerns; and I will appeal to common experience whether it be common, or whether an instance can be found of a man who, having begun to think better of his duties and what he has got to look forward to in life, becoming, as they say, serious, a regular attendant on his church or on his meeting, but that you find that man in the course of a few months wonderfully altered both in his language, in his power of connecting words, and with that, in his power of generalizing and the increase of his intellectual faculties generally. This I say because, if we may use the word, ('proud' I was about to say, but yet pride that has no selfishness is honorable) it is a proud distinction because it is a grateful one; and our religion, *<distinct>* from all others that have been revealed, has been the faithful guide and the pioneer and companion of civilization. Look at the countries under the influence of Mahometanism. Look at the countries under the influence of Brahmanism, and observe how from good it has become less so,

to the bad, and from the bad to the worse with all the natural effects of degraded nature in sensuality, cruelty, and finally, under a familiarity with despotism, that last, that worst state of man, utter insensibility, in which nothing remains that is human but the forms of superstition.

Let these men, the Megaric school, therefore, as friends of logic though little interested in philosophy properly speaking, have our thanks and our honorable remembrance.

In their school it appears that Pyrrho,⁽¹²⁾ the founder of the Sceptics or the Pyrrhonists, was educated. His biography however is stuffed with contradictions and different tales; different individuals of the same race are confounded with him. There appear still all the practical consequences that would follow if this sceptic was supposed, as a man, really to believe all that the demonstrators thought [*dogmatists taught?*] and what on grounds of logic (supposing he [*them?*] alone)* <HE> had <DENIED> as a philosopher. Imagine such a monstrous impossibility as this, and that these were passed at once into actual matters of fact concerning Pyrrho, that because he would call on a man as a philosopher to prove to him the existence of that post out of his own mind, that therefore Pyrrho must necessarily run his nose against that post or he was a very inconsistent man. Pyrrho would say, "I am reasoning on a point of science. I believe the post to be there, and act on its being there, as well as you. The dispute is whether you as a philosopher, as a scientific man, have or have not assumed a light by which you can demonstrate this independent of your natural feelings." This is the true doctrine of Pyrrhonism and were it otherwise it would be an affront to the name of philosophy to bring the history of such men, or their names, into any discussion at all but in that sense.

Mr. Hume†—no one will suspect me of being an advocate of Mr. Hume's opinions, but I most assuredly do think that he was attacked in a very illogical not to say unhandsome manner both by Priestley and Oswald, and I grieve to say for the beauty

* The parenthesis is not in the notes, and the whole sentence seems to have been garbled in the reporting. For the "dogmatists" see the next footnote.

† NB. 25: A rich Biography of Mr. Hume might be easily constructed in this way out of Oswald, Beattie, and Priestley's writings against him, and as it is capable of strict <proof> that no one of those writers understood what the point in question was, so it is more than probable was the case of the Dogmatists with regard to Pyrrho.

of the book in other respects, by Beattie.⁽¹³⁾ It was a book that honoured Beattie from the display of genius and eloquence which shot through and through as it were with a good heart and sincere piety, but notwithstanding that, Mr. Hume had some right to say it was a great big lie in octavo as far as it referred to him; for it went on the ground that Hume did not believe there was any connection of cause and effect that man could act by, whereas it was a proud challenge to your proud dogmatists who conceived all things to be the influence of their reason, and particularly those (as was the case with ninety-nine out of a hundred for whom he wrote) compleat [Lockians]* who held that all knowledge was derived *from* the senses and that there was no reality *in* the senses,⁽¹⁴⁾ and he cut the matter short by calling on them to prove that the ideas of cause and effect have any reality at all. They may be produced by the mere force of association, as the law of association in the human mind; when two things come together habitually, with the one appearing we naturally expect the other, and as long as that experience remains uncontradicted so long we act confidently, and there we affirm the reality of those ideas. I call on you to give up your [Guy Faux man of straw, innate ideas, and allow some other truth than the senses can arrive at], or admit with me there is no philosophic, no sciential ground, for the arguments of cause and effect.⁽¹⁵⁾ Instead of answering this book, a great clamor arose. "Here is a man denying all cause and effect. What will become of all our religion?" If it stopped there, there would be some sense in it. But they went on. What was to become of all society? "If such opinions were to prevail men would not use their spoons to put their soup into their mouths!" In short a wonderful number of [*absurdities which could only be answered*] by telling them there were a great many things not dreamt of in their philosophy. So much I have said, because I think it a duty owing to every man who has sought for truth, however widely what he believed as truth differs from my conceptions.

Now something of this I believe to have been the case with Pyrrho, for his character was most highly revered; and from the fragments of Timon which I have mentioned he is spoken of exactly as Socrates, whose great object was to withdraw men from vain speculations beyond their powers to the practical

* Gaps in this paragraph are supplied from British Museum MS. Egerton 2826, ff. 282-7.

duties of life,* but to prevent especially that feverish positiveness that so often deludes minds under the best impulses into the worst actions, to teach men what a difference there is between positiveness and certainty; and if they could not arrive at the latter, which he professed himself unable to do, then to say with Voltaire—and the very passage is found in Timon⁽¹⁸⁾—I neither know nor believe myself to have the means of knowing why the air of Greece is better than the air elsewhere, but this I know, that we ought to cultivate our olive gardens.†

The sect of the sceptics were, however, obscure, and counted of all the sects the fewest great names. This arose from the nature and the circumstances of the Grecian and of the Roman republics. There was not any criminality, in the first place, attached to any direct belief or unbelief while it remained merely philosophical, as long as the question was purely metaphysical, relative to the divine nature,‡ and not to the gods of the laws and the establishment. For like us the ancients were liberals, enlightened and tolerant men of the very first water as long as the subject in dispute was one in which they had not the slightest degree of interest. Where indeed any interest was awakened on the subject, they could, if not burn, yet poison and banish, and display the usual modes of conviction, in deferring or preventing that spread of heresy with as much alacrity and thorough good will as the Inquisition itself. But scepticism was not in the nature of the times. Their very republican habits led them to carry into the schools of philosophy the same temper of minds with which they voted in the assemblies. They must be on the one side or the other directly, and the doctrine which seemed to put a check to all progress of the human mind (which it really did or would have done) was opposed to their better feelings, as well as it was incongruous with their manners or accidental ones. I have mentioned this, therefore, merely in proof that all the forms of philosophy that are properly philosophy, that is to say grounded

* NB. 25: of the *whole man*.

† NB. 25: In general, we may say that Pyrrho's doctrine freed from the misrepresentations of the Dogmatists was like that of Aristippus the Cyrenaic & Antisthenes the Cynic, a one-side[d] Socrates, a slip transplanted and forming a tree of itself. The writings of Timon unfortunately lost, all but a few fragments; but these are highly in honour of Pyrrho . . . P. S. Pyrrho accompanied Alexander in his campaigns—Here go back to the Cyrenaics.

‡ NB. 25: τὸ θεῖον.

in any of the operations of reason, or of the understanding, right or wrong, had been developed previous to the appearance of our Lord; and I therefore defer the rest to the second part of this course, the reappearance of philosophy in Christendom, where it will be found that, from other circumstances, the sceptics then had and continued to play a much more important part—though without a single argument THAT WILL NOT BE FOUND ANTICIPATED IN THE WORK OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. BUT AS THE INDIVIDUAL IS THROUGHOUT THESE LECTURES SUBORDINATED TO THE HISTORY OF philosophy, as a striving of the mind OF the world, of Man, in accordance with this plan, I defer the detail of their arguments as well as the consequences of them to the era in which they were truly influential and effective.⁽¹⁷⁾

I proceed therefore now to the Epicureans and the philosophy of Epicurus, but in order to do this it will be necessary for me to recur again, not to repeat but simply to recur, to the Cyrenaic sect, whom I spoke of in an earlier lecture as arising out of the ambiguity of Socrates's own doctrine, which split itself in his immediate followers into the Cynic sect under Antisthenes and the Cyrenaic or voluptuary sect under Aristippus.⁽¹⁸⁾ The particulars I deferred until the present time. Aristippus himself was not properly the founder of the school. He was a courtier, a man of fashion, a philosopher of the world, but his grandson Aristippus* became, strictly speaking, a Master of philosophy and the founder of a particular school. After him came Theodore, surnamed the Atheist, HEGESIAS, AND ANNICERIS.† And the tenets common to them all seem to be these: they all alike divided the movements of the mind into pain and pleasure, between which stood the states of indifference;‡ these movements, pain or pleasure, originate all in the body; they admitted however certain agreeable and disagreeable emotions—some of them at least did—that had their ground in the soul, such as the LOVE§ of our country. But then what they gave with one hand they took away with the other, for they declared those emotions to be so

* NB. 25 adds: Aristippus the second, called Matrodidactus, from being educated by his Mother Arete.

† NB. 25 adds: Each of these appeared to have modified the tenets of the School, tho' the particulars as given by Diogenes Laertes are inconsistent as usual with that Biographer who alas! seems equally deficient in historical & philosophical critiques.

‡ NB. 25: ἀγδονία καὶ ἀπονία.

§ The reporter wrote "laws".

faint and ineffective in themselves that unless they were accidentally associated by some bodily feeling they would have no weight and scarcely arrive at consciousness. Pleasure and the avoidance of its opposite they declared to be the actual only motive, and the impulse of each moment and the aggregate of pleasurable sensations the final sum total (I beg to observe, for something rests on the distinction, the *final sum total* of these, not the co-existence of them at any one time); but the final sum total of pleasurable sensation they proposed as the great object of all human thought and action under the name of [εὐδαιμονία,* or HAPPINESS]. So far their doctrines do not appear in direct open hostility against all morality, however indirectly or by fair deduction they would be found so personally. But there was a third which renders all sane or safe interpretation impossible. They declared that each individual is as an individual an entire *end*, to and for himself, and that all our objects have no other reality except as the sensations and phantoms in the individual mind constitute a part of his whole pleasure. But, it was objected, the bodily emotions too often contravene each other and it is hard to reconcile them. This they admitted, and to systematize them, therefore, they said, requires prudence; but the task being very difficult, for that reason and for that reason only, prudence becomes virtue. So that virtue they defined to be prudence exerted on a difficult subject. But as every noticeable time, every time of which we can be conscious or remember, however short it be, must itself be a system of sensations, therefore say they we may without impropriety speak of *happy* moments; and he is on the whole the happiest man who has the greatest number of intense enjoyments or of happy moments.

It follows from all this that there can be no universal criterion either of duty, or of virtue, or of wisdom, because there can be none of the sensations in which all these have origin and from which they derive their only reality. Disputemus non de gustibus†—we must not dispute about matters of taste. Each man's appeal is to his own incommunicable peculiarity‡ of

* NB. 25: So far, false as I hold these tenets, & equivocal the terms adopted—yet they might possibly be interpreted into a semblance of morality—a safe tho' not sane sense.

† NB. 25 gives the more usual *De gustibus non est disputandum*.

‡ NB. 25: idiosyncrasy.

feeling. I have Cicero for my authority who says: *PRAETER PERMOTIONES INTIMAS NIHIL PUTANT JUDICII*⁽¹⁹⁾—they admit of no criterion of judgment except their own innate or incommunicable feelings. And undoubtedly this is not so wild as it may seem to be, when fairly stated, for even in modern times I have met with books which assert the very same things.

I have seen a very elaborate work on taste,⁽²⁰⁾ for instance, in which the taste of venison and a taste for Milton and a taste for religious sentiment have been all treated of as a species of the same genus, all originating in the palate; and the whole system of criticism both in poetry, painting, statuary, and so forth, is derived from this grammatical mistake of 'a taster of' and 'taste for'. Various others passed the same inward judgments till the moral being [*was outraged by the*] absurdity as well as the baseness which is contained in their notions. What is the consequence of this? I need not say that to the greater part of mankind it would preclude all wish to be better. For unless I could demonstrate to a healthy fellow, that is, for instance, in an alehouse or elsewhere enjoying himself over a pot of porter, that I at that time enjoyed more pleasurable feelings in endeavouring to develop my intellectual faculties than he did with his pot of porter; or if I said, "I believe you are as well employed as I am, if only you are developing your being in the best way of all by an earnest desire to perform your duty", if he says, "I have neither tasted the sweetness, nor felt the smoothness, nor seen the colour nor had any other gratification from this sort of duty you talk of," what motive could I offer to such a man in the world? He is the judge of his own sensations. I cannot pretend to tell him I think the development of his intellectual faculties or the keeping sacred the principles of conscience are worthy his notice if I am to reduce them to what I know nothing about. Whether it will tickle the man or give him a pleasurable sensation or not, the moment I press that, I must reason as we all reason: "Well, Sir, taste differs". No man is angry with another for liking beef when he prefers mutton. If our moral duties originate in the same way the same reasoning must follow, and as the object of all philosophy is to raise man from a lower state to a higher, what must become of that which is incapable of shewing that any one man could gain by the exchange, which has not one single argument that can be offered why he would be at all happier

in one state than in the other? For every argument would suppose something under the name of happiness which did not belong to the sensations, and which did not belong to any *thing* peculiar[*ly*] but which was convincing to all men when it was once offered to them (unless that conviction was precluded by their own fault). There are things on which we are entitled to say, "Perhaps, Sir, I cannot convince you, but this I know, that you ought to be convinced", and philosophy which strikes the words "should" and "ought" out of the dictionary, and intellect *<out>* of philosophy is only anti-philosophy. And presented in this crude form no man would admit it, but when tricked up with all the advantages of a religion where the grapes from the vineyard and of revelation are hung on the thorns, it is astonishing what a decorous, well-bred, courtly, amiable, and convincing system this can be made to appear, even to a majority of mankind.

From the Cyrenaic sect arose—I should say before, for it is a necessary part of—the proof of it; the Cyrenaic may be taken for a sect who in a plain manner followed the natural consequences of their doctrine. They rejected in the first place two of the three divisions of philosophy, namely physics and dialectics, and retained only the ethics. The dialectics they rejected as utterly useless because a man must know his own sensations, and all logic consisted in knowing whether a man did or did not *look* on a thing. The physics* they rejected on a higher ground. They said it tended to create a belief in any reality out of a man's own feelings,† and therefore troubled his mind, and made him anxious. But what sect will give up morality? It was a sort of gourmands' almanac. There were many dishes that agreed very well and appeared digestible to many persons, and therefore in the form of a question they were all strongly recommended to try; and if another found the direct opposite to agree with him better, they hoped *<to receive>* his communication in time for the next edition. This was the same they mustered under different forms. All are pretences to ethics which are founded on the principle of self-gratification. I do not say "self-love", that is a subtler point.⁽²¹⁾ More interesting a great deal here, (for this is one thing different from the whole history of philosophy, that the biography of the individuals that formed it is infinitely more interesting than the scheme itself)

* NB. 25: others, however, admitted logic but excluded physiology.

† NB. 25: & with it the hours of Fear, Conscience etc.

two or three must be mentioned—Theodore, surnamed the Atheist, and HEGESIAS and ANNICERIS.⁽²²⁾

First of Theodore. He was surnamed the Atheist and undoubtedly the inevitable consequences of the Cyrenaic system must have been atheism. For what man would pretend to say that he had any consciousness, that he had any sensuous perceptions of the objects of religion? However he appears to have been, as far as a man of such principles could be, yet practically an honest man; and it was not for his real atheism but for his sincerity in rejecting the divinity of his country's gods and goddesses, whom he regarded as mere deified men and women, afterwards employed in a secondary use and by an afterthought as symbols of the powers in Nature, THAT HE WAS CALLED AN ATHEIST. And consequently he has found many able advocates in the best fathers of the Christian Church. But though he ought not on this ground to be called an atheist, or perhaps on any, yet doubtless a sceptic or unbeliever—a negative atheist HE WAS—AND SUCH CHARMS HAVE CONSISTENCY IN LOGIC AND MORAL SINCERITY FOR ME, THAT OF ALL HIS SECT whether in this its cruder* form the Cyrenaic, or in its after more prudential shape, as the school of Epicurus, I feel the greatest respect for Theodorus, whose brief creed of his unbelief† has been preserved by Plutarch. "To the idea, God, I CAN ATTACH NO APPROPRIATE MEANING, BUT THAT OF BEING, INFINITE AND YET SELF-CONSCIOUS, EXISTING yet not in time, every where present yet not in space; acting on all and yet impassive to all RE-action; ETERNAL, IMPERISHABLE, immutable. Now for the possibility of a reality correspondent to this idea I can find no grounds in the FORMS OF‡ my understanding, no facts AND NO ANALOGIES IN THE WORLD OF MY senses". And I think that what the philosophic Apostle has said—one sentence—this is a just comment on. By the mere power of reasoning no man ever yet arrived at God,⁽²³⁾ at that Being given by his conscience and his moral being. Then his intellect, his senses, and all the objects of both intellect and senses, are one continued book forever calling it forth, forever reminding him of it, forever bringing it into distinction and comparison. But those who think it easy to demonstrate the being of a deity are mistaken. A very worthy

* NB. 25: but yet more veracious

† NB. 25: non-credence

‡ The report reads instead of "forms of", "terms and in".

man once expressed to me his astonishment that any doubt should be felt about it. "What have you to conceive of but infinite goodness, infinite wisdom, and infinite power—and that is God?" Fortunately the most powerful of the ancients found this no easy task, and poor Theodore who saw clearly, by what I must think a proof of a good heart, what he would wish to believe, and who admitting more than his senses and his understanding as that which brings it into consciousness, was perfectly right in affirming that he could find there no correspondent reality to such an idea. Were we, regardless of the anachronism, to imagine to ourselves Theodore, and the furious compromiser* who followed him, as present at that sublimest moment in the records of orators, the oration of St. Paul† at Athens⁽²⁴⁾ when the JORDAN, SWOLN WITH IMMEDIATE SHOWERS FROM HEAVEN, FLOWED INTO AND DROVE BACK THE STREAMS OF ILISSUS, were we to consider both these men auditors of this Apostle, we should not hesitate in determining which of the two would most probably have been the disciple of St. Paul—Theodore the honest and reluctant Atheist or ANNICERIS,‡ who holding precisely the same premises, found a number of courtly ways of agreeing with the established opinion of society on all occasions.

Next to Theodore was HEGESIAS⁽²⁵⁾ THE [πεισιθάνατος or death-counselling], who drew from the same premises the same melancholy results with respect to the great idol of their scheme, namely, happiness. Whether understood as the Cyrenaics, that is enjoyment, or as their successors, the followers of Epicurus, that is pleasurable tranquillity, I say from the same premises he drew the same melancholy results with regard to happiness which Theodore had done. With regard to truth he held this happiness to be demonstrably unattainable. Nothing could be more legitimate than his deductions were from this system,¶ which since his time has been called Eudaemonism,§ of that which places happiness as the true source and regulator of duties, as the object and the aim of man, rejecting as they did immortality, because that again could be brought under no sensation, under no per-

* NB. 25: Anniceris.

† NB. 25 inserts: before the Areopagus

‡ NB. 25: Atheism—which Theodore honestly confessed & the odium of which frightened back Anniceris into the system of *Compromise* which has so many advocates at the present day.

§ NB. 25 at this point reads: Here repeat the lines from the *Sibylline Leaves*, p. 268.

ception; thence their reasonings. I had at one time felt within myself and gave utterance to them in a few lines under the title of "Human life contemplated on the denial of Immortality".

"If dead we cease to be; if total gloom

Swallow up life's brief flash for aye, we fare
As Summer gusts, of sudden birth and doom

Whose sound and motion not alone declare,
But *are* their whole of being! If the breath

Be life itself and not its task and tent
If e'en a Soul like Milton's can know death;

O man thou vessel purposeless,* unmeant
Yet drone—hive strange of phantom purposes

Surplus of Nature's dread activity
Which as she gazed on some nigh finished vase

Retreating slow with meditative pause
She formed with restless hands unconsciously

Blank Accident! Nothing's anomaly!

If rootless thus, thus substanceless they state,

Go weigh thy dreams, and by thy hopes thy fears
The Counterweights!—Thy laughter and thy tears

Mean but themselves, each fittest to create
And to repay the other! Why rejoices

Thy heart with hollow joy for hollow good?

Why cowl thy face beneath the mourner's hood

Why waste thy sighs, and thy lamenting voices.

Image of image, Ghost of ghostly Elf,

That such a thing as thou feel'st warm or cold!

Yet what and whence thy gain, if thou withhold

These costless shadows of thy shadowy self?

Be sad! be glad! be neither! seek, or shun!

Thou has no reason why! Thou canst have none!

Thy being's being is contradiction."⁽²⁶⁾

When we can conceive a man of eloquence painting life as it really is, under all the vices and turpitudes and under all the miseries arising out of these, out of the passions which originate in these sensations taken as the law of action; when he perceives how nature, still sympathizing with man, suffers with

* The report reads, "purposely", surely an error. (*P.W.*, I. 425-6.) The punctuation is unusually close for the report, but not complete. I have left it as it stands, in case it has some bearing on Coleridge's reading. But see note 26.

[*his degradation of himself*] and revenges it with marsh fevers, how she breathes forth to him in the air and yet she cannot as a mother [*reconcile herself*] with his inflictions on his own species; when he came to paint a society unregulated by moral principle and describe those who “waked to labor in order merely to sleep that they may again rise to labor”, in all things showed the impossibility that the full development of the frame of man could be arrived at under the state of society which, fatally as he deemed, was their destiny. Who could wonder that such a man infused such melancholy or despair, such tedium of life, that he was forbidden by the government, by Ptolemy,⁽²⁷⁾ ever to speak in public*, and was directly banished from Egypt because he told the melancholy truths that must necessarily force themselves upon every thinking and feeling man’s mind? “Were you once to remove a view and belief of a future state, then better” said he, “is death than life, but how far better would it be, never to have been!” Such is the end which is the true and natural conclusion of every voluptuary system. For it is a fatal [*nemesis*] that cannot be evaded.⁽²⁸⁾ Man must not be, man cannot be, on a level with the beast; either infinitely more blessed than they or incomparably more wretched, either above them beyond all measure, or deplorably below them; angel he may be, fiend he may make himself, but beast—that is a privilege which a bad man cannot hope for, it is a punishment which a good man can never suspect.

The transition from this to Epicurus is short. As I have hitherto done, I begin with his biography.⁽²⁹⁾ He was born in the third year of the 109th Olympiad or about 342 years before Christ. His father, NEOCLES was one of the poor men who were sent to Samos as colonists. The farm allotted to him there being insufficient for his maintenance, he endeavoured to make up what was wanting as a travelling schoolmaster or instructor of children.† It is not however without interest what is related of Epicurus’s mother, that she was remarkably superstitious, under constant fear of evil or bad spirits haunting her place of abode, profuse in the use of holy water, exorcisms, etc., and that Epicurus when a boy was obliged to recite to her the usual incantations‡

* NB. 25 adds: as spoken of in the *Spectator*.

† NB. 25 adds: like the travelling hedge-masters still found in Ireland & elsewhere.

‡ NB. 25: the barbarous jaw-breaking jargon of the formulæ.

by which the spirits were to be laid or sent, as we say, to the Red Sea. This anecdote is interesting as it explains the excessive antipathy he had in his after life to the very name of spirits and to every thing that was connected with it.* In a sort of spite, as it were, against them, he revenged himself on the miseries he suffered in his childhood. It is said that his education having been narrow,† and in short almost entirely without any masters, he received his first impulse from Hesiod when he was twelve years old in a line beginning "First of all things arose Chaos". "And out of what", said the boy, "did Chaos arise?" And finding no sort of explanation—it is the same feeling many of us have heard from our own children when we first speak to them of the origin of things‡—finding no satisfaction, he remained perplexed till he fell in with the works of Democritus; and appearing to himself to receive great satisfaction from them, thenceforward attached himself to the corpuscular philosophy and that of atoms. But it is characteristic both of Epicurus and the whole sect that their acquaintance with the writings of the philosophers whom they opposed was altogether superficial. It was Epicurus's pride that he was a self-taught man, none of your vulgar students who acquire their knowledge from study; it all came by force of his natural genius. True it is he had read a little, but all the rest was a perfect creation of his own and he brought forward, according to his own declarations, the opinions of other philosophers and enquired concerning them only for the purpose of confuting them. This is <not> so strange <as> it might sound. I believe it is not uncommon in life for it has happened to me with a man of considerable eminence in the medical world§ who, just after I had quitted college, told me that he had some wish to employ a young man of a metaphysical turn to read the books of all former philosophers to him and to give him a syllabus of their opinions which he was not acquainted with. "For," says he, "I can reconcile the whole to my system and I think it will be doing a great service to confute them when I establish the great doctrine of physics and

* NB. 25: hence perhaps, like Hobbes against ghosts & all that belonged to them

† NB. 25: and inferior to most other of the great philosophers

‡ NB. 25 is more dramatic: (*Who made God? Mama!*)

§ NB. 25: (So in the present day—anecdote of Dr. Darwin & myself) the likewise between Epicurus & Hobbes—Darwin continue—he would be in all things an *avroðlakros*, despising the sciences, even Mathematics—but Epicurus had more amiableness than Hobbes & D[arwin]. (180).

the understanding of man." This took place with a man who was deemed a great philosopher some time ago and I believe in the hospitals and elsewhere you may hear his name now, and there was a time when he was a great poet likewise. Both the one and the other appear to have been in rapid decay, but it is truly the case with men when they oppose the sympathies of mankind, when they have to bear up against all the connexions which we have formed in the most sacred manner, from our homes, from our law courts, from our churches, from all that binds us to the earth as it were. Why what is a man to do who has determined to mount a balloon which in truth compleatly raises him from earth but without getting one inch nearer to heaven, and then he is to float above and have no other amusement but to look on those below and consider how high he is?

Vanity and an earnest desire of [*glory*,* or what the Germans call '*Ruhmsucht*'], were two other qualities universally attributed to Epicurus by the ancients; yet with these he had many amiable qualities. He was a friendly man, weak in constitution and therefore incapable of any of the Cyrenaic maxims. It led him very naturally to prize that most which was most in his power, that is, comfortable tranquillity, the absence of pain. What sort of ground that is for morality you may well suppose by recollecting the old Proverb:

"When the Devil was sick the Devil a monk would be!

When the Devil was well the Devil a monk was he!!!" (31)

So it is when a man is in pain, or the moment afterwards; nothing appears so delightful as mere tranquillity to him. Let a little new blood out on his nerves and the man doffs aside all tranquillity—no—an active life and a merry one—give me a short life and a merry one. Because then the tone of the one is just as good as the other. They are the natural notions and feelings that arise out of the *immediate* state of the feelings or the mind. And so far Epicurus was consistent that while he preferred comfort to enjoyment, in preferring the pleasures of the mind to those strictly called bodily, he however assured you that both one and the other arose entirely in the body† and had no other value than the body, began with it, and with it ceased altogether. Another difference, too, there was between Epicurus and the philosophers both before

* Tennemann, III. 351.

† The report reads: other.

him and his contemporaries. He attempted to settle himself, it appears, and establish some particular school in various parts of Minor Asia, without success, and then as his last resource went to Athens, where he exerted himself and employed the influence and interest of his acquaintance to procure him scholars. He became a busy candidate for scholars and he succeeded in bringing them not only together but in organizing them INTO A SOCIETY OR FRATERNITY THAT HAD MANY POINTS OF RESEMBLANCE TO THE Pythagorean, only that every appearance of religion and enthusiasm was excluded, and all their discipline calculated on the plan of the greatest possible prevention of pain, admitting of as much possible enjoyment as was compatible with the absence of pain.

For in this, I repeat, consisted the difference and the whole difference between the Cyrenaic and Epicurean—that they *<the former>* attached the greatest value to POSITIVE* pleasure. They were for intense happiness, and measured it according to its intensity, while the Epicureans prized most the absence of uneasiness, and that diffused sense of comfort, which the act of living is accompanied by when the organs go on in harmony,† when no one is noticed, but the effect of the whole is what we call the sensation of happiness—a most desirable thing beyond all doubt. The only fault in it is this, that nature itself forces us to seek for this happiness in some way or other, that it is very absurd to make that to be the principle of regulation which is to be the thing grounded, that whether I will or not I cannot help wishing to be happy. There is no man, not even a madman, but wishes to be happy in some way, but unfortunately every man wishes it according to his passion at the moment. A man no doubt is influenced by the gratification of some feeling or other to procure pleasure or to get rid of a greater pain when he dashes his head against the wall, but where is the rule for this? No man doubts every sentient being must seek for a pleasurable sensation and avoid a painful sensation, but what has this to do with morality? Morality is to be the regulator of this which is only the aggregate of the passions and senses. They are the very things the moral principle is to conduct and regulate, and the whole argument of

* The report reads: passive.

† NB. 25: They to the body, he to the mind—but this = 0: for in both the body is the [globe & rivers? nurse?]

self-love⁽³²⁾ goes into a perfect circle; for if you drive it from one gross form to another less so, still you come to the most refined of all—I do it for the pleasure of a good conscience.

I first of all object to the word “pleasure”. It appears such a strange generalization which brings the consistency of having done your duty to the best of your power to the very same class with eating an orange, or any grosser gratification; but after all that, you do it for this reason only, for no other reason but because your conscience would give you a certain quantum of pleasure. If so you will be greatly deceived. Your conscience will not be mocked and will tell you essentially and intellectually you are as great a rascal as if you had done the very opposite. No man can have the sensation of an approving conscience, in the nature of things, but as far as he has consciousness in himself that he did it because it was his duty, because it was the will of his Maker, because he could not do otherwise without introducing a complete contradiction to the love of that Being to whom he is worse than a beast if he does not feel love, and gratitude, and incapability of deriving his happiness from the senses, and to the best of his power acting and living and feeling with the consonance of our Author.

There are in short but two systems possible that have an essential difference; the one is that virtue is the *means*—the other that it is an absolute *end*. To take virtue as a precept in order to render it a nature, this is the true problem of all true philosophy. Then comes history and the most important comment on history—self-knowledge, which acknowledges the truth of this position and the moral necessity, but at the same time its impracticability by human nature unaided.* This is a philosophy which at once reconciles the highest ideal with the truest and profoundest humility, and all that is on the one side or on the other is empty pride or bestial degradation.

The physiology of Epicurus so fully detailed in [Lucretius]† I have no concern with. That does not come within my plan except

* NB. 25: The supplement & conciliation is—*Christ Crucified*. Well therefore might Paul say, i.e. that he would preach this alone—for in it he preached all truth, as far as it comprized both meanings of truth—namely, idea & realization.—Importance of this view, as the only effectual as well as rightful way of quelling *Fanaticism* and visionary Enthusiasm. For ex. the Methodists = men talking English with never any intelligible connection indeed, but yet *English*, in the wild deserts of Africa, in the hearing of an English Exile & Wanderer?.

† The reporter wrote “Lycurgus” here and again below.

as far as it refers to the actual state of things now; that I think I may say enough upon when I refer to the part in [Lucretius] in which, being asked why the earth produced animals he answered, "First of all the mud was a milky substance with which the living things were nourished and that in the former state it was still better for it produced the living things themselves." Being asked why we can see no instances of this at the present, he answered, "We have a clear analogy for that. When hens are old they leave off laying."⁽³³⁾ Now as this was the best philosophy they could bring I hope you will forgive me for not entering into it further. What was further belonged to Democritus, not to Epicurus, and observe again as in the Cyrenaic sect, it was peculiar to the Epicureans. Indeed the Cyrenaics did modify the opinions of their predecessors as far as their purpose permitted; but with Epicurus it was irreligious to alter any form of thinking* to be found in his very voluminous writings, and to revere him as a god was the only religion of his followers. Their Epicurus was a god, the great being who had lifted them up above all superstitions, who had freed them from being afraid of their mothers' and nurses' stories of ghosts and bloody heads and bones, (but unfortunately he had not freed them from the fear of death, had not given them one consolation in sickness or pain); but to be something more than a beast for no conceivable reason but that of dying at last and admitting that life ended in nothingness, this was Epicureanism. No progress was ever made in philosophy by them. Their effect upon the morality of the Roman people was incalculable. It appears that at least ninety-nine out of a hundred of Epicurus's adherents were Cyrenaics or voluptuaries in the grossest sense. And yet poor human nature, so essentially does it crave after a religion that he who denied a God, who denied immortality, who denied everything that can sooth sorrow or elevate thought,⁽³⁴⁾ he, for lack of a better, he must be their god, Epicurus, and his words must be their oracle, and in his wretched hopeless doctrines was their faith to find its necessary object.† So true it is that to believe nothing, or to disbelieve,

* The report inserts a "not" here. NB. 25 reads: it was a matter of religion among his disciples not to move a hair-breadth from the doctrine of their master.

† NB. 25: a voluminous writer—one of those found (& not found) at the Herculaneum—died in the 71st year of his age—without any persecution—what said by the Cyrenaics, to be said of Epicurus—his Summum Bonum not worth the having, as in his overthrow of final causes & the intelligence he himself portrays—

is impossible to man, and infidelity merely shifts the object of faith, not the faith itself, and merely turns from Paradise to a Slough of Despond.

At the same time with Epicurus, and as if where the poison grew, there the antidote was to grow, Zeno⁽³⁵⁾ was born at Citium, a town in the Isle of Cyprus, his father a merchant, a man of opulence, who in some of his mercantile journeys brought with him for his son a collection of the best philosophical writings from Athens. This excited the young man's interest, and eager to hear either the great writers themselves or some of their immediate followers, he proceeded to Athens and studied for a while in the school of the Cynics under Crates. But born as a gentleman and with all the feelings and habits of a gentleman, we need not wonder that he was soon disgusted at this outrage of all the common habits of life which was prescribed in the Cynic school. He formed a scheme of itself in which he endeavoured to avoid the faults of the others. The ancients have charged him with pride, with neglect of acknowledging his intellectual obligations, but in all other respects calumny itself has left him unattacked. He is everywhere spoken of as a model of purity, piety and disinterestedness; <he> taught in the famous hall of paintings called the Stoa, at Athens, from whence the name of his sect and of his followers, in direct opposition to Epicurus in all things. As Epicurus rejected religion in every form except as far as was necessary to secure him from the magistrates, so Zeno appears to have been an advocate even for its superstitions. The Stoic system likewise was not like the Epicurean, formed at once, but gradually, so much so that Chrysippus is said to have been its founder by many, though in truth he appears only the man who brought it into a system and no doubt illustrated and perhaps added to its consistency.

The groundwork of Stoicism may be found in the few premises of their philosophy. Philosophy, say the Stoics, is the science of wisdom, is the supreme and *absolutely* necessary perfection of man. That is, not as the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, and even Aristotle himself have stated it, as a means to an end, but as an end in itself to which all other things are indifferent except as means. The reality and the practicability of this absolutely perfect wisdom they asserted, and this assertion properly constitutes Stoicism as distinct from all other sects. The three divisions, logic, physics,

and ethics, they considered all in reference to the attainment of this ideal. To the perfect wise man logic was useful to discover to him the truths of the intellect, physics in order to act according to nature in all things, and ethics for the exercise of the will in order that it might be a convenient servant to the speculative wisdom which they supposed capable of being contained in humanity.

Another distinguishing point immediately is that they adopted Aristotle's maxim that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses,⁽³⁶⁾ in opposition to Plato; and the reason was evidently this, that they wished to bring all wisdom in its perfect ideal into the form of man. But only once allow that there was any truth which had no connexion with the senses, there could immediately arise a probability that this wisdom might indeed exist in the Author of the universe, but could scarcely exist in a finite being. Hence they rejected whatever was super-sensual, and the supreme Being itself, and described it as an ether or a fire; and their gods they considered as like all bodies, perishable, though after very long intervals. Hence do their discussions and endless doubts respecting immortality and all those endless contradictions which Plutarch (or whoever is the author against the Stoics)⁽³⁷⁾ has collected, arise; for men who call themselves Stoics have here the greatest eulogists, and in their argument against them they hold it unworthy of a wise man to have any motives at all except that of being wise. But as wisdom was not dependent on time, therefore a man could not be influenced by any considerations with regard to his own continuance in time. Again, for the same reason, the Stoics (strange is the contradiction) added reason, the greatest and the most obstinate defender of polytheism. Their gods were indeed but men, but they were men who had risen to a state of perfect wisdom. The Supreme Being they did indeed admit, a Will and an intelligent Being, but their notions of his personality were extremely weak, extremely contradictory one with the other, and though a Stoic would not hesitate to avow his belief in a God, yet if he had been asked concerning the living God I fear the answer would have been a most imperfect one; and all that forms the true bond between man and his Maker would have been found composed of very slight and rotten threads.

Hence throughout they confounded God and Nature.

is impossible to man, and infidelity merely shifts the object of faith, not the faith itself, and merely turns from Paradise to a Slough of Despond.

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The groundwork of Stoicism may be found in the few premises of their philosophy. Philosophy, say the Stoics, is the science of wisdom, is the supreme and *absolutely* necessary perfection of man. That is, not as the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, and even Aristotle himself have stated it, as a means to an end, but as an end in itself to which all other things are indifferent except as means. The reality and the practicability of this absolutely perfect wisdom they asserted, and this assertion properly constitutes Stoicism as distinct from all other sects. The three divisions, logic, physics,

and ethics, they considered all in reference to the attainment of this ideal. To the perfect wise man logic was useful to discover to him the truths of the intellect, physics in order to act according to nature in all things, and ethics for the exercise of the will in order that it might be a convenient servant to the speculative wisdom which they supposed capable of being contained in humanity.

Another distinguishing point immediately is that they adopted Aristotle's maxim that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses,⁽³⁶⁾ in opposition to Plato; and the reason was evidently this, that they wished to bring all wisdom in its perfect ideal into the form of man. But only once allow that there was any truth which had no connexion with the senses, there could immediately arise a probability that this wisdom might indeed exist in the Author of the universe, but could scarcely exist in a finite being. Hence they rejected whatever was supersensual, and the supreme Being itself, and described it as an ether or a fire; and their gods they considered as like all bodies, perishable, though after very long intervals. Hence do their discussions and endless doubts respecting immortality and all those endless contradictions which Plutarch (or whoever is the author against the Stoics)⁽³⁷⁾ has collected, arise; for men who call themselves Stoics have here the greatest eulogists, and in their argument against them they hold it unworthy of a wise man to have any motives at all except that of being wise. But as wisdom was not dependent on time, therefore a man could not be influenced by any considerations with regard to his own continuance in time. Again, for the same reason, the Stoics (strange is the contradiction) added reason, the greatest and the most obstinate defender of polytheism. Their gods were indeed but men, but they were men who had risen to a state of perfect wisdom. The Supreme Being they did indeed admit, a Will and an intelligent Being, but their notions of his personality were extremely weak, extremely contradictory one with the other, and though a Stoic would not hesitate to avow his belief in a God, yet if he had been asked concerning the living God I fear the answer would have been a most imperfect one; and all that forms the true bond between man and his Maker would have been found composed of very slight and rotten threads.

Hence throughout they confounded God and Nature.

For this was the grand error of Socrates himself⁽³⁸⁾ and common to all his disciples as far as they were his exclusively. The Stoics adopted it, namely, that the definition of virtue is to live according to Nature, without considering the double constitution of man, his spirit and his body—in one part indeed the creature of Nature but in another constituted above Nature, its lord, the master of light and fire who commands its elements and not merely avails himself of them. What then could the Stoics do who had rejected this duplicity? Flatter and idolize Nature, make a false Nature and thus in effect exchange vices and pride and obduracy for effeminacy and selfishness, but ending at last in mere selfishness alike in both, alas too often producing despair and a recklessness of all living, from finding that impossible and impracticable which yet was constantly spoken of not only as the true object which man ought to pursue, but as the real prize which man could attain, and that in so exclusive a form that, short of this, they denied there was any difference in actions but that the greatest crime and the smallest deviation from the severe rule of reason were to be considered as equally criminal.

Such then has been the career of philosophy. It has been presented to you in all its forms in the utmost efforts that unaided men could make use of, in Pythagoras and Plato, as originating all their systems in the pure reason or in that part of the human being which is above his senses, and though evoked, called forth by them, yet still having its root and origin in itself. The utmost that the understanding of man or that faculty by which we arrange and apply as well as remember the notices given us by our senses, we then find in the Aristotelian philosophy, the following of Nature according to the senses and a reliance wholly on the senses. We then are presented with the Cyrenaic and the Epicurean, while at length there remained* only the pride of the human will—which dismissing all support of itself affirmed its own sufficiency and made an arbitrary apotheosis of self, a complete deification. We have seen in all these how hollow it was and its effects will prove it.

For nearly half a century there seems to have been a pause of all philosophic thinking, painfully endeavoured to be counteracted by Cicero—sensuality at home and ferocity abroad—the days all passed by in which their chief commanders came from the

* I.e. in the Stoics.

conquests of kings and emperors and reverentially laid down their *fasces* before the Jupiter of the Capitol⁽³⁹⁾ and returned into the rank of private citizens, or to the plough of Lucullus,⁽⁴⁰⁾ and every great commander aiming to render his whole country but a camp, his fellow citizens but his soldiers, and hesitating at no means however atrocious which were to answer this end. In short we had Marius and Sulla and Caesar and Pompey and [Caesar] Augustus and Antony and the last massacre[; by *Tiberius's praetorian guards*] and in the country itself a most dreadful contest between unprincipled poverty and unprincipled opulence. In this state there seemed to be a pause of all that was good in human nature, a state of suspended animation, with all the fiends that are permitted to agitate the world (as if conscious that their hour was coming in which they must again retire to their prisons) were taking their holiday and exercising their saturnalia. That bright Being appeared when nothing short of divinity could have saved man from this state, for where else was the assistance to be found? The eye which was the light of the body had become filmed and jaundiced. The only two nations which possessed intellect, and with that intellect the power of communicating order and civilization, were corrupted and become the vilest of the vile. They had gone to Egypt and brought to Rome their Egyptian gods. They had gone to Persia and introduced the worship of Mithras in all corners of the world. Whatever was strange and magical they were all gone to [*worship*], and the best purpose of their own polytheism of gods was to furnish jokes for their comic poets when they had had enough of the gladiatorial games. There was no help from the north; and from the south all things and all the best powers of humanity had been marching forward to one point and paused at a limit and stood gazing towards that at which they could not arrive. And likewise to the north and to the south they looked in vain for any comfort. It was not to be found in the dreadful wilderness of Germany. It would not come from the low voluptuous slavery of the east and of the south. Athens had lost patriotism, nay it had lost genius itself; and Rome existed only to exhibit one awful act of justice, that of the oppressors self-oppressed and avenging on themselves the cruelties with which they had plundered and then desolated the world. At that time came assistance from whence alone it could come, from the Author of Being who alone could

regenerate, who alone could give the germ of regeneration.

It does not belong to me to enter into the depths of theology. Reverentially, believe me, for I almost dread to connect the human nature, even the most awful name in its purest sense with that of my Redeemer, but as he was to be perfect man as part of his character, I will therefore endeavour to contemplate him for you in that which is a perfect man, as a perfect philosopher, as he in whom all the rays of truth from all the different sects concentrated, but whom none of their errors could reach, and who supplied that which was wanting to all. For if I even begin, I first find that submitting to all righteousness he found* the basis of moral obedience (*in and through*) almost all the social and natural affections. Prior to his commencing a teacher of others, in the very first act in which he announced his ministry, I find him at once taking the divine medium between the opposite and jarring extremes of men. In the marriage feast at Cana, he neither came with the gloom and austere self-denial-without-reason of the Cynics, and still less with the relaxed morality and sensual principles of the Epicureans; yet his first act was that of consecrating and blessing of that ceremony which is the foundation of the whole moral being of the world, namely marriage, the family, from which arises the condition of all progressiveness and without which man can be nothing but a miserable self-contradictory beast. His first act was to give his blessings upon all the innocent enjoyments of social life, on the condition of all that could make man capable of those enjoyments, his moral and intellectual being. Again, in opposition to all the pretenders of self-love, with the severity and more than severity of the Stoics, we hear him commanding us to be perfect even as our Heavenly Father is perfect, and yet declaring to men that they must perish—utterly perish—if they relied on themselves, or if they sought for a realization of that perfection, which yet remained even the only ground of a safe morality, in aught but a reliance on a superior power: not a mere tame acquiescence in the truth of it, but in a total energy of their being with utter concentration of the soul to that our intense wish, a sense of its utter dependence which is entitled faith. Ask and it shall be given to you. Your reason has informed you what morality is. Your feelings have instructed

* The report reads "formed" and is emended from MS. Egerton 2801, f.32. See Lect. VII, Note 7.

you to do to others as you would that others should do to you and to love your neighbours as yourself, but God above all is the sole Ideal of the moral law.⁽⁴¹⁾ It is truly the law and the prophets. But that this cannot be attained by a mere act of unaided will, that this is not to inflate the mind with any pride but only by a sense of its dependence, by a sense of its utter incapability, can it ever command that faith by which it shall ask and have that given.

More than this we lead on to the great object of all religion, namely a faith in a Supreme Being. How widely different do we find the precepts of our Lord compared with the noblest passages, the purest exhibitions, of natural theology in the pagan world prior to his coming! Here we find, even in the extant writings of Plato himself, the [τὸ Θεῖον], the power which is indeed complimented with intelligence and which, appearing in divers forms acquiring divers consciousnesses, constitutes a theology, a system of gods; but nowhere do we find a living God to whom we may be privileged to say, "Our Father"; nowhere is it consistently pressed that he is *our* God, not only the God of the universe but the Lord God whose voice our parents heard walking in the garden, not only that which connects the humble but awful duties of existing life with the highest aspirations of religion, and which in the love of our earthly parents prepares us for the love of our heavenly, but that which gives a reality to the idea, that which gives the dignity of the ideal to reality, that which combines all the common sense of the experimental philosopher with all the greatest prospects of the Platonists—that we find in Christianity. And in Christianity alone it is so with regard to the other great article of faith, our immortality.

The imperishableness of life was indeed taught by many sects, but in what form the spirit of animation passed out of one organization into another organization, without any definite prospect, was left without any certainty, so that with many minds the fear of immortality was predominant above the hope of it. Through how many forms of untried being may we not pass! But in others again, there was a sort of perfect consciousness reserved, chiefly in the popular religion, which was at the first draught to be Lethe, but after a thousand years were circled round, the souls, as if the bodies were to be by that time empty to receive them, were to come back and make up the same endless

and objectless circle. But it is in the Christian religion only, and I mention this particularly because from the manner in which natural theology in the last century was said to be the theology of human nature . . . we are too apt to mistake a great point of our religion which is this—that immortality is only immortality for us as far as it carries on our consciousness, and with our consciousness our conscience; that it is truly the resurrection of our body, of our personal identity and with it all by which and for which we are to be responsible; that there is no metaphysical division, on which we can safely affirm it is utterly out of the power of man ever to learn or if it were learnt to comprehend, no metaphysical division between the soul and the body as two distinct or two heterogeneous things. No, we are taught that there is a bond, that a finite being has a body and must have a body; there are bodies celestial as well as bodies terrestrial, and that only in the body, that is in that personal identity, that which constitutes every man's self and which as an intelligent being he has the power of communicating to another, *<is that>* which constitutes that body. Hence are removed all the fears of Pythagorean transmutation; hence comes all the healthful and necessary terrors [*of future retribution. As we would die,*] so must we live. That body which is put into the earth will not indeed in that visible shape, or those ponderable articles of matter, appear, but even as when the corn is put in the earth that which is visible passeth away, we know not into what forms in the visible world, yet there arises the plant healthful or diseased as the seed may be, and in which the seed continues. Even so is man. And this I say is the true supplement.

Even this would be little more than mockery, as in truth philosophy itself is nothing but mockery unless it is considered the transit from paganism to religion. Unless we were told how we could do this with advantage, it is as if I say to a man who is paralytic in both arms, "Rub your arms against each other!" "Alas! that is my misery I cannot do it!" If I say to a man involved in habits of sin who sees the misery of his vice and yet still goes on from bad to worse, "Exert your Will!" "Alas!" he would answer, "that is the dreadful penalty of my crimes. I have lost my Will!"⁽⁴²⁾ What do I say of the man? Or I take out one [*peccatum originale*], in particular, or draw your attention to vice when it stares you in your face, and when it happens to affront your social advantages,

when it breaks in upon your strong box, or annoys your outward senses, or in any way interferes with your plans or your interest *(you ask)* why do I draw this one thorn out of the hedge? I say of the whole human race they have lost their Will. There is not one that would dare put his hand on his heart and say, "In all things I act and feel as I know I ought to do," unless that man is the most degraded of the degraded and in order to purchase a mere trance of conscience does away with all conscience together by declaring that he has no Will at all.

This therefore was the great object: first to shew man that as a spirit he ought to be an intellectual Will—but a finite Will whose perfection consisted in its being perfectly concentrated with the Will of the great Being, Author, and Lord of the Universe. Next to shew him into what a state he had fallen, that vain were all the Stoic dreams; they would fail him and his own inward conscience would give him the lie till by a trick of pride he had forgot to attend to it, forgot his own inward being in the attention he paid to his external . . . and all the air and demeanor of the Wise Men—in vain too there. It was not life to himself but scourging nature and the vices of his own fellow men. In vain would he hope for any relief. From the pleasure of the senses pain comes, and at all events old age; and what a strange relief is that which every year lessens, which every year brings you nearer to, an opposite state! No!

The eye gives you a power which enables you to see but you have not the hand to grasp, and you have not the wing to soar towards it, and what remains for you? This—and by this essentially are you distinguished from the desperate. You can ask, you can confess, you can feel an earnest desire for that which you want and without which you must perish. And this is all that is asked of you—ask and it shall be given you—feel deeply that you can do nothing of yourself. Ask, and in that very energy of asking—oh, how we talk of prayer as if it was an easy matter,⁽⁴³⁾ as if it were but the repetition of a few words, a paternoster or so! But the energy of the soul to act is by the divine grace made to be the very means of strength, made to be the very wing by which you are to fly and from which alone you can. But who can ask who does not believe in the Saviour? Who can expect, when he has no consistent conviction, that there is that which can and ought to give it? It is impossible.

Therefore I call this the supplement of all philosophy. It is to feel that philosophy itself can only point out a good which by philosophy is unattainable; to feel that we have a disease, to believe that we have a physician, and in the conjoint action of these to exert that total energy of soul from which it is as impossible that evil or aught but good can follow (if it be indeed total) as that a fountain should send forth sands or a fire produce freezing around it. No, not from any external impulses, not from any agencies that can be sought for; these may make men prudent and may make them outward moralists. They may deceive themselves by it fatally. But man comes from within, and all that is truly human must proceed from within; and for him who does not enjoy it there remains but one thing—ardently to desire that which he does not possess and gratefully to look towards that Being who was not only ranked as the only true philosopher, but who was warmth and vital action, yea that light which is the life of every man, as it is the light of every man that cometh into the world. It is a combination of light and life, and this is the true criterion.

Will you find any pretence to light in that which has really no warmth? There is nothing in it that can be called tangible—nothing which presents motives or shapes itself to human imperfections. Allow the light: it is moonlight and moths float about in it!

Again, those who reject all knowledge, who have wonderful incommunicable we-know-not-what, in the recesses of we-know-not-where, and who scorn all knowledge and all the means of attaining it, we will say here again, you have warmth; this may be a stove of life, and crickets and other insects sing their inarticulate songs in it!

But you must be as the lark, and rise and enjoy the [*light as well as the*] warmth,⁽⁴⁴⁾ and therein your own being will be made fit for its appointed happiness and the extension of power which will come when the spring has been given.

Then only will true philosophy be existing when from philosophy it is passed into that wisdom which no man has but by the earnest aspirations to be united with the Only Wise, in that moment when the Father shall be all in all.

LECTURE VII

FEBRUARY 8, 1819⁽¹⁾

THIS EVENING, Eight o'clock, Crown and Anchor, Strand, MR. COLERIDGE concludes the first Half of his PHILOSOPHICAL COURSE with a LECTURE on CORRUPT PHILOSOPHY, in union with Magic and the Superstitions of Egypt, as the Plagiary, Mimic, and Opponent of Christianity, including the Origin and Growth of Mysticism and Quietism; from the Antonines to the final suppression of the Philosophic Schools under Justinian. Tickets for the Seven Lectures, forming the second and last division of the Course, which comprises the re-appearance of Philosophy in Christendom, and the influence of its successive schools (from the rise of the Schoolmen, to the close of the French Revolution) on the Structure of Language, & the Political, Moral & Religious Opinions of Europe, may be procured at the Lecture Room; and the Booksellers. Double Ticket £1.12s., Single, One Guinea.*

It is in its very nature a melancholy theme when we have to record the decline and the follies of mankind only, while the good which is going on in the meantime is hidden, or appears only by starts to us; like the later months of autumn when the leaves are dropping from the trees and all nature seems ruined to us, while the vegetative powers that are then retiring, as it were, to their

* The *Morning Chronicle*, Feb. 8, 1819, and also in the *New Times*. There was no notice on that date in *The Times*, and no Saturday notice in the *Courier*. *The Times*, the *Morning Chronicle* and the *New Times* all carried an announcement on Feb. 1 that the lectures, both courses, were "intermitted during the present week, previously to the commencement of a fresh critical course; but on Monday se'nnight, Feb. 8, the first half of the Philosophical Course will conclude with—'Philosophy in combination with Magic, Mysticism and the Superstitions of Egypt & the East'"—similar to the announcement above.

rest, and sinking down to their root to reproduce a new world and perhaps in a more glorious form, are hidden from our eyes. It is a remarkable circumstance that the most valuable works respecting philosophy, in the strict sense of the word, are those of the Sceptics, in this period of decline. One valuable fragment indeed alone remains to us from the works of *ÆNESIDEMUS** which has been preserved by *PHOTIUS*, but the truly important work of *SEXTUS EMPIRICUS* is fortunately extant and gives us the full system of scepticism among the ancients,⁽²⁾ perhaps the completest work of philosophy ever executed. This in its detail would *<not>* require ample mention were it not that in the succeeding lectures the great object will be to exhibit the modern SCEPTICISM *<and>* TO STATE IN EACH INSTANCE ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE MORE EXCUSABLE SCEPTICS OF OLD.

On long reflection I have determined so to divide the course as that the first half of it should present the growth of philosophy as a striving of the human mind and as presenting the utmost that as far as we know human reason itself can achieve; while in the second I endeavour to present the effects of those discoveries made by the ancients in speculative philosophy, to demonstrate that nothing as [*sensible*][†] has really been discovered in pure speculation by the moderns; at the same time, while I humbled the pride of a false originality, and took away from infidelity its outward varnish of apparent genius and invention, still to maintain the importance of philosophy itself by exhibiting [*the influence which, indubitably from*] the historical facts, I can prove it to have exerted upon the structure of language, moral feelings, and political opinions of the European nations. For permit me to say that though there was a struggle for a time, not between philosophy and religion but between a corrupt philosophy and the Christian religion, yet still, when the victory had been achieved, religion did not grossly enslave her captive. No, she placed her in her proper rank, and as Ahasuerus did to Mordecai,⁽³⁾ she threw her own royal robe around it and made it the overseer of her household. It lost nothing but that which it had itself been seeking after, the head, and the ground.

It is impossible to explain the state of philosophy at this time in the ancient world without adverting to the spread of Christi-

* MS. Egerton 2801, f.32 supplies missing words in this paragraph.

† The report reads: *sensual*.

anity. They are too intimately interwoven to make it possible to treat of either separately. I have the highest respect for the learning, the industry, and the genius of Mr. Gibbon, but I assert no more than I am prepared to prove when I say his celebrated fifteenth chapter, of the causes of the spread of Christianity, exhibits offences against all the most serious duties of an historian.⁽⁴⁾ For if I take the three main duties of an historian who professes to give the causes of any great event, those will be admitted to be: that the causes assigned should in the first place be true; secondly that no more and no less than their due proportion should be attributed to them, either directly in themselves or indirectly by the omission of other causes still more applicable; lastly that they should be placed in their proper light. Now in all these instances Mr. Gibbon appears to me to have grossly offended—as for instance when he states that the belief of the last conflagration taught among the Christians was one great cause of the rapid spread of their religion. I would not be thought deficient in respect to a great man, but I declare this is little else than childish. For to the belief of a doctrine, naturally we should expect it would be the greater objection (more especially with those who professed against religion) that which the Platonists and Pythagoreans had told them was [*permanent, subject to*] no visible causes of decay, that this *<world>* should at a particular time—within a few years—be utterly destroyed. I should have conceived one might fairly place this among the obstacles to Christianity, and assuredly it was so thought of by the Church. For with a charity to private opinions, where they did not interfere with the essentials of religion, it appears that the church tolerated or was indifferent to the opinions of different doctors while innocent or innocuous; but as soon as any superstitions were raised on this event, any false articles introduced into the Church by the advocates for a millennium, it became a weighty motive with the Church to suppress it.* And as to the prophecies in the scriptures and the sophisms on them, it may be worth answering them once for all. In a prophecy of St. Matthew of the Siege of Jerusalem (being typical of the final dissolution of the world) the language is that of the ancient prophecies, and with the

* MS. Egerton 2801, f.226: thus the belief of the End of the World is *childish*: for it presupposes a belief in the Gospel so interpreted—and the spread was greatest after the Church had discouraged the *millenniaries*—

numerous converts of Christianity it is not to be wondered at if many of them understood and expected the events according to their own hopes and fears; but that this does not apply in any way to Christianity, or what was notoriously taught, is evident in the first place from St. Peter who tells them, "What is this to you? Whether or no this happens a thousand years hence or tomorrow can make no imaginable difference to you, the same fate will await you, the same reward and the same punishment." And on the other hand with regard to St. Matthew himself, the argument is brought to a very easy conclusion. Either that Gospel was written before the siege of Jerusalem or afterwards: if it was written before the siege here is a clear prophecy, and that even in minutiae, of an event not at all within the bounds of human foresight, fulfilled in all its particulars. But if you suppose it written after, and that the Evangelist really understood the words he wrote to mean the coincident destination of the whole world, it is supposing him to be as great a madman as if a disciple of Brothers,⁽⁵⁾ or any other fanatic in the present day, were to publish a book recording a prophecy that in 1810 all London was to be destroyed by an earthquake and publish it in 1819 as a proof of Brothers having been gifted by divine inspiration. For it supposes a man to put a story not fulfilled as a proof of the prophetic powers of the man who spoke. Nothing that I know of can avoid this dilemma. If written before the siege—here is a clear prophecy fulfilled in its minutiae—and if written after, you must suppose the man a madman (if the words were to be understood as applied to something supposed to have passed, the non-fulfilment of which was notorious). I mention this as one instance of the many others of the same kind in the form of sneers.

Another fault is that many things are attributed to Christianity which instead of being the effects of Christianity were counteracted by the same, as for instance, the civil wars. It is notorious that Rome suffered a more quiet decay in consequence of the quiet manners and morals impressed on the minds of men who were taught to obey for conscience sake. But the best answer would be to state the true human rules of the conquest which Christianity made over polytheism, including the philosophy which there marshalled itself on the side of superstition. The first, and perhaps the most important, is the growing necessity felt, in all ranks, of a powerful religion, in proportion to the

unutterable depravity of manners then reigning. It is really shocking to human nature to read the accounts given of the manners in the Roman world by Seneca, by Tacitus, and by others. The manners of ancient Greece were indeed highly relaxed. Crimes that may not be uttered were related of their greatest men, and the general fashion was to consider them as mere bagatelle; these were hid under a splendour of patriotism, of great exploits, of superior eloquence; and we almost forget the vices of republican Greece and Rome under their so far heroic virtues as they implied an heroic energy and self-control. But where the same heroic virtues, which Tacitus says they vexed in order to exhaust, by all the want of noble objects success brought with it, and by the last curse and the due punishment which always attends subjection to military despotism, produced an utter want of all noble objects for the mind, then vice appeared in its own shape connected with none but its kindred vices, and all who pretended to any morality at all shuddered back from them.⁽⁶⁾

In this way we are to explain the very superior moral philosophy of the few moral writers in those times—nay that of the best ancients. I will not undertake to say that nothing of this was borrowed from Christianity, but I think it may be derived from other causes and that the cause of Christianity will receive advantage in another way in a still greater degree; for the Seneca's, the Antonine's, the Juvenal's, felt those vices and expressed their abhorrence of them in tones very different from what are found even in the writings of Plato himself. And yet what was the effect? We can not discover even a check given to the progress of depravity, and the event proved its utter insufficiency. This may be derived from many causes and among others from the success of the Roman arms which had united in one empire nations so heterogeneous, local faiths so widely diverse, that the mob, the population, had no longer any local associations in favour of local gods. The Jupiter of the Capitol, or the Temple of Mars in its place, referred to histories with which they had no connexion, which inflamed them with no sense of glory, while in the meantime the dreadful despotism of pinching penury, contrasted with consciousness *<of>* wealth about them, depriving them of every hope in this life, must, unless they ceased to be human beings, inspire a wish and a craving for something beyond desire. Before Christianity had appeared, already the yearning after a

religion for man as man, and not as Roman or as Grecian, had appeared; already the religion of the Jews had become a superstition in the Roman metropolis; and after the birth of our Saviour, Egypt poured in all her gods, Persia all her superstitions, and this not among the lowest people but the philosophical. The excellent Emperor Antonine himself, previous to his campaign against THE MARCOMANNI* ordered sacrifices to be made to all the gods—Grecian, Roman, and barbarian over the whole empire—nay, he sent to every part of the empire for priests of each superstition, brought them to Rome in order to pray in Rome itself to their own particular gods for his victory, and caused expiations and sin offerings to be made successively through all the streets of the metropolis. So strongly had the desire to bring something that all men could agree in by an attempt to bring them all together worked in one of the most intelligent minds of the time.

And this necessity for a religion comprehending the interests of all mankind, with the utter absence (excepting Christianity) of any one religion which answered to this end, I regard as the first and main cause (human cause) of the spread of Christianity, and equally providential with the miraculous evidences which lie as its ground. For what can we ask more, what can we think more elevated, as a proof of a religion, than a demonstration of its necessity for mankind, a necessity not first felt when it was preached, but already discovered; so that, as it were, the very vices of mankind and their own sense of their utter helplessness went beforehand as a prayer for its appearance, and when it appeared and was found adapted to the heart of man in all its recesses, surely it was something more than mere human reasoning, and yet included it. <This> all <goes> to say that a religion which so fitted the human heart must have come from that Being that made the human heart.

What perhaps might be placed as second in importance is this, that Christianity being the divine medium between all the opposite doctrines of the different philosophers, and comprehending what was true in each, had them, with few exceptions, all as its pioneers, all as its combatants. If, for instance, the Platonists looked forward to a ground *out of* the objects of the senses, and not dependent on mortal life, they were asked, "On

* MS. Egerton 2801, f.266.

what ground do you pretend this?" They could appeal only to the desire itself which prompted it, or to what they would call an *idea* of this, which could not be explained but on the supposition of its truth. Christianity presented the same thing to the wise and to the simple, to all mankind in the very mode which was fitted to them all; it presented it to the common people, to whom the Gospel was preached by the evidence of their senses, and above all by the presumption common to all mankind—that receiving it all men must be happy; while to the learned it presented the same truths authoritatively, and upon that authority upon which their own great philosopher had himself rested it finally.

In the meantime the Epicureans were fighting for philosophy, as [*were* LUCIAN, and *Sextus Empiricus*] for instance—and I should say the Epicureans and the Sceptics were the predominant sects with men of rank and genius. They first exposed the folly of magic and detected its tricks, they held out to ridicule the absurdities and the immorality of the ancient polytheism, and in every way they convinced men, and that too by arguments which have never been bestowed without success, that the human reason in and of itself can not go beyond the objects of the senses. It may hope, it may expect, it may pray, but of itself it cannot secure a point beyond that coincidence of external experience with the forms of the mind which constitutes what we ourselves call fact. All beyond that are forms; we can demonstrate that they are forms, not derived from accident, not originating in education or in prejudices, but necessarily evolved out of the human soul in a given state of cultivation; but still their reality remains unproved. I can demonstrate, for instance, that the mathematical circle and the different truths of geometry are all inherent in the human reason and in the forms of the mind itself but it would be in vain to seek for a proof of a perfect circle in nature, and as vain to attempt an explanation by an actual experiment on the measurement of a wooden circle. And if a man asked, "Do you believe that there is such a thing as a circle, except as an idea?", you would be puzzled to give any other answer than the negative. Even so is it with all the great moral truths. They show a fitness in the human mind for religion, but the power of giving it is not in the reason; that must be given as all things are given from without, and it is that which we call a revelation. And hence it is that I have ventured to call Christianity the proper supplement of philosophy

—that which, uniting all that was true in it, at the same time gave that higher spirit which united it into one systematic and coherent power.

There is a fine passage in LACTANTIUS⁽⁷⁾, who has indeed many admirable passages, where he says it is easy to show that all the scattered opinions in the different philosophies of the Greeks and Romans are united in Christianity and united without the imperfections with which they at first appeared. "But to what purposes," says he very sensibly, "would this be? Who shall make the selection, who shall place them in their proper order—but the man who already knows that truth and who is already possessed of the same faith as a Christian?" The *Helen* of Zeuxis is said to have been composed from different features of the most beautiful women of Greece but yet it would be strange to say that the Helen of Zeuxis had existed anywhere but in the picture. Or to use another image—man is called the microcosm, inasmuch as he comprehends in him all the faculties and abilities of the other animals, but no person would say that man existed elsewhere but in man, or that those different powers of the different animals could have been united into one real being otherwise than by some higher cement, some copulative as it were, which interpenetrated them all and combined them into one and therefore remained as truly original as any component part the excellence of which he might have taken up unto himself.

The consideration of the slaves in Rome is likewise a most important one both with regard to philosophy and to the spread of Christianity. The secession of wars, except at the extreme borders, had rendered slaves much more valuable in proportion as they were less easily bought and gained. But likewise the nations with whom Rome, towards the decline of her republic and in the flourishing time of her empire, was engaged, were men who in all but the acts of civilization were in truth equal or superior to Rome itself, as Seneca admits when upon a proposal for distinguishing the slaves by a particular badge he said,⁽⁸⁾ "O beware how you teach them to number themselves. These are our equals in power and mind, our superiors in virtue and bodily strength, and hereafter are to be our conquerors". In proportion, however, to the value attached to them, was the jealousy; and it would shock us to have brought before our minds the treatment they received and the various cautions used to prevent their

insurrections. What wonder then that a religion which taught all men to consider themselves as equal before their common judge should find a ready hearing with the oppressed and with the poor? This is mentioned by Mr. Gibbon but mentioned as an objection, and really an objection to it, that the religion of Christianity gave comfort where it was most wanted. But there was another point he has not taken, the consummate wisdom, unexampled in the history of mankind, with which the Christian Church from its very foundation managed this most difficult point. We in our translation, and perhaps for very good purposes, have rendered the word "servants" which in the original we know means properly "slaves"; but consider the numbers of the passages addressed to servants: the earnest admonitions to them to obey their masters, not from worldly fears or hopes but as standing before a great Master.

And one point more particularly I would notice, that though Christianity instead of lessening came to increase in every way the awful duty that every rational being has to set apart a portion of his time to his permanent interests, yet still no direct holiday was prescribed by authority for that sacred portion. No day was by immediate and direct authority appointed as a substitute for the Sabbath. The sacred duty was impressed, the duty upon every man as plain as if a voice from Heaven had spoken it, but no particular time was then stated. The reason is evident: so large a number of the first Christian converts being slaves, there would have been endless quarrels with the masters, endless martyrdoms with the slaves who had persisted in dedicating that day, and in taking away, as it would have been said, the master's property. But as soon as ever the Christian religion became the religion of the state, then, not the duty was taught anew (that was ever the same and must be) but a particular day was apportioned in order to render the religious duties of each man compatible with his civil duties and with the conveniences of the whole state. Then, when Christianity became *<the faith of>* the marked majority of the nation, it was declared with full right that that day in which the Christians devoted themselves to the recollection of the resurrection of their Redeemer should be the holiday of the state. There was no persecution. No man was forced to become a Christian thereby. It was simply an enunciation of a stated fact: the majority of the empire are Christians and consequently they

have a right to have their day appointed as a general holiday, even as we do in every state. Those who are Christians will know how to make use of it; those who are not will regulate their worldly affairs by it. I mention this as a peculiar instance of the wisdom of the first founders of Christianity, and especially so as an instance of the benevolence and the temperance with which Christianity was taught.* Supposing for instance that all the doctrines which benevolent and warm-hearted men would consider to be founded in truth, as they are indeed if truth were independent of all circumstances, had been announced, would not the [authorities] have had an unanswerable argument to the spread of Christianity? Would it not have been said, "No wonder you spread when you teach insurrection, when you teach the slaves to disobey their Masters, and when you teach disobedience on particular days"? One man would have said, "I am a Jew and this is a [Saturday, the holy Sabbath]"; a second would have said, "I am a [Mithradite] and this is a Friday, and I am to worship the sun"; and a third, "I am a Christian and this is the first day of the week and I cannot do any labor". Others went further and taught them this was a grievous aggression of the rights-of-man, a horrible tyranny. The consequence would be that from an inner religion, which was to soften all evils for the time and gradually by the means of persuasion to do away with them, it would have become a vulgar rights-of-man <fanaticism> and in its consequences would have brought disgrace on the sublime truths which it taught, and which are so sublime as to render even the supposition painful to a good man that it could have been so. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Christianity had among its chief enemies what would surprise one—the sect that *seems* to have been in its moral doctrines the nearest to it, but which only *seems*—I mean the Stoics. For, as in a former lecture, I dwelt on the principle <of> pride in the Stoical system as the groundwork of all its splendid pretensions, so it joined with that pride a vast deal of worldly motive; and hence it became a favorite doctrine of the great men in Rome who were men in power. For of all the philosophers of Greece the Stoics were the only ones who, where they admitted nothing

* MS. Egerton 2801, f.226 adds: On the other hand the very great difficulty that attended the very purity and benevolence of the true Philanthropy & Cosmopolitism (not ex- but in-clusive of patriotism etc.)⁽¹⁰⁾—with regard to war and the sacramentum military, with the adoration of the Emperors.

spiritual, nothing that was not the object of the senses, yet took under their immediate protection all the superstitions of polytheism, and the doctrines connected with the auguries and oracles, and in short with whatever beauty the human hopes and fears might make from the objects of the senses. It has struck me upon much examination that the Sadducees mentioned in our sacred scriptures were a sort of stoicised Jews. In this way we can best explain their origin from Sadoc, the just man, whose doctrine was that no other motive ought to be sought for than the mere sense of right—a stoical opinion; next, that all crimes were equal, the smallest offence against the law equally punishable with the greatest; and lastly that it was a dangerous doctrine to teach anything that was at all disconnected from the senses. Now this perfectly corresponds in all its parts both with the history of the Sadducees and their appearance in our gospels. For Josephus says⁽¹¹⁾ they were a small number of rich men occupying the chief magistracies of the state, descended from Sadoc, a high-flying Stoic, and marked for their contempt for all things supposed to be removed from the object of the senses, above all the notions of spirits and of apparitions or beings in a spiritual state not strictly corporeal. These men were [*openly inimical to Christianity*].

But the more dangerous sect was arising, the rival of Christianity, namely the sect which is said to have begun [with Ammonius]* about the beginning of the third century but which in truth had begun somewhat earlier.⁽¹²⁾ It is very difficult to speak accurately of the opinions of a sect whose great pride was to combine and to reconcile all the truths of the other philosophies that had appeared in the world, in that very instance presenting itself as the mimic of Christianity and pretending to do what had been really done by Christianity; and the more difficult is it because, as their predominant features, according to themselves, were in the union of Pythagoreanism with Platonism, it becomes doubly perplexing to us who are not really well acquainted with what Platonism was. It is very easy for those who take the writings of Plato as now extant as containing his own peculiar opinions and who regard Socrates as a man of straw from which Plato, as a ventriloquist, made the voice proceed. It is easy to do as Tennemann has done,⁽¹³⁾ contrasting it, <Neoplatonism>, with

* MS. Egerton 3057.

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those doctrines, but not so easy to know precisely in what respects particularly it varied from the doctrines of Plato and in what it coincided. As far as I have been able <to discover>, who perhaps have spent more time than I should be willing to acknowledge in reading the works of these men, it is not so much in the opinions themselves as in the extremes to which they carried them, and in the accessions they made, [*such as those by Iamblichus and Porphyry*]* that the philosophers called the Eclectics differed from their great predecessors. Their great object was to uphold the heathen superstitions in the then state of the empire. They in common with all others felt the absolute necessity of some one religion which should be common to all men as men; and they hoped by means of a philosophy to bring all religions interpreted in a particular way under some one point of view, so that without any man's changing his religion every man should find to his own great surprise that in this religion he possessed all the truth in the world, that he might be miserable and hopeless under it but it was <for> want of a better interpreter: in short that there was one common object in all, and that all those religions were but different modes of representing it. With this however they were not content. The mind of man stript of all sane enjoyments from without, without any noble objects, had been forced to yearn after a support from a higher cause. This was so strong that the old augurers, the common mouths of superstition, which had been legalized in Rome as the interpreters of the *Sibylline Leaves* and so forth, were grown into utter neglect; but from Persia, Egypt, and other places, a perfect stream of astrologers and nativity-casters and magicians or whatever they might have been, inundated Italy. This was too strong to be resisted, and this Eclectic system adopted it, and we have to contemplate the strange and unnatural union of the abstrusest philosophy with the basest superstitions. Many are the difficulties that press on this subject, more so in consequence of the determination which the literati of the last century and a half have had to consider all the ancient oracles, all the facts related concerning extraordinary circumstances among the ancients, as mere delusions, as poor conscious tricks of the priesthood, little considering whether it was *possible* century after century and century after century. No acknowledged imposture *could* have prevailed and could have produced such

* Cf. Lect. IV. p. 165.

belief in the sacredness of an oath and such a constant superintendence in conscience, in an imperfect morality indeed but yet still in a morality, as appeared in the Roman Empire for so many centuries—when their generals after conquering kings came back and humbly laid their *fascēs* at the foot of the Jupiter Capitolinus—no!

But since something more *<is needed>*—we need not go to revelation, but it is not to be believed but that certain powers of nature (which they *<the Eclectic Platonists>* interpreted religiously) were made use of—and the decay of the oracles, and the decay of those things, by their own admission, seems strongly to prove that circumstances had taken place which then no longer existed. I could say more on this subject with reference to an opinion which has, strange to say, become quite common even among Christian people, that the human race arose from a state of savagery and then gradually from a monkey came up through various states to be man, and being man to form a state, and being states to improve upon them, and so by a certain train of regular experience to explain all things as they now exist. Which reminds one of the French lady who hearing a story that a dead man had walked a league with his head under his arm, somebody exclaimed, “What! a league!” with surprise. “Aye!” said the lady, “the first step was the thing.” If, however, man began to exist in the infancy of his race, he must like every other animal have been protected by an instinct; but as sure as he was protected by an instinct, so surely must it have been a human and an intellectual instinct. And that this might have existed in imperfect degrees and will go on even to its last decay, appears to me I confess not at all extravagant.⁽¹⁴⁾

And I say this because in the writings of [Philo Judaeus]*⁽¹⁵⁾ not to mention some striking passages in Plato himself I find references to secret arts in their mysteries which correspond so strangely and minutely to the facts which have been lately brought forward on the continent,⁽¹⁶⁾ (and permit me to say I am not passing any judgment on those facts because what I state will be true, whether we take the report of Dr. Franklin and the philosophers who made their report before the American war,⁽¹⁷⁾ or the reports made by the direction of other governments which bear a different complexion, still it remains fact) that means

* MS. Egerton 3057.

exist by which a mutual action of the imagination upon the nervous system and the nervous system upon the imagination will produce most extraordinary phenomena. For these phenomena have never been denied. The facts themselves cannot be disputed. The only question has been whether it is necessary to assume a new principle of physiology or whether what we know of the human frame and the power of imagination is sufficient to explain the fact, the facts being the same. Now *<from>* this (which I find to have been the constant practice in their higher mysteries so that [Philo Judaeus]* declares he has no confidence in their writings, but such as were composed when [*they were*]† in one of those extasies) I conclude that those arts which may be practised among the meanest of men were among the main secrets of the Eclectics, and constituted those pretences to magic and to a divine communion which appear everywhere in their writings.

Apollonius of Tyana, one of their great men, set it up as the whole object of this philosophy to form a rival sect to Christianity, and therefore they chose him their great man.⁽¹⁹⁾ He appears to have been an extraordinary enthusiast who had proposed early to himself to imitate Pythagoras, in which he travelled to the Indies‡ and worked wonderful miracles and taught great morality, the great object of which was to support the heathen gods and the pagans. No wonder therefore that the Christian religion when it began to [*spread was considered a dangerous antagonist and rival*]. Queen [Julia]§ commanded Philostratus a century afterwards to collect the facts, in consequence of which he went upon his travels after this pagan [*wonder-worker*]|| and he found some writings of a companion of his, namely [*Damis of Nineveh*]. He likewise went into the different cities where he *<had>* performed his works, and he enquired of the temples in which they had been recorded. But unfortunately some of the most striking of those miracles are copies almost word for word from those of the Gospels, which we know to be anterior. Speaking unthinkingly and to others, the best authorities were the priests

* MS. Egerton 3057. The whole sentence is confused and incomplete.

† The report reads: he was

‡ India?

§ Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius*, I. iii; and Tennemann, V. 199.

|| Tennemann's word is "*Wunderthäter*".

themselves, for whose sakes they were worked. A more striking contrast cannot be conceived than that between the miracles of our Lord, in opposition to a priesthood, and those miracles which were attested by the very priesthood for whose preservation they were worked. And yet Philostratus is honest enough to acknowledge that his different accounts of the same miracles were so different he did not know which to choose from amongst the number. But what could not be done by trick and imposture (for here the Epicureans have assisted the other sect) that was to be done by the highest principle of philosophy. And wherein did this consist?

Plato had taught men that after going through all the highest exertions of the faculties which nature had given them, cultivating their senses, their understandings, their reason and their moral powers, yet still there was a ground wanting, a something that could not be found within the sphere of their knowledge. Yet knowledge led men to ask for that ground, and this he placed in the Supreme Being as the final result of all human effort* and human reasoning.⁽¹⁹⁾

The same doctrine was taught by Plotinus and [Salloristios]† but with this remarkable inversion of order—they began first with the knowledge of the Supreme Being, not in our Christian sense of the word, not as a belief that such a being exists whom we are to obey, and under whom perform our duties, no—but by a certain [quietism]‡ men were to arrive at a communion—that is to say at an intellectual, a positive, possession of this Supreme Being which would supersede all knowledge by giving them a higher one. So that what by the efforts of reason we were to acquire painfully, arriving at truth by possession and by all the power [*and force*] of reasoning, this was to appear in a blessed vision at once—that is the great object. Beautiful passages there are in Plotinus—exquisite morality—fine observations so that you would believe him to be a Christian (as indeed his teacher§ left it doubtful whether he§ was or was not a Christian, for his only works, as far as we can ascertain, were comments on the Scrip-

* MS. Egerton 2801, f.32.v: Plato teaches God-likeness as the end; and a pure morality as the means.

† From Coleridge's marginal comment on Tennemann, V.27.

‡ MS. Egerton 2801, f.32.v.

§ Ammonius, after Tennemann, VI. 24-5, who makes a similar statement.

tures). But this is the difference between the works of Plotinus (and in speaking of Plotinus I speak of almost all that follow him) and those of the ancient philosophers: in the works of Plato and Aristotle you see a painful and laborious attempt to follow thought after thought and to assist the evolution of the human mind from its simple state of information to the highest extent its faculties will reach; but in the works of Plotinus it is all beginning, no middle, no progress. All depends upon one assertion, an assertion which undoubtedly had the advantage of putting a stop entirely to all sceptical objections: there is a power which we may arrive at, of seeing certain things as facts, which neither our senses, nor our understanding, nor our reason, could give us the least conception of. And I point you to the means of doing this. You are to consider the social virtues and so on, as things which, if you are obliged to exercise them, you may; but it would be infinitely greater virtue in you entirely to abstract yourself, and regarding these as utter delusion, to give yourself to those rites of subjugating the body in retirement, and submitting to certain mystical ordinances which would open a new faculty in you.⁽²⁰⁾ It would be said, "Sir, if you disbelieve this, we have no reason." As John Penn very warmly said, in exposing the vain efforts of human reason to arrive at the truth, "Well, but how am I to know you have it, or any man?" "Oh! you must seek for it yourself. I cannot talk with the blind upon colours."⁽²¹⁾ The strangest feature in this was in the assumption. It attempted at a supernatural something in the commencement and placed it in this light which the Christian religion had indeed taught, but taught in order to humble man, had taught it not as a beginning, but as the final reward of long exertion.

In short the Eclectic philosophy might be contrasted in its distinctions alike from genuine philosophy and Christianity. From the genuine philosophy it stood distinguished by its unnatural union with magic, and while it pretended to consider the senses as mere delusion and all the impressions on the senses as mere dreams, yet with strange inconsistency it was constantly combining itself with all the tricks by which the senses could be acted on, this not only in the mean and low adherents of the sect in the after times, but in Plotinus himself—as for instance—the story of Porphyry of him—that he said one day of one of his pupils, "This man is working magically upon me, but I will shew him

I am his master." He records that [an Egyptian priest undertook to produce the guardian spirit of Plotinus. To his surprise he found that no spirit of the order of daemons appeared but a God who however quickly disappeared before being questioned. "And so," says Porphyry,]* "Plotinus has a God that protects him." Similar stories are related by Porphyry, the immediate friend, disciple, and companion of Plotinus, of his raising up from two mountains the two daemons, one [*Eros*] or Love and the other the opposite to love, not to mention the grave manner in which he quotes a passage of Plotinus to him on the subject that four times Plotinus had been united with the Deity as a foretaste of great and wonderful [*beatification*] while he himself had been but once. "Which was in my 60th year and on the 9th day of such a month", <he says>,⁽²²⁾ a sort of minuteness in the date of this wonderful event which I cannot but say reminded me of some late stories I have heard of conversions on days, hours, and so on, suddenly coming, which disgrace those who know better, who know that Christianity is to convince us in spirit and truth and not by tricks on our feelings, and is not that which every dreamer may mistake <for>, or the weakest be most likely to believe, the truth. They were distinguished from Christianity by this one great point, namely, that Christianity's great object is to make us fit for Heaven and to make our future state work upon us as a motive for our exertion in the present; but the great object of the Eclectic philosophy was to persuade men Heaven was already practicable on earth; not to raise men up to God, but by pernicious practices and contrivances of rites to bring God down to man.

And with this it joined all the artifices that policy could prompt, although in the time of Julian and again [*in the reign of Jovian*][†] the Christian modes of preaching upon particular days and the administration of holy rites were adopted. The Empire was to be divided and began to be in different parts. In all things there was a laborious imitation of Christianity, and the better feelings of mankind were to be bribed by a constant appearance of conscientious abstraction and elevation of mind above the senses. This therefore, which was the conclusion of a philosophy, was to have answered all its purposes; the natural conclusion it would

* Adapted from Tennemann, VI. 37-38 and his quotation from Porphyry, *Vita Plotini*, ch. 10.

† After Gibbon, whom Coleridge seems to have had in mind in this lecture.

not acknowledge—its due subordination. The Eclectic philosophers were not content that philosophy should be the pioneer and guide to, and afterwards the willing servant and helpmate of, religion. No—it must make religion its property. Philosophy must be the great mouth of religion; that which is meant for all mankind and therefore must be understood by all mankind, applicable to all the situations of mankind, and working by motives in which men might partake, *that* was to be given to the sacred priesthood under the head of the learned, of the philosophers. And yet as they could not bring up the poor and the ignorant to them, they were obliged to sink down to the poor and the ignorant, and to answer their purposes by the low tricks of jugglers and the constant pretence of mystery.

Yet let me not say this without acknowledging that truths are to be found in those writers, and in my mind, awful truths. I certainly do believe that in the quiet of the soul truths will be felt and found, hopes and impulses, which will not arise either in the bustle of occupation, no, nor in the bustle of mere [*speculation*], the activity of the understanding; but I contend this is not the mode of beginning a truth nor the means of arriving at the very state it pretends to. Let a man follow what the Christian religion has everywhere impressed, perfect himself in all his duties, acknowledge no duty in anything which is to abstract him from the love of his neighbour and the fair performance of all his relative obligations to others; let him do the best in his power to develop and exercise all his natural faculties, strengthen his understanding, make all that good which nature has given for this world; and then, in that best quiet of a good conscience, in that Sabbath which hope and faith bring, if he derives hopes more confirmed and fear more fixed, aspirations more lofty, it is his reward, and can mislead no man.

The very contrary of this was attempted by the mock religion placed as the rival to Christianity, and which has often reminded me of a fable of the Rabbins⁽²³⁾ who say that after the creation of man, Nature, jealous with the remnant of the delegated power which had been given to it in the preceding days of the creation, attempted to make a man in the same way as that being was formed from whom she had been excluded, and that she succeeded so far as to make an ape, the most resembling indeed, but the most in antipodia [*sic*], the most imitative, but likewise the most mischievous

and degraded of all her creatures. So with regard to the Eclectic philosophy in which philosophy found its dishonourable grave. We find indeed one the nearest to Christianity, for it stole from it, but at the same time so perverting it in its order and so degrading it by the difference of motive, as to have at length no other than the sad memorial that it has too often been seen to reappear in the Christian world, of which, as with regard to all the other sects of philosophy, my next seven lectures will give an account, and I will entreat your attention in order to state the particular purpose of those lectures.

I shall begin with a brief statement of what was really done by philosophy, with a short proof that before the birth of our Saviour all philosophy could do or has done had been really achieved, and as well achieved, if philosophy is confined to the meaning I give it, by the efforts of the reason itself, as it has ever since been done. It was at that time a substitute for religion among the higher classes. That it was no mean substitute a simple fact may inform us, namely the great difference and superiority of the Greek and Roman states to those of the other parts of the world, Judea excepted. The remainder is to shew the reappearance of philosophy, no longer as the substitute, or as the guide, but either as the mark or the direct antagonist of the same, still however keeping separate in my mind the great difference in the opinions (often pernicious opinions) of particular men and the general influence of the tendency to philosophy itself. For as the human mind, I shall demonstrate, never can in a civilized state be without some philosophy or other, and it is an utter mistake to suppose its influence is confined to particular classes, I shall endeavour to trace as I go on, first in each age what those particular opinions of the ancients were which in all their essence were then brought forward, and to state their effects upon the nations of Europe at a time since the Aristotelian system and its effects. I shall go on to the temporary but brilliant effects of the institution of Platonism [*in Alexandria*], to a new scheme of Eclecticism, and finally to materialism, and everywhere hold in with the two points: first, to demonstrate that in those opinions there was nothing new, and secondly, that such as they were, they were highly influenceive and connected with the manners, nay with the great political events, of mankind, in a degree and in a manner which ought to impress on the minds of all statesmen that without a congenial

philosophy there can be no general religion, that a philosophy among the higher classes is an essential condition to the true state of religion among all classes, and that religion is the great centre of gravity in all countries and in all ages,⁽²⁴⁾ and accordingly as it is good or bad, whether religion or irreligion, so all the other powers of the state necessarily accommodate themselves to it. So true is it in this, as in most other things, that what is really influencive is out of sight, and that the indirect consequences are in almost every instance ten times more important than the direct and apparent ones. These lectures therefore will of course lead me a great deal more into history and to mark out the *effects* of opinions upon the minds of *men* and of *countries* *<more>* than upon mere *opinions*, which I shall only have occasion to repeat as proving that whatever merit they might have, they have not that of originality.

LECTURE VIII

FEBRUARY 15, 1819⁽¹⁾

Eight O'Clock, Crown and Anchor, Strand. Mr. COLERIDGE commences the history of MODERN PHILOSOPHY in connexion with the events, institutions, political and religious opinions of Christendom to the close of the French Revolution, comprised in seven Lectures. The subjects of this first introductory Lecture are, successive Portraits of the Social State in the Western Empire from Theodoric the Goth to the 12th century: the counterpoise of the feudal and military powers, by the Papal Hierarchy; the obligation which learning owes to the Jews of the middle ages; and the origin and growing importance of the Universities, in special reference to the rise of the Schoolmen, and the re-appearance of systematic philosophy as a power in the world. Admission 5s. Tickets for the seven lectures, £1, double, £1.12.*

In the order of Providence as revealed to us by history, it seems to have been the final cause of a philosophy to prepare the way to religion. The necessity of some intelligible object of that religious feeling which is the proper characteristic of humanity was indeed the working impulse to philosophical investigation; for according to the definition which I have given in the first lecture of the first part of this course, I have defined philosophy to mean an attempt to seek after the origin of things and the fundamental laws of the world by the efforts of the reason and understanding alone. A religion commensurate with all the wants and with the honorable yearnings of the human being had been announced, and we find that from the first preaching of the Gospel

* *The Times*, Feb. 15th, and the *Morning Chronicle*. Abbreviated in the *Courier* for Feb. 13th.

to the Antonines, philosophy, as having already performed its functions, existed only as an unvegetating trunk.

There were, indeed, teachers of the old schools, and men eminent as teachers but without any desire or pretence of [erudition].* The Sceptics, the most deserving of philosophic celebrity at that time, as *<for instance>* Sextus and others, blunted their own tools by extending their scheme of doubt too far. While they attacked the dogmatists, who had confounded the motions of the machine with the stuff upon which it must work, and had given a reality to those motions, they were successful; but at length they carried on their doubts to the form of the machine itself. That is, they would leave us to doubt of those things which we cannot doubt, because they form the very means of our doubting; as for instance against the human reason, which we must necessarily meet with the argument: if you reason rightly you confute yourself and if you reason falsely you only prove yourself to be a blockhead: that in no case can man reason against reason. Still, however, as far as they acted at all—in that unhappy state of mankind under the despotism of the Caesars, and the far worse state, the insusceptibility of the people of any better government—as far as they acted at all, they and the scoffers such as Lucian and others aided the cause of the Gospel. They rendered its opponents ridiculous. But in all this there was no proper revolution. The revolution commenced with the attempt of the Eclectics, under Ammonius Saccas, no longer to consider philosophy as a pioneer to religion, but to drag religion down into philosophy.†

There are hopes which he is guilty of treason against human nature who endeavours to damp, but they are hopes, not absolute proofs, derived from the sum total of our human nature, not from our mere faculties of reasoning. We see everywhere throughout nature an adaptation of means to end. If we discover aught the final cause of which is not evident to us, it immediately becomes an object of anxious curiosity and scientific research; and this is so implanted in our nature that it is quite independent of any particular opinions of philosophers who have prided themselves

* The report reads: addition

† NB. 25: Here introduce the passage from the red book—The Butterfly—This, however, is a rational persuasion—but not content with this the Eclectics. ("The red book" is NB. 21½.)

in opinions that reject all intelligence from the government of the universe, and would subject it to a blind necessity, and have yet shewn themselves as anxious concerning the spleen or whatever part of the body has not its known and permitted use, as the most pious, as the most rational, of their fellows of the same profession. The butterfly is not led in vain for a purpose unknown to itself, or unconscious* of any particular desire and want, to lay its eggs on any particular leaf fitted to sustain the caterpillar. And if this be true through all nature as far as we know it, is it in man,† is it in the sole magnificent temple of the world of <VISIBLE>‡ existence, is it in the holy of holies in this temple, is it in the high priest, in the consciousness of nature, that nature tells her first and only lie?§ Is it here that she begins to deceive us when she bids us believe that ours is a mixed nature, belonging in part to the earth, and like it transient, but belonging, like our reason and like its magnificent products, the sciences, to a higher and more permanent state of existence?

This would be impossible. But observe that it is a reasonable persuasion, whereas the Eclectics for the prospect would substitute an insight; for a confidence that could result only from the harmony of all our powers and faculties, of man en masse, if I may venture so to express myself, they would present the intellect as <ALONE> sufficient. The tools with which they worked must of course be the mere *forms* of human thinking. To these they gave not only a true reality as forms of the mind, but EVEN A PERSONAL || reality. They made *things* of them, and consequently fell very far short of the understanding. For every logical generalization or abstraction they obtained a new deity—this is carried so far that in one of the Eclectic philosophers there is not only a deity for the EARTH—CYBELE, AND THE OCEAN—NEPTUNE, but THE UPPER AIR WAS JUPITER, PLUTO THE LOWER AIR¶ as they called it,⁽²⁾ but an especial deity for every point of the mariners' compass

* NB. 21½: unconnected with

† NB. 21½ continues: that is, in the moral & rational part of humanity

‡ NB. 21½.

§ NB. 25: the rational *Hope* that. . . in the high aspirations *subjectively* necessary Nature would not tell her first Lie.

|| NB. 25. The reporter wrote confusedly: To this they gave not only a true reality as forms of the mind, but as impersonal reality. (The notes here (NB. 25) are clear and are being rather closely followed.)

¶ NB. 21½.

having its due attributes. And all that was to distinguish the [forces hidden in the finite],* as if the philosopher had been writing history instead of investigating into the laws of the world. In short the numbers by these means became so monstrous that in the time of Proclus there became a necessity of generalizing and classifying these classes themselves, which he actually did, making four classes of gods: the νοητοί† who were intelligible—the objects of intellect but themselves above all intelligence (what was to be substituted is not known): the νοεροί or intellectual—those who were not only the objects of intelligence but were themselves intelligent: the ὑπερκόσμοι, SUPERMUNDARI, or those who were [*above and beyond the world*]: and the ἐγκόσμοι, or the INTRAMUNDARI, [*who were of or in the world*], each containing numbers numberless, <or> at least equal in number to a lexicon of all possible abstract words. But as all this would have been chill and SHADOWY [*and*] partook of its origin, merely the sport of logical fancy, they were obliged to call it an unfair alliance. They connected philosophy with magic, with the power of names and numbers,‡ and the whole secret trade which we know little of, but which they professed under the name of theurgy, was ADDED.§ What it was it is perhaps of little importance to us to know. I am inclined to think that mere fancy, mere delusion, it was not, but whatever it was, that it was worthless and in its nature of no true value or capable of originating any serviceable laws to mankind seems evident from its impermanence.||

The worst part of all is, they abused the highest prescript of philosophy and religion, that of becoming Godlike. The voice both of philosophy and religion teaches us man can become like his Maker only by imitation of his goodness, only morally, but these men taught that there were modes by which physically man could be taken into the Godhead, and the consequence was

* Adapted from NB. 21½.

† The reporter wrote it in Roman letters, and missed the next two. A valiant attempt at the fourth produced "Inkosmeoi." The notebook supplies the terms, except that the second one appears incorrectly νοητοι, and all are unaccented, as they are in Tennemann, VI. 328.

‡ NB. 25: invocations

§ NB. 25, squeezed in between lines: and then worst of all, physical for moral God-likeness. Add a few words on the probable nature of Theurgy. (And then written up the outside edge of the page): worst of all, the moral into physical God-likeness

|| NB. 25: But yet that it was all mere trick—&c. (8).

the most fearful superstition that can be imagined. For it is astonishing how little human beings will regard either labour or pain or privation if they can only arrive at any one object of their desire by any other than the appointed means. The poor East Indian will suffer himself to be hung up by hooks, he will walk upon nails turned upwards, he will sit under a tree with his eyes fixed in one position year after year,⁽⁴⁾ in the hopes of obtaining this godlikeness, because that is so much more easy, after all, than to think and to do his duty as a social man. In the former instance he is gratifying his will while he is tormenting himself; in the latter he is obliged to subjugate his will to his reason, the good sense of those about him, and the laws of his country. Here, then, is the true secret of superstition. It is not whether it demands this sacrifice or that, but does it enforce the principle which gratifies no pride, and which when a man has performed it he has simply the consolation that he has performed it, the test of an approving conscience?

These men,* however, taken apart from the prejudices, were by no means men of light minds or without all the praise that genius misguided can give to them. The more awful therefore, is the example to us when, accustomed as we are to see superstition appear only in conjunction with ignorance, we find that under certain circumstances it is capable of being held forth with all the pomp of eloquence, with all the pretence of deep research, nay, of being brought into a system and advanced as a demonstrated and regular fabric of human reason.

It was not therefore Justinian's edicts merely that suppressed philosophy, but it died itself of a natural death from two causes. First of all from weariness of mind aided by the fearful political commotions which were then agitating the world, an effect which, if I have not been misinformed, is at this time observable in Germany.⁽⁶⁾ For thirty years or more the Germans were philosophy mad; one sect followed another, and if Englishmen asked of the weather or enquired of the last night's debate, Germans were enquiring concerning the newest philosophy or whether the efforts of the learned Spinosists had produced anything. The time came of practical danger, of practical effort leaving behind it, as all such struggles do, expectation that never

* NB. 25 adds: were great men especialy [*sic*] Plotinus, and Proclus—the latter De Fato & Provid. Fab. Graec. 8 vol. (8).

can be gratified, and yet hopes that never can be given up; and yet at this present moment to speak of philosophy *<in Germany>*—it makes a man shrug up his shoulders—it is gone by—nothing can be made of it. There have been the greatest geniuses of our nature.* One system brings on another which is . . . new political pamphlet and so forth. Such is the natural effect of exhausting philosophy when it happens to combine at the same time with political commotion, and this I assign as the first cause. The second is that having dragged religion down into philosophy, philosophy itself became nothing compared with that which it had unnaturally taken up as a part of itself, instead of being its handmaid and subordinate. DAMASCIUS⁽⁷⁾ had succeeded in detecting the folly of assigning to the abstractions of the mind personal realities; and it was astonishing, having reduced his opinion so closely to those of the Christian Church, how he could remain pagan; but it appears he preferred the revelation of Hermes, [*Orpheus*] and ZOROASTER (the two former of which he could have no possible document to prove having existed, as individuals, and the latter nothing more than that he did exist) to the credibility of the Gospel history. I need not say that at that time when all the powers of the world were on the side of the Christians, and all the argument (where the philosophers admitted their argument) was contained in Christianity, and the only question was which they should chuse between—the fables of paganism or the attested facts of Christianity—the contest could not be with philosophy. Therefore as well of POLITICS [*as of*] philosophy this may be called no more than the death† of the old world. It died self-convicted.

The materials for the renovated *<STATE OF>* man are two-fold—first, the laws and customs by which the individuals are to *<co>*-exist as a state; and secondly that dignity in each individual which, reacting on the state to which it belongs, gives to that state itself a moral being. The character of the Gothic conquerors gave the second, the Roman laws and institutions supplied the first, and the union of both is most pregnantly expressed in the word Christendom: that is a state composed of states, as those of individuals, professing to be governed by a law superior to each or all collectively, even as every single person is so subject.

* nation?

† NB. 25: or metamorphosis.

Nothing like this do we find in the ancient world. I refer you to that incomparable historian, Mitford, for the document of my assertion.⁽⁸⁾ Nay, that no attempts were ever made at a representative government in Greece or in Rome, though the idea had been given so early as in Thales,⁽⁹⁾ marks the deficiency of the very materials for constituting a state like the present.

The childhood of states,* like that of individuals, promises more than it fulfils: for it gives a promise as the representative of universal humanity, as every healthy child is, but it performs it both in individuals under all the modifications of circumstances, and in states likewise as aggregates of individuals under the same compunction. But we have one comfort, that in the existing state of the world we are to remember that the progress of cultivation† no longer rests as of yore on the fates of a single people; that therefore we may, notwithstanding particular progressions, be yet in the youth of the process and are not therefore entitled to draw the same depressive results as weigh on all minds during the perusal of Greek and Roman history. The origin of this state, then, well deserves a more than common attention and more than ordinary research.‡

It is impossible that we can contemplate the present state of the planet without perceiving that Europe is the predominant and influencing power. In vain do we look with hope for aught higher or better; but, on the other hand, idle would be the fears so rationally felt in the Roman times, of a worse, of a deteriorating power. Take our own country, a little island, small at least in dimensions, which a few centuries ago could scarcely have boasted of more than four or five millions of people, and we find *<what>* this country, by the effects of those institutions which Christianity engrafted on Gothic customs, combined by the copula§ of a fitting religion, has produced. This country we find governing the very waves of the ocean with a regularity scarcely less than the moon does the tides. We find her by her own children commanding, and for the most benevolent purposes, a multitude fourfold greater than that of her own immediate subjects, in the east and in the

* NB. 25: races.

† As distinct from "civilization". See p. 255 below.

‡ NB. 25 adds: Then go to the Clasp Book (i.e. NB. 29, the relevant notes in which were originally written for the second lecture of the literary series, Jan.-Mar. 1818).

§ The reporter wrote "copular", which tells something about Coleridge's pronunciation.

west. We see her offspring and empire which, if no convulsion of the planet should arise, will in the course of a few centuries present as great a multitude speaking the English language and uttering the words of a Bacon, a Milton, and a Shakespear, as are contained in the vapid improgressive empire of China. If this be the case with our country, what must not necessarily be deduced from the prospects of the whole of Christendom combined? It is, if aught can be clear to man of the future, evident that the intention of Providence is that from the ancient Roman Empire, to which Christianity was first preached, should diverge the rays that are to enlighten and civilize the rest of the planet. I mention this in order that we may feel a greater degree of probability in the sketch that I will venture now to present.

Various have been the disputes of antiquarians concerning the origin of nations.⁽¹⁰⁾ I have found no reason whatsoever to differ in the least from the plain and simple account given us in our Scriptures. We are told that after a great revolution in the planet, which had destroyed all but a few of the race of man, the three children of Noah spread gradually from one point over the globe. The children of Shem, still distinguished in their posterity by the similar nature of their languages, which have been from thence called the Semitic languages, <such> as the Hebrew, Syriac and so forth, remained near their original station. We are informed too that the JAVANIC RACES,* JAPETIDAE† or descendants of Japheth, diverged into two branches but with this remarkable distinction that their instincts or tendencies were both westward: the one to the south-west, the IOAONES‡ or Ionians, or children of Japheth who formed the Greek Islands and in a later period possessed Italy and were the founders of the Italian Empire, and with a strict conformity to the sacred writings did really abide in the tents of Shem; the other, or north-western race, passed into the more barbarous and less favored realms of the north, into Germany, and so on into Sweden, and there remained in their original simplicity, still, however, hardened by the hardships around them, but in all respects most distinguished and even contrasted§ with that of

* NB. 25.

† NB. 21½, and MS. Egerton 2801, f.26.

‡ NB. 21½. MS. Egerton 2801 adds: Chaldaic and Arabic.

§ "comparable with"?

the savages whom we found in America. In truth, the south-western race became civilized to the loss of true cultivation, but the north-western race appear to have retained their cultivation in spite of the diminishing civilization. The third set, the children of Ham, seem by Providence to have been impelled to the south, and there as the inhabitants of Africa, to bear witness to us of that awful prophecy which Christianity, the universal redeemer, has been lately, to the undying glory of this nation, at once fulfilling, and healing the unhappy slaves that were to be servants to their elder brethren till that time when the servant should be as the master and the master as the servant before the eye of the common Lord. The children of Shem we find were strictly forbidden to intermarry with those of Ham or Japheth. We are informed likewise that excepting the Jews, who were prevented by a miraculous interposition of the Arabs, who were equally prevented by a providential course of circumstances, this command was generally disobeyed. A mixed race arose who appear to have spread east and west, neither ascending northward nor descending, but forming as it were a mighty wall or isthmus between the north-western descendants of Japheth and the south-western, under the name of the Celtic nations.⁽¹¹⁾ Against this wall, ignorant of each other, the divided brethren were fighting till at length by their mutual successes they came themselves into collision. For a long while the contest was doubtful; for on the part of the Romans, into whom the Greeks had flown as the great rivers in America flow into yet greater, on the one side there was discipline, there was all the advantage of art and science; on the other there was superior valour, superior morality, and a population wholly applicable to military purposes. So, long the contest remained undecided, but when from frequent wars and increasing depravity on the part of the Romans, the Germans had acquired Roman discipline, had become themselves masters in part of *the* Romans' knowledge, the contest no longer remained disputable.

It was not, as we have too commonly been led to imagine,⁽¹²⁾ a direct eruption of barbarous nations which at once overwhelmed a civilized empire—far from it. All the eruptions that were the [*migrations, actually,*] of the Goths and Vandals, were in full activity long before. Let any man who has been at Rome compare the Arch of Constantine with that of Antonine, [*the later Roman*

architecture in general] with the pure works of Greece, and he will see how rapid the degeneracy had been. In truth, the Christians, naturally predisposed to the natural morals of the Germans as soon as the Germans themselves had adopted Christianity, became their warm friends, and to them they looked for the fulfilment, if not of the prophecies, of their interpretation of the prophecies. A powerful party had been formed in Italy, nay in Rome itself, and the German party prevailed, doubtless with all the horrors which accompany a long and wide-extended warfare, but by no means by all those horrors with which we have been accustomed to consider the event, forgetful that our narrators were Italian monks or Italian priests of the Italian party, and that the few writings which remain by others of the other party present to us very different results.⁽¹³⁾ It was different in different countries. In Spain, for instance, the conquerors took the conquered into full partnership, adopted their laws, and in a short time their language, and no other difference remained but what was supplied by heraldry and the pride of families. In other countries, the conquerors gave the conquered no better terms than those of VASSALAGE IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER: * but still everywhere Christianity was received, and in that, a slow but certain cure of the evils which had been inflicted.

I have placed the commencement of the modern times as opposed to the ancient, in the time of Theodoric the Goth,⁽¹⁴⁾ and truly I cannot conceive a better characteristic could be afforded of the differences between the modern and the ancient world with respect to philosophy, poetry, politics, religion and all that is interesting to mankind. I cannot imagine a more expressive symbol, and, as it were, allegory of this, than by placing before my eyes the palace of that imperial Goth, THEODORIC†, frowning opposite to the Christian temple THAT ALONE OVERLOOKS IT & THE MAGNIFICENCE OF GREEK AND ROMAN ART, the one temple that was permitted to overlook the monarch's palace, the sole remaining object of reverence and willing submission. For in this I seem to have the commencement of the era as in a living symbol. I imagine that temple, too, removed, with all its Greek and Roman associations, and nothing remaining but Christ and the Cross, and instead of it a cathedral like that of

* NB. 29.

† NB. 29 supplies the missing passages in this paragraph.

York, of Milan, or of Strasburgh with all its many chapels, its pillared stems and leaf-work roof, as if some sacred GROVE OF HERTHA, THE MYSTERIOUS DEITY OF THEIR PAGAN ANCESTRY, HAD BEEN AWED INTO STONE AT THE APPROACH OF THE TRUE DIVINITY, AND THUS DIGNIFIED by permanence into a symbol of the everlasting Gospel. I hear the choral thanksgiving rolled in peals through its solemn aisles, or the chant of penitence and holy piety from VEILED and consecrated virgins, sobbing and dying away in its dark recesses AMONG STRANGE GROTESQUES AS STRANGELY AND YET HARMONIOUSLY COMBINED WITH THE IMAGES OF SAINTS AND THE BRAZEN TOMBS OF WARRIORS; AND PERHAPS STILL SOARING HEAVENWARD, AS IF INDEFATIGABLE IN DEVOTION AND ASPIRATION THE VAST DOME SEEMED A TEMPLE FOR UNSEEN ANGELS THAT HOVERED OVER THE ADORING MULTITUDE AND RE-ECHOED THEIR ADORATIONS. AND BEHOLD AT THE HIGH ALTAR THE WARRIORMONARCH KNEELING WITH BOWED AND BARED HEAD, HE AND HIS ATTENDANT PEERS, AND WITH CHILD-LIKE AWE RECEIVING FROM THE AGED BISHOP OR MITRED ABBOT THE PRECEPTS, THE BLESSING, and the sacramental pledge of peace and mercy. In these assemblies thus collected before my imagination I see and recognize the completion of that era, A MARVELLOUS COMPOUND, IN WHICH THE PHILOSOPHY AND THE LOVELINESS OF GRECIAN GENIUS, THE LEGISLATORIAL AND ORDONNANT MIND OF CIVILIZING ROME, JOINED WITH THE DEEP FEELINGS, THE HIGH IMAGINATION, THE CHIVALROUS COURTESIES AND STRONG BREATHINGS AFTER IMMORTALITY OF THE GOTHs, HAD PRODUCED THE BASE, AND CHRISTIANITY THE ALL-COMBINING, ALL-PENETRATING, ALL-TRANSFORMING SPIRIT OF UNION AND ENNOBLEMENT.

For a time philosophy must of course have been out of the question; the business of the schoolmaster was to take its place. And where under a similar revolution before the time of our Saviour could such a schoolmaster have been found? We hear of the terrific revolutions produced *<in other countries>* by the Asiatic conquerors, and the result has been degradation if not utter extinction. There the arts and sciences have appeared to be trampled under foot. Fierce warriors, still fiercer from their recent conquests, possessed the custom* of the world; the custom* *<of those who,>* from *<the>* contempt of those *<by>* whom they had *<been>* conquered, were suffered to lose their ornaments, their

* The report reads: customs

pasture fields to pass into forests, and their flocks to be exchanged into wild beasts to furnish more amusement for the warlike spirit of the victors. <Here,> with all that could bring on an utter decay of the human race, what do we find continued? A traceable progress. A mild schoolmaster was there amidst all the clang of arms, of the terrific sound of the trumpet; still the elevation of the cross had a power that tamed the proudest spirit. If at once it could not do away <with> the angry passions, if those who had joined in conquering a common foe had then begun the trade of war with each other, what could not be prevented was still alleviated, and a single sound of the Ave Maria bell secured, for a few hours at least, the labourer and the husbandman from their danger. If the turbulent passions of the chieftains prevented all discipline in the arts or in philosophy, still their religion secured a sanctuary in <the> humble monastery for all the learning that remained. Everywhere the Church appeared as the combining power. It was an union unknown before, but an union so powerfully effective that if we could but dwell upon it, forgetful of all heats and differences which the events of two or three centuries past have occasioned, I persuade myself that we should hear, and read, too, with far different feelings, the stories of emperors holding the stirrups for the popes,* and of archbishops menacing their sovereigns.⁽¹⁵⁾ That is one view of the subject. When the Church had gone beyond the due bounds and when having passed, as all earthly things do, into excess, the reaction had begun. But present to ourselves the humble peasantry, the peaceful tradesman of the town, trembling to lead out his wares lest the feudal lord should pounce upon them! [*The Christian Church*] gave the only chance of hope for the poor and the humble man to rise into distinction and to sit down in equality with his proud peers. Conceive that it was, however impure in particular dogmas, yet still it was religion, the only religion then upon earth. It was learning, however defective, yet the only learning upon earth. It was science which, though the links were composed of ignoble matter, was still preserving the chain† that stood before the lordly warrior, and lowering his spirit, presented to all the world the

* NB. 25: How unfairly we *feel* the tales of Emperors holding the stirrup to Popes—arising from the mistake that our differences were before the council of Trent.

† In NB. 25 this metaphor is applied directly to the monasteries: The Monasteries too—not that many or the greater part were lax & idle—for so were all, but that many

great truth: right is greater than might: as sure as you are man, there is a power more powerful than brute force. And see the monarch himself obeying it, and holding, as he holds the stirrup, the visible confession that the moral and intellectual part of mankind were destined to be the governors, and arms and brute force to be their implements and organs. And then we should see justly the sources of the hierarchy* and learn to distinguish the benefits derived from an institution during the time to which it was fitted, from the disadvantages which announce its decay, and in its decay announce that it has already performed the functions for which it was intended, and was making way for a new order of things, prepared however in a great measure by its own former merits.

This is not merely declamation, for it is to the Church assuredly that we owe all the origins, all the groundworks of our present state of civilization.⁽¹⁶⁾ The land was divided among the great lords by feudal tenures, there was none but master and slave, and to the bishops, to the [*monasteries*] was alone given the privilege of forming places of refuge. Where the bishop's castle was, there and for a certain extent around it, was a sacred land. Where a church was built, there likewise was ground that dare not be encroached on. What wonder, then, if the poor vassal, when his oppressions became greater than he could sustain, fled thither? What if a foreigner, instead of being submitted to the caprices of savage ignorance, had fled at least within the vicinity of reason? The effect was even so. Wherever a bishop's castle was, a town arose and this town increased into a city. Wherever a church was, with a few exceptions, a small set of houses arose about it. And thus began the greater part of the towns and almost all the cities of this kingdom, and in truth of all the rest of Europe. Then began the possibility of freedom. Before that there was freedom indeed, a well-balanced freedom between the monarch and his peers, except that the balance was too often on the side of the subject. But even to a far later period, I am sorry to say, we are not to read the panegyrics of freedom without remembering it was only freedom for gentlemen; and as low down

were otherwise & preserved the chain tho' the links were of less noble metal. This proved in the different results of the re-proclamation of Ancient Liter. in Europe (feudal) & in Russia—

* The reporter wrote "higher arcade". [E. H. C.] emended.

as the time of Milton and Algernon Sidney and some of our more modern great lovers of modern freedom, we find that gentlemen only are the persons in contemplation and that with the exception of a few Levellers, even in the turbulent times of Cromwell, there was not a man of sense who would have believed it possible, or if possible, probable or advisable, that there should be the degree of freedom now possessed in this kingdom.

(I will venture to say that, like the trial by jury which is often talked of as carelessly as freedom, [*a constitutional monarchy*], that is one of the most difficult problems to solve, from so many fine balances and counterbalances, so many things that are met here; but the opposing powers are so much the most capricious that by the goodness of Providence it* has ripened into present wisdom. But above all, and what is more, that all the imperious circumstances and events drawn from our history, all the imperious circumstances and events drawn from our insular situation, all the imperious circumstances and events drawn from the time when our towns and cities began to have a greater weight and influence than elsewhere, all these combined to produce two effects: in the gentry of the country, a spirit of compromise, and in the country throughout, a volunteer spirit; without both of which it appears to me that the British constitution, first, would not be practicable, and secondly, that not it, but the whole sway† of it, would be one of the greatest curses that could be inflicted on a country, because it would quell all real progressive improvement by fixing the sting of disappointment in the public mind.)

At this time all the philosophy of the world was, of course, contained in their books of theology, and those existed for the priests alone, and were presented to the people at large in the disguise of external ceremonies and of forms; but here, even in those very doctrines which were connected with those ceremonies, lay the seed, the reviviscence of philosophy, the Christian religion. I am not speaking now of the pure Gospel; but the Christian religion as an historical fact differed from all the institutions of the ancients in this point, that great truths were connected with all its ceremonies. Nay, even the very sacred events in which the historical part of Christianity consisted were themselves only so many really real and historical symbols of the great truths which it

* The British constitution?

† The report reads: a whole array of it.

was the object of Christianity to propagate. Or rather, to speak more truly, Christianity first of all destroyed the pernicious distinction between truth and* reality, *<between the practical?>* and that which was merely speculative. They considered of no weight a moral opinion or a moral feeling deprived of intellect, that it was an impossibility; in consequence of which, as the God of the Christians differed from those of the old philosophers by being no abstraction, no blind power but a living God, so at all times truths appeared as living truths. And even in an excess of ceremonies, still there was a more or less visible connexion between each ceremony and an opinion represented thereby. When therefore, chiefly by service of the Jewish physicians†, ⁽¹⁷⁾ (who, keeping up connexion with their brethren in different parts of the world who were employed in commerce), and even before the siege of Constantinople, they having brought into Europe this treasure which excited the restoration of literature—even before that, they had brought certain stores of philosophy from the Arabs; and that “the dark ages”, as they have been called, were not darker is certainly in no small measure owing to the service of the poor despised Jews.

The cities, as I mentioned before, originating in sacerdotal production‡, became of course the chief seats of instruction from§ the clergy. From these came the colleges and the universities. Those universities naturally gave their first attention to the articles of their religion; the point was to bring forward a *system* of religion. This was done from the writings of the Fathers. Differences arose in consequence, not concerning the opinions themselves, but concerning the modes of defending them. The Aristotelian logic, which had been brought into Europe from the Arabs, supplied an inexhaustible source of disputation.

At that time to suppose any other than [*theological controversies*] would have been out of the question, when men were content to devote all the powers of mechanism to their Church. Accustomed to a hardihood of life, it was not to be expected that the merely practicable sciences would have effect. That

* or?

† NB. 25: Obligations to Physicians. Lastly, the Universities—& while they supported were with the Schoolmen counterpoising the Pope. (The notes for this lecture end here.)

‡ protection?

§ for?

must appear a paradox, but though a paradox it is strictly true, for every true [*art appears*] earlier than what is termed utility.⁽¹⁸⁾ The savage before he ever thinks of making a coat or waistcoat fixes a feather in his head, or the bone of his enemy. Or the very skin of the wild beast he throws on his shoulders is not for warmth; he would despise himself if he was capable only of external sense. No, it is a mark of power and revenge [*and it is historically true that the art of decoration, painting, or poetry, or music, some one of the fine arts,*] or a religion, where a man has been favored with it, has in every instance been the foundation and the beginning of his imagination. No wonder, therefore, that just in proportion as the useful arts would have been most useful were they the less regarded.

At the time when men were deficient in the comforts and conveniences and many of the necessities of life, then was it that they became most zealous, most earnest, about generalities, convictions, everything except their present state, as if all that is wanted in the present state seemed only to whisper to a man, "for this reason it is not worth your attention. Let my affections be given to something that is permanent—to something that is beyond this"; while the more worthy, the more pleasant our present circumstances appear, unfortunately (I speak as a general tendency) the greater aversion we seem to shew to all the points of thought, a greater objection to all that is general, permanent, or fundamental, sufficient if only we have that which is at the moment expedient. And this is not only the feeling of individuals but it spreads to the feelings of states.

And therefore, as I before vindicated in some measure the image I have presented at least of the hierarchy in the dark ages, so in a certain qualified sense I cannot look on the theological disputations in those times with the contempt it is customary to do. I see something awful in the fact that three or four thousand men could collect together in a single place to hear one great teacher—men barely able to read, begging on the road and submitting to every species of privation and yet crowding to hear—what? An amusing tale, or to see a splendid tragedy, or even to give their attention to some song or ballad? No! To listen with greedy ears to the forms of their own minds; to be told by what laws thoughts are connected with thoughts; to be made sensible of a certain pride when they could come to an apparent

conclusion, a certain sense of history when they could detect an inconsequence—I say, to see such men, poor and with every privation of life, yet disputing, as described by the writers of those times, eagerly in the streets and with a degree of warmth (which *we* scarcely hear even on the most important concerns) with respect to things in which they as individuals have no imaginable interest—it certainly does not degrade the men themselves in my mind; but most assuredly it greatly elevates our nature. The consequences more important that result from this, the peculiar nature of the Schoolmen and of their philosophy, and the manner in which it not only worked onward towards the restoration of literature which ended in exploding its introduction, these will be the subjects of my second⁽¹⁸⁾ lecture which will carry down the history of philosophy from the race of the Schoolmen to the restoration of literature throughout Europe.

But I cannot conclude without a few remarks on the different position in which philosophy must now be treated compared with what it has been in the former course of lectures. In the former course I considered it as a growth of the human mind; the different individuals, Thales and Pythagoras, or Plato and Aristotle, I regarded as only the same mind in different modes or in different periods of its growth; and I am satisfied that from the rude beginning, namely the first bidding farewell to mere tradition and seeking for light in the mind itself, to the age of Epicurus, philosophy had formed its circle and appeared in every possible form. This was my object. In the present course so far from having aught new to inform you concerning the opinions themselves, it must be my business to tame the vanity of the moderns by proving to you, in every case I know of, that those men took up such and such opinions but that those opinions were nothing more than what had been brought forward by such and such of the ancients, as far as they were really philosophical.

But I have another thing to do. I have to shew the effects of philosophy, which I have not had an opportunity of doing, in the very tumultuous, very hastening, changes of the Greek and Roman Republics; there its effects, such as they were, were so intermixed with political events, with wars, with rapid risings-up and as rapid descents, it was impossible to give a fair and convincing statement of what philosophy can do, both of good,

where it is what it ought to be and deserves the name, and of evil when it combines with wrongful causes. This I shall, I hope, shew: that as religion never can be philosophy, because the only true philosophy proposes religion as its end and supplement, so on the other hand there can be no true religion without philosophy, no true feelings and notions of religion among men at large without just notions of philosophy in the higher classes.⁽²⁰⁾ And I may venture to add likewise that all the great events of Europe have borne so wonderful a coincidence and similarity with the predominating systems of philosophy at the time, that if we consider, too, that those predominant opinions were always prior (and fashionable)* to the event, yet strictly homogeneous with the event, and the event such as we should have been entitled to deduce, it would be extravagant if we were to imagine it was altogether vain, or like a weathercock that without affecting the wind simply shews it. Now I trust I shall shew that a true religion will necessarily lead to a just philosophy; and on the other hand that statesmen, who have to manage a constitution founded in the spirit of one philosophy, but who *do* manage it in that directly contrary, or even a clergy, who with one set of opinions are to preach doctrines brought together by men who believe the direct contrary, cannot but produce a state either of dissension or of indifference. And as one example among a *thousand*, think of Frederick the Great of Prussia⁽²¹⁾ and Joseph of Austria . . . to manage the constitutions formed by the noble Goths their ancestors; and look at the records of the early parts of the French Revolution for the precise effects produced by the contrast to which I have alluded.

* Could Coleridge have said 'fasten-able'?

LECTURE IX

FEBRUARY 22, 1819⁽¹⁾

This Evening, Eight o'Clock, Crown and Anchor, Strand; Mr. COLERIDGE'S LECTURE on the Schoolmen and Scholastic Philosophy, with the opposite extremes, the Alchemists and Visionaries, Admission, 5s. Tickets for the Course, including this Lecture, single, 18s. Double £1 8s.*

A series of lectures on a subject which comprises a space of some thousands of years must be a chain indeed, but it cannot be composed of links of the same lustre, or of the same metal, and yet those are links and cannot be altogether omitted. The history, therefore, of the scholastic philosophy, an important evolvment in the progress of the human intellect, I cannot pass over, though at the same time I can only promise my best endeavour to make it interesting, without promising to myself any favourable result. But I must rely on your favor, and I am [*in fact glad of an opportunity to protest against*] "uselessness", and so forth, being connected with the name, almost with the soul, of scholastic philosophy.

In a former lecture upon the Eclectic philosophers, or those who were in opposition to philosophy, I have shewn not only the immense progress† that by some of the great men, strongly prejudiced in favor of their ancestral religion, had been made, but likewise the pernicious or utterly worthless results of an attempt to confound religion with philosophy in order to mix religion itself with philosophy; for that is the proper character of the efforts of those philosophers after the birth of our Lord. The national religion and national religions in general had lost all their influence, and those who rejected Christianity had nothing

* *The Times*, Feb. 22. There was no announcement in the *Morning Chronicle* or the *New Times*; one similar to this had appeared in the *Courier* for Feb. 20.

† The report reads "powers".

left but to try to make an universal religion out of philosophy.⁽²⁾ Now we are to prepare ourselves for an attempt equally impracticable but equally natural, and far more excusable under the circumstances, that of the Schoolmen to make philosophy religion. I know no better description that I could give you than this as the Eclectic philosophers had confounded them <<(religion and philosophy)>> so did they, but the Eclectic philosophers attempted to make religion philosophy,⁽³⁾ the Schoolmen's attempt was to convert philosophy into religion.*

Now there is not perhaps a truth more important to us than <THAT> these two dearest names to human nature, philosophy and religion, can neither be confounded nor yet can they be separated. If you would confound them you must immediately conjure up imaginary faculties, powers of the intellect, of an intellectual vision so estranged from intellect that the most eloquent supporters of it are obliged to borrow their metaphors from a rival sense and call it a rival act†, a rival intellect in which intellect becomes one with the object of which it is supposed to be the contemplator—in short we must abandon ourselves wholly to visionary speculations, to the ennoblement of mere bodily

* The notes go on more systematically than the lecture. Not less difficulty has been found in dividing the School philosophy into its different periods and if the dates of particular writers were the point of guidance, it would be impossible. For some men lag behind their age and others hasten with giant strides & 7 league boots before it. But if we keep steady to our original plan, the progressive movement of the human mind *collectively*, rather than suffer ourselves to be disturbed by the accidents of individual genius, we may easily map it out, from Alfred and Charlemagne to the end of the Eleventh Century⁽⁴⁾—in which it was a great merit to think at *all*—but the Philosophers were adherents of the last Philosophy, but as captive & willing Servant of Christianity—in this they all joined that they were *Realists*. What could be clearly conceived as logical truths were taken for granted as existential realities—2 From Roscellin to Thomas Aquinas, the controversy of the Realists & Nominalists began, and was decided in favour of the former by the Church General Councils—By this and the Genius of Albert, Thomas Aquinas, and above all Duns Scotus, Realism became triumphant—& this is the third period—Occam renewed the strife in favour of Nominalism, and aided by the restriction of Classical Learning and the influence of the Alchemists, & mechanic Arts gave the overbalance to the Nominalists—and about the time of the Reformation the Scholastic Philosophy, tho' still retained by perhaps the majority of Doctors (for almost all the Romanists, and many Protestants adhered to it) was yet no longer the ascendant Interest. This sufficient for historical chronological Distinctness, we go back to our first definition, and explain it by a description applicable to the whole School-philosophy in all its periods

† The reporter wrote "tact".

sensations by the connecting with them mere notions and fancies. This must necessarily be the case when you would turn religion into philosophy. On the other hand if you would have a religion without a philosophy, their history <(*the Schoolmen's*)> will enable me to tell you what the result would be. It was presented in indelible characters very shortly after [*the edicts of Justinian had closed*] the last philosophic schools; and when the very reading of a book tending to learning was complained of by [*Sulpicius Severus; and*]⁽⁶⁾ when even a philosopher himself, and a man of no mean merits, ALCUIN,⁽⁶⁾ sent forth a pastoral [*decree*] concerning an abomination he had heard of—the introduction of Seneca and Virgil, lest it should injure faith! What was the consequence? Man was left to combine his senses with his better feelings. The church had taught him, indeed, truths of the utmost importance to his well-being, but by precluding all exercise of intellect had left it to himself to substantiate them, or bring them into any form of reflection. What the <*effects on the*> lower classes were, of the worship of dead bones and relics, on all the blessed influences of that religion which was to emancipate us from the control of our senses, so that it became instead the means of disturbing [*fancies and superstitions,*] the legends of the dark ages will sufficiently inform you; but even in its influence upon the higher classes, upon those who possessed whatever education was then existing, nay, who were themselves the teachers of it, the operation of this cause is manifest.

During the Roman Empire, while Christianity was struggling with philosophy, and itself fought the enemy with her own weapons, we find the great objects* of controversy to have been the Trinity, or those parts of our religion most removed from our senses. After the first dawns† of intellect, dispute will turn to some object of the senses, namely on the sacrament and the sacrament itself was turned into a sort, if I may so say, of exponent of that effect; for here was the spiritual degraded into an image, and secondly, the image was unnaturally made to possess spiritual powers‡, and in that very description I have given you the true

* subjects? See note ‡ below.

† dimming? See next paragraph.

‡ The notes are more specific: Down to the 6th Century the Tri-unity and the assumption of Humanity by the second Person of the Godhead in an individual perfect man, body & soul, were the subject of earnest controversy & maintenance but after the 8th Century, the *Sacramental Elements*, the objects of sense spiritualized, the spiritual power spite of all inherent heterogeneity corporized.

character of superstition. Man cannot deprive himself of his moral feelings altogether. He cannot deprive himself of that instinct which still teaches him that there is something which is better than his senses or the mere organs of his body can present to him; but he has it in his power to confound what he cannot destroy, and to give to the spirit the attributes of the body, and to give to the body the attributes of the spirit, to make an image real, to make a wafer possess omnipresence, and to make [the spiritual corporeal, the heterogeneous homogeneous].* This is the character of superstition in all ages: it is the confounding of the spiritual with the bodily.⁽⁷⁾

Now it being the business of philosophy ever to distinguish without unnaturally dividing, it is for this reason that you may trace the world through its whole history and you will find that wherever philosophy has attempted to place itself above religion or to take religion in as one of its parts, the consequence has been a dreary scepticism, which has ended in a sensual delivery of our own being up to the wants and appetites of the present state; on the other hand when a religion, misunderstanding the holy word *faith*, shall attempt to put the extinguisher upon all the powers of the intellect, however pure the dogmas may have been in the beginning, so assuredly it will become a mere [blind credulity].† Man will differ from the beast only by a falsehood and a blunder‡, only because, instead of seeing a snake as a snake or a tree as a tree, his higher being makes him combine with it something of hope or general fear which is perfectly estranged from the apparent existing cause. Oh! believe me, sirs, gross blunders are those which are represented to us in gross forms, but the very same in essence lurk under handsome appearances, and cheat many a man who [*would recognize*] the scorn of his honored mind in a more beggarly dress. So even is it in this. The same errors are going on among us, and have done, and as long as men remain men in their inequalities, will do so still. You will have two classes of [*ignoramuses*, who may be termed “the self-confiding reasoners” and “the reason-sacrificing faith men”].§

* Adapted from NB. 25. See preceding f.n.

† Adapted from NB. 25. From the same source an alternative reading might be: apotheosis of sensuality.

‡ MS. Egerton 3057 reads: Thus we see the poor deceived Indian Matlock worshipper differ only from the brute by grosser errors &c.

§ Except the first word, from MS. Egerton 3057.

And the one will, when he has seen an astronomer looking through a telescope say, "Nonsense. The man is a madman. What will that pole do with those bits of glass? Recommend me to my common senses. I will not believe a word he says." Another who has attended more, or whose fears have been acted on by the fulfilling of an eclipse predicted, goes the contrary way. "You shall deserve fire and faggot if you do not believe everything the astronomer tells you. Your eyes are the greatest nuisances in the world. They are deceiving you on all occasions, they are leading you into ditches and pools wherever you go. Let me pore through a telescope." Now what the telescope is to the eye, just that, faith (that is the energies of our moral feelings) is to the reason. Reason is the eye, and faith (all the moral anticipation) the telescope. No wonder that when men had placed themselves voluntarily in the dark they began to rub their eyes, as in the den of TROPHONIUS*, and made sparks such as proceeded from no one thing there is in nature. And such is the case where man rests solely on self, or *<on>* any *<one>* of those things which God and nature have made to be conjoint.

Still there is a noble something in man that cannot be suspended long, that will lift up great weights, and the moment that other causes have removed them, will play forth at all the pipes. Such was the case in that glory of our kingdom and of human nature, our Alfred. As soon as his victories had procured a small interval of tranquillity, he began to think whom he was to govern, and what the purposes of government were; and it ought to be written in letters of gold what this great sovereign conceived government to be. Books of politics have been written and have not contained so much wisdom as this one sentiment—that it was a substitute for the defects of self-government arising out of the imperfections and perverted will of man.⁽⁸⁾ There is the ground of all true liberty, and there, too, is the guard against all sedition, all false and idle pretences to give freedom—when freedom they cry but license they mean—

"License they mean when they call for liberty,

For who loves that must first be wise and good."⁽⁹⁾

Hence it follows too, necessarily, that there can be no universal form of liberty, no universal constitution. For just in proportion to the increasing quantum of self-government, ought *<it>* to be,

* The reporter wrote "Polyphernus".

may, it ever will be the case that such will be the decreasing power of external government. And were the men of Algiers by any miracle to be turned into self-thinking self-governing beings, their present military despotism would be done away⁽¹⁰⁾ probably; but whether it would or not, it would not make an atom of difference, for in every country (and I would the higher classes felt that) the minority will be influenced by the feelings of the majority. [*The tyranny of the tyrant*] is brought back to him, into his very soul and even into that of his very confederates. Alfred and Charlemagne,⁽¹¹⁾ in different ways the two greatest men of the modern world, sought in their obtaining of power as much as possible to supercede it. A grander eulogy cannot be placed on a human being than an individual in that station saying "I will exert my whole powers to prevent the necessity of it". He therefore founded or established *<one of>* our universities—that of Oxford.⁽¹²⁾ He first brought, LIKE THE LEGISLATORS OF OLD—AS LYCURGUS, WHO FIRST BROUGHT BACK THE HOMERIC SONGS—so did Alfred strive to bring in, the Bible, as one thing of interest common to all—not only the joining states that composed his own realm but those of his own neighbours; and in the same spirit acted his immediate predecessor in age, I mean Charlemagne.

The most extraordinary man, perhaps, of his age, and the first philosopher that arose after the suspended animation of philosophy, was Johannes Scotus ERIGENA, of whom we know nothing but that he was an Englishman. A wonderful man he must have been—who had travelled, according to his own account, into Greece, into Egypt, from Egypt to Italy and thence through France*, and back again to England, and he says of himself, calling heaven to witness, that no temples were there which were supposed to contain any valuable works of the ancients which he did not visit; nor was there any man he heard of superior to others whom he did not pay his address to. He came back to France first, and when the nobleness of his opinions drew upon him suspicion, Charles the Bold (unwilling to deliver up his friend and favourite to the irritated Roman Court, and yet not daring to disobey it) contented himself with forbidding him to reside at

* NB. 25 adds: upon what authority a German historian has asserted that these travels were superfluous, and that Ireland was at that time the Athens of Christendom, especially in all Greek Literature, I am ignorant and somewhat incredulous.⁽¹³⁾

Paris*. Our Alfred, hearing of this, invited him to England and gave him the destiny of establishing, or if it be so, of re-establishing, the schools at Oxford. His death is scarcely known. It is said he was assassinated by the monks† with pen knives,⁽¹⁴⁾ but the operation of his mind could not be destroyed.

He first of all introduced what alone could be interesting at that time—the law of thinking. He was, as Roger Bacon, himself a high authority, has declared, the first sound commentator on Aristotle, and <one> who had read the original writings.⁽¹⁵⁾ And from Aristotle he gave the first simple laws of necessary thinking, but so far from being ascribed to Aristotle, that he mingled his opinions with those of Platonism, and he endeavoured to subordinate the whole to the higher wisdom he had learnt from his religion. In one word, and with one exception <in> which he appears to have been somewhat dazzled with the splendour of the Eclectic philosophy and in some points to have come too near pantheism, but with all his practice and his opinions we may say, he was a Protestant in the present sense of the word. At least on all the doctrines on which we call ourselves Protestants, his opinions were the same as ours. And this was the stand he made against transubstantiation, the glorious zeal with which he stood forward against double predestination, that is ELECTION & REPROBATION‡⁽¹⁶⁾ without any respect at all to actions, or the enjoyers or sufferers. These were great measures, but still greater

* NB. 25: Invited by Charles the Bold to superintend his schools—gave offence to the Pope by dispersing copies of his Translation of Dionysius the Areopagite without having previously submitted it to his Holiness. In fact, Erig. carried his accom[m]odation and allegorizing system so far as to have given some cause for jealousy—the attributes of the divine Being he declares *piae fraudes*. Pope Nicolaus II by an express Bull required that he should be sent to Rome—or at least be forbidden to teach in Paris.

† NB. 25: nay, school-boys, at Malmesbury.

‡ NB. 25: The Council at Lyons' condemnation of him characteristically expressed. Yet he does not appear to have pushed himself forward as a turbulent Innovator, but to have given a public opinion only at the demand of his Sovereign & of the Bishops alarmed at the strides of Roman Corruption & Despotism. So invoked, he acted the part of a Patriot & an honest man & seems in every point to have been of the rational party. For tho' he believed that every point of Religion was amenable to Reason, he as firmly maintained that the sum total of Reason was contained in the Christian Religion. His opposition to Godschalk who on the strength of some overheated passages of Augustin had introduced the double predestination—Election & Reprobation, then to Radbert's Transubstantiation—curious that both he & Berengarius=Ch. of England.

was the merit of the zeal with which he urged that a true religion might be above, but never could be contrary to philosophy, and that therefore any act of the Church, by which an apparent philosophical truth not conceived in faith* was declared to be false, would strip religion of intellectual aid and bring it into parity with blind paganism. Add to this HIS ORIGINALITY† IN DENYING EXTERNAL BEING TO SPACE, AND AFFIRMING SPACE TO BE NO OTHER THAN THE SOUL'S IMPERFECT POWER OF DEFINING THE OUTLINE OF IMAGES, and he was beyond his age as other men have lagged behind.‡ The utmost consolation is to think he was the companion, the counsellor, the friend of Alfred§, who, placed in more genial circumstances, could form institutions more lasting than the philosopher in his closet, (with the perishable materials before printing was known), than were ever in his power. But do not let us be insufficient in gratitude. What was better than all? What gales of refreshment from the mere power of talking with a rational being—one perhaps and the only one who, like himself, was beyond his age,⁽¹⁷⁾ and thereby appointed to bring that age forward into the power of producing a nobler!

Johannes Scotus ERIGENA (and we have no better way of describing the philosophic period than by stating the names of those who most distinguished themselves) was followed by BERENGARIUS, who took precisely the same path with himself⁽¹⁸⁾ and whose hours IN ENDEAVOURING TO QUELL THE CONTROVERSIAL SPIRIT had IN VAIN been wasted; he again by Abelard⁽¹⁹⁾ and Abelard by JOHANNES SARISBERIENSIS or John of Salisbury,⁽²⁰⁾ whose merit in opposing the ridiculous minuteness of the Schoolmen|| will for ever be read by intelligent minds, if not with the

* The report reads: truth.

† NB. 25: his deviation from Aristotle.

‡ NB. 25: His belief that all future punishments are spiritual—and of a universal Redemption—

§ NB. 25: a learned man, itself a *wonder* in that age—& a Self-thinker, a Miracle!

|| NB. 25: the extravagances to which it [dialectic] was carried, well painted by our John Salisbury—(p. 55, 56, 57. viii, i.). [The reference is to Tennemann.]

Its effects the same as with our Theories when brought to practice in Inflation, Self-conceit, Presumption, &c.—but *it* had its advantages too—yea even by excited antagonism & self-inventions—Arts discovered in the Middle Ages—For let it not be forgotten, that *all was to be produced anew*. Even the oldest plants were to undergo the risks and difficulties of Transplantation.

Where however the real Knowledges were to be reproduced, they cannot be taken as existing: which truism seems yet to have been overlooked by the Declaimers against the Schoolmen.

same pleasure yet with a higher moral satisfaction than we read now the writings of Lucian; as also his account of the controversies carried on by the Schoolmen, not by men of no authority but men of the highest ranks, by Archbishops and Bishops: as for instance whether in the resurrection men who are fat will remain so or whether a man who has been very thin for a course of years will get more substance, or, lastly, whether when a man takes a pig to market who is obstinate and the man is obliged to use a rope, the man drags the pig or the rope. And when he speaks of the excessive clamor excited in the schools—the fury not only of the young men but of the elders, [*the heat shown, for instance,*] by JULIAN, ARCHBISHOP OF TOLEDO in his PROGNOSTICS,⁽²¹⁾ we feel highly amused; and when we find the eloquence with which he calls on men to exert their common sense. In this he was aided by another great man of his time, Eusebius, who endeavours to repress this controversial spirit, especially on the sacrament and on the doctrine of transubstantiation, ending with this sober devise, “Let every man take the sacrament in faith of the words, and let him rely on faith for that enlightening the answer to which is promised in so far as the individual’s veil is off. And why then should we dispute? Because, if the gospel be true, that every man who asks to be enlightened in sincerity with it will learn, as far as he ought, why need he go to an earthly teacher, or attempt to define that by words which he is assured by his religion will be given by a gradual light afforded to him?”⁽²²⁾ But the good man failed, and all those who taught the same doctrines of tolerance and sober sense. And let us not regret that they failed.⁽²³⁾ Do not let us fall into the mistake of requiring that the *thing* should be present before the *conditions* of the thing were. The human mind was to be drawn out of barbarism, it was to have the power of acting upon the materials before the <REAL> materials <OR OBJECTS> were present [*or*] our powers called into actual use*.

Is not that the case in nature?⁽²⁴⁾ Does she not make every young animal, in sport and without any purpose of utility but that of enjoyment, rehearse as it were, the task he is to perform in the course of after life? Does not the calf butt before the horns are there, or while they are yet budding? Even such is the course of Providence in the education of man. First of all the faculties are encountered with as many stumblings as the babe makes in

* NB. 25: And after all, the Understanding was *exercised*, unsensualized.

learning to walk—and would that our minds were such as to contemplate them with the same love and forbearance. And so with regard to man—through many errors his mind is to be cleared up. He is to seek everything in itself, nature is not gone, *<though>* it does not proceed in created beings with that [*consistent progress we see in the natural world*], no, but in created beings still one thing comes forward with mighty force, and perfects itself with mighty force, while other things are then in instinct*; but the former has gained its point—it no longer exists as interesting. It has no novelty. There is a dead pause like the tide at its highest—a little while it stands and trembles till an opposite direction is taken, and then we must expect another mark of human frailty. What is good will be neglected and confounded with what is bad; the whole together is an object of reprobation till that is performed too, and nature looking back takes up what has been left behind and constitutes a higher home than either. So we find still the likeness between the education of man and the process of nature—we see, too, the insect—we find everything going outwards—of every insect the internal is almost as simple as plants—the external more multifarious. Each insect has its shop of tools about it, but with those it has instincts that act outwardly. It constructs its nests—makes its hive and becomes the object of our profound admiration; and in all that it forms but the process with which it forms its own body. But we find no mark of an internal life. Nature takes a higher step and passes into the fishes and there the nervous *<system,>* the object by which reflection or memory is rendered *<a>* probability, begins, but in doing this she has lost something—all the instincts of life—all that delight in the instinct is gone. She takes another step and combines both in the birds, but both glorify it in a higher degree—there is the nervous system, and the instinct and again *<that>* brings back the acts. She takes another step in the animals—the four-footed animals. But this is so great a step before she can come to her last [consummation]† that here again we miss all, not only the acts of the insects, but we miss all the lovely analogies to moral feelings which are found in the birds—their mechanism, their fidelity, their power of imitating articulate sounds—but where she has been withdrawing from the external form, the more

* Indistinct?

† E.H.C. The report reads: consolation,

she has been perfecting the internal organization. She has split [and multiplied]* the centre[s] of action and reaction. Then she takes up all that she had been doing before, even from the [zoo-phytes]† up to the elephant, and by superior aid presents the materials for forming the microcosm of man, who, with none but the simplest forms of external power, has the power of conquering the whole; and all that instinct had done throughout the creation in each separate part, to gain that by power of reason, so as bearing in itself the best witness of higher birth; no longer [to be the slave]‡ of nature, but to be placed as her Lord, no longer as receiving gifts, but as standing forth, from the naked savage up to Newton, to bring whatever was within the eye within the power of the mind§ and to subject to the mind that which the senses had only given him the first notices of, as spies and out-ministers to discover what was yet to conquer.

In ANSELM,⁽²⁵⁾ however, who was born at AOSTA in Piedmont in the year 1034 (and afterwards our Archbishop of Canterbury) we have perhaps the proper founder of the Scholastic philosophy. He, joined with Hildebert,⁽²⁶⁾ Archbishop of Tours, born in 1057||, I call the proper founders of Scholastic philosophy, for this reason, and which will give you a further definition or rather description of Scholastic philosophy and its distinction from Greek and Roman philosophy. The Greek and Roman philosopher set out attempting, by the powers of the human reason, to find truth; truth he was seeking and to arrive at that was his object, the final cause of all his efforts. This could not be the case when the power of the clergy and what was still more powerful, inward conviction, had declared that the truth was already found. Philosophy that pretended to discover the truth could not have been tolerated; and perhaps (if we consider this, that we were yet to be brought out of savagery), could scarcely be rationally or humanely tolerated. Therefore the Schoolmen stood with the truth already discovered.¶ The [total] of the sum was given to them,

* Based on Coleridge's note on a gift copy of the *Friend to Allsop*, B.E., II. 174-8.

† MS. Egerton 34, 225. f. 142.

‡ Lect. VIII. p. 249.

§ The report reads: arm.

|| NB. 25 adds: studied at Clugny—admirer of Berengarius—his beautiful Epitaph on B. p. 106.⁽²⁷⁾ His excellent definition of Faith—as an anticipation of Knowledge by the Moral Will, above opinion tho' below perfect knowledge—

¶ The version in NB. 25 is of some interest: that [truth] was already possessed by

as we give them to boys in arithmetic; the object was to prove that what faith and the Church had declared to be true was coincident with reason, and therefore that truths already known were rational truths.

This constituted the aim and guided all the efforts of the Schoolmen.* (28) The mode in which they put it was naturally, first of all, by bringing together the opinions of wise men on such and such subjects; but yet so many and so discordant were the doctrines to be proved that nothing could be effected but by fine distinctions. The next step was, therefore, philosophy that employed itself in desynonymizing words, in giving them sometimes perfectly just and distinct meanings, often but apparent ones, but which whether true or false laid the foundation of our modern languages. And that wonderful . . . which in our first writers in the popular languages we find . . . when we see an . . . which is national or which is more than national spreads over many countries at the same time. Be assured you see a manufactory of something excellent, but with all the dirt and confusion of an unripened process; so was it here. For after a time this necessarily led men (from the opposition to common sense which many of those distinctions appeared to involve and yet from the inability to find any logical defect in the reasoning) to doubt whether a logical truth was necessarily an existential one⁽³⁰⁾, i.e. whether because a thing was logically consistent it must be necessarily existent; the founders, these I may say, the men who first presented the occasion

a higher means, that of supposed Revelation & the decisions of the Church, i.e. direct information from the Holy Ghost, in the general councils—but a logical demonstration of these truths

* NB 25 Surely not to be despised. It was all that they dared do as individual great men—but likewise it was the only way in which the mass of men could be drawn upwards. To make the lower faculties harmonize with the supposed highest—this confirmed by Alcuin's dedication of his work on the Trinity to Charlemagne, in which he declared his object to be not so much to confirm the Emperor's Faith already perfect as to this article but to shew the importance of Logic in Theology—quoting the authority of St. Augustin that to Infidels who were yet to be converted, it would be impossible to answer the difficulties without aid of the Categories of Aristotle⁽³⁰⁾

When therefore by Alfred's and Charles's influence Schools were formed, and the rudiments at least of Universities; when Education began with the children of State-officers, and in order to fit them for State-employees; and Logic was the great aim, what wonder that this became the great object of Ambition? Even as in the present day, the (so-called) science of Political Economy—Q[uer]y which the *less* blunder?

for this, had been haunted with an exccoding wish, to give a demonstration of the reality of the idea of the Supreme Being. We ourselves still say "a proof" of the existence of the Supreme Being, and too few attend to the force of the words. We admit a difference between "existence" and "being" yet; that exists in our language, for there is no man who would not say it. Is not the essence of a circle that a circle has all the lines from the [*centre, the radii, equal?*] Yet few would say that a circle exists or that there is a body that [*has its radii*] perfectly equal. We ourselves therefore feel a distinction between essence and existence. This answer must puzzle one, and the story which he <Anselm>* relates of himself is a highly interesting instance of the age in which he lived, of the connexion of superstition with metaphysical acuteness. He long had been oppressed with this wish; he had tried to discover a demonstration that afforded him satisfaction, till he began to mistrust that this was a temptation of the enemy, that it was an attack to destroy his faith. He fasted and prayed but he still was haunted. He prayed longer, till at night in a dream a great light appeared to him, and all at once, he knew not how, the demonstration came forth and he awoke in full possession† of it. This was no other than the famous Cartesian⁽³¹⁾ demonstration‡. He found that the idea of God was the only idea of which man was capable which involved the necessity of its existence, not only because man [*was a microcosm*] and therefore implied an infinite Being as its Cause, but principally from its being involved in the idea itself. For what do we mean by God but that which contains all perfectness without any negation? But [*essence*]§ is the perfection, therefore it must contain, of necessity, the existence, consequently the necessity [*implies the actuality*]. This was proof which we must not think much of [*the German historian, Tennemann, for criticizing. After all, his great master Kant*]|| still referred to this as a something so near to human nature it could not be given up—without falling into scepticism and an utter distrust of anything

* MS. Egerton 3057. This paragraph appears to have given the reporter many difficulties.

† The reporter repeated the word "demonstration" above.

‡ NB. 25: Anselm's life—and conversion—and Eadmer's account⁽³²⁾ of the Inspiration by which he received the famous Cartesian Demonst. of God—

§ The report reads: existence.

|| Offered very tentatively. There is some support for this attempt at an approximation to Coleridge's words in Tennemann, VIII. 136-7; and cf. Lect. XII. pp. 363-5.

which, if they have been in an old library they probably may have seen without knowing it, but of which most assuredly they never read a page. But I happen to have read a considerable portion of the works of Thomas Aquinas⁽³⁷⁾ and [Duns Scotus]^{*(38)} and I should be perplexed to name any books which impressed me with a deeper sense of the power of the human mind, however they may have been misled by their partiality or by moving in one direction.

Through the powers of these men aided by abler councils [*counsels?*][†] . . . in the lower classes, and perhaps better suited to the higher aspirations of the nobler character of man, *<Realism>* became triumphant, till just about the time of the restoration of letters, Occam[‡] ⁽³⁹⁾ our English philosopher arose. Yes, I say Occam, that obscure name as it now is, but which was formerly most celebrated, the object of the thunderbolts of Rome, leading a life of persecution and yet still consoled by finding his opinions triumphant, brought forward a system of sound philosophy. He defined faith according to its proper nature. He said that it was an anticipation of knowledge by the moral will. That *<it>* was indeed below science, for that was what we were to enjoy as the reward of faith; but far above opinion; which therefore was not indeed ever attainable in its height by reason but which was constantly tricked by it, and though ever flying before, still in its latter steps reached it; and consequently that a doctrine of faith that was against reason was absurd, and a faith that was not admitted to be above reason ceased to be faith altogether, inasmuch as it became one and the same with reason. But what I would wish to impress is what struck me as so beautiful a definition of faith that of itself it is enough to preserve any man from fanaticism and at least secure him against [*charges of atheism and the persecution or neglect of posterity*].

Does not the child, feeling its growth, anticipate its manhood and does not it work on with a view to it? Does not the child while it plays on its mother's knees, yea in the touch on the mother's arm, receive in love and in kindness a pledge that that

* Supported by NB. 25.

† This sentence appears to be corrupted in the reporting. Some sort of transition was to be made from Realism to Nominalism.

‡ The reporter throughout writes 'Hockham'. An indication of Coleridge's pronunciation?

something it understands not it yet possesses,⁽⁴⁰⁾ the essential of sense and truth and reality combined with a reversional property, something yet to come? This, in reality, is the pride of human reason because it is the pledge and necessary consequence of its progression.

All that has been done in later times in the critical examination of the faculties by which we are to judge of both the objects of our senses and those which are removed from us, all that speculation to rightly employ itself upon a . . . shapes by its own powers a correspondent . . . and then that larger portion of truths which are attained partly by the absurdity of supposing the contrary, and partly by the contradiction which the . . . not of our own beings—this I say was presented—no true [*prototype*] of that age indeed, but yet with a clearness which has not had many modern superiors. In our countryman, Occam, at this time, the two causes were working to produce a great revolution in the human mind. The first was that the very satiety of a perpetual controversy concerning mere notions and words, although it had done ample services in the formation of language and strengthening the human language (and remember that this very philosophy was the tennis court, if I may so say, it was the game of cricket, that had given all the robust vigor to the greatest statesmen and the mighty minds that existed in this country and the whole of Europe in the reign of Richard the 3rd, Henry the 7th, and Henry the 8th, and part of the time of Queen Elizabeth) it was in this school they had learnt robustness, and robustness of intellect. Though very scanty should be the quantity of the information gained, *<it>* is no trifle; or if it were, we must *<then>* admit that the under-chemist at the Royal Institution or any other person who knows five hundred facts of nature, five hundred substantial pieces of knowledge of some use to mankind where Lord Bacon knew but one, was a greater man than Lord Bacon, and more likely to be a benefactor to his species. I mention this because it is one of the vices of this age that we are too fond of dwelling on the vices and follies of our ancestors. We may remember, if they thought too much of giving power, we have been falling into the opposite extreme of corruption, till we have destroyed the tone of the stomach which it was to nourish. We have been desirous of a [*tangible*] geometry, we have invented wooden circles and tried to make the child to feel. In short we have tried

to keep up his memory as the lumber room of his soul, with guns and swords and all the implements of warfare, without observing that the arm was paralyzed and the soul turned to a mere lumber room where inactive [*and dead nothings and ghosts of nothings*]* remaining together brought forward merely mists and vapours and self-conceit.

Extremes are produced by extremes. The tyranny of Aristotle and the Aristotelian philosophy called forth the visionaries and the mystics. They abandoned all ideas, and their principle was that there was an universal life, that this life was distinguished by sympathies and antipathies, that this existed through all nature and that the proper mode of invoking nature was by attaining nature by means of simple substances. Out of this arose the fancy of the transmutation of metals. They believed that all the metals were the same thing in different states of growth, and that by warming, by bringing stimulants from [*sulphur*]† or contradiction‡ from [*mercury*]† they could bring forward . . . and which they believed to be no other than what they called earthly life, or life in its opposite extreme; that as one extreme of life is projectile and against gravitation, so, as all extremes have some one middle point of indifference, there was a super-sensual life revealed in two ways, one by phenomenal light and the other by life or gold; and carrying this on they concluded, as life was light, so the [*universal menstruum*]§ from life would [*blend and harmonize the most discordant elements*]||. The same view therefore gave them hope of discovering an universal remedy, a power of keeping life in the highest state conceivable of energy; and on the same principle, carrying on the notion of life everywhere, and animating the universe, they presented all parts of the world as having symbolical meanings, that there was no shape in nature but had its correspondent in the heavens or under the earth, that it was merely a likeness to something else and therefore capable of acting on some superior being; and in this manner they introduced, indeed, all that was most absurd in fancy or imagination, but at the same time, still in direct opposition to the scholastic philosophy which drew man

* MS. Egerton 2826.

† *Misc. Crit.*, 202.

‡ contraction?

§ || Based on a phrase in the *Friend*, I. 150.

wholly back from his senses and from the outward world into the distinctions in his own thoughts. And constantly directing the human mind to found itself [*upon phenomena it*] will lead to an experimental philosophy, lead us further to chemical operations and what they called "constellations", faith watching the effects, imagining the possession of these things to be somewhat in the nature of ceremonies or magical invocations of them, noticing the results. And so, blindly leading on to other truths so important to the actual purposes of man in society, it drew strangers'* minds into it, infected [*even the learned*] with the same notions, infected with the same disposition to lying which follows an intelligence [*intent on an imaginary end. Which reminds us of*]† a thing presented to us in Don Quixote, where he begins with a grave story which he cannot bring himself to deny but goes to a magician to know whether it is true or not. So with these men. They indulged themselves with these imaginings <so> that certain indulgences became so vivid from hope that they declared they were so, and afterwards many of them, I believe, really believed it. But yet where the whole human faculties were called forth, and with amazing industry, something must come of it; and to the Alchemists we are indebted for chemistry as it now exists,⁽⁴¹⁾ a wonderful science I may call it, for it has transmuted into reality all the dreams of polytheism; and it would be difficult to find in the *Arabian Nights* anything more wonderful than chemistry has presented. So that which began in imagination, (proceeding and wedding with common sense, and finally with science), has ended in the gratification of it.

Letters however were gradually introduced, and who shall speak—who shall be worthy to describe—the enthusiasm with which the Great men of Rome and Greece, in the reappearance of their works, were greeted in Christendom? Remember how many . . . and to introduce letters and arts and sciences. Compare the efforts of the Russian court from Peter the Great to the present day, and its existing state, and then look back with honest pride to your ancestors when the trumpet of ancient literature was blown, and king and noble and warrior and peasant came crowding, when men gave up their pleasure, exposed to every privation, and with their manuscripts under their arms would

* stronger?

† Based on a hint in *Misc. Crit.*, 202 Lect. XII, 1818, on the Alchemists.

start from a hedge [craving a penny for a poor scholar].* And those men were the Erasmuses, the Luthers—the men who have made us all we are, and whose works if well studied would make us a great deal better. Thus spread throughout *<Europe>* a zeal that declared to the human mind that it was arriving at its manhood, that it was no longer to be confined to this or that study, but was capable of passing *<on farther>*† according to the will of individual genius and the social stimulus.

Shortly afterwards, the reformation‡, which could not well be delayed, threw open all the stores of religion to man. There, too, the same mark of Providence was shewn. There, too, was the blast of the trumpet, and all those nations and all those individuals who were fitted for Protestantism received it; and having received it, the voice seemed to have passed forth, and within a few years only, after Luther's death, it received its outline and limits which it has not varied to this day. So materially are things dependent upon the great course of events, and so little is really done by individual reasoning, or what we are now so proud of under the name of enlightening, or the spread of general information, and so forth. That information§ which is suitable to and which conforms with all its facts, which in the present is wedding the past to some future, that is mighty. All the rest may sometimes distinguish individuals, but it is, as it were, nothing, in the ocean of human concerns. But assuredly the way to improve the present is not *<to>* despise the past; it is a great error to idolize it, but a still greater to hold it in contempt. Wordsworth has beautifully said, "The Child is the Father of the man", and I would wish men to be taught to be, "Bound each to each in natural" charity.⁽⁴²⁾

I will conclude this lecture by a few general remarks on the ages of which we have been treating, and as my next lecture will begin with the reformation and go on to the time of Charles the Second, what I mean now I will state by repeating almost a conversation that passed. "What!" says one objector to me, "do

* MS. Egerton 3057.

† The reporter wrote "off".

‡ NB. 25: Reformation, truly the Egg of the Schoolmen tho' they ostrichlike left it to be hatched by chance.

§ Did Coleridge pronounce this with emphasis on the first syllable? Information as compared with *ab extra* facts. One remembers the poem about 'inquietance'. P.W., II. 1012.

you hold out these Middle Ages as objects of admiration? What can dreaming of the past do but make men forget the duties and advantages of the present? Where are your fine chivalrous knights? You forget their miserable vassals. There, to be sure, are your great displays of priestly power, but do you forget the cruel crusades and examine into the detail of life, without its comforts, with all the wretchedness that you may still find if you go into the territories between Turkey and Europe?"

I answer, "There is always enough that is secured to us, both by what is evil as well as good in nature, that will be secured to us by the present; and the elevation of the past is as necessary as an attention to the present. The events of nature ought to be continuous. Many are the deformities of the Middle Ages, but they may be well compared to the eruptions on unhealthy children; they are repulsive to our feelings. But where any evil exists *inwardly*, and when the body becomes weaker and weaker it is found easy to combine* the poison of the disease with the life itself, and the outward counterfeits of smoothness and harmony, of which the wretched inwardly have no partaking."

That Europe is what it is, could not have been, in the first place, but in consequence of the wisdom of Charlemagne, and the other powers of Europe in imitation of him, in subordinating the temporal powers for a time to the spiritual powers. For what interest was there but that which remained common to all the states? If the Pope could not wholly prevent wars, has the Protestant balance of power been more successful? Since it has, by the necessary change of time, taken from the *person* and turned into the *balance*, have we gained more in that respect? But the vassals, the dreadful slavery of those ages!

I am far from wishing to exculpate or palliate the evils of slavery. What makes a slave a slave? If I mistake not it is oppressions†—it is the being in a state out of which he cannot hope to rise; and he who is placed where there is no motive for action, but where the miserable thing he is must ever remain in the same sphere, is a slave, and a pitiable one. But were the vassals of our ancestors such? Can we compare them with the miserable victims of the West Indies? If so, how came the bur-

* confuse? As for example, to confuse the fevered flush of the tubercular with the glow of health.

† NB. 25: True notion of Slavery—Hopelessness!

gesses? They came from somewhere; they were not original citizens. The privileges of cities were not known till a considerable length of time had passed after the first conquest. Of whom came the great majority of the religious, the monks and the priests? It appears, then, that there were two modes by which the vassals had a hope of rising, either in themselves or in their children; and that they did so is evident first from the power of the clergy and secondly from the great powers of the burgesses. Reflect only on the Hanseatic League.* Recollect only how early the House of Commons became important. And what were those burgesses? Think of their buildings, think of the cathedral at Strasbourg, think of the superior morality, of the admirable, balanced constitutions, of the men of genius that were rising out of them, and the refuge afforded to men of genius! See them, wrongfully sometimes, oppressed, and sometimes wrongfully oppressing, the nobility and genius, but [*the source of stimulation*] and also that which was to be stimulated. Consider, I say, too, likewise, not the gloomy accounts of monkish historians only, but take the picture given by the poets of the times. Surely it was not all cruelty! We find there, on the contrary, nothing more frequent than such characters as that which Shakespeare has drawn in *As You Like It* †, and we find

[“The constant service of the antique world,
When service sweat for duty, not for mead”]‡

was predominant in the minds of men.

I feel the blessings of the present time most fully; but I still, when I reflect on a German⁽⁴³⁾ town which I myself was once in, and which had never been polluted by any foreign invasion, and remember how strongly it struck me like something I have seen and all I have heard of good old simple times in England, and compare it with the result of the manners of that same town after it had for three years had French troops quartered in it—how much more information there was in the town, and how much more of what was infamous in man and woman, and how much shipwreck had taken place in their morality, and we

* NB. 25: & all the trade & commerce which the Landholders abstained thro' pride from—Their constitutions, so admirably balanced as to have remained in Germany even to the French Revolution, the murderer of all the recollections and *fall the Hopes of good men.*

† NB. 25: What an affecting picture has Sh. drawn of his Adam in *As You Like It*.

‡ II. iii.

shall not be so apt to despise what is ancient, nor admire all, as good, that comes under the name of modern illumination.

But above all I find throughout the dark ages one striking proof of the greatness of our nature. The present man was in all his doubtings and in all his notions subordinated to the future. Religion in thought, religion in heart, was with all their imperfections their guide, their ultimate, their supreme aid in all things. We are apt to take prominences as history, but remember that historians naturally take that which is prominent and chief, but all prominences are EXCEPTIONS INSTEAD OF THE RULE. We read of cruelties to the vassals*—we swell with indignation at their wretched life and various instances are brought in confirmation of it; and in the meantime we bless our fate and have reason to do so, but greater our reasons to do if we look to correspondent individuals in our own times.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Great have been the advantages to this country by commerce. Next to the church it has been the great source of information, and art and science in some measure, though in a less degree, but most assuredly the main support of freedom, nay the very cause of freedom as actual and practicable throughout the country, and of that general diffusion of knowledge which, if we have fewer wells now, fewer reservoirs, makes us have a hundred more frequent brooks which may be shallow but yet go bubbling and chattering and conveying fertility where they go, to a certain extent. I feel that now you may pass from one end of England to the other and scarcely know you are twenty miles from London, from the general uniformity of language, habit, information. I feel that by the confidence made necessary between man and man, it has given a physical strength to this country perfectly new and unknown in any periods of the history of the world. All this I feel and feel grateful for. But it has taught us to consider men, our fellow creatures, mere parts of the machine.⁽⁴⁵⁾ It has directed us to consider the quantity of consumable *goods* without reference to the quality of the consumer. I say it enables us to look with trifling concern at well-attested

* NB. 25: But grant truth as we must that the Vassal had many grievances, did it arise wholly from these times? from the Vassalage? or from the evil of Human Nature—Dare to end with the Cotton Children—&c. & then with the manufacturing System counter-balanced by nothing, compared with the System of Arms & Land counteracted by the clergy & this very system in its youth—

facts of many thousands of little children, from the age of six years old to fifteen*, working from fourteen† to fifteen hours out of the twenty-four in a heated atmosphere of eighty-five degrees or more, in an air polluted by cotton flue, nay, by the very effluvia from the poor little sufferers who each contribute their quota to the common contagion. I say this—and that these die off so as to leave only one in fifty. And happy are those who die, so escaping a miserable old age loaded with diseases (as numerous as the organs of the body by which they can be attacked) that arise from debility and excessive stimulants. For it is not a contradiction—this is so, and it is not a contradiction—they are *free*⁽⁴⁶⁾ labourers, poor little darlings! And consider the revenue, consider the money got by them!

“But morality? But religion?”

“They are all very good things—we subscribe to the Sunday Schools—but you must not mention those points when it comes to a question of commerce!”‡

* “Fourteen” in the *Remarks on . . . Peel's Bill* (see note 45), and changed in the margin of the Ashley copy in the British Museum (Ashley 2861) to “Sixteen”. The hand may be Coleridge's.

† “Thirteen”, *op. cit.*

‡ Did Coleridge really “dare to end” with this? Did he not conclude with a sentence or two on the benefits, in spite of weaknesses, of mediaeval Christian philosophy and institutions? See f.n. p. 287. But the reporter of MS. Egerton 3057 gives no support to this conjecture.

LECTURE X

MARCH 1, 1819⁽¹⁾

MR. COLERIDGE LECTURES THIS EVENING on the REVIVAL OF CLASSICAL RESEARCH and the BELLES LETTRES; the REFORMATION; the CHARACTERS &c. of ERASMUS, LUTHER, and the great Italian Platonists under Cosmo and Lorenzo de Medicis; and the influence of these Causes on the speculative, religious and political tendencies of Philosophy in the 15th & 16th Centuries. 8 o'clock, Crown and Anchor, Strand. Admission 5s.*

The Gothic tribes, both before and after they had received Christianity and become the founders of Christianity, were strikingly distinguished from the Greeks, the south western branch of the same great family, by a federal character as opposed to a direct republicanism or the character of a state. They in all their habits discovered a connexion without combination. They were belinked⁽²⁾ together, but no part would lose its own integrity and individuality. Each house was to be a man's castle. Each town owed indeed its duties and its audiences to some noble or prince from whom it held <land,> but still it was a whole, of itself, with its own rights, its own magistracies.

And this which marked the whole political character disclosed itself likewise in their poetry: we find no remnants of any poem which can be said to have a beginning, a middle and an end, and in which all the parts are means to some great end, with a number of successive highly interesting narrations following each other in the order of time and going to one purpose.

* *The Times*, March 1, 1819. Also in the *Morning Chronicle* and the *New Times*. The *Courier* of Saturday, Feb. 27, carried a similar announcement.

It is, in truth, the same character which afterwards appeared and has given rise to the couplet verse, which is precisely what I mean—if we take for instance, the writings of Dryden, or Ben Jonson's poems, you will find a series of distinct couplets, all upon the same subject but each having a wholeness of itself. I have explained this because it is the character of the language, marked by a smaller number of cases, and inflexions, and the manifest tendency to lose those which it possessed, compared with the interwoven sentences of the Romans and Greeks, which doubtless permitted them a much more logical position of words, according to the order of thought, than a language where the grammatical must ever over-rule that position in which the mind itself brings forward the conceptions.⁽³⁾

I have made this preface for the purpose of explaining myself and being intelligible when I say that the scholastic philosophy had two great purposes. First, it introduced into all the languages of Europe, as far as the languages were susceptible of it, the power and force of Greek and Roman connexion. It forever precluded our falling—or at least it should seem to have promised so to do—to have precluded our falling into the mere aphoristic style of the Oriental nations, in which thought is heaped upon thought by simple aggregation of words. In truth, what our Schoolmen had so well labored to prepare, and what the great writers before our revolution had so admirably elaborated and exemplified, the writers since then have seemed to take equal pains to destroy: to remove as an offence all the marks of connexion, to make each sentence an independent one, easily indeed understood, but still more easily forgotten.⁽⁴⁾ And as these men have shewn an utter contempt in general for whatever is ancestral, and conceived themselves to have been so abundantly wise that till some hundred years ago, no light was in the world at all, it may be of some service to inform them that this is the only mark they bear of their great Gothic ancestors. By returning to that which it was before, it* had ingrafted upon it† all of which it was capable. This was the first step. The second was the bringing into clear view what in all ages, clearly or obscurely conceived, works in the mind, the true engine of all speculation, expressed in a controversy between the Nominalists and the Realists⁽⁵⁾ (those who conceived [on the one hand, universals]‡ or those terms by which we [generalize

* Scholasticism?

† language?

‡ MS. Egerton 3057.

or connect a number of particulars under one word, and who valued terms only as words, and who thought of]* such connexions as not applicable to nature at all but mere parts of logic; and those who contended that those words appertain to certain forms of the mind and that those forms were truly correspondent to connexions in nature, so that the mind was to be conceived of as one pole of a line, the other pole of which was in nature—the contemplative and the contemplated being, as it were, the positive and the negative points of the magnetic line). As soon as it† had answered these purposes, as soon as it had had such an impulse given to it that it was sure to move forward by its own impetus and by the additional force [of] the celebrity, the rank, and influence, which it was sure to confer on the men who excelled and became eminent in the exercise, Providence introduced an antidote, which was to grow as the scholastic philosophy was losing more and more its utility, and finally to take its place when it was superannuated.

This was the other part of the Gothic mind—the inward, the striking, the romantic⁽⁶⁾ character, in short the genius, but genius marked according to its birthplace; for it grew in rude forests amid the inclemencies of outward nature where man saw nothing around him but what must owe its charms mainly to the imaginary powers with which it was surveyed. There nothing outward marked the hands of man. Woods, rocks and streams, huge morasses, nothing wore externally the face of human intellect; and yet man cannot look but intellect must be either found or placed. There arose therefore, among the Gothic nations, a superstition or a worship of fire. Imagine, then, that of images they had nothing like those of the Greeks. They had nothing but what was to be inward and sullenly refuse[d] to disclose itself otherwise than in terrors. So powerfully was this held, so strongly did the inwardness of the Gothic nature work, that the first great children of genius (called no doubt as by a foreign light and awaked from slumber yet with all the passionate admiration, with all the gratitude, that was felt for the light that had awoke them) never could in the least degree approach near to the centre. They believed themselves imitators. They professed to follow the ancients as guides. They sometimes actually copied; but nature

* Adapted from MS. Egerton 3057.

† the scholastic philosophy

maintained her rights, and instead of the copyists of Homer or of Virgil, we have imitators⁽⁷⁾ indeed, in Dante and Ariosto; but imitators only as nature imitates herself, when the same energies are excited under other circumstances, and on different materials through which she is to diffuse her creative and shaping mind.

Dante may be considered as a sort of staple connecting two chains, the metaphysics and the mysticism of the poetic side of the scholastic Realists whom he held in high honor, and on the other side, the first link of the chain of the men of genius.⁽⁸⁾ It was fortunate, and in all things we may trace the chain of events which it is perhaps scarcely religious to call by the name of fortunate, that Realism should then have been in its pride of triumph. It was so admirably adapted to give a sort of feeling and emotion and passion to the energies in nature, and at the same time connected the true form of the scholastic philosophy with that craving after something more substantial which soon characterized the alchemists and the wonder-workers of the same time. And as admirably adapted to the occasions of mankind does this appear—that Nominalism under Occam should rally its forces when erudition was growing *<into>* pedantry, and Platonism (which had performed its functions) was degenerating into sickly dreams.

The great PETRARCH,*⁽⁹⁾ great in every respect because he was likewise eminently good and desirable, even in the very height of the Scholastic philosophy was its determined enemy. He had, in truth, too much of inward reality, too much of interest for his human brethren, to find any gratification in forms of any sort (in mere *forms*). The same causes deterred him from the law, because he thought that the mere application of universals or of general rules, as drawing away the mind from that which, in mind, in† each thing, makes it itself and such as no other can be, appears to have made him unjust to the Schoolmen, and called forward from him, declamations against their spread as one of the greatest evils, and a sorer barbarism, under the name of philosophy, than had oppressed mankind in the ages before from mere simple ignorance. In short among PETRARCH's prose works, and especially his letters, you will find all the abuse of the Schoolmen which it has been fashionable since the Reformation to heap

* Throughout, the reporter wrote "Patrick" for "Petrarch".

† "of"?—and omit the comma after "thing"?

upon them; but far more pardonable was it in PETRARCH compared with those of later times. For it is not given to man to be wholly just to his contemporaries: for he is too WARM IN THE GAME*—too warm and interested, not merely to see and weigh what the beauties are, or what the defects, but when he feels the defect warmly to join towards its removal and when he feels an excellence to allay the flatteries with it. But who that lives in an age which labors under the very contrary disease to that of the scholastic age, who lives in an age when thinking becomes an actual toil and when, if you attempt to put three sentences together in connexion, you are asked for facts, though none that I have been able to ascertain knew what the meaning of the word "fact" is, or how it is possible for a man to know how, out of an immense number of circumstances, *<to decide>* that one is "the fact",⁽¹⁰⁾ unless he had asked himself simply first, for what he was looking.

A[mong] the most interesting of the great men who followed PETRARCH was his own scholar, JOHN OF RAVENNA.⁽¹¹⁾ His family name seems to have been MALPEGHINI. [*He was*] born about the year 1352, of very poor parents who yet, however, seized with the enthusiasm which was then beginning to spread over Christendom, had sent him to the celebrated DONATUS who introduced him to PETRARCH, then an old man. PETRARCH reared him and treated him as a child; and perhaps there does not exist in all biography anything more interesting, displaying more admirable traits on one part, or more natural ones on the other, than the letters of PETRARCH concerning this John of Ravenna. His first letter, written to his friends, in which he gives *<on the one hand>* an account that a fond father would give of a boy of twelve or thirteen (he could not be much older) of his tracing his distress when he was restless, while on the other, the account of his vexations. The young man, who had been growing restless for a time, at length addressed his benefactor.

"I cannot stop any longer. I must go away."

"And why?" First there was one excuse—he was weary of transcribing manuscripts.

"But I told you when you had written so much to leave it off for a year." No, he must go.

"But why?" Something or other, till at last, wearied by

* The report reads: to be one in the scheme—too be warm and interested. The correction is based on NB. 25.

PETRARCH's questions and kindness, he declared he knew not what it was but that he was consumed with a restless wish to be moving. And accordingly PETRARCH, after having in vain endeavoured to detain him, and though the young man in his passions had even behaved most ungratefully to him *<and>* wounded him by words, and though Petrarch writes to his father in a passion, he the next day sends another letter for fear the former should have produced a bad effect, in which he says, "It cannot be very wrong or I should not love him so much." And at length, when he went away, the affectionate recommendation that followed him! All these are the happy introduction of the life and after-works of a man who left no written works,* but who left works of an invaluable price; for under him were produced almost *<all,>* directly or indirectly, *<of>* the great scholars and literary characters *<or>* RESTORERS, LEONARD ARETIN, ANMEBU OF PADUA, ROBERT ROSSI, AND JACOB ANGELS OF FLORENCE, POGGIUS OF VERONA, AND OTHERS, in short there was scarcely a great man that had not received a part of his education from John of Ravenna, or had not been directly and immediately his scholar.

In consequence of the zeal for knowledge which the reputation of PETRARCH and the unwearied exertions of his young scholar had diffused, Emanuel CHRYSOLORAS came from Constantinople and settled in Italy. Shortly afterwards followed POGGIUS's DISCOVERY of Quintilian, THEN CICERO's LETTERS TO ATTICUS. BISHOP LAUD found under an old ruin a manuscript of Cicero which for a time was not legible till A YOUTH OF VERONA, CUSANAS, SUCCEEDED [*in deciphering it*] AND ITALY WAS THEN FILLED with copies of the DE ORATIONE . . . And now in scholastic philosophy everything was forgotten among the young men—it was only an effort who could write most eloquently, who could convey their thoughts most eloquently, who in short could feel most like a Roman.

Still though this checked, and perhaps happily checked, the excess of a speculative turn, it could not wholly suppress it. But philosophy assumed a form suited to the occasion, and under the patronage of the great [Cosmo]† of Florence and his sons afterwards, there arose classical philosophers, passionate admirers

* NB. 25: He *lectured*—but O what works did he not leave in the minds of his Auditors.

† MS. Egerton 3057.

of Plato but not of Plato's SUCCESSORS, FICINUS, MIRANDULA, &c.* . . . In treating of the Eclectic [philosophers]† there was one point which I did not notice⁽¹²⁾ but which it is of importance that we should now attend to. Plotinus wrote against [*the Gnostics*], Porphyry <against the Theurgists>, Iamblichus, [who answered him], wrote against the Christians in general; but we shall entertain a very false notion if we suppose these men contended at all in the spirit in which the Epicurean and [*Stoic pagan philosophers*] did. No, in the present day these philosophers would have formed a sect amongst us, of Christians. Throughout their works they speak with the highest reverence of our Lord. It never occurs to them to doubt, much less to deny, any of the miracles. Whatever the Christians believed in point of history, they believed—his miraculous birth, his resurrection, his ascension. Wherein did they differ? First of all in certain points of philosophy, but those were trifling however important they might appear to them. But secondly, which was of great importance, they said, "All this is true. We reverence Christ, we place him among the highest of the Gods that have descended into the human form; but you do wrong in appropriating and confining this. Pythagoras and [Plotinus]‡ were each such another." This constituted them enemies of Christianity, if they were so; which should teach us to look not only at what a man disbelieves, but <at> what he believes beyond or beside it, for on that the nature of his belief and disbelief must depend. This was, however, very fascinating, especially as the Eclectic philosophy was connected with the boldest purposes for the extension of the human powers.

For conceive what are the strongest passions of the human mind. One is the love of knowledge, when it is awakened, for its own sake; the other is the love of power which as it is exercised, as that power must be exercised in every moment for the preservation of our lives, must necessarily become the strongest and need most the discipline of the moral law. Now the Platonic philosophy in its degenerate form after Plotinus combined both. There was [*no limitation*] allowed of, no boundary to the human intellect. It allowed, indeed most fully, that many were the truths which could not be arrived at either by the senses or by the

* Adapted from NB. 25.

† The reporter wrote "laws".

‡ The reporter wrote "Polonius".

understanding, or even by the reason as far as it was human. But what then? There were mysteries: powers higher than those means, by which they could be united positively with the Deity, and live in him, and in that state partake at once of his omniscience and omnipresence. And these, too, were to be learned; the discipline indeed was severe, the time required in the penances and the watchfulness were perfectly like those of . . . or the Brahmins; but still the wished for results attached.* Finally Plotinus, we are told by Porphyry, enjoyed it three times, and Porphyry when sixty-eight years old enjoyed it for the first time.⁽¹³⁾ By what faculties he came to remember this, which was not only above the senses and the understanding but even above the reason, or by what words or by what possible means he could have communicated this even to himself, he has not been so kind as to inform us. Few however must be so ambitious as to expect this last consolation, but various were the seats of preferment. It was at least common for a philosopher to become connected with a daemon, the [*private Junos and Genii of the*]† higher air, or form an intimacy with a [pleroma of gods]‡⁽¹⁴⁾ or in short with the innumerable spirits above us. It was hard if he could not find a spirit with whom he could melt like two dew-drops,⁽¹⁵⁾ and then becoming refreshed, like a philosopher, tell wonderful things of himself. But this was still knowledge and contained within the mind. And here Plotinus appears to have stopped, for he certainly, upon the subject of astrology reasons, like a sound philosopher and speaks of magic with detestation, confining himself to natural magic, which appears to be nothing more than a want of experimental philosophy.⁽¹⁶⁾

This, however, was of short continuance, for already in the successor of Plotinus, in Porphyry who was Plotinus's immediate successor, magic is highly spoken of and the means by which it is performed, and in short, stories not only as gross as those which we find in our common books of magic, but for the greater part they are the very same. For it is with superstitious stories as it is with jokes. They have a wonderful metamorphosis; you may trace them in China, in India, in Persia, among the ancient Greeks. You may take a story or joke and find it successively in

* arrived?

† Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II. v.16. See this lecture, p. 304 & f.n.

‡ Thomas Taylor, *Iamblichus on the Mysteries*, 1821, 43 f.n.

almost all the countries of the civilized world, of course in each country in its own drapery, the same circumstances belonging to it, and with the same individual soul; and I believe an edition might be given of Joe Miller,⁽¹⁷⁾ or any other text book, that would deserve to be called the most learned book in the world, if a man were to trace each story back to the different writers, or heroes, or men of genius, to whom, age after age, it was attributed. Some have supposed it was given by some oracle. Certain commentators, I believe, are persuaded of it, for the first rule I have observed in notes on Milton and others, is to take for granted that no man had ever a thought originate in his own mind; in consequence of which, if there is anything in a book like it before, it was certainly taken from that. And you may go on, particularly by their likenesses, to the time of the Deluge, and at last it amounts to this: that no man had a thought but some one found it, and it has gone down as an heirloom which one man is lucky enough to get and then another. It struck me with astonishment when I found how devoid of power and thought our Milton is! Anything equal to *Paradise Lost* could not be his! For there was a man who made a poem upon it in Italy; consequently this poem is the true origin of the *Paradise Lost*, and so on⁽¹⁸⁾—with regard to all the detail it is a clear point. And really, with regard to certain wit and to certain stories, it may be admitted without any of the ludicrous consequences that follow when applied to the production of genius.

The connexion however between philosophy and magic did not flourish so well in Italy. It met with two mighty oppositions: first of all, the passionate love for poetry, whatever was cheerful and whatever was elegant, and next, the Inquisition and the watchful eye of the hierarchy. But it produced another effect, most remarkable, and *<one>* which convinces us how completely necessary the Reformation was, not merely for the reform but for the church from which the schism was made. There was scarcely a man of learning in Italy at that time who was believed to be seriously a Christian; some were open infidels, that is as open as they dared to be; and in truth if we read their writings we find that before the Reformation, there being a little jealousy excited, they made no great disguise of it. But the greater number were mystical infidels of the school of Proclus who felt the common notions of the school and Christianity too vulgar, and in the

horror they felt for superstitions, passed into the opposite extreme of visionary enthusiasm. It was in the north, in Germany and in England, that the magic, the alchemistic want and desire to exercise power by obscure means, were principally noticed. And this arose from that great desire for reality which marks the northern nations, arising no doubt in part out of their climate, but far more I am persuaded out of their institutions—nay, however much it may be deemed a prejudice, I would say likewise, out of the original stock. The same thing which makes us domestic, which makes us retire from one circle into a narrower and yet into a narrower, as if the mind within required a still stronger and a still stronger grasp to balance itself, this was shewn in Germany by the Bohemians, who believed in the sacrament of the cup which the church had withheld from laymen. Why should it be withheld? The Church had encouraged a belief that it almost approached to magic, and it is curious that the fighting *for* a superstition that degraded the holy institution over which the controversy was, should have led the way to the reformation of religion *from* that, and from all its other true deformities.

In Germany the first man, (and with the exception of Huss and Wyckliffe,⁽¹⁹⁾ and others, who might be said to be the more distinct heralds of the Reformation), Reuchlin⁽²⁰⁾, deserves to be mentioned as better known by his Latin name, Capnio. Now with the greatest zeal for the restoration of letters in general, with a courage and an address exerted against the great enemies of all knowledge (but at the same time the main supports of the Roman hierarchy—the mendicant orders) Reuchlin distinguished himself first by a service which will remain and which will entitle him to gratitude when all his follies and all his weaknesses will be forgotten. He introduced the Hebrew Scriptures and the study of them; he did more, we may say he prevented the destruction of them. For upon the first dawning of the Hebrew literature, so great was the alarm taken by the ignorant clergy that they had begun an Inquisition among the Jews, accompanied with every species of cruelty, for the purpose of discovering the Hebrew manuscripts and committing them to the flames. Reuchlin, by means of the influence he had with the Emperor, and by that extended correspondence which he enjoyed among eminent literati, secured both the Jews and the Oracles of which then they had the

keeping. But in the commune which he naturally had with the more learned of the Jews, he acquired a knowledge of the Cabala, and mixed his recommendations of the pure words of God with the most extravagant encomiums on this most sublime of philosophies.

What the origin of the Cabala⁽²¹⁾ was I cannot pretend to tell you precisely. I know it is commonly said that it began from the 10th century or even later in the middle ages. This appears to me utterly unlikely. At least I find the references to it so strong in the works of the first century—I find the same doctrines so plainly marked, even in Philo Judaeus, in works which are supposed to be before the birth of our Lord—that I am inclined rather to think that its origin is to be sought for about the same time that the Wisdom of Solomon, in our Apocrypha, was written, which likewise contains passages strongly cabalistical. Whatever its origin was, its doctrines were nearly the same as the lower* Platonists'. A species of pantheism was taught, in a very wild form indeed, but which when reduced to common sense appears to be nothing more than this, that they made no essential distinction between God and his creation but that of the manifested and the manifestation. The Deity considered in himself and in his own essential nature they represented as three in one; but the Deity as manifested, as expanding *<in at>* least *<seven>* ways, they represented as the seven spirits or the seven Sephiroth.† The last, which was to be the Messiah or the Shekinah, was to be the same as the second person of the triad, and to be in the Shekinah a concentration of all the seven‡ spirits of the manifestation, a doctrine which must have been very early indeed in the Church, because we find a clear reference to it in the beginning of the Apocalypse. And this I confess is among my chief reasons for according to the Cabala a much greater degree of antiquity than is commonly done. For I cannot reconcile it with common sense that the Jews, who are admitted to be the inventors of this doctrine, should have made a doctrine in every respect shadowing out the mysteries of Christianity, and those very mysteries which, after the first conversion, which after the Apostolic times, they made the stumbling block and the cause of the obstinate refusal

* Later? Possibly the shorthand sign was the same for both words.

† The reporter wrote "Zephyrs".

‡ ten?

to receive our Lord. It seems to me therefore that the Cabala must have a traditioning* philosophy among them, the likeness of which to Christianity will not be wonderful to any man who has studied the fragments of Heraclitus, or believes these were derived from the mysteries, that they were founded by the fanatics, and that they produced it as corrupt productions from the patriarchal . . . religion. But the Cabala likewise possessed certain combinations of sounds, figures, and numbers, by which external nature was to be controlled and governed; and this, too, Reuchlin seriously contended for and practised; or at least sought for, as far as he could, the means of practising.

Next to Reuchlin comes Henry Cornelius Agrippa,⁽²²⁾ not to be compared in interest with him; but his whole life is so characteristic of the philosophy and temper of his age, as well as so interesting from his [addiction to magic, that]† he cannot be passed <over> without some notice. Although almost a century and a half had passed since the first great revival of letters, yet still the number of writers, especially in the north of Europe, was exceedingly small. In truth every country had its own dark age, and the dark age was far lighter than that of later times, even as England had its dark age when Italy was enjoying a full light. It had awakened too suddenly—had knowledge too wide for its natural effects; in short you must draw a picture full of incongruities to represent fairly the state of things in Europe about the time of the Reformation. You must take genius in all its splendor, in individuals, magnificent structures by bodies, and a spirit of zeal and art throughout society (of which we have since had but feeble or at least but morbid imitations); but we must combine with it barbarism in all the detail of social life, and so gross and ignorant in the lower order as to infect the higher, by rendering the lower order susceptible of so many delusions that evidence forced men into the belief of the impossible, whilst it was not considered of how little weight evidence ought to be, except from him who is capable of examining and recording the circumstances under which the events have taken place. I know no other way to account for the serious, solemn, and minutely established details of extraordinary facts which you find, not in the works of weak men or fanatics, but in the writings of the

* tradition in?

† Adapted from MS. Egerton 3057.

greatest scholars of the then age. It seemed to be, and any man who has looked into . . . * law or those who have a character to maintain—it seems as if it were a peculiar species of madness, as if the intense desire of power, seizing hold of the mind and becoming a habit in it, had given such an unnatural vividness to certain notions as to impress a belief that they had occurred as events. Some of those, however, appear to have been what is its natural connexion, mere imposture; and this calls me to the character of one of the most extraordinary men that ever lived, Henry Cornelius Agrippa.

He was born at COLOGNE IN 1487, OF AN ANCIENT AND NOBLE FAMILY. At Cologne he was educated. He blended the study of the Romish Law with religion† and in his first works, before he was fourteen,‡ he discovered his attachment to magic and the occult sciences. Soon after he removed to PARIS and there he formed a secret society, and I believe it is the first that is to be found of the many, many of them the laugh of young men who wished to act the Roman, but some which had more serious objects, as those of the Bavarian Illuminati. But it is of still more interest in a moral point of view, for Agrippa believed earnestly in the possibility of magical arts. He had persuaded himself he had produced some extraordinary effects. He sought to spread this faith with others. He erected a secret society. And one of the first articles of it was that they were to pretend to do these things, to do it by conspiracy, and above all things to bring great men under the belief that they would arrive at some extraordinary power, but that they must pass through all the mysteries. . . . This, by the letters§ found after his death, was the plan he laid down while he was a firm believer that he should actually arrive at those powers which were to reward the labors of the first greater degree. This is a lesson full of instruction indeed, to shew that when the mind yearns after power by any other mode than that appointed by our Maker, it begins from secret deception to pass into direct and intentional imposture, till the greatest and the wholesomest powers of the mind are sacrificed to the low

* I suggest very tentatively: the works of Behmen translated by William Law, or *<into any of>* those of any men who have a character . . .

† NB. 25 reads: medicine.

‡ NB. 25 reads: seventeen.

§ NB. 25 adds: to & from an Italian member, Landolfo.

ambition and the vile tricks of a mere conjurer. Now such was the case with Henry Cornelius Agrippa.

It is not easy to conceive what that man might not have promised himself, would he have preferred common sense to cunning, would he have taken the shorter way of becoming respectable instead of playing the knave and running round that long and weary way of playing the fool. He possessed genius as a poet. He had uncommon acuteness as a philosopher. His remarks, wherever they occur upon the powers of the human mind, are wonderfully applied, and are more marked even, by good sense, than those of his contemporaries. Not only this, but as a man in active life he was an excellent and commanding statesman, an admirable officer; in the different services in which he fought he distinguished himself greatly. He was created a knight on the field, and had all that could have raised him to all the honorable objects of human ambition. But what was that compared with the ambition of frightening emperors and making them believe that you could command all the inanimate objects around them? Agrippa had fully persuaded himself that he should be able to bring over the Emperor himself, and at the same time the King of France, whom he calls "Magnus Jovis, the great Jupiter", to become members of his secret societies, and submit to be placed in a lower class. In consequence of this the king wished to have proof.

One of the secret society by the name of [*Juanetin de Gerona*]* had been entrusted with a fortress in the Pyrenees. He behaved so cruelly to the boors about it that they had risen and taken the fortress. It was by nature inaccessible and the king proposed to Agrippa that he should win that fortress, convinced he could not do it, as it was abundantly supplied and the neighbours were friendly to the cause. Agrippa was unwilling; he was about to run away. But at length, ambition, and that confused state of mind in which *<in>* extreme anxiety a man will think and wish on a thing, till at length he conjures up a belief that he can attain it, in such a state, Agrippa undertook the enterprize, and strange to say, he succeeded. In what way he succeeded no man knows, and it was his interest at the time to keep it concealed. He did, however, take possession of this fortress and, in the belief of the boors, by secret arts. They described themselves as being entirely

* From Morley, Henry. *Henry Cornelius Agrippa*, 2 vols. London, 1856.

overpowered by magic, and by this diabolical wizard, by collusion with evil spirits. The poor boors were delivered up to massacre. Agrippa's shocked and heart-sick conscience began to torment him, and in the meantime news came that the party who were coming to relieve him had been seized by the boors, his friend put to death, and in short that it was impossible he could remain where he was for three days. He employed a neighbouring abbott to make peace with the boors. They refused, unless the conjurer was given up to them. Still, he discovered there was one passage to the abbey, but there was a lake to pass over which it was impossible to pass but by means of the abbott sending a boat or skiff there (and here we know the magic, for Agrippa informs a friend of it in a letter). He took a peasant boy and by means of various herbs produced sores like the leprosy; he made him a cripple and sent him back again [*to the abbey for help*].* The abbott assisted Agrippa with a boat, and he escaped,† but nothing would persuade him to go back to the King of France.⁽²³⁾ He was afraid that the king, as his success was still ambiguous, would set him on some other expedition; and accordingly he went into Spain and Italy, everywhere extending this secret society. At length he came to England where he was for a time eminently successful, and as he was connecting what was good with evil, studied under Colet, the founder of St. Paul's School. And he declares he learned more under him of true, sober, theological knowledge than he knew before. And yet during this time he was actively employed IN FORMING AUXILIARY SOCIETIES. ON HIS RETURN TO GERMANY [he wrote] HIS 3 BOOKS OF MAGIC [*but*] his greater business was his founding this secret society and connecting it with his brothers throughout Europe. It would be endless to follow this man through all his adventures, his poverty, his dogs and cats that were his familiars, but which he treats as the wretched means by which he was obliged to get his bread at times, till at length he wrote his recantation. And he declares that he had found magic in the ordinary sense of the word to be but delusion, that though he had made a great deal of money by

* Morley *op. cit.*

† NB. 25: His escape—meeting with an old Wanderer Authonius Xanthus, whom he takes into the secret order to—then to Valencia, thence back to France. Having no money sets up a Goldmaker's Sellar—Strange fatality in certain minds to prefer cunning to wisdom, with men of the rarest Talents.

gold-making, at one time he began to despair of any gold ever being made but by cheating, by the pretense of it. Still he contends there is a natural magic⁽²⁴⁾ and this natural magic (he does not merely *say* it would be called natural magic if a peasant puts his hand upon an air pump) . . . no, he seems to have entertained a notion as if from the earliest times experimental sciences were divided into two parts, the one common and communicable to the whole, the other esoteric, as it were, or [*theurgic, reserved*] to the prepared student. The former was mechanics . . . as what we commonly call mechanics—though he says mechanics itself must necessarily suppose something as the ground, as the universal agent which is not mechanical. But, he contends, besides this, there is an art by which power is communicated immediately, and from the references people make to . . . and others it seems probable he would consider electricity as one of those magical arts. And the arguments he adduced for supposing this are very strong to us now—for if you remember, the circumstance of Doctor Franklin calling down the lightning from heaven and afterwards a Russian attempting it and being struck dead—? It is remarkable that the two priests . . . who had taught . . . that light . . . as to . . . to intreat down the lightning when it is mentioned, as Pliny has said, by historians of gravest name, that there were particular spots with [groves and altars]* and so on, on which, at times, with many religious ceremonies and rites, the lightning had been brought down. And this not only in Rome but in Tuscany. And he assigns a reason for it, that [Porsina] their king, was a priest, and that [Numa] was likewise sacerdotally educated. And when we find [Tullus Hostilius] imitating, we are told, the ceremonies of [Numa] but mistaking them, <he> imitated the god and though he brought down the lightning was struck dead with it. The circumstance is a most particular coincidence, but still more (though not with regard to electricity) appear the other facts referred to and of which the Greek writers are full. I allude to the sleeps in the temple of [*Aesculapius*][†] and [*Serapis*][‡] and other deities, but more especially those of Egyptian

* This and the four following emendations are based on Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II. 53.

† ‡ These gaps might be filled from any number of references in the books Coleridge read, but it is perhaps of interest to note that these names are coupled in the first section of Kluge, C.A., *Magnetismus*, Berlin, 1815, a book Coleridge liberally annotated. See the reference to mesmerism below.

and Phœnician origin. We find in the Greek historians of the empire that it was habitual where persons could afford it to travel to those temples, where they prevailed on the priests to throw them into a charmed sleep, where they prescribed medicines for themselves, and the god appeared to them. And it was so common that I think, in our present records, at least five of the emperors are mentioned as having gone into the East to be thrown into these magic sleeps, and to utter oracles in the temple of [*Aesculapius*]. It is impossible to read this with the minute accounts to be collected, some from one and some from another, (*without asking*) whether true or not; whether there is any physical agent that still remains, as galvanism did till a century ago, yet undiscovered, makes no difference at all in the argument. But I think it is possible, and most probable, most highly probable, [that mesmerism]* was known to the priests in Egypt—that it was conveyed by tradition to the latest period of the Greek Empire. We find it manifestly spoken of in [Ireland],† and in Piedmont it is mentioned, and it may be traced, if I mistake not, from the very earliest of times to the present day. And this I mention as one of the characteristics of that age, and as one of the modes by which philosophy, through magic, gradually passed into experimental science⁽²⁶⁾ and gave way finally itself to materialism. But a glorious period, which has left seeds that cannot perish, took place under the first operation of these chaotic causes. The trumpet in the revolution was blown and prepared by whatever was great and excellent; and with it no doubt, even the vices and the follies of mankind were forced into the same services.

Perhaps the man to whom the revolution owes the most may be said to be [*Martin Luther*]⁽²⁶⁾ if we speak of an immediate agent, or Erasmus if we speak of one who might be called its pioneer. I have long ago given a comparison of Erasmus with a great man of the last generation.⁽²⁷⁾ “If we listen,” I observe, “to a symphony of Cimarosa, the present strain still seems not only to recal, but almost to *renew*, some past movement, and present‡ the same! Each present movement bringing back, as it were, and

* Derwent Coleridge.

† Marcus & Schelling, *Jahrbücher der Medizin als Wissenschaft*, 1807. Bd. II, Heft. I. 22. Coleridge read and annotated it.

‡ yet? *The Friend*, I. 216: “some past movement, another and yet the same.” Coleridge’s punctuation, except for capitals, is reproduced in this passage.

embodying the spirit of some melody that had gone before, anticipates and seems sometimes trying to overtake something that is to come: and the musician has reached the summit of his art, when having thus modified the present with the past, he at the same time weds the past *in* the present to some prepared and corresponsive future. The auditor's thoughts and feelings move under the same influence: retrospection blends with anticipation, and hope and memory (a female Janus) becomes one power with a double aspect. A similar effect the reader may produce for himself in the pages of history, if he will be content to substitute an intellectual complacency for pleasurable sensation. The events and characters of one age, like the strains in music, recal those of another, and the variety by which each is individualized, not only gives a charm and poignancy to the resemblance, but likewise renders the whole more intelligible."

"It* is not from identity of opinions, or from similarity of events and outward actions, that a real resemblance in the radical character can be deduced. On the contrary, men of great and stirring powers, who are destined to mould the age in which they are born, must first mould themselves upon it.⁽²⁸⁾ Mahomet, born twelve centuries later, and in the heart of Europe, would not have been a false prophet; nor would a false prophet of the present generation have been a Mahomet in the sixth century. I have myself, therefore, derived the deepest interest from a comparison of men, whose characters at the first view appear widely dissimilar, who yet have produced similar effects on their different ages, and this by the exertion of powers which on examination will be found far more alike, than the altered drapery and costume would have led us to suspect. Of the heirs of fame few are more respected by me, though for very different qualities, than Erasmus and Luther: scarcely anyone has a larger share of my aversion than Voltaire; and even of the better-hearted Rousseau I was never more than a very lukewarm admirer. I should perhaps too rudely affront the general opinion, if I avowed my whole creed concerning the proportions of real talent between the two [purifiers]† of revealed religion, now neglected as obsolete, and the two modern conspirators against its authority, who are still the Alpha and Omega of continental genius."

* Quotation from the *Friend* continues, one sentence having been omitted.

† The *Friend*, I. 218.

Yet I can never hear these two names mentioned without recalling those of our great Reformers.

*“Those who are familiar with the works of Erasmus⁽²⁹⁾ and who know the influence of his wit, as the pioneer of the Reformation; and who likewise know, that by his wit, aided by† the vast variety of knowledge communicated in his works, he had won over by anticipation so large a part of the polite and lettered world to the Protestant party; will be at no loss in discovering the intended counterpart in the life and writings of the veteran Frenchman. They will see, indeed, that the knowledge of Erasmus was solid through its whole extent, and that of Voltaire extensive at a cheap rate, by its superficiality: that the wit of the one is always bottomed on sound sense, peoples and enriches the mind of the reader with an endless variety of distinct images and living interests; and that his broadest laughter is very well‡ translatable into grave and weighty truth: while the wit of the Frenchman, without imagery, without character, and without that pathos which gives the magic charm to genuine humour, consists, when it is most perfect, in happy turns of phrase, but far too often in fantastic incidents, outrages of the pure imagination, and the poor low trick of combining the ridiculous with the venerable, where he, who does not laugh, abhors. Neither will they have forgotten, that the object of Erasmus was to drive the thieves and mummers out of the temple, while the other was propelling a worse banditti, first to profane and pillage, and ultimately to raze it. Yet not the less will they perceive, that the *effects* remain parallel, the *circumstances* analagous, and the *instruments* the same. In each case the *effects* extended over Europe, were attested and augmented by the praise and patronage of thrones and dignities, and are not to be explained but by extraordinary industry and a life of literature; in both instances the *circumstances* were supplied by an age of hopes and promises—the age of Erasmus restless from the first vernal influences of real knowledge, that of Voltaire from the hectic of imagined superiority. In the voluminous works of both, the *instruments* employed are chiefly those of wit and amusive erudition, and alike in both the errors and evils (real or imputed) in religion and politics are the objects of the battery. But here we

* Quotation from the *Friend* continues, *ibid.* I. 219.

† “added to”, *ibid.* I. 219.

‡ “every where”, *ibid.* I. 219.

must stop. The two *men* were *essentially* different. Exchange mutually their dates and spheres of action, yet Voltaire, had he been a ten-fold Voltaire, could not have made up an Erasmus; and Erasmus must have emptied himself of half his greatness and all his goodness, to have become a Voltaire."

Here at least there is some likeness apparent, but I might well be asked what likeness I could find between the gigantic Luther and the sickly dreamer of love dreams, <between the heroic acts of a Luther>* and the [speculative cobweb]* dreams of the misanthrope Rousseau. If I were to take them without reference to the time in which they lived I should make such a comparison as the honest Welshman does in *Henry V*, when he compares his monarch to Alexander the Great.⁽³⁰⁾ But there are many points very strikingly alike. Erasmus had prepared the way for Luther by wit, by polite letters, by gentle raillery; and Voltaire had won over to the evil cause of infidelity all that could be won by frivolity and superficial knowledge. But still, nothing great, either for good or for evil, or for evil or for good, can ever be done without earnestness. A man must employ the whole of his being to do aught effectually.

Now this did Rousseau.⁽³¹⁾ He came forward with a fulness of heart; apparently he possessed naturally great sensibilities. He applied these to the sufferings of his fellow creatures. He was unwilling to find the causes where alone they could be found, (in the corruptions of our nature in the first instance) and looked for it, therefore, wholly in artificial institutions; and he died, luckily for himself, before he had seen a tenth part of the miserable effects of his doctrines. Luther, with a far stronger mind but with great sensibility and with a very hypochondriacal temperament, felt the same ardour against oppression as Rousseau had done. Indeed nothing can be conceived more violent or more disrespectful than Luther's first writings⁽³²⁾ just before the Peasants' War had commenced. Likewise he felt no less superstition against superstitions. And the difference between the two men, besides that of great genius and a heroic mind, consisted in this, that Luther, with all his enthusiasm and with all his natural heat of temper, had still a something that balanced, a something that kept him, even his full belief in the inspiration of the sacred writings—a belief in which he sympathized with all his fellow

* Adapted from the *Friend*, I. 221, and MS. Egerton 3057.

creatures upon whom he was to act. It had first an effect in humiliating the mind, and secondly a great effect in rendering it kindly.

But Luther was still the man of his age or he could not have removed the mountains which he had to remove. He had to overthrow the scholastic philosophy and to substitute for it the word of God. He therefore was not, and could not be, carrying on a process of fine reasoning. Bold eloquence—that which rather knocks down an objection than stands to question, it was the very means by which he was to act. In short, as I have somewhere⁽³³⁾ observed, Luther was one of the greatest poets that ever lived, but he was so possessed by his own genius that he acted poems not wrote them. His whole life in truth was one grand poem. Think you that a man could have gone through what he did, have stood alone before assembled Diets, dared sovereigns, continued with his pen scourging a Pope here, and a monarch there, and treating both of them as his inferiors, when at the same time he was uttering a language to the very lowest of the low which, as he says himself, that every man that looked at the move of his mouth said, “This man is speaking language to me and I know its truth”. Think you that a man could have done this with the cool rational language of what is now called philosophy, or philosophic . . . ? No—Luther’s mistakes might have been superfluous but the spirit which made them inevitable was not superfluous. He believed himself most fully to be at the head of an army of the faithful whom he was to provide with weapons—with sword and shield and spear out of the spiritual armory of the Bible.⁽³⁴⁾ And he not only believed that the powers of the world were armed against him but that the powers of the air were leagued against him. And as it was, he felt, as completely as if he had been, in a field of battle while wielding his pen; and no warrior ever wielded a sword with greater courage than Luther wrote those writings which fell like rockets and set all on fire and . . . who alone can command the elements. If in some such times as these we suppose him, as I have somewhere painted him, in such a mode of mind, “Methinks* I see him sitting, the heroic student, in his chamber in the Warteburg, with his midnight lamp before him, seen by the traveller in the distant plain of Bischofsroda, as a star on the mountain! Below it lies the Hebrew Bible open, on which he gazes, his brow pressing on his palm,

* *Friend*, I. 238.

brooding over some obscure text, which he desires to make plain to the simple boor and to the humble artizan, and to transfer its whole force into their own natural and living tongue. [And he himself does not understand it! Thick darkness lies on the original text:]* he counts the letters, he culls up the roots of each separate word, and questions them as the familiar spirits of an oracle. In vain! thick darkness continues to cover it! [not a ray of meaning dawns through it. With sullen and angry hope he reaches for the Vulgate, his old and sworn enemy, the treacherous confederate of the Roman Anti-Christ.]† This must be some temptation! Disappointed, disheartened, enraged, ceasing to *think*, yet continuing his brain [on the stretch in solicitation of a thought; and gradually giving himself up to angry fancies, to recollections of past persecutions, to uneasy fears and inward defiances and floating Images of the evil Being, their supposed personal author; he sinks, without perceiving it, into a trance of slumber: during which his brain retains its waking energies, excepting that what would have been mere *thoughts* before, now (the action and counter weight of his senses and of their impressions being withdrawn) shape and condense themselves into *things*, into Realities!‡ In this state what if, for instance, he should have imagined an evil spirit? What if he should actually have hurled the inkstand which he employed in a better way at his Satanic Majesty? And *<what>* if he had left the black stone in the wall which they shew to all travellers? It only proves that Luther lived in an age in which almost every part of philosophy had been cultivated but that which should have been its pioneer. That by which alone it can be effectually prevented from leading, first, into the visionary and the enthusiastic and, then, into the directly superstitious and magical, till finally it ends in imposture and conjuration—I mean the analysis of the mind itself as acted upon by the senses, and as again reacting upon them, or what is appropriately called [*epistemology—epistemology*]§ was, during the whole of the middle ages—wholly I might say, I scarcely recollect an exception—neglected. The consequence of this

* *Ibid.* I. 238.

† *Ibid.* I. 238. It is impossible to determine the exact limits of the quotation used in the lecture. Coleridge has changed and shortened the account of Luther for lecture purposes.

‡ *Ibid.* I. 240.

§ Experimental psychology?

was that the greatest men, and the greatest merits, were no securities in that age against weaknesses that would now disgrace the ignorant themselves; and it is by appealing to such weaknesses that we are taught to take away our veneration from men but for whom we should have been utterly unable even to have known that those were weaknesses. But on the other hand as [*an epistemology*] is a necessary preparation for philosophy, and as without it we have yet to arrive at the very portal and can never be secure whether we have not mistaken a post for the real abode, that still is not philosophy; nor yet is it a substitute for the same. And it is in this as throughout the whole history of man. He goes to two extremes before he can determine the [*media res*].* [*Methodology*] in the next place, which begins with the time of Bacon, dawned on man. By Descartes⁽³⁵⁾ it was carried to a great state of perfection as now it appeared to afford such a world of information. It appeared to bring us into such a world of intimacy with our nature that men considered all was known, with a few words of connexion everything was discovered, everything was solved. Philosophy, the whole wonderful world of man, was to be learnt in half an hour, and there was the [*whole macrocosm*] in a nutshell. The consequence was a growing contempt of philosophy itself, and finally for half a century . . . as Hobbes and others were avowed materialists; and the other party took the predominant parts of materialism and tied them to the opposite philosophy, and this passed very well. "He is a sensible man I say, . . . he tells you there are no truths"; but, with the pious man, . . . "he has all the scriptures rightly." But whether if one is true the other is false, requires an effort of thinking which has hitherto become more and more unfashionable.

Now in my next lecture it will be my endeavour to shew the good and the evil of that state which was necessarily to introduce experimental philosophy; which is introduced, which has answered its end, and as I have shewn throughout these lectures, having done so, begins to tell us, in an intelligible language, the evil it is now doing, even by a reaction on the good effects which it produced in its former agency. This will form the subject of my next lecture which will take in the philosophy of Lord Bacon, as misunderstood and continued to the time of the Revolution, taking in the counteractions by the . . . as the counter acts.

* The reporter wrote "medium" and left a gap.

LECTURE XI

MARCH 8, 1819⁽¹⁾

MR. COLERIDGE'S LECTURE for THIS EVENING, the Progress of Opinion from Edward VI to the Republic, or the Golden Age of English intellect with especial reference to the Character and Philosophy of Lord Bacon. Eight o'clock, Crown and Anchor, Strand. Admission 5s.*

At once the most complex and the most individual of creatures, man, taken in the ideal of his humanity, has been not inaptly called the microcosm of the world in compendium, as the point to which all the lines converge from the circumference of nature. This applies to his sum of being, to his powers collectively. But we find him gifted, as it were, with a threefold mind: the one belonging to him specifically, arising I mean, necessarily, out of the peculiar mechanism of his nature and by WHICH he beholds all things perspectively from his relative position as man; the second, in which these views are again modified—too often disturbed and falsified—by his particular constitution and position, as this or that particular individual; and the third, which exists in all men *potentially* and in its germ, though it requires both effort from within and auspicious circumstances from without to evolve it into effect—by this third and higher power he places himself on the same point as Nature, and contemplates all objects, himself included, in their permanent and universal being and relations. Thus the astronomer places himself in the centre of

* *The Times*, March 8, 1819. A similar notice appeared in the *Morning Chronicle* with the addition, after "the Progress of Opinion" of the words, "and the Revolutions of Philosophy". The announcement in the *New Times* shows a more interesting difference. After "Lord Bacon" it goes on, "and the influence of the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy". The explanation is too long for a footnote. See note 2.

the system and looks at all the planetary orbs as with the eye of the sun. Happy would it be for us if we could at all times imitate him in his perceptions—in ~~the~~ intellectual or the political world—I mean, to subordinate instead of exclude. Nature excludes nothing.⁽³⁾ She takes up all, still subjecting the highest to the less so and ultimately subjecting all to the lower thus taken up. But alas! The contrary method, exclusion instead of subordination, this and its results, presents the historian with his principal materials in whatever department his researches are directed. Thus in our own past route, we find a long period from the first Christian century to the sixth, distinguished by a vain attempt to substitute philosophy for religion, and following it a more injurious endeavour to make religion supercede philosophy. As this is an error which is in truth never out of date, because religion is the interest of all men, and among those who are incapable of the higher paths of intellect there are too many too proud to feel their *<in>*capability here, I may be allowed to dwell awhile on this.

What had been recorded by some individual celebrated for purity and Christian virtues as useful discipline for himself, as a part of ascetic piety, was soon recommended as laws for all men, and by degrees enforced as such; and when it happened to meet with a congenial disposition and with warm sensibility it produced all the extravagancies which had deterred the sober from, and invited the visionary to, superstitions in various forms in all ages of the world. I was struck, in looking over some memorandum books, with the character of ST. TERESA* who may be fairly taken as the representative of that class of beings who would have religion without any mixture of intellect.⁽⁴⁾ I was led to Teresa [*of Avila*] by a letter of hers in which she gives serious advice to her friend Lorenzo to keep holy water BY HIM, TO SPRINKLE ABOUT WHEN HE FELT ANY INWARD CONFUSION, SUDDEN ARIDITY,⁽⁵⁾ or any under-whispers of temptation, all which she assures him proceed from the pressure of some evil spirit felt by the soul, though not evidenced by the senses. This led me to reflect on the importance of any act in† strengthening and enlivening the will,⁽⁶⁾

* NB. 18. While lecturing, Coleridge read from the *Works* of Teresa and his notes thereto. Probably he therefore spoke too quickly for the reporter; hence the unusual number of gaps. These are filled in, unless otherwise stated, from NB. 18. See note 4.

† NB. 18 adds at this point: restoring the mind from its wanderings, the servitude of mere association, by

and I could not but think, what if a mind like hers had attached anything like a religious meaning to the Aeolian harp, as she did to the crucifix and the holy water? What endless religious applications and accommodations all its irregular tones would produce!

Her character will give the character of the whole class of those who from real piety opposed the revolution. She was indeed framed by nature, and favored by a very hot bed in a hot-house of circumstances, to become a mystic saint of the first magnitude, a mighty mother OF SPIRITUAL TRANSPORTS, THE MATERIA PRESTABILITA OF DIVINE FUSIONS, INFUSIONS AND EMFUSIONS. First she was a woman. Secondly, a lady tenderly and affectionately reared—no dull, no sobering or deadening reality of physical privation or pain, to draw off her self-consciousness of her inward goings-on, OF HER THOUGHTS AND SENSATIONS. THIRD, UNDER A VERY FOND FATHER AND MOTHER, BOTH OF THEM STRICTLY PIOUS, AND THE MOTHER ROMANTIC TO BOOT. FOURTH, SHE HAD EARLY SYMPATHY from her brothers and sisters and made a convert at eight years old of her favorite brother. Next, she was a *Spanish* lady—reflect on the full import of that word—THE RELIGION, THE GOVERNMENT, THE MANNERS, THE CLIMATE, THE CONSTITUTION, THE BOOKS IMPLIED IN IT. Again, accustomed to read the lives of saints and martyrs who had fought against or suffered under the Moors, at eight years old she and her brother were engaged to run away and go to Africa, and obtain the crown of martyrdom, a subject which has occasioned [*a poem by the poet, Crashaw, "The Flaming Heart"*].* She regarded the martyrs with more envy than admiration—they were so very lucky in getting an eternal Heaven at so easy a price. In the habit, and that, too, without the will or knowledge of a superstitious FATHER†, of reading volumes of romance and chivalry to her mother (before the appearance of Don Quixote) and then all night long to herself she had added all fancy could do. By the CORRUPTION OF A LIGHT-MINDED BUT [*favourite cousin*]‡ AND her FEMALE servants—it seems she opened her fearful heart to a Spanish lover, doubtless in the true OROON-DATES⁽⁷⁾ style; and the giving audience TO SOME DYING SWAIN THRO' THE BARRED WINDOWS, OR HAVING RECEIVED A LOVER'S MESSAGES of flames, and flaming conceits, and anguishing despair

* See note 9.

† The reporter wrote "fear".

‡ Suggested by *The Eagle and the Dove*. See note 4.

—these seem to have been the *mortal* sins of which she bitterly accuses herself, together with perhaps a few warm fancies of earthly love; but above all, what she considers her greatest crime, her aversion at fifteen years old to shut HERSELF UP FOREVER IN A NUNNERY, TO WHICH HER FATHER LIKEWISE WAS OBSTINATELY AVERSE. HE HAD DOUBTLESS SENSE ENOUGH, WITH ALL HIS SUPERSTITION, to perceive how utterly unfit such a nursery OF INWARD FANCIES AND OUTWARD PRIVATIONS [was] TO A BRAIN, HEART, AND BODILY CONSTITUTION, LIKE THAT OF INNOCENT, LOVING AND HIGH-impassioned Teresa. What could come of it BUT A DESPAIRING ANGUISH-STRICKEN SINNER, OR A MAD SAINT? Then this frame of such exquisite SENSIBILITY, BY NATURE AND BY EDUCATION, SHAKEN AND RUINED by the violence done to nature by her obstinate resolve to become a nun against her own wishes, and against her fears,* arose <from bed> out of a resolve of duty, finishing in a burning fever WHICH ENDED IN MADNESS FOR MANY MONTHS, OR A STATE VERY LIKE IT, AND WHICH LEFT HER BRAIN UNSETTLED, AS IS EVIDENT from the frequent paroxysms OF FAINTING FITS TO WHICH SHE WAS EVER AFTER SUBJECT. PREVIOUSLY TO THIS she had been reading to her over-religious uncle, books of the most gloomy kind,⁽⁸⁾ of death, hell, and judgment, which made a fearful IMPRESSION ON HER TENDER MIND, BECAUSE, OUT OF HER EXCEEDING DESIRE to give pleasure, she had *affected* to take a delight in reading them to him, and thus combined an act of the will with the emotions otherwise proceeding. SHE AT LENGTH RESOLVED ON NUNHOOD, SHE SAYS, BECAUSE SHE THOUGHT IT COULD NOT BE WORSE THAN THE PAINS OF PURGATORY, and not so long, and that A PURGATORY FOR THIS LIFE WAS A CHEAP EXPIATION IN EXCHANGE FOR HELL FOREVER!! Combine these causes only and you will see how almost impossible it was that a woman so innocent and so susceptible, of an imagination so lively by nature, and so fever-kindled by disease and its occasions, (AND THIS SO WELL FURNISHED WITH THE REQUISITE IMAGES AND PRE-CONCEPTIONS), SHOULD NOT MISTAKE, AND OFTEN, THE LESS PAINFUL AND IN SUCH A FORM THE SOMETIMES pleasurable approaches to bodily DELIQUIM, AND HER IMPERFECT FAINTING-FITS, FOR DIVINE TRANSPORTS AND MOMENTARY UNION WITH GOD. ESPECIALLY IF, WITH A THOUGHTFUL YET PURE PSYCHOLOGY, YOU JOIN THE FORCE OF SUPPRESSED INSTINCTS STIRRING IN THE

* NB. 18: father's will.

HEART AND BODILY FRAME, OF A MIND UNCONSCIOUS OF THEIR NATURE, AND THESE IN THE KEENLY SENSITIVE BODY, IN THE INNOCENT AND LOVING SOUL OF TERESA, WITH "ALL HER THIRSTS, AND LIVES, AND DEATHS OF LOVE",⁽⁹⁾ AND WHAT REMAINS UNSOLVED, FOR WHICH THE CREDULITY OF THE MANY AND THE KNAVERY OF A FEW WILL NOT FURNISH ample explanation?

But what required the concurrence of many causes to produce in one, by infection will spread over many, till at last mankind become almost divided into knaves, dupes, and visionaries; and such must be the necessary effect of an attempt to disunite religion, the highest object of our nature, from the reason which is its highest faculty. But even in this attempt, which was too successful—if only instead of religion we put superstition—it had, in truth, borrowed from a former attempt, namely that of substituting philosophy for religion. It had borrowed ITS theurgic RITES in one of their great purposes, that is, not to subdue nature and call forth spirits FROM THE VASTY DEEP*⁽¹⁰⁾ but to control evil demons that were supposed to be for ever hovering round the poor Christian AND LIKE SATAN AT THE EAR OF EVE INFUSING INORDINATE THOUGHTS AND SINFUL DESIRES.

Were it only therefore for their endeavours to reunite reason and religion by a due subordination of the former to the latter, we owe a tribute of respect to the Schoolmen from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. That one general ill-consequence of this was a direct application of the studies to the MERE forms of logical thinking, and because they were treated as more than forms, of thinking therefore sophistically, is most true, and AT THE REVIVAL OF ANCIENT AND CLASSICAL LITERATURE BECAME THE OBJECT OF UTTER DISTASTE & THE SUBJECT OF INCESSANT COMPLAINT to the great pioneers and chieftains of the Reformation. Yet is this to be carefully distinguished from the works themselves of the most eminent Schoolmen, as Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and Occam,† whom those who have never read their works are ever the most apt to accuse‡ and speak with contempt of. I indeed am persuaded that to the scholastic philosophy the Reformation is attributable, far more than to the revival of classical literature,

* NB. 25. Henceforward the emendations are from this notebook unless otherwise stated.

† Coleridge spells it Ockham in NB. 25.

‡ NB. 25: abuse. (—Baxter's—).

except as far, indeed, as it produced a general impulse and awakening over society—nay, even more to the scholastic philosophy than to the MORE genial school of Platonism in Italy.

In the life of Baxter written by himself, speaking of the great obligations he had to the Schoolmen, he particularly instances this, that ever afterwards they rendered all indistinctness of means intolerable to him.⁽¹¹⁾ It enforced on him, it introduced into his mind, the necessity of having every position as far back as either duty permitted or it was not demonstrably beyond further pursuit. But I think facts would bear me out in my assertion that the Platonism, perhaps I might call it the Plotinism rather, of the great Tuscan scholars, under the great [*Cosimo de Medici*] seems to have been unfavorable to the Reformation, strikingly so as compared with scholastic philosophy which was logical and analytic. THE MYSTICISM OF THE FORMER [was] FLEXIBLE TO ALL SUPERSTITIONS AND IF IT ENGENDERED ANY DISLIKE* to those of the Church† it was because there was not enough in it. They preferred paganism, and were more in danger of becoming polytheists than PROTESTANTS; and it is well known that the greater part of them confessed to their intimates an utter disbelief of Christianity and disavowed all attachment to it except as a substitute for the more malleable Jupiters and Junos who could mean anything the philosopher chose. Even to this day the far greater number of converts to the Romish Church, among the educated class, are drawn into it by the attractive PIETISM‡ in that church, by that VIE INTÉRIEURE—THAT SAN-THERESIANISM that attracted our CRASHAW§. And the revised PROGLO-PLOTINISM EVEN AT THIS VERY HOUR IS MULTIPLYING NOMINAL CATHOLICS AMONG THE YOUNG MEN THROUGHOUT GERMANY. Add too, with what favor, with what unmingled APPLAUSE the Cabalistic writings of REUCHLIN⁽¹²⁾ in defense of all that was visionary and magical were received by Popes, Cardinals, and Bishops; and that Luther and the first leaders of the Reformation in Germany opposed the Schoolmen as the great supports of the

* NB. 29 is the source of the emendations in this paragraph, a very corrupt one in which I have silently corrected a number of obvious errors.

† NB. 29 reads: Romanism.

‡ NB. 29. The report reads: poetism.

§ NB. 29. The report reads: Cassio.

Roman religion.* This seems to have been confined to that particular time and did not extend into England; on the contrary our great divines found in the writings of the Schoolmen the strongest testimonies in their favor.

There are three great instructive events in history, the reflection on which perhaps more than on any other part of human history will repay us by the lessons of wisdom and caution which they imply: I mean the Reformation, the Civil War, and the French Revolution. We are now come to that period of time in which we are to speak of the state in which the Reformation had left the minds of the educated class in Europe. As I have already spoken of two opposite extremes, so we may divide philosophy, before the time I am now speaking of, and the period since then, into two classes.

During the whole of the middle ages and almost down to the time of the Restoration of Charles the second we discover everywhere metaphysics, always acute and frequently profound, but throughout estranged from, not merely experimental physics generally, but from its most intimate connective, experimental psychology; while from the Restoration we have the opposite extreme, namely experimental physics and a truly enlightened though empirical [and mechanical]† psychology estranged from and in utter contempt of all metaphysics. From the former we are to deduce the explanation of a phenomenon which must strike every student of the reigns of Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth and Charles I, I mean the astonishing credulity displayed by men of learning, and in many respects, of profound research. I do not speak too strongly when I say it would be difficult to find any old woman who with a grave face would relate the stories to be found in Luther and the divines of the English Church (but especially among the Puritans) combined with so much political wisdom, so much ecclesiastical research, and so much genuine piety, that a man must be thoughtless indeed who could find a

* The notes in NB. 29 continue: There are few subjects so little understood as the relations of the Schools to the Reformation. I am much in the dark; but I seem to see so far that its evil influence consisted more in the trifling dry chop-straw questions into which the young Theological Students were compelled rather than in the false doctrines or reasonings of the great Schoolmen, Aquinas, &c., whose works were quoted and referred to no less by Protestant, especially English Prot[estant] Divines, as [*sic*] by the Pontificalists.

† *L.R.*, IV. 78, 92.

recurrence of such facts and not seek for their explanation. That explanation is undoubtedly to be found mainly in the cause I have now stated, namely the absence of all psychological knowledge, or that knowledge by which a man learns the reaction of his thoughts upon outward objects equally with the action of outward objects through his senses on his thoughts. A large number of the tales which Luther tells of himself, and which Baxter records both of himself and of others, will be explained at once as occurring in those imperfect states of sleep which are the true matrix—the true birthplace of all the ghosts and apparitions that history has recorded.

We find for instance that in the story told of Dion and the spirit, the fury that he beheld at the end of the room, or the appearance of the spirit of Caesar to Brutus,⁽¹³⁾ or that which [*Captain Lyon*]* has recorded of himself or which the great [*Lord Lyttleton*]* has related, all have happened under one set of circumstances; they were anxious, weary, in cold and bodily discomfort; the consequence of which is that the objects from without, weakened in their influences on the senses, and the sensations meantime, from within, being strongly excited, the thoughts convert themselves into images, the man believing himself to be awake precisely by the same law as our thoughts convert themselves into images the moment we fall asleep, and which *<are>* no less *<real than if they were actual>*. Dreams no longer strike us with their wonderful nature, from their frequency. From this one circumstance, that all the well recorded stories took place under the same circumstances, we could scarcely hesitate as to their solution. And when a story has once had any ground of this kind, and falls into a state of society where the love of the miraculous is uppermost—it will be indeed difficult, in a very short time—a month's time, and the travel of twenty miles, will convert it into a wonder which I will defy all the philosophers in the world to explain. We are lucky, therefore, when we get hold of a well attested fact, especially when we can discover it in a disguise when it has passed over many shapes and poured itself into the right one out of a multitude of mouths.

Fearful, however, was one of the results. It revived the notions of witchcraft combined with all the horrors which the purer† and more powerful religion could give to it. How it ought

* *T.T.*, May 1, 1823.

† The report reads "weaker". MS. Egerton 3057, "a purer and reforming religion."

to humble us when we reflect that it was not in the dark ages, that it was not in countries struggling only out of barbarism, but in the very morning, in the brightness of reviving letters, in the age of a Kepler and a Galileo, when every department of human intellect was felt and supported in its greatest splendour, it was then that the dreadful contagion of witchcraft and persecution of witches raged*, not in one country but passed like a postillion through all Europe, till it died in North America among the puritans of New England.⁽¹⁴⁾ No country seems free from its ravages. Some of our greatest divines were the warmest advocates of these persecutions, nay, boldly asserted that he who disbelieved in witchcraft could not believe in a God.⁽¹⁵⁾ In one city alone in Germany in five years, three thousand women and children, for there were many children among them, were put to death by public execution. And the noble Jesuit⁽¹⁶⁾ who first raised himself against it, or rather next to [*John Wierus*]⁽¹⁷⁾ did so, on being questioned by a prince how he came to have grey hairs, answered it was the witches that had turned him grey. A smile being provoked he answered with a sigh, "So many thousands have I attended to the stake after confession, with a certainty that every human being was perfectly innocent". I mention this as a proof that it is not by learning merely, no, nor even by knowledge of experimental physics, that the most disgraceful enthusiasm can at all times be prevented. The sole prevention, in reality, is the recurrence to our highest philosophy—know thyself: study thy own nature, but above all do no evil under the impression that you are serving God thereby.

More innocent at least, if equally wild, was one of the two divisions of philosophy, namely the mystical, which at the time I am now speaking of was so far useful that it was the antagonist

* NB. 25 is more specific: Innocent VIII, who first approved and then condemned Johannes Picus, Count Mirandula's 900 propositions, at once brought him in guilty and not guiltless, was the same Pope who did not indeed first set on foot, but who first made universal, spread and authorized the Witch-processes—all before him is so trifling as to be = 0. Yet this very Man who sincerely believed that Christendom was invaded, and above all that Germany was deluged by Wizards and Witches—and by his instruments, the Witch-inquisitions &c. renewed the sacrifices of Moloch or rather those of the Mexican Tescalipoca, and in number & cruelty reduced both to Flea bites by comparison—this very man was the Lover of Learning, the strenuous Patron of & munificent Rewarder of all the most celebrated Italian Literati, as Politian &c!!

to the excess of the former. It is very difficult to trace the origin of mysticism in Europe, for this reason (not that it is difficult to explain any visionary tendency of man, a progressive animal while he is in the lower states of the progress, but) from an uncommon uniformity in likeness of the opinions which were wide<ly>, apparently, even to craziness, entertain<ed>, from the THEURGY OF THE mysteries of SAMOTHRACE, founded shortly after Homer, by the Phoenicians in all probability, and which seem to have continued to the very remotest time of Platonism, and to have initiated almost all the remaining pagan world.⁽¹⁸⁾ There were certainly societies formed which under various names, some known, some unknown, carried down these principles in a degraded form, which, in the time when they were doing their destined work, had perhaps preserved Greece from falling into that barbarism which in all other countries has been the effect of [physiological]* polytheism. Look to the names of the Gods worshipped at [Alexandria] and you will well understand what they are if you will.

Conceive a system of pantheism which, describing air as a living power, gave a history of its manifestations. The three lower gods [were the *dii minores* or *Titans*; and the *dii majores*]† with <Jove at> their [head] were the first three. The <former were> theurgic gods, that is, those who were the workings of the deity in manifesting itself in the formation of the world; they were otherwise called the magic gods, and it is very curious that the name may be traced in almost all the superstitions of the world wherever the Phoenicians, or after them the Greeks, had pierced. Thus we have still the Ghebers or Fire-Worshippers in Persia, we have the [good companions]‡ or fairies of the [Gaelic mythology]. In the North of Germany, (and what is remarkable, Agricola in his

* "With these secret schools of physiological theology, the mythical poets were doubtless in connexion, and it was these schools which prevented polytheism from producing all its natural barbarizing effects." *On the Prometheus of Aeschylus*. L.R., II. 332-3.

† Something went badly wrong with the reporting of this paragraph, and the omissions are not always indicated; nor are they restricted to difficult words and names. Was it noisiness from latecomers? Or was Coleridge fumbling somewhat? The emendations, suggested very tentatively in this and the following paragraph, are based on *On the Prometheus of Aeschylus*, and on Lect. XI of the early 1818 series, on "Mythology, Imagination, Superstition". *Misc. Crit.*, 191-4.

‡ MS. Egerton 9057.

account of the mines states) there [*are said to be subterranean spirits or gnomes, referred to as 'cobalos'*],* as appearing in the same form in which the [*miners clothe themselves. They*] are found on metals in [*mines*], namely as [*'guteli'*],* signifying the deities that were bringing out disorder into order. To trace it somewhat further—another of their nature was the [*peri*][†] a name still found in the valleys of Persia, and from that the fairies of Europe. The third name of [*these familiars*] was *bonae societae*, the good members, which is still a name for the fairies in Scotland and in the north of England, but their doctrines bore still more resemblance. It is impossible to read Paracelsus and compare it with what remains in Psellus[‡],⁽²⁰⁾ and elsewhere, in§ the doctrines taught in the mysteries, without perceiving their identity. A system of pantheism it was, but not irreligious.

These powers had a certain dim personality attributed to them and if we could conceive them as [*Psellus*]^{||} did, capable of being combined with true religious faith, for [*Psellus*]^{||} tells us that the three first of their divinities answered to the [*obscure names of Axieros, Axiokersos, and Axiokersa, representing symbolically different modifications of animal desire or material action, such as hunger, thirst, and fire, the ever-seeking maternal goddess, the origin and interpretation of whose name in the Hebrew root signifies hunger and hence capacity*] or the dangers represented the[*reby*], or that which the yearning after being called forth; and then Pluto (*or darkness, or chaos, in the same sense, called forth light*). He then tells us that the next Trinity answers to the Jupiter, to the Apollo (but according to others the Bacchus) and to the Venus or universal love; but the most mysterious consequence of this cannot be explained but by supposing some connexion *<between>* the Phoenicians and the Jews. They introduce a wonderful character the [*Cadmilos or*

* Agricola, *De Animantibus subterraneis*. See note 19.

† The name and the theory are used by Scott in his *Essay on the Supernatural in Fictitious Composition* published in the *Foreign Quarterly Review* in 1827. See *Essays on Chivalry, Romance, and the Drama* by Sir Walter Scott, Bart., London, 1888, p.274. "The French *Fée*," he says, "more nearly resembles the *Peri* of Eastern or the *Fata* of Italian poetry." Coleridge's reporter lived too early to know the word from *Iolanthe* or *The Peers and the Peri*.

‡ The report reads "Paley", I suspect from a mistake by the reporter in transliterating his shorthand. The next paragraph confirms the correction.

§ of?

|| The report again reads: "Paley".

Mercury] who, we are told, is the first that calls out the lower Trinity, who is the *<mediator between the second and the>* first, says [*Psellus*], becomes the lower, and raises it into the light.* But this is the same with the second or with the higher or heavenly trinity. And as lights† were still celebrated, not as having appeared, but as again appearing, as the infant Bacchus, who was to perform for *man* what as the Mercury he had performed for *nature* before he came into light and consciousness, namely to bring back the human soul again, the rites of this infant Bacchus were celebrated as the redeemer to come. So that they divided their religion into seven deities. We have already *<referred to>* an eighth that was yet to appear. The three first were the theurgic deities, representing, in short, *<first>* the different processes of nature from a known real or merely potential state, from the chaos in which all countries had originated no thing, to *<second,>* the appearance of the deity in his full manifestation as conscious will, intellect, and action; and lastly, as a redemptive process by which the spirit of man was to be called up again into its higher and heavenly state.⁽²¹⁾

Such were the doctrines taught by [*Giordano Bruno*]⁽²²⁾ but blended with a multitude of the wildest chemical fancies, which however, as mysticism was not connected with [*alchemy*], was obliged to apply itself to external objects of nature; but it was applied in the same way, and where a modern chemist would talk of attractions and affinity and so forth [*Giordano Bruno*] talked of [*excitability*].‡ But it was in a belief that every being, however apparently inanimate, had a life if it could be called forth, and that all along that was called but the law of likeness. In short, the groundwork of their philosophy was that the law of likeness, arising from what is called the polar principle, (that is that in order to manifest itself every power must appear in two opposites, but these two opposites having a ground of identity were constantly striving to reunite, but not being permitted to pass back to their original state, which would amount to annihilation, they pressed forward and the two formed a third something) and in this manner they traced in their [*trichotomous*] philosophy all the facts in nature and oftentimes with most wonderful and happy effects.

* Eight? † Eight? Rites?

‡ Based on a passage in NB. 18.

Such was the character of [*Giordano Bruno*],⁽²³⁾ a man who possessed a genius perhaps fully equal to that of any philosopher of more known name. He was a tutor to our famous Sir Philip Sydney, and his friend Lord Bruce. He came over into England, and one of his exceedingly rare works which is called the [*Cena de le Ceneri, or Ember Week*], describes London as it then was in the time of our Elizabeth, and with all the feelings *<with>* which an Italian accustomed to the splendid feelings and lovely climate of Italy might be supposed to be impressed. This man, though a pantheist, was religious; he provoked the priests, he was seized at Rome, and in the year 1601 was burnt for an atheist. Before his death he wrote a Latin poem which I think in grandeur of moral has been rarely surpassed⁽²⁴⁾—he says*,

“To . . .
or let them desire to be carried beyond the flaming walls
of the world.

But we have been gifted with that genius that not
blind to the light of the sun, not deaf . . .
and to the influences of the Gods.

We care not what the opinion of fools is concerning . . .
diviners.

Neither genius nor reason will condemn me, nor the
cultivated mind of true learning but the supercilious-
ness. . . .

. . . that salute the writer of a book from the
threshold. . . .

Let the sun proceed. . . . Moreover the species or the
form of truth sought for, found, and manifested will
bear me up; and though no one understand me yet if with
nature I am wise, and under the Deity, that verily is more
than enough.”

* Coleridge probably read his translation (prose?) and the reporter caught only a few scattered phrases. In the absence of any complete version by Coleridge, I am privileged to present the following translation by the Canadian poet and student of Coleridge, Mr. George Whalley of Bishop's University, Quebec.

After Giordano Bruno

Let others lust to bind to naked shoulders
Daedalus' wings, to fly with the clouds' strength
And seek the buffeting impulse of the winds—
Hunger to be hurled, like Pegasus, beyond
The hollow confines of the flaming world.

For we have known the gift of Genius
And gaze undaunted on our shadowy fate
Lest, being blind to light of the sun, or deaf
To Nature's universal voices, we
Receive the gifts of God ungraciously.

We do not care at what low price fools rate us
Nor mind how mad we look in the eyes of the world.
We soar on stronger wings: we penetrate
Beyond the cloudy pathways of the winds
By power of vision—that is enough for us.

Following us the multitudes will rise,
Climbing the path that leads from each man's heart.
No auguries by fire or bird or cloud,
No necromancers' forecasts show the way,
But Genius bestowed out of the treasure of God.

Not the bright quality of polished wit,
Nor vivid mind nor reason can betray us;
But only the shifty trickster's arrogance,
A blind, unbalanced, groundless confidence
In self-created seed of miracles.

Away with grammar-masters' thick-lipped verses—
Elegant doggerel polished by rule of thumb.
Away with petty critics, petty pundits,
Who crowd the spacious margins with their notes
And greet the unseen reader with a gloss.

Wings are not for mortals. Let the sun
Go naked, unadorned by any cloud.
Vision of truth! quested, found, revealed,
Take me—though none may follow where I go.
If I am wise with Nature by God's bounty
That is enough indeed, more than enough.

In this mode the brave man passed to his death an atheist,
and it would be well if all the priests of Rome could have acquired

his genuine piety according to his own apprehensions. His philosophy he has himself stated in these terms: there is throughout all nature an aptitude implanted that all things may be *<related>* to each and to all, for everything that exists in some time strives to be always, everything that perceives anywhere strives to perceive everywhere, and to become that universally whatever it has as an individual; in short each part of nature contains in itself a germ of the omnipresence, inasmuch as it still strives to be the whole, and what it cannot possess at any one moment it attempts to possess by a perpetual succession of development. His notions are oftentimes highly graced. He considers himself as the reviver of the Pythagorean system of the universe, and consequently opposed himself to Aristotle. But he was the first, I think, of the moderns, who asserted the immensity or infinity of the universe, a praise that has been given falsely to Descartes. He warmly defended and supported the Copernican system, and many parts of his chemistry seem wonderful in his age as anticipations of modern discoveries. He refers everything to invisible fluids or light. Whatever is not light, he says, is a fluid, but this fluid is capable of existing in fixation; or as a fluid or *<in>* a higher form it is capable of combining with light and then constitutes fire. He affirms the existence of an absolute vacuum which is necessary to motion but of which God is the sole plenitude. And he especially explains gravity as being the necessary consequence of attraction and repulsion in a system which could exist only as far as there was a central body. The doctrine of astronomy which he teaches has been revived* even, I believe, of late years, namely that the sun owes its light and so forth, entirely to its mass, which again is reciprocally the cause and effect of its being the central body. And (which is strange, for situate in Italy he was not likely to observe the Aurora Borealis) he states that every planet produces from itself necessarily an accumulation of inflammable matter which, floating in the higher regions, will give at times a light of its own, and that the sun, from the immense mass which it possesses beyond that of all the other planets collectively, has its light by no novelty or difference of formation, but solely by the production which is common to all matters of the air. He distinguishes particularly the oxygen, and describes it with the greatest accuracy, and the substance which

* The report reads: reviled.

he more properly calls the air—the nitrogen. This he supposes thinning, or still disposing of more and more light, till at last in the higher regions it becomes light altogether; and to this light, in its different passages from a state of fixation upwards to its appearance as light properly, he gives many of the most striking attributes of our modern electricity. His poetry will place him high—for there are few [*such sublime enunciations of the dignity of the human soul as the De Immenso and the prose commentaries on it.*]*

Of a very different character from Bruno was a man whose very name would excite a smile in many, but I confess is far from doing it in me, for I have felt my own mind much indebted to him. And why indeed should I be ashamed of my own friend, Jacob Behmen?⁽²⁵⁾ Many indeed and gross were his delusions, and such as furnished frequent occasion for the triumph of the learned over the poor ignorant shoemaker who had dared think for himself! But while we remember that those delusions were such as might be anticipated from his utter want of all intellectual discipline, and from his ignorance of rational psychology, let it not be forgotten, as I have noticed more than once, that the latter defect he had in common with the most learned theologians of his age. Neither with books nor with book-learned men was he conversant. A meek and shy quietist, his intellectual powers were never stimulated into fervorous energy by crowds of proselytes or by the ambition of proselyting. He was an enthusiast in the strictest sense, as not merely distinguished but as contra-distinguished from a fanatic.

Whoever⁽²⁶⁾ is acquainted with the history of philosophy during the last two or three centuries, cannot but admit, that there appears to have existed a sort of secret and tacit compact among the learned, not to pass beyond a certain limit in speculative science. The privilege of free thought, so highly extolled, has at no time been held valid in actual practice, except within this limit; and not a single stride beyond it has ever been ventured without bringing obloquy on the transgressor. The few men of genius among the learned class who actually did overstep this boundary, as Bacon and others, anxiously avoided the appearance of having so done. Therefore the true depth of science, and the penetration to the inmost centre from which all the lines of know-

* Based on a phrase in a long note on Bruno in NB. 21, reproduced in part in A.P., 16 foll.

ledge diverge to their ever distant circumference, was abandoned to the illiterate and the simple, whom unstilled yearning, and an original ebulliency of spirit had urged to the investigation of the indwelling and living ground of all things. These then, because their names had never been enrolled in the guilds of the learned, were persecuted by the registered liverymen as interlopers on their rights and privileges. All without distinction were branded as fanatics and phantasts; not only those whose wild and exorbitant imaginations had actually engendered only extravagant and grotesque phantasms, whose productions were for the most part poor copies and gross caricatures of genuine inspiration; but the truly inspired likewise, the originals themselves. And this for no other reason but because they were the *unlearned* men of humble and obscure occupations. When and from whom among the literati by profession have we ever heard the divine doxology repeated, "I thank thee, O Father! Lord of Heaven and Earth! because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and has revealed them unto babes"? No; the haughty priests of learning not only banished from the schools and marts of science all who had dared draw living waters from the *fountain*, but drove them out of the very temple, which meantime "*the buyers and sellers and money changers*" were suffered to make "*a den of thieves*".

And yet it would not be easy to discover any substantial distinction *<as>* ground for this contemptuous pride in those literati who have most distinguished themselves by their scorn of Behmen, De Thoyras*, George Fox, and others, unless it be that *they* could write orthographically, make smooth periods, and had the fashions of authorship almost literally *at their fingers' ends*,⁽²⁷⁾ while the latter in simplicity of soul made their words immediate echoes of their feelings. Hence the frequency of those phrases among them which have been mistaken for pretences to immediate inspiration; as for instance, "It was delivered unto me"; "I strove not to speak"; "I said, I will be silent but the word was in my heart as a burning fire", and so forth. Hence, too, the unwillingness to give offence; hence the foresight and the dread of the clamours which would be raised against them, so frequently avowed in the writings of these men, and expressed, as was natural, in the words of the only book with which they were familiar. "Woe is

* "Taulerus"? Cf. Sara Coleridge, *B.L.* (1847), I. 148.

me that I am become a man of strife and a man of contention. I love peace. The souls of men are dear unto me yet because I seek for light every one of them doth curse me." Oh, it requires deeper feeling, and a stronger imagination than belong to most of those to whom reasoning and fluent expression have been as a trade learned in boyhood, to conceive with what *might*, with what inward *strivings* and *commotion*, the perception of a new and vital truth takes possession of an uneducated man of genius.

His meditations are almost inevitably employed on the eternal or the everlasting, for "the world is not his friend nor the world's law". Need we then be surprised, that under an excitement at once so strong and so universal, the man's body should sympathize with the struggles of his mind; or that he should at times be so far deluded as to mistake the tumultuous sensations of his nerves, and the co-existing spectres of his fancy, as parts or symbols of the truths which were opening on him?

But* one assertion I will venture to make, as suggested by my own experience, that there exist folios on the human understanding, and the nature of man, which would have a far juster claim to their high rank and celebrity, if in the whole huge volume there could be found as much fulness of heart and intellect, as burst forth in many a simple page of George Fox, Jacob Behmen, and even of Behmen's commentator—the warm and fervent William Law.⁽²⁸⁾

He was indeed a stupendous human being. Had he received the discipline of education, above all had he possessed the knowledge which would have guarded him against his own delusions, I scarcely know whether we should have had reason to attribute greater genius even to Plato himself. When I consider that this ignorant man by the result of his own meditations presented the Newtonian system⁽²⁹⁾ in a clearness which it certainly had never before appeared in, not even to Copernicus himself, or to the learned Bruno; when I trace in him the love of action and that constant sense of the truth that all nature is in a perpetual evolution, that two great powers are for ever working, manifesting themselves alike in the apparently inadequate and inanimated, and in intellectual nature, (namely the powers by which each particular endeavours to detach itself from nature and the counteracting powers by which nature is still bringing

* Two sentences in *B.L.* (1817), I. 143, are here omitted.

back each of her creatures into itself—this led him assuredly into anticipations and views of truth which will detract from many modern discoveries some part, at least, of their originality); but above all that spirit of love which runs through him; that dread of contempt; that belief that the potential works in us even as the actual is working on us, and that not only man but every creature contains in itself a higher being, which is indeed bedimmed under the lustre of the immediate and sensual being (which is as it were its husk and outward covering) but which in moments of tranquillity most frequently appears in the voice of conscience, but often in high aspirations and in feelings of faith that remain afterwards as sentiments and thoughts of consolation; when I find this animating his whole language, presenting everywhere a being who had forgotten himself in the love by which he possessed all things, I again and again wish that some more enlightened friend had been present and had rescued this man from evils. I mean the error and the delusion which, fortunately, however, his own sense of right held from him; for with all this, though he himself prized his system mainly as explaining and inferring all the mysteries of religion, there is, as there was throughout in the philosophy of that time, a tendency to pantheism; or rather it was itself a disguised pantheism. In short, with the exception of those who have strictly followed the Scriptures and who will not cheat themselves by explaining this away into a metaphor and that into an accommodation, I know none who has avoided one or the other of two evils—the one making the world have the same relation to God as a watch has to a watch-maker, in truth, giving all up to secondary causes and rendering the omnipresence of the great Being, the ground of all things as well as their Creator, a mere word of honor and of pomp in the state-room of the intellect,—or the opposite error of carrying the omnipresence into a condition of nature-with-God, and involving all those fearful consequences from which, as I before said, the best refuge is not to see them. From this I cannot excuse Behmen's writings, any more than I can praise or attempt or pretend to understand many of the strange fancies by which he has represented his truths. Sometimes indeed one can guess at the meaning; sometimes it is utter darkness. And altogether he represents a great mirror, but placed in the shade; all the objects of nature seem to pass by, but they are reflected in shadow and

dimly, but now and then a light passes along and the mirror in the shade flashes and seems to lighten from out of its retirement.

At this time, when the downfall of the scholastic philosophy and the emancipation from the superstition in at least the Northern parts of Europe, had left the mind open and almost impelled it to real silence, there arose our great Lord Bacon,⁽³⁰⁾ and at the same time nearly with him, the famous Kepler;⁽³¹⁾ two men, one of whom we all know as the beginning of truly scientific astronomy, of that science which possesses power and prophecy and which will for ever remain the greatest monument of human greatness, because by laws demonstrably drawn out of his own mind he has, in that mind, not only light, but as far as his own purposes require it, controlled the mighty orbs of nature; and Lord Bacon, who appeared not for any one purpose but to purify the whole of the mind from all its errors by having given first that complete analysis of the human soul without which we might have gone on for ever weighing one thing after another in scales which we had never examined, and thus constantly, perhaps, mistaking as existing in the thing weighed that which was really owing to the scales themselves.

I have, in the beginning of this lecture, referred in part to it when I spoke of the threefold powers with which man was gifted and of the evils which had arisen from their confusion. Lord Bacon has been commonly understood as if, in his system itself, he had deduced the propriety of a mode of philosophizing of which, indeed, there are found in his own writings not any specimens but some recommendations which it is difficult to suppose that he himself could have been in earnest with. His own philosophy is this: he demands, indeed, experiment as the true groundwork of all real knowledge, but what does he mean by experiment? He himself strongly contrasts it with the "gossiping with nature", as he calls it, of the Alchymists, the putting one thing to another in order to see if anything would come out of it. No, he requires some well-grounded purpose in the mind, some self-consistent anticipation of the result, in short the *prudens [quaestio]*,* the prudent forethought and enquiry which he declares to be [*dimidium scientiae*],* the one half of one science. He expressly says, "We do not aim at science either by the senses or by instruments so much as by experiments; for the subtilty

* The *Friend*, III. 204 foll.

of experiments is far greater than that of the sense though aided with the most exquisite instruments. For we speak of those experiments which have been preconceived and knowingly placed, and arranged, to the intention and for the purpose of that which is sought for according to art. Therefore," says he, "we do not attribute much to the immediate and proper perception of the sense, but we deduce the matter to this point, that the sense can judge only of the experiment, but it is the experiment which must inform us of the law which is the thing itself." In this instance Lord Bacon's fondness for [verbal antitheses]* has perhaps rather obscured his meaning; but the sense is this, that our perception can apprehend through the organs of sense only the phenomena evoked by the experiment, but that same power of mind which out of its own laws has proposed the experiment, can judge whether in nature there is a law correspondent to the same. In order, therefore, to explain the different errors of men, he says that there is a power which can give birth to the question; *this* he calls the *lux intellectus*, the *lux maxime*, the pure and impersonal reason freed from all the personal idols which this great legislator of science then enumerates, namely the idols of the den, of the theatre, and of the market place†; he means, freed from the passions, the prejudices, the peculiar habits of the human understanding, natural or acquired; but above all pure from the delusions which lead men to take the forms and mechanism [of their own mere reflective faculty]‡ as a measure of nature and the deity. In short, to use the bold but happy phrase of a late ingenious French writer, he guards you against the man particular, as contrasted with the general man,⁽³²⁾ and most truly and in strict consonance in this with Plato, does the immortal Verulam [teach that the human understanding, even independent of the causes that always, previously to its purification by philosophy, render it]§ more or less turbid or uneven, not only reflects the object subjectively, [that is, substitutes for the inherent laws and properties of the objects the relations which the objects bear to its own particular constitution; but that in all its conscious presentations and reflexes, it is itself only a

* *Op. cit.*, III. 206; or perhaps, "pungent antitheses".

† (*Idola . . . spectūs, fori, theatri*), *Op. cit.*, III. 207.

‡ *Op. cit.*, III. 208.

§ *Op. cit.*, III. 209.

phenomenon of the inner sense, and requires the same corrections as the appearances transmitted by the]* outward senses. But that there is potentially, if not actually, in every rational being a somewhat, call it what you will, the purest reason, the spirit, true light, intellectual [intuition, etc. etc.; and that in this are to be found the indispensable conditions of all science, and scientific research, whether meditative, contemplative, or experimental; is often]* expressed and everywhere supposed by Lord Bacon. And that this is not only the right but the [possible]† nature of the human mind, to which it is capable of being restored, is implied in the various remedies prescribed by him for its diseases, [and in the various means of neutralizing or converting into useful instrumentality the imperfections which cannot be removed. There is a sublime truth contained in his favourite phrase—*Idola intellectus*. He tells us that the mind of man is an edifice not built with human hands, which needs only to be purged of its idols and idolatrous services to become the temple of the true and living light. Nay, he has shown and established]† the true criterion between the ideas of the mind and the idols, namely that the former are manifested by their adequacy to those ideas in nature which in and through them are contemplated.⁽³³⁾

This therefore is the true Baconic philosophy. It consists! in this, in a profound meditation on those laws which the pure reason in man reveals to him, with the confident anticipation and faith that to this will be found to correspond certain laws in nature. If there be aught that can be said to be purely in the human mind, it is surely those acts of its own imagination which the mathematician avails himself of, for I need not I am sure tell you that a line upon a slate is but a picture of that act of the imagination which the mathematician alone consults. That it is the picture only is evident, for never could we learn the art of the imagination, or form an idea of a line in the mathematical sense, from that picture of it which we draw beforehand. Otherwise how could we draw it without depth or breadth? It becomes, evidently, too, an act of the imagination. Out of these simple acts the mind, still proceeding, raises that wonderful superstructure of geometry and then looking abroad into nature finds that in its own nature it has been fathoming nature, and that nature itself is but the

* *Op. cit.*, III. 209.

† *Op. cit.*, III. 210.

greater mirror in which he beholds his own present and his own past being in the law, and learns to reverence while he feels the necessity of that one great Being whose eternal reason is the ground and absolute condition of the ideas in the mind, and no less the ground and the absolute cause of all the correspondent realities in nature—the reality of nature for ever consisting in the law by which each thing is that which it is.

Hence, and so has Lord Bacon told us, all science approaches to its perfection in proportion as it immaterializes objects. For instance, in the motion of the heavenly bodies, we in reality consider only a few obstructions of mass, distance, and so forth. The whole phenomenon of light, the materiality of which itself has been more than once doubted of, is nothing but a sublime geometry drawn by its rays; while in magnetism, the phenomenon is altogether lost and the whole process by which we trace it is the power of intellect. We know it not as visible but by its powers. If instead of this we are to substitute the common notion of Lord Bacon, that you are to watch everything without having any reason for so doing, and that after you have collected the facts that belong to any subject, if any person could divide them and tell what could be contradicted, then you may proceed to the theory, which must necessarily be false if you omit any one term; and consequently, (as in all physical things the difference between them and the mathematical is that in the mathematical you can control them because they are the things of your will) it follows necessarily, then, there can be no such thing as a physical theory. Nothing remains, therefore, but either an hypothesis, which if it is a thing is part of the problem, or the discovery of some law, by which our knowledge proceeds from the centre and diverges towards, by a constant approximation, an ever distant circumference, but feeling its progress as it moves and still increasing in power as it travels onward.

For this a very ingenious man⁽³⁴⁾ (and a man who had a particular talent for discovery and the whole history of whose very active life is the best answer to his own recommendation) has proposed the following, and I must again repeat that this is most frequently the opinion now of Lord Bacon's philosophy: he says that before a foundation can be laid "upon which anything like a sound and stable *theory* can be constructed" you are to make yourself acquainted with a certain number of facts, *<the*

lists of > which I think contain three and twenty pages, of which I will give you one small specimen. You are to be acquainted with "the history of potters, tobacco-pipe-makers, [glaziers, glass-grinders, looking-glass makers or foilers]*—spectacle-makers [and optic-glass-makers, makers of counterfeit pearl and precious stones, bugle-makers, lamp-blowers, colour-makers, colour-grinders, glass-painters, enamellers, varnishers, colour-sellers, painters, limners,] picture-drawers, makers of baby heads, of little bowling-stones [or marbles, fustian-makers] (I do not know whether poets deal in this trade?), music-masters, [tinsey-makers, and taggers. The history of school-masters, writing-masters, printers, book-binders, stage-players, dancing-masters, and vaulters, apothecaries, chirurgeons, seamsters,] butchers, barbers, [laundresses, and cosmetics! etc. etc. etc. (the true nature of which" he concludes—"being actually determined) will hugely facilitate our inquiries] in philosophy"!!!

As a summary of Doctor [R. Hooke's multifarious†] recipe [for the growth of science may be placed that of the celebrated Dr. Watts for the improvement of the mind, which was thought, by Doctor Knox, to be worthy of insertion in the *Elegant Extracts*, vol. ii. p. 456, under the head of

Directions concerning our Ideas.

"Furnish yourselves",] for it is worth listening to, "Furnish yourselves [with a *rich variety of Ideas*. Acquaint yourselves with *things* ancient and modern; *things* natural, civil, and religious; *things* of your own native land, and of foreign Countries; *things* domestic and national; things past, present, and future; and above all be well acquainted with God and yourselves; learn Animal nature and the working of your own Spirits. *Such a general acquaintance with things will be of very great advantage.*"'] Certainly a most incomparable lesson.

No, the truth is that let any unprejudiced naturalist turn even to Lord Bacon's own questions and proposals for the investigation of greater problems, or to discover . . . or enquire of his own experience or historical recollection whether any important discovery was ever made in this way. For though Lord Bacon never so far deviates from his own principles as not to admonish

* The *Friend*, III. 196 f.n. & foll. The emendations in this paragraph and the two that follow it are all from this source.

† The reporter wrote "metaphors".

his readers that the particulars are thus to be collected, only that by [careful selection they may be concentrated into universals;] yet so immense is their number, and so various and almost endless the relations in which each is to be separately considered, that the life of an antediluvian [patriarch would be expended, and his strength and spirits have been wasted, in merely polling the votes, and long before he could commence the process of simplification] or have arrived in sight of the Law which was [to reward the toils of the over-tasked Psyche].

I trust that I yield to none in my veneration for Lord Bacon's writings. Proud of his name we all must be, as men of science; as Englishmen we might be almost vain of him. But I will not suffer nationality so far to bribe me as not to confess that there are points [in the character of our Verulam from which we turn to the life and labors] of John Kepler as from gloom to sunshine. The beginning and the close of his life were clouded with poverty and domestic troubles, while [the intermediate years were comprised within the most tumultuous period of the history of his country, when the furies of religious and political discord] had left neither his head nor heart for the Muses. But Kepler seemed born to prove that true genius could overcome all obstacles. [If he gives an account of his modes of proceeding, and of the views under which they first occurred to his mind, how unostentatiously and] *in transitu*, as it were, does he introduce himself to our notice; [and yet never fails to present the living germ out of which the genuine method, as the inner form of the tree of science,] springs up! With what affectionate reverence does he express himself of his master and immediate predecessor Tycho Brahe! How often and how gladly [does he speak of Copernicus! and with what fervent tones of faith and consolation does he proclaim the historic fact that the great men of all ages have prepared the way for each other] as pioneers and heralds! Equally just to the ancients and to his [contemporaries, how circumstantially, and with what exactness of detail, does Kepler demonstrate that Euclid Copernicises—*ὡς πρὸ τοῦ Κοπερνικοῦ κοπερνικίζει Εὐκλείδης!* and how elegant the compliments which he addresses to Porta! with what cordiality he thanks him for the invention of the *camera obscura* as enlarging his views into the laws of vision! But while] we cannot avoid contrasting this generous enthusiasm [with Lord Bacon's cold invidious treatment of Gilbert, and his assertion that the

works] of Plato and Aristotle had been carried down the stream of time, like straws, by their levity alone, when things of weight and worth sunk to the bottom; and truly so calumniously does he everywhere speak of Plato that we are obliged to believe that the manifold occupations and anxieties to which his public and professional duties engaged him and his [courtly,—alas!] his servile, [prostitute, and mendicant ambition, entangled him in his after years], [so that he] must have derived his opinions of Plato and Aristotle from any source rather than from a dispassionate study of the originals themselves.* This however would have been a trifle, but was not true of the great men themselves. Plato and Aristotle were abundantly the falsifiers of their systems, but it is not a trifle that those are the parts in Lord Bacon's character and those the passages in his writings which have been of late more read, and which are more in the mouths and minds of the common race of modern materialists, than his invaluable system, which differs in no other respect from that of Plato's except as the objects were different, except as far as that the mind was the great object in Plato, and what I may call the Ideal, while the philosophy, and the correspondence of the laws of nature to the ideas of the pure reason, was the object of Lord Bacon. But unfortunately men had been, as it were, satiated with the admiration of the great men of old; the mind wanted to act upon its own stores, upon its own faculties and with this there was much of the insolence of youth. Had it remained there, we should have indeed only had to travel a long road before we came back again and found we might have spared ourselves the trouble, but it unfortunately extended into the moral and political character of nations. Nothing was to have been known before, nothing was to be valued, all was to be created anew; and from this moment the mind was led to the revival of systems which the better feelings of mankind had exploded for many many centuries, and to new systems that had not the least claim to originality but which have a most dreadful claim to history from the effects they have produced.

These will form the subject of my next lecture, when I shall trace the state of mind in the Civil Wars under Charles the First and from thence [*sic*] the progress of materialism and infidelity on to the time immediately before the French Revolution. And I beg to

* The quotation from the *Friend* ends here.

conclude with one remark, namely, that the influences of philosophy must not be sought for either in the lives of philosophers themselves or in the immediate effect of their writings upon the students of speculative knowledge. No! we must look for it everywhere, only not in their own shape, for it becomes active by being diluted. It combines itself as a color, as it were, lying on the public mind, as a sort of preparation for receiving thought in a particular way, and excluding particular views, and in this way its effect has been great indeed, great in past times for good, but great, likewise, in recent times for evil. And if any one would doubt the truth of what I say, let him look at the disputes in the time of Charles the First and detract from the controversies of the Calvinists and Arminians⁽³⁸⁾ all that belongs to the Christian Gospel and leave nothing behind but the metaphysics, and I suspect that *<in>* spite of the theological phrases, he has left at least four fifths of the whole work untouched, and that Christianity might fairly give up her claim to the bitterest controversies and resign them again to the Schools.

LECTURE XII

MARCH 15, 1819⁽¹⁾

MR. COLERIDGE'S LECTURE for THIS EVENING is on Dogmatical Materialism*—in its relations to Physiology as well as to the religious, moral and common sense of Mankind; of the misnomer in entitling it scepticism; and the contrast between this empirical dogmatism & scepticism of any kind, much more philosophical scepticism. The grounds, occasions and influence of Materialism† have long occupied the first place in Mr. Coleridge's researches & reflections, more especially during the last two years,‡ and from its paramount importance in this country, and at the present time, he must defer the consideration of the Critical Philosophy of Kant & Schelling's Philosophy of Nature till Monday Se'nnight.§

It is a wonderful property of the human mind⁽²⁾, that when once a momentum has been given to it in a fresh direction, it pursues the new path with obstinate perseverance, in all conceivable directions, to its utmost extremes; and by the striking consequences which arise out of those extremes it is first awakened to its error and either recalled to some former track, or to some new pursuits which it immediately receives and admits to the same monopoly.

* "Materialism and Empirical Dogmatism"—the *Courier*.

† "from Hobbes to the present hour." *Ibid*.

‡ "and persuaded of its deep interest in this country, and of its paramount importance to the Students in all the learned professions, Mr. Coleridge will defer the account of the critical system of Kant and Schelling's *Natur-Philosophie*, or revived Plotinism, to Monday se'nnight." *Ibid*.

§ *The Times*, March 15, 1819, and the *New Times*. The same announcement appears at the beginning of the report of this lecture in MS. Egerton 3057. The *Courier* notice, which appeared not on the preceding Saturday as was usual but on the Monday, is somewhat fuller as indicated above.

Thus in the thirteenth century the first science which roused the intellects of [men]* from the torpor of barbarism, was, <as> we have seen in all countries ever has been and ever must be the case, the science of metaphysics—[and ontology].† We first seek at home, and what wonder [if truths, that appeared to reveal the secret depths of our souls],‡ should take possession of the whole mind, and all truths appear trivial which could not be either evolved out of simple§ principles, by the same process, or at least brought under the same forms of thought by perceived or imagined analogies? And so in fact it was. For more than two|| centuries men continued to invoke the oracle of their own spirits, not only concerning their own forms and mode of being, but likewise concerning the laws of external nature. All attempts at [philosophical explication were commenced by a mere]¶ effort of the understanding, as the power of abstraction; or by the imagination, transferring its own experiences to every object presented from without. By the former—the understanding or abstracting powers, a class of phenomena was in the first place abstracted and fixed in some general term: of course this term could designate only the impressions made by the outward objects, and so far therefore the effects of those objects, but having been thus generalized in a term they were then made to occupy the place of their own causes, under the name of occult qualities. Thus the properties peculiar to gold were abstracted from those it possessed in common with other bodies, and then generalized in the term [Aureity]:** and the enquirer was instructed that the essence of gold, or the cause which constituted the peculiar substance called gold, was the power of [aureity]. By the latter, that is, by the imagination, thought and will were superadded to this occult nature,†† and every form of nature had its appropriate spirit, to be controlled or conciliated by an appropriate [ceremonial]‡‡ and this was entitled the substantial

* *Theory of Life*, 28.

† MS. Egerton 3057 and *T.L.*, 28.

‡ *T.L.*, 28.

§ *Ibid.*, "similar".

|| *Ibid.*, "a century".

¶ *Ibid.*, 29.

** *Ibid.*, (1).

†† *Ibid.*, "quality".

‡‡ *Ibid.* The reporter wrote "Psychology".

form. Thus, physic became a dull [poetry]* and physiology [or the art of medicine was a system of magic blended with traditional empiricism].* Thus the forms of thought proceeded to act in their own emptiness, with no attempt to fill or substantiate them by the information of the senses, and all the branches of science formed so many sections of logic and metaphysics. And so it continued, till the time the Reformation sounded the second trumpet, and the authority of the Schools sank with that of the [hierarchy]† under the intellectual courage and activity which this great revolution had inspired. Power, once awakened, cannot rest in one object. All the sciences partook of the new influence, and the world of the [experimental philosophy was soon mapped out for posterity]‡ by the comprehensive and enterprising genius of Bacon.⁽⁴⁾ Experiment, as an organ of reason not less distinguished from the blind or dreaming [industry]§ of the alchymists than opposed to the barren subtleties of the Schoolmen, was called forth, and more than this, the laws explained by such experiment could be dignified into scientific experience. But no sooner [was the impulse given, than the same propensity was made manifest of]‡ looking at all things in the one point of view which chanced to be the predominant attraction. No sooner, I observed, had Lord Bacon convinced his contemporaries of the necessity of consulting their senses as well as their understandings, (but at the same time of consulting their reason equally with their senses) than the same propensity of moving in one path and that to the extreme was made manifest. Our Gilbert,⁽⁵⁾ a man of genuine philosophical genius, had no sooner [multiplied the facts of magnetism, and extended our knowledge concerning the property of of] magnetic bodies, but all things in Heaven, and in earth, and in the water beneath the earth, were resolved into magnetic influences.

Shortly afterwards a new light was struck by [Harriot⁽⁶⁾ and]‡ Descartes,⁽⁷⁾ [with their contemporaries, or immediate predecessors, and the restoration of ancient geometry,]‡ aided by the modern invention of algebra, placed the science of

* *Ibid.*

† MS. Egerton 3057 and *T.L.* 30. The reporter wrote "higher arcade".

‡ *T.L.*, 30

§ *Ibid.*, 30.f.n. The reporter wrote "history".

|| *Ibid.* The reporter wrote "magnified" for "multiplied" and then left a long gap.

mechanics* on the philosophic throne. How widely this domination spread, and how long continued, if indeed even now it can be said to have abdicated its pretensions, I need not remind you of. The sublime discoveries Newton⁽⁹⁾ taught, [with his] not less wonderful than fruitful [application, of the higher mathesis to the movements of the celestial bodies, and to the laws of light,]† gave almost a religious sanction to the corpuscular [system and mechanical theory. It became synonymous with philosophy itself. It was the sole portal]‡ at which truth was permitted to enter. The human body itself was treated of as an hydraulic machine, the operations of medicine were solved, and too often directed, partly by gravitation, and the laws of motion, and partly by chemistry which itself, as far as theory was concerned, was but a branch of mechanics, working by imaginary wedges, angles, and spheres. Should you chance to put your hand at any time on *The Principles of Philosophy* by [De La Forge,⁽¹⁰⁾ an immediate disciple of Descartes]‡ you may see the phenomena of sleep explained,§ and the results demonstrated by mathematical calculation. In short from the time of Kepler⁽¹⁰⁾|| (whose mind was not comprehended in the vortex for he erred in the other extreme) but from the time of Kepler to Newton, and from that to Hartley, [not only all things in external nature, but the subtlest mysteries of life and]‡ organization, even of the intellect and moral being, were conjured within the magic circle of mathematical formality.

But now a light was struck by the discovery of electricity,⁽¹¹⁾ and in every sense of the word it may be affirmed to have [electrified]‡ the whole form¶ of natural philosophy. Close on its heels followed the momentous discovery of the [gases] and composition of water,** and the doctrine of latent heat by Black.⁽¹²⁾ The scientific world had been prepared for a new [dynasty; accordingly, as soon as Lavoisier⁽¹³⁾ had reduced the

* *Ibid.*, "mathematics".

† *Ibid.*

‡ *T. L.*, 31.

§ *T. L.* inserts here: in a copper-plate engraving, with all the figures into which the globules of the blood shaped themselves.

|| The reporter wrote "Cooper".

¶ *T. L.* reads "frame".

** *T. L.* inserts here: "the principal gases by Scheele and Priestley, the composition of water by Cavendish." The reporter wrote "causes" for "gases".

infinite variety of chemical phenomena to the actions, reactions, and interchanges of a few elementary substances,]* or at least excited the expectation that this would be effected, a hope shot up almost instantly and as rapidly ripened into a full faith that this had been effected. Henceforward a new path became the common road, as in the former instances, to all the departments of knowledge; and even to this moment it has been pursued with an eagerness and almost epidemic enthusiasm which characterizes the spirit of this age. Many and inauspicious have been the inroads of this new conqueror into the territories of our [other sciences and strange alterations have been made in less harmless points than those of]* terminology, in homage to [an art]* (of whatever importance yet unsettled) in the very ferment of imperfections, discoveries either without a theory, or with a theory maintained by compromise. Yet this very circumstance has favoured its encroachments, by the gratifications which its novelty affords to our curiosity, and by the keener† excitement which an unsettled mind is sure to inspire. And he who supposes science possesses *an immunity [from influences]* like this, knows little of human nature*, and how impossible it is for man to separate part of his nature wholly and entirely from the remaining parts. All these causes, however, of every political event, from their magnitude, have had one tendency, that of drawing men from attention to their own minds to external objects, and giving them a pre-disposition to receive as the more true that which in any way makes a more vivid impression. Consequently a system that supplies image after image to the senses, however little connected they may be by any necessary copular [*sic*], will be a formidable rival for another which can pretend only to a logical adherence of conceptions, and which demands from men the most difficult effort in nature, that of truly and earnestly thinking.

In the commencement of literature man remained for a time in that unity with nature which gladly concedes to nature the life, thought, and even purposes of man, and on the other hand gives to man himself a disposition to regard himself as a part of nature. Soon however he must have begun to detach himself; his dreams, the very delusions of his senses which he became acquainted with by experience, must have forced him to make a distinction

* *Ibid.*, 31-32.

† *Ibid.* The reporter wrote "genial".

between the object perceived and the percipient. Nothing, however, enabled him to determine to *<assign>* one of these a priority over the other; they were both strictly co-existent. And it seems remarkable, both in ancient and in modern times, the first philosophy was that of idealism, that which [began]* with a courageous scepticism, which I think Descartes has beautifully stated when he himself gave a beautiful example of it, in what he called voluntary doubt, a self-determined indetermination, expressing at the same time its utter difference from the scepticism of vanity or irreligion:⁽¹⁴⁾

"*nec [tamen in eo scepticos imitabar, qui dubitant tantum ut dubitent, et praeter incertitudinem ipsam nihil quaerunt. Nam contra totus in eo eram ut aliquid certi reperirem.]*† "Nor yet," says he, "did I in this imitate the sceptics, who doubt only for doubting's sake and seek nothing but a distinction [*by*] uncertainty, for on the contrary my whole soul was engaged in this, the hope of discovering something certain." In the pursuit of this therefore it was evident that success depended on an austere and faithful adherence to the principle of the mind, with a careful separation and exclusion of all which appertains to the external world—as far as this was considered, not as a philosophy, but as a mere introduction or discipline of the mind previous to the discovery of truth. As a natural philosopher who directs his views wholly to external objects, avoids, above all things, the intermixture of mind and [*its*]‡ properties in his knowledge, as for instance, all arbitrary [*suppositions*],§ occult qualities, and the substitution of final for efficient causes, so on the other hand the philosopher who begins with the mind is equally anxious to exclude all mental [*interpellation of the objective into the subjective principles of his science.*]] He will be equally careful to [*exercise*] [an absolute and scientific scepticism to which the mind voluntarily determines itself for the specific purpose of future certainty]] and by the purification of his mind of all that does not belong to the mind itself, he acquires a true sense both of its strength and of its weakness.

* The report reads "beginning".

† *B.L.* (1817), I. 259–60.⁽¹⁴⁾

‡ The reporter wrote "the".

§ Inserted from *B.L.* (1817), I. 259.

|| *Ibid.*

We have seen in an earlier lecture⁽¹⁵⁾ that about five hundred years before Christ, Leucippus founded the ATOMIC* system, or pure Materialism, in direct opposition to the Eclectic philosophy or pure Idealism—and that within the next hundred years, at a period rendered uncertain by† the extraordinary longevity of the individual, this SYSTEM was enlarged‡ by Democritus. And during the interval from 322 to 270 years before Christ, it was brought to that state of completion by Epicurus§ to which it was restored by Gassendi,⁽¹⁶⁾ who was born in a village of Provence in 1592, and was after Gassendi especially applied to|| the explanation of humanity by Hobbes,⁽¹⁷⁾ who was born at Malmesbury four years before Gassendi¶ and who almost rivalled HIS GREAT PREDECESSOR, DEMOCRITUS, in the length of his life.** The three ancient philosophers declared†† the inherence of MOTION‡‡ and, the essence at least, of life and of sensation,§§ in the atoms which they assumed, though they made a difference with regard to those atoms, which will not be well understood unless we give the history of those atoms themselves.

The Eclectics had begun by demonstrating the inconsistencies that arise out of the <sup>position of motion, arising from the arguments against the real external existence of space. Having shewn that space involved a contradiction of a something that had the properties of nothing, of course that it was a nonentity, they then deduced that as motion was inconceivable without the belief of space, so neither motion nor space possessed any reality. The materialists who followed, and who were perhaps first materialists by this outrage on their common sense, were not able to combat the Eclectic philosophers in subtlety of reasoning,

* NB. 25. The reporter wrote "Academic".

† NB. 25 inserts: the general inaccuracy of ancient chronology and

‡ NB. 25 adds: and modified

§ NB. 25: in which at the period to which we have now advanced it was restored

|| NB. 25: anthropology, or

¶ NB. 25: 1588.

** NB. 25: the date to which his life extended. But tho' the senior of Gassendi, as a man, he was his junior as a philosopher.

†† NB. 25: or implied

‡‡ The reporter wrote "the notion".

§§ NB. 25: sentiency in the atoms—tho' the round atoms and bodies composed of them they regarded as motive or self motive powers and souls, or principles of thought and motion.

and they cut the knot which they could not solve, and took for granted at once the existence of matter and motion without further explanation. But still there were two properties of matter which demanded some solution, and those were the partibility which it presented even to the senses, and its resistance. Now no hypothesis suggested itself more probable, more plausible at least than that of atoms, to answer both. For while their extreme multitude and minuteness seemed every where to account to the professors of matter for its divisibility, on the other hand their hardness, which they were obliged, like motion, to declare to be inherent and essential, they gave as the true cause of the resistance of matter. So that these atoms in truth were in the first place a pure fiction, for no man ever pretended to have seen an ultimate particle. It was merely a supposition derived from another supposition, namely that of external matter. But, in the next place, it was to account for partibility by the very circumstance of being impartible. If they were asked how it was that matter was divisible, they answered, "in consequence of the infinite multitude of ultimate particles of which it was composed". If they were asked how those particles came to be ultimate and why they stopped there, the answer then was, if they were atheists (as in our sense of the word the old materialists were) it was "an inherent eternal property"; if they were theists, it was "a miracle"—God has made them, and "who shall pretend", as a late writer has said, "to quarrel with any decree of God's." Certainly not, but we may quarrel with a man who chooses to affirm a miracle on his own authority. This however was the ground of atoms. It was nothing more than an hypothesis to suppose in one thing, the partibility of matter, by the amazing smallness of it, and the resistance or impenetrability of matter, by its hardness!

But these atoms still, when they had them, would only account for a certain number of things, either shapeless or of the same shape, but among the phenomena of matter the most impressive was the manifoldness of forms. This again the system of materialism found the means of explaining, by a variety of figures. Some of them were angular and some were round, and these last forms, namely the round atoms and bodies composed of them, the ancient materialists regarded as motive atoms or self-motive powers; in short the souls and principles of all thought

and motion were, according to them, round atoms. And inasmuch as the element of fire was supposed to be composed of those round atoms, likewise the soul, therefore, was according to them of a fiery nature. In the form of warmth these round atoms appeared as life, that is where a sufficient quantity was accumulated; for in inanimate substances, says Democritus,⁽¹⁸⁾ there is still a certain quantum of warmth,* because there are no bodies without a certain roundness, but they are not vital. In this sense Democritus says, there is a soul in all things,† all things have sensation in kind, but the inanimate things have only a momentary sensation, which being interrupted by‡ other elementary atoms not round, prevents all consciousness and all memory and even all marks of life. Yet interior sensations or impressions they [the ancient materialists] derived from atoms, or their components§ that were of like nature with the sentient, and all life|| was but sensation which modified (*how* has not been preserved). Thus then the round atoms, according to Democritus, constituted souls or the power of sensation and voluntary motion. But all mind is sensation which, modified in the brain (we are not told how) becomes thinking, but if modified in the region of the breast becomes feeling, and in the abdomen it shews itself only as growth or the obscure sensation of life. The mode, the process, of perception he explained by the effluvia of the images from every body,—every body, according to him, sending forth images of each of its component elements, and these falling on an organ of the same element, as for instance water¶ falling on the eye (which he says is essentially water) constitutes sight, the air falling on the ear** constitutes sound, and so forth; but this we may safely omit. It is sufficient for our purposes to know that the fundamental positions of ancient materialism were first, that motion and sensation are properties of a specific kind of atoms, and that mind is but a species of sensation, and all the processes of perception and of reflexion purely passive, and all the acts (or more accurately

* NB. 25: inherent and specific; but not enough to reveal themselves as vitals.

† NB. 25 inserts: (here his different figures of atoms entangles his materialism in difficulties not necessary)

‡ NB. 25 adds: the intervenience o.

§ NB. 25: compounds

|| NB. 25: mind

¶ NB. 25: the watery eidola

** NB. 25 inserts: which is essentially aeriform &c. &c.

all the phenomena or appearances of life, just as the seeming acts of a dream) are wholly mechanical or produced by necessitating antecedents. Lastly, that the distinction between these ancient materialists and the moderns from Hobbes,⁽¹⁹⁾ lies mainly in this one position, that the ancients accounted for the soul, as the common principle of life, thought and voluntary motion, from a peculiar sort of atoms, namely the round atoms, or fire-composing corpuscles, while the moderns make the same things result from the organization of atoms, without any assumption of a particular species, or if of any, yet not ab origine, and consequently not immutably peculiar,* but the peculiarity itself produced by this self-all-working organization.⁽²⁰⁾ In this assertion, however, I beg to be understood as speaking of the opinion common to all, and the organization as being the predominant thought; though in connexion with organization the successors of Hobbes have not all confined themselves to his scheme of successive corpuscles propagating motion like billiard balls;⁽²¹⁾ but they had had their† spirits, that is their irrational and inanimate solids, thawed down and distilled, or filtrated,‡ into living, and intelligent fluids that etch and re-etch engravings on the brain for themselves to look at, according to the pure materialists; though they were intended FOR THE soul to contemplate, by their first inventor.⁽²²⁾ We have too, what comes nearest to the ancient notion of hollow tubes⁽²³⁾, <AN OSCILLATORY ETHER VIBRATING ALONG STRINGS> which had been regarded formerly as a TUBE, and we have had too, electric light, at once the immediate object and the ultimate organ of inward vision which rises to the BRAIN§ like an Aurora Borealis, and there disporting in various shapes (as the balance of plus and minus, or negative and positive, is destroyed or re-established) images out both past and present. But all these had been proffered as auxiliaries ONLY, themselves <THE PRODUCTS OF ORGANIZATION: AND MY FORMER ASSERTION REMAINS TRUE> that the modern scheme of materialism differs from that of Democritus by representing life, mind, and will as the result of organization, not as pre-existing in the specific atoms as the organization.⁽²⁴⁾||

* NB. 25: & consequently, the non-assertion of inherent life

† The reporter in error? NB. 25: but animal spirits

‡ NB. 25 adds: by ascension

§ The reporter wrote "line".

|| NB. 25 reads: atoms so organized. (Here turn to *Lit. Life*,⁽²⁶⁾ p. 218.)

To the best of my knowledge Descartes was the first philosopher who introduced the absolute and essential heterogen[*eity*] of the soul as intelligence, and of body as matter. ⁽²⁶⁾ The Eclectics deduced matter, and with it the mind, as the mere process of thought. Democritus and his followers deduced the mind as resulting from the body, while the Platonists had founded a system* which at all events had the merits of being extremely poetical, and which has been far more accurately as well as beautifully given by Milton than you will find it in Brücker or all the writers of philosophical history.

“Oh Adam, one Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return,
If not depraved from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all,
Indued with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and, in things that live, of life;
But more refined, more~spiritous, and pure,
As nearer to him placed, or nearer tending,
Each in their several active spheres assigned,
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportioned to each kind—So from the root
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
More aery, last the bright consummate flower
Spirits odorous breathes; flowers and their fruit,
Man’s nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed
To vital spirits aspire, to animal,
To intellectual, give both life and sense,
Fancy and understanding; whence the soul
Reason receives, and reason is her being
Discursive, or intuitive;” ⁽²⁷⁾

Now Descartes had taught an absolute and essential diversity of the soul as intelligence and of the body as matter. The assumption, and the form of speaking have remained, [THOUGH] the denial of all other properties to matter but that of extension, on which denial the whole system of this diversity is grounded, has been long exploded. ⁽²⁸⁾ For since impenetrability is intelligible only as a

* MS. Egerton 3057 inserts here: which set aside everything purely objective or external.

mode of resistance, its admission places the essence of *matter** in an act or power, which it possesses in common with *spirit*; and body and spirit are therefore no longer absolutely heterogeneous, but *may* without any absurdity be supposed to be different modes, or degrees in perfection, of a common substratum, as I have just read described in the lines of Milton.—To this possibility, however, it was not the fashion to advert. The soul was a *thinking* substance; and body a *space-filling* substance. Yet the apparent action of each on the other pressed heavily on the philosopher on the one hand; and no less heavily on the other hand pressed the evident truth, that the law of causality and effect holds only between homogeneous things, that is to say, things having some common property, and cannot extend from one world into another its opposite. A close analysis evinced it to be no less absurd than the question whether a man's affection for his wife lay north-east or south-west of the love he bore towards his child.⁽²⁹⁾ For if matter be defined as a space-filling substance, it is evident that what cannot apply to what be predicated of space, can in no degree apply to what is material. Leibnitz's doctrine of a pre-established harmony, which he certainly borrowed from Spinoza, who had taken the hint from Descartes's animal machines,⁽³⁰⁾ was in its *common* interpretation too strange to survive the inventor. The next hypothesis, therefore, was that of recurrence to, and afterwards the hypothesis of, Hylozoism, or that every particle of matter is essentially though not apparently alive. But this was found to be the death of all essential† physiology, and indeed of all physical science; for science requires a limitation of terms, and cannot consist <of> the arbitrary power of multiplying attributes by occult qualities. Besides, the system of life in matter answers no purpose; unless a difficulty can be solved by multiplying it, or that we can acquire a clearer notion of our soul by being told that we have a million souls, and that every atom of our bodies has a soul of its own. But it is here, as it is in many other cases. Man, while he was persuaded that he had a soul, and that he had a body, and that his soul was gifted with a faculty of perceiving external objects through the medium of that body, or

* The italic type from here on is from the underlining in NB. 25 and corresponds generally with *B. L.*, Chap. VIII. Presumably it suggests Coleridge's emphases in speaking.

† *B. L.* (1817), I. 129: rational.

by its organs, was satisfied all was clear. But when he came to ask, what form has this copular [*sic*]? Is the soul diverse from the body? And if so, how can diverse powers act and react on each other? And if it be the same, in what point or degree shall we place the soul and where the body?—Then it is as if the sediment were at the bottom of a vessel, all the water above being clear and transparent, but we are not satisfied on account of the sediment, and we cannot take it; and the best we can do is to shake it up, not diminishing it by the least degree, but for our pains rendering the whole water turbid.

Still I deny yet that it is the duty of man to despair to solve a problem till its impossibility* is demonstrated. How matter can ever unite with perception—how *being* <*can*> ever transform itself into *knowing*, is conceivable only on one condition;⁽³¹⁾ that is if it can be shewn that the *vis representativa*, or the sentient, is itself a species of matter; i.e. either as a property, or attribute, or† self-subsistence. Now that it is a property is an assumption of materialism; of which permit me to say thus much in praise, that it is a system which could not but be patronized if it performed what it promises. But how any affection from without could metamorphose itself into perception or will, the materialist has not only left incomprehensible as he found it, but has made it a comprehensible absurdity. For, grant that an object from without could act upon the conscious self as on a consubstantial object; yet such an affection could only engender something homogen[e]ous with itself. Motion could only propagate motion. Matter has no inward. We remove one surface, but to meet with another.⁽³²⁾ We can but divide a particle into particles; and each particle has the power of being again divided. Let any reflecting mind make the experiment of explaining to itself the evidence of our sensuous intuitions, from the hypothesis that in any given perception there is a something which has been communicated to it by an impact or an impression *ab extra*. In the first place, by the impact on the perceiver‡ or *ens representans*, not the object itself, but only its action or effect, will pass into the same. Not the iron tongue, but its vibrations, pass into the metal of the bell. Now in our immediate perceptions, it is not the mere power

* The report reads: improbability

† NB. 25 adds: as a hypostasis or

‡ As in *B.L.* (1817), I. 131-2.

or act of the object, but it is the object itself, which is immediately present. We might attempt to explain this result by a chain of *deductions* and *conclusions*; but that, first the <VERY> faculties of deducing and concluding would <EQUALLY> demand an explanation; and secondly, there is no such intermediation by logic as cause and effect. It is the object itself, not the product of a syllogism, which is present to our consciousness. Or would we explain this supervention of the object to the sensation, by a productive faculty set in motion by an impulse; still the transition, into the perceptive,* of the object itself, from which the impulse proceeded, assumes a power that can permeate and wholly possess the soul,

“And like a God by spiritual art,
Be all in all and all in every part”.⁽³³⁾

And how came the *perceptive* here? And what is become of the wonder-promising matter that was to perform all these marvels by force of mere figure, weight, and motion? The most consistent proceeding of the dogmatic materialist would be to fall back into the common rank of *soul-and-bodyists*; to affect the mysterious, and declare the whole process a revelation *given* and not to be *understood*, which it would be profane to examine too closely. But a revelation unconfirmed by miracles, and a faith not commanded by the conscience, a philosopher may venture to pass by, without suspecting himself of any irreligious tendency. Thus as materialism has been generally taught, it is utterly unintelligible, and owes all its proselytes to the propensity so common among men, to mistake distinct images for clear conceptions; and vice versa, to reject as inconceivable whatever from its own nature is unimaginable. But as soon as it becomes intelligible, it ceases to be materialism. In order to explain *thinking*, as a material phenomenon, it is necessary to refine matter into a mere modification of intelligence, with the two-fold function of *appearing* and *perceiving*. Even so did Spinoza†—even so did Priestley in his controversy with Price.⁽³⁴⁾ He stripped matter of all its material properties, substituted spiritual powers; and when we expected to find a body, behold we had nothing but its ghost!—the *apparition* of a defunct matter.

* As in *B.L.* (1817), I. 131–2.

† The reference to Spinoza is an addition to the *B.L.* (1817), I. 133.

Let us then re-trace our history. Throughout the whole we have discovered nothing like thought. The earliest materialists began with declaring all who differed from them truly out of their senses. They themselves however began with [an] hypothesis and they moved forwards, as a materialist ever must do, by a succession of [leaps]* as for instance from an atom, fiction the first, to atoms of various figures, fiction the second; amongst these, round atoms constituting the elements of fire, fiction the third, then that the element of fire is the principle of the soul or thinking, which is the fourth fiction; that sensation and thought are precisely the same, which at all events is but an assertion; then that this same sensation whatever it be, (if it be below my heart, is to be one thing, and if it be in the region of my heart, another) but at once becomes philosophical and intellectual as soon as it passes into the marrow of my skull. These may be placed each as a separate law and fiction, and the whole comes at last to what? Not to anything that was meant by matter in the first sense of the word. But without the slightest instruction given even in the meaning of terms, without one practical consequence in science or in philosophy being deducible, and with an outrage to common sense and to morality, it formed a complete circle of dogmatic, mere unsupported, assertions.

The moderns were ashamed of these angular and these round atoms, and they had substituted therefore for it, organization, some, and others life or a vital principle. We will examine both. First then what is this organization?⁽³⁵⁾ For we have been assured, not in old times but even in our own, that mind is a function of the brain, that all our moral and intellectual being are the effects of organization; which I confess has always had much the same effect upon my mind as if a man should say, that building with all the included handicraft of plastering, sawing, planing, &c., was the offspring of the house and that the mason and carpenter were the [result of a suite of chambers, with the passages and staircases that lead to them.]† For to make A the offspring of B, where the very existence of B as B presupposes the existence of A, [is preposterous in the *literal* sense of the word, and a consummate instance of the *hysteron proteron*]† in logic.—For what, again, I say,

* The reporter wrote "laws", but clearly MS. Egerton 3057 has the correct word here.

† *T.L.*, 34.

is organization? Not the mere arrangement of parts as means to an end, for in that sense I should call my watch organization, or a steam engine organization. But we agree these are machines, not organizations. It appears then, that if I am to attach any meaning at all to the word organization, it must be distinct from mechanism in this, that in all machines I suppose the power to be from without, that if I take my watch there is nothing in the component parts of this watch that constitutes it peculiarly fit for a watch, or produce[s] it. There is nothing in the steam engine which of itself, independent of its position, would account for that position at all. Organization therefore must not only be an arrangement of parts together, as means to an end, but it must be such an interdependence of parts, each of which in its turn being means to an end, as arises from within. The moment a man dies, we can scarcely say he remains organized in the proper sense. The powers of chemistry are beginning to shew us that no force, not even mechanical [power, can *make* life.]* To say therefore that life is the result of organization, and yet at the same time to admit that organization is distinguished from mechanism only by life, is assuredly what I before said, to affirm a thing to be its own parent or to determine the parent to be the child of his own child. In every instance we may indeed account for the difference of qualities, difference of powers, from organization, but even there we do it only [*metaphorically*] not in the strict sense of the word, for it is in all times incomparably more probable [that the qualities and powers, e.g. of reproduction and irritability, are only manifestations of sensibility, which, therefore, alone is properly life,]† and considered with regard to the universe produces the power itself. At all events in order to justify materialism, and in materialism the assertion that life, and much more, that thought or will, are the results of organization, it would be necessary to call for a fact of organization subsisting prior to life, prior to some one of the properties of life. If indeed you could do that, and then present a life resulting from it, we will cheerfully agree with you. But if you can shew an arrangement of means to an end without life and declare it not to be mechanism, and if by the superadding the idea of life, that is, a power from within, you constitute an organization, it follows

* Adapted from *T.L.*, 36.

† *Fraser's Magazine*, November, 1835. "Monologues of S. T. Coleridge, No. I."

self-evidently not that life is the result of organization but that organization is in some way or other dependent on life as its cause.

We come then to what is life.⁽³⁶⁾ Almost all the attempts that I have seen to explain its nature presuppose the arbitrary disposition of all that surrounds us into things with life and things without life—a division which is certainly quite sufficient for the common usage but far too indeterminate for a philosopher. THE POSITIONS OF SCIENCE MUST BE WEIGHED ON JEWELLERS' SCALES,⁽³⁷⁾ NOT LIKE THE MIXED COMMODITIES of the market on the WAY-BRIDGE* of common opinion AND VULGAR USAGE. Yet such has been the procedure in the present instance. By AN EASY† logic which begins BY BEGGING THE QUESTION AND THEN MOVING IN A CIRCLE ENDS WHERE AND AS IT BEGAN, EACH OF THE TWO DIVISIONS has been made to define the others by a mere re-assertion of their assumed contrariety. THE THEORIST HAS EXPLAINED $Y + X$ BY INFORMING US THAT IT IS THE OPPOSITE OF $Y - X$: AND IF WE ASK, WHAT THEN IS $Y - X$, WE ARE TOLD THAT IT IS THE OPPOSITE OF $Y + X$! A RECIPROCATION OF GOOD SERVICES. We are plainly REMINDED OF THE TWIN SISTERS IN THE FABLE OF THE LAMIAE with but one eye between them both, which each borrowed from the other as either happened to want it,⁽³⁸⁾ but with this ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGE IN THE PRESENT CASE, THAT THIS ONE EYE IS AFTER ALL BUT AN EYE OF GLASS! For instance—now that I may not be supposed to have stated [the position unfairly] for my knowledge and acquaintance with the subject does not permit me to [treat]‡ it with [complete assurance, I turn to a work by the eminent French physiologist, Bichat, where] I find this definition: Life is the sum of all the functions by which death is resisted. I could not after a long pause but ask myself, what is the meaning of this? Life is the sum of all the functions by which death is resisted, that is, that life consists in being able to live! And more was I surprised when I observed the whimsical gravity with which the author⁽³⁹⁾ has informed us that hitherto life had been sought for in abstract considerations; as if four more inveterate abstractions could be brought together than the words life, death, function, and resistance.

* The reporter wrote "waverings". *T.L.*, 21, reads "weigh-bridge".

† *T.L.*, 21. The reporter wrote "By crazy logic".

‡ *Ibid.* The reporter wrote "read".

This is the vilest* form, however, of modern materialism, that is, asserting a fact in other words and then putting the synonyms in place of the cause and the definition. Others have taken and observed some particular function of life, as nutrition,† or assimilation, for the production of life or growth, as their act of life. Now in the first place this would be a definition of the lowest species only of living things. It might describe a fungus, but assuredly it could not describe a living man. Consequently it could be no definition of life as a principle of all the other vital functions. But in truth it merely tells us one thing, that life enables animals to DO, not in reality what life itself is. For if that be the case, assimilation or nutrition would convey to us some notion of life, whereas we are obliged to preassume a notion of life as KNOWN to understand the difference between [the *natura naturata* and the *natura naturans*.]‡ A better definition certainly, as might be expected from the truly great man who produced it, is⁽⁴⁰⁾—the power of resisting putrescence—for this is not like the former, wholly unfruitful. But even this definition need only be resolved into a higher formula to be found to contain little; for if we say that every thing strives to preserve the state in which it is, or nothing changes its state but with some resistance, that will be found equally applicable to every process in chemistry as attacked by mechanical powers and weakened, and again by those of mechanism. Every thing in nature, and not a living body only, tends to preserve its state and all we can learn is that life is a particular state. That is, the knowledge is assumed in the very definition which was supposed to give it, but in truth it was not, by the great founder, supposed to give it. He knew too well what he was about. He merely pointed out as a description, as that most marked property, which involved in itself the most fearful consequences and above all others that which will for ever immortalize his name, an assertion justified by all facts and by all logic from within and without, that to explain organization itself we must assume a principle of life independent of organization.

Now where shall we seek for this principle of life? We will suppose, for instance, that it is probable that without any reason

* NB. 25: purest.

† The reporter wrote "attrition".

‡ Cf. Lect. XIII, p. 370.

we had made these arbitrary assertions of not merely a distinction in degree, but of a distinction in kind, between inanimate and animate body. We may suppose for instance, with Newton, that in nature there is a continual antagonism going on between an universal life and each individual composing it. We will suppose that there is a tendency throughout nature perpetually to individuate, that is in each component part of nature to acquire individuality, but which is as harmoniously counteracted by an attempt of nature to recall it again to the common organization. Would there be aught very extraordinary in this? Certainly not in the first instance, because mechanism itself implies organization in the higher sense of the word, namely a power from within; for after the watch maker has placed the watch in its due positions, he looks to that power from within, belonging to all, the gravity which itself, of course, can never be the result of any mechanism; for if you explained it by a subtle fluid, ⁽⁴¹⁾ for instance, you would be asked the cause of that subtle fluid gravitating, and you must have another, and another, and at last you would be asked, by what logic you connect power within, or why a thick body should be dull, and spirits of wine light and even intellectual. These were answers to no purpose. Mechanism leads to *<no>* organization and there seems no contradiction in the supposition that mechanism, in the strict sense of the word, is nothing but the negative of organization: for the absence of mechanism will not presuppose organization, but organization ceasing, mechanism commences. In short, there is through all nature, and we must assume it as a ground of all reasoning, a perpetual tendency at once to individualize and yet to universalize, or to keep *<a balance>* even as we find in the solar system a perpetual tendency in each planet to preserve its own individual path, with a counter tendency which of itself would lead it into the common solar centre. Suppose this, as I believe we must in all reasoning, to take place in the world, where would be at all the extravagance of lugging in the more subtle parts of inanimate nature and in tracing their analogies and comparing them with those of life in ourselves? Certainly if a man were to say *bona fide*, that that which [in corallighine slime]* [is] accumulated, is the same thing as that life which is within me, he might as well have called his life by any thicker fluid, or any other inappropriate thing. But if, in

* *Fraser's Magazine*, Nov. 1835. "Monologues of S. T. Coleridge, No. I."

proportion as life becomes less the object of the senses, in proportion as it is less capable of appearing fixed, and as the body retains more and more of those properties which I notice in life, and *<if a man were to say>* that therefore it is not impossible but that in a still higher evolution of the universal nature, it may appear as life—I know no logic on earth that would point out any defect in this reasoning. It may be indeed said, “but where would you get this?” If it be said that here is an organization like the steam engine, and I procure a state which in a higher state is life, and as soon as I put it in, the machine plays, that would not be tenable, because it would leave organization unaccounted for; for organization has no other meaning than a power which instead of moving in a straight line as the mechanism does, moves round upon itself in a circle, and though it is an act of subsisting (being the act of self-reproduction) is at each moment of our life the identical same act as that by which it was first established—if ever there was a first in reality. No, that we should not do, nor do I believe that has been asserted; but it is easy, when a man is anxious to express his thoughts, to take one illustration and pin it down to the literal words and to draw from it all the consequence that may be drawn from every simile, a sort of procedure which excites my indignation where it does not excite my ridicule. And as I said to a man, “I have presented a simile as a simile just as I present a candle for a light . . . or of the stench for your pains.”

In truth there are two errors. The one places the centre in the circumference, as the man who affirms life to be in the organization, whereas the organization is nothing but the consequence of life, nothing but the means by which and through which it displays itself. It is, in truth, its effects, formed by the infinity of radii which proceed from that as a centre, and which take collectively from the circumference.* The man, therefore, who states life to proceed from organization, acts as a mathematician would who should be mad enough to assert the centre was placed in the circumference. On the other hand, one who would bring life from without, either in the shape of a soul or any other, would commit an equal fault in logic, namely he would make the centre out of the circumference and besides that, very unnecessarily, I think, confound animal life with the soul and the intellectual

* which taken collectively form the circumference?

faculties. For I think too highly of my responsible nature to confound it with a something by which I am not distinguished from the merest animal. Whatever life is, in its present state it cannot be brought to account for that which more especially constitutes us Man.

Now I am to state the effects of materialism in its different relations, and first with respect to science. There are three forms under one or the other of which all science must proceed: those are, theory, hypothesis, or law.⁽⁴²⁾ And it is in my intention to prove that by neither the first nor the last of these can a materialist reason, and only by the second which is hypothesis, and that arbitrarily and most groundlessly.—First then theory, the origin of the word. [θεωρεῖν], * *contemplari*, is to see, as from an immense <distance, a> number of objects together in such a manner as to perceive their relations to each other. A perfect theory, therefore, is possible in mathematics only, the mathematician creating his terms, that is, determining that his imagination has had such and such acts. For instance, <with> such and such lines he himself forms the terms with which he composes his proposition, and consequently he knows well that there can be no more than those and no less, for there being that exact number constitutes the proposition. But he, of course, can never know by any possibility that he has exhausted all the terms. If, for instance, in the composition and decomposition of water, which is generally believed, (and which I think a late very eminent physician declared⁽⁴³⁾ to have an evidence fully equal to the mathematical science) we are told, by the combustion of hydrogen and oxygen water is produced; again, that if water is decomposed in a particular manner, a certain proportion is oxygen and another hydrogen, and that the quantities lost and gained will be perfectly equal [to] the sum.† But here it is clear, in the first instance, that the electrical spark is not taken in or is taken in as a mechanical agent. It may be so, but we know that the contrary theory, namely that oxygen itself is only water combined with positive electricity, has been supported by very ingenious men, and we have never heard of any mathematical demonstration or position whatever. . . . ‡ Consequently a perfect theory is impossible in physics, but as far

* The report reads "theorem contemplarii".

† The report reads "at the sun".

‡ Something omitted? There is no indication in the report.

as we may essentially conclude for our purposes, we have seen the objects which belonged to them. Though it can never produce more than probability, we shall discover some one, which being taken for granted, will serve as a support to all the rest, will enable us to classify and to understand them. And therefore, out of every theory, as far as it is a just or plausible theory, there arises a just or plausible hypothesis, an hypothesis being only that fact which, in a multitude of facts, is observed as common to them all, and which being ascertained, the order and relation of all will be secured. But a law will arise from an hypothesis only when, having been once given, it at once supersedes both hypothesis and theory. From a perfect theory arises an hypothesis, that which we place under all; from a steadfast hypothesis arises a law; and from a primary independent or absolute law, a system.

Thus Sir Isaac Newton,⁽⁴⁴⁾ contemplating the abstracts of material bodies as weight, mass, and motion and the conditions of a perfect theory as far as bodies are considered exclusively under the conceptions of weight, mass, and motion, he made the bodies mathematical, for he contemplated them under those conditions only which he could state abstractly and as parts of a definition. From this arose his hypothesis of gravity, and from this again finally the law of gravitation, and thence forward neither theory nor hypothesis were further regarded. Nothing but the law was at all paid attention to, with the law dwelt power and prophecy, and by exclusive attention to the law it has been that late disciples of Sir Isaac Newton, [La Place]*⁽⁴⁵⁾ and others, have removed all the apparent difficulties in the theory of gravitation and turned them into the strongest confirmations of the same, as they must. But the progress of all great science is to labor at a law. The question then is will ever physics define . . . not the heavenly bodies in abstract but competent to the same bodies I answer . . . and the other instruments impossible that we should ever acquire through mere observation perfect theory, or in other words we can never be sure we have exhausted all the terms, that is that we have present to our knowledge all the agents and their relations. But whether physics may or may not be ultimately elevated into science and prophetic power, proceeding in the opposite direction, that is from law to hypothesis and from

* The reporter wrote "replace".

hypothesis to theory, the last of which will be [a mere suffiction]*, will depend of course upon the discovery or non-discovery of such a centre and this again on the . . . and this again on whether the forms of the human conscience . . . *mutatis mutandis* and whether an absolute is contemplable [*sic*] in every dependent and finite, but this is to conceal that scarcely had the present state of physics been removed from a law than the heavenly bodies appeared in the time of Kepler. . . . Now it is clear that the materialist excludes all facts that are not immediately the objects of his senses. By his very hypothesis he cannot have a theory, for he determines first of all rather to place effect for cause than to concede any one thing which his reason dictates if his senses do not at the same time give him a picture of it. The law which is to come, which is to fulfil, how this can ever arise from mechanism, which must be dependent constantly upon the accidents of the external world, and therefore of all others the least fit to control it, it would be useless to speak <of>. But hypotheses, or sub-fictions,† may be had in abundance. There may be atoms counteracted by atoms, and these again counteracted by yet finer, and so on to infinity; and if only you will grant three or four moderate requests such as those Leucippus‡ demanded: first of all atoms, some one of which is a great deal larger than the others, and having common powers of attraction and repulsion, and these so and so modified, then he will make a picture out of it, having taken care that all the contents of the picture shall be put in the definitions and the assumptions before given.

But if even in science it be pernicious, what must its effects be in morals and in religion? In religion it necessarily will lead either to atheism or to superstition—to atheism if it be driven into all its consequences. For a man who affirms boldly that what the senses have not given to his mind (which mind itself is but, like the senses, an organization of his body) that he will regard as nothing but words⁽⁴⁰⁾—that is, he will look for those impressions of the senses which he is aware of, and those are only motions§ of articulated air. Such a man cannot pretend to believe in a God. Consequently (God forbid I should say a

* *T. T.*, June 29, 1833.

† Suffictions? *Ibid.*

‡ The reporter wrote, and perhaps Coleridge said, by a slip of the tongue, "Lycurgus".

man may not be very virtuous and pious in consequence and that the human heart will not often rescue the human head, but I say, as a consequence), a reasonable man cannot profess to believe in a God unless at the same time he professes to have seen him and been acquainted with him. If he does that, it is what we should call superstition. And if without thinking, if he is a dogmatic materialist . . . by a corrupt and ignorant hierarchy he will worship statues, and imagine the same power into those statues which the more philosophic materialist imagines in his composition of particles, which are called atoms.* But this would be nothing, if it only left something in us to force a belief in God, which cannot be destroyed without destroying the basis of all truth. That is, it destroys the possibility of free agency, it destroys the great distinction between the mere human and the mere animals of nature, namely the powers of originating an act. All things are brought, even the powers of life are brought, into a common link of causes and effect that we observe in a machine, and all the powers of thought into those of life, being all reasoned away into modes of sensation, and the will itself into nothing but a current, a fancy determined by the accidental copulations of certain internal stimuli. With such a being, to talk of a difference between good and evil would be to blame a stone for being round or angular. The thought itself is repulsive. No, the man forfeits that high principle of nature, his free agency, which though it reveals itself principally in his moral conduct, yet is still at work in all departments of his being. It is by his bold denial of this, by an inward assertion, "I am not the creature of nature merely, nor a subject of nature, but I detach myself from her. I oppose myself as man to nature, and my destination is to conquer and subdue her, and my destination is to be lord of light, and fire, and the elements; and what my mind can comprehend, that I will make my eye to see, and what my eye can see, my mind shall instruct me to reach through the means of my hand, so that everywhere the lower part of my nature shall be taken up into the higher. And why? Because I am a free being. I can esteem, I can revere myself, and as such a being I dare look forward to permanence. As I have never yet called this body 'I', but only 'mine', even as I call my clothes so, I dare look forward to a continued consciousness, to a continued progression of my powers,

* The reporter wrote "organs".

for I am capable of the highest distinction, that of being the object of the approbation of the God of the Universe, which no mechanism can be. Nay further, I am the cause of the creation of the world. For what cause? To a Being whose ideas are infinitely more substantial than the things which are the results, or are created from them, what motive to create things that are not capable of right or wrong? What was there in them? Not reality. They existed with an infinitely greater reality in the mind. The Deity (*I*) knew in that which was God himself, which could come from God only, the will and power of becoming worthy of a return to that Maker." This I say is so sacred a privilege, that whatever dares to tell us that we are like the trees or like the streams, links in an inevitable chain, and that the assassin is no more worthy of abhorrence than the dagger with which he murders his benefactor, ⁽⁴⁷⁾ that man I say teaches treason against human nature and against the God of human nature.

Shall I be told, "this is scepticism only"? Oh, we have met with nothing like scepticism here. We have met in truth, with nothing but the most dogmatic assertions from the time of LEUCIPPUS to Hobbes, who was so far from anything like scepticism that he told Doctor Wallis* that he could demonstrate all Euclid was nonsense ⁽⁴⁸⁾ because he himself admitted that the eternal truth of mathematics† would be subversive of materialism. And from Hobbes to Condillac, ⁽⁴⁹⁾‡ who, having this objection made to him, that if all things were dispositions of material particles, or the result of them, you might ask what colour such a virtue was, answered with coolness, "Yes and very properly too, for as such a virtuous action is nothing but a generic term for so many particular acts, which particular acts are but so many combinations of motions of a particular man, which particular man must at that time have had such a coat on, with such and such impressions joining with that motion; such was the colour of his coat, such was the colour of the action." We would be surprised at this, but looking into Condillac's *Logic* ⁽⁵⁰⁾ you will find it asserted. But we have been told that a truly great man, Professor Kant, has justified this scepticism. Now that requires an answer.

* The reporter wrote "Willis".

† Supported by MS. Egerton 3057. The reporter wrote "metaphysics".

‡ MS. Egerton 2826, f. 393.

Kant has told us that there are certain great truths, which, though they are born in the reason, as ideas, even as the mathematical theorems are in the pure understanding, do not yet, and cannot, derive their reality from the reason; that in and of themselves, as far as the reason was concerned merely, we should say we cannot help from the nature of our reason having such ideas, and an existence therefore in the reason they undoubtedly have; but whether there be any reality correspondent to them, whether the being of God has likewise an existence, *that* not our reason can assure us.⁽⁶¹⁾ We believe it, because it is not a mere idea but a fact, that our conscience bids us do unto others as we would be done by, and in all things to make that a maxim of our conduct, which we can conceive without a contradiction as being the law of all rational being. This, says he, is a fact. But this being the case, there is a difference between regret and remorse, which is another fact; and these would be nonsense, they would not be facts, if there were not a free will. But *<for>* there being a free will, we should fall into an endless contradiction of nature. For one part of our nature forces us to demand a value in things, that is, their consequences with regard to our happiness. Another part of our nature demands that there should be a worth in things. I will explain myself in a moment. A man in a moment of hatred and revenge stabs me with a dagger. He happens to have opened an imposthume and brings about my health. That act is of value. Do I therefore love the man, or feel grateful to him? No, I feel grateful to Providence for using such an agent, but for him nothing but detestation. Why?—Because one part of my nature demanded worth and could not be satisfied with the value only.⁽⁶²⁾ Again, no man can pretend without insincerity to say he could . . . productive of no consequence but arising from the mind like a bubble of water bursting into nothing. No, however pure they were, however great the worth in the agent, we should still complain of the want of value.

Now our will is to a certain degree in our power, and where it is not it is owing to some prior fault of ours; but the consequences of that will are not in our power, and hence there arises a moral interest that a Being should be assumed in whom is the only will, and the power that involves all consequences as one and the same; which Being supposed, it then follows immediately that he who . . . and the consequences because his will marches under the

banners of omnipotence. This is Kant's scepticism. It is a modest humility with regard to the powers of the intellect. It was a means of curbing the pride of dogmatism because he had seen that Descartes and others had their doctrines turned round and used by Spinoza, and used [pantheistically, or by others hylozoistically in proof of a Supreme Being,]* that is, an unconscious something, that being every where is no where, that being every thing is no thing.

But what does he say of another kind of assertion? I will as literally as I can translate his words⁽⁵³⁾ when he says, "When the reason in things which concern super-sensual objects, such as the existence of God and a future state, is denied the right which belongs to her to speak first, then there is the door open to all fanaticism, to all superstition, and to atheism itself. I know not," says he, "but in some of the late writings of Jacobi and [Schleiermacher? Holbach?][†] I have heard of a philosophy which demonstrates the non-existence of a Deity, or at least asserts certain things, which being granted, such an idea becomes impossible. I have seen them say that it is directly against reason to believe in a soul or in a free will, that all consequent reasonings must necessarily lead to Spinozism", (that is to say, to matter and thought being one and the same thing, and matter having the priority so as to produce thought by organization). He goes on thus, "but that reason can easily give her full assent to that which it is not in her power to produce, that having herself produced the idea of a Supreme Being, of a free will, and of a future state, as a consequence she can then without pretending herself to prove the reality, gratefully receive such proof from revelation or from a moral *law* and its dictates—this I can understand. But when a man tells me that it is against his reason to believe such things, that all argument proves the contrary and yet pretends to believe it from a principle of faith, I am very glad that one thought remains to me, that he may be a fanatic and not a hypocrite, but one or the other must he be, as none but a hypocrite or a fanatic would pretend to believe by faith not only what is

* Based on a note on Tennemann, *op. cit.*, I. 216.

† The punctuation is tentative here where the length of the hiatus is unknown. It is possible that the sentence ends and a new one begins. And the limits of the quotation or paraphrase are also difficult to determine.

above his reason, but directly against it." Indeed I know no better definition of it.

And if you will allow me, I will conclude with one little allegory, if I may so express myself, by which some time ago I endeavoured to express my opinion between the materialist who would have nothing but what proceeded from his senses, and the philosopher who thought it not beneath him to look at the other part of his nature, namely his mind, and to see whether there he might not be led to some law which would render the objection from the other part of his nature intelligible. I have said, "Imagine the unlettered African, [or rude yet musing Indian, poring over an illuminated manuscript of the inspired volume, with the vague]* yet deep impression that his fates and fortunes are in some unknown manner connected with its contents. Every tint, every group† [of characters, has its several dream. Say that after long and dissatisfying toils he begins to sort, first the paragraphs that appear to resemble each other, then the lines, the words—nay, he has at length discovered that the whole is formed by the recurrence and interchanges of a limited number of cyphers, letters, marks, and points,]* which, however, in the very height and utmost [perfection of his attainment, he makes twentifold more numerous than they are, by classing every different form of the same character, intentional or accidental, as a separate element. And the whole is without soul or substance, a talisman of superstition, a mockery of science: or employed perhaps at last to feather the arrows of death, or to shine and flutter among the plumes of savage vanity.]* The poor Indian too truly represents the state of learned [and systematic]* ignorance—arrangement guided by the light of [no leading idea, mere orderliness without METHOD!

But see! the friendly missionary arrives.]* He explains to him the nature of written words, translates them for him into his native sounds, and thence into the thoughts of his heart—how many of these thoughts have evolved into consciousness! Henceforward the book is unsealed for him; the depth is opened out; he communes with the spirit of the volume as a living oracle. The words become transparent and he sees them as though he saw them not."

* *The Friend*, III. 247.

† The reporter wrote: "every tent, every grove"

And then too shall we be in that state to which science in all its form is gradually leading us. Then will the other great Bible of God, the Book of Nature, become transparent to us, when we regard the forms of matter as words, as symbols, valuable only as being the expression, an unrolled but yet a glorious fragment, of the wisdom of the Supreme Being.

LECTURE XIII

MARCH 22, 1819⁽¹⁾

MR. COLERIDGE'S LECTURE FOR THIS EVENING, the GERMAN PHILOSOPHY with its bearings on the System of Locke, comprising the systems of Leibnitz, Kant and Schelling. Thursday, Don Quixote: and on Monday next Mr. Coleridge will deliver his LAST ADDRESS as a PUBLIC LECTURER, with a review & application of the whole preceding course. Eight o'clock. The Lecture on the History & Influence of Dogmatical Materialism, with notes, is preparing for the Press.*

I trust that the very nature of the subjects on which I am to address you will of themselves inform you, that without compromising the very ends for which I stand here, you must derive your best amusement from that degree of information which it will be in my power to impart. The subject itself cannot be ornamented or impassioned without placing you in the very state of mind subversive of the objects which I have in view. There are few pursuits more instructive and not many more entertaining, I own, than that of retracing the progress of a living language for a few centuries, and its improvements as an organ and vehicle of thought, by desynonymizing words. Thus as late as the Restoration, for instance, "ingenuous" and "ingenious", "ingenuity" and "ingenuousness" were used indifferently the one for the other.⁽²⁾ "Propriety" was the common term for propriety of

* *The Times*. March 22. The announcement in the *Morning Chronicle* was the same, in the *New Times* briefer. The *Courier* for Saturday, March 20, carried a variant: "German Philosophers in relation to Locke," &c. And, "The Lecture on Dogmatic Materialism (the doctrine namely that life and mind exist only as results of organization) with the History and Influence of Empirical Dogmatism, from Democritus to the present day, is preparing for the press with notes and additions".

behaviour, for instance, and for property in the sense of estate or ownership. Thus from the Latin *magister*, softened by the Italians into *MAESTRI*, we have made "Mister" as well as "Master"—and thence "Miss" and "Mistress"—and use them as contradistinctions of age; and it would have been quite in the course of the progress of language if another pronunciation which actually exists,* "*MEESTer*", had been adopted by some great writer, Chaucer for instance, to express mastership, instead of† servant.

This is the progress of language. As society introduces new relations it introduces new distinctions, and either new words are introduced or different pronunciations. Now the duty of a philosopher is to aid and complete this process as his subject demands, and a distinction *THAT* has perhaps already begun in an adjective to carry ON INTO a substantive.‡—We should say, and be perfectly intelligible, that Cowley was *A* fanciful, Milton *AN* imaginative§ poet. The philosopher proceeds and establishes the same meaning—in fancy and imagination.⁽⁴⁾|| For active philosophical language differs from common language in this only, or mainly at least, that philosophical language does that more accurately, and by an express compact, which is unconsciously, and as it were by a tacit compact, aimed at and in part accomplished by the common language, though with less precision and consistency. Thus in the philosophic world, each contributing consistently to the finishing of that work, the rudiments of which each man *IN SOCIETY* at large is unconsciously aiding to furnish, the mighty machinery goes on, at once the *CONSEQUENCE AND THE MARK* of the symptoms of the mind, the mind of the nation which speaks it.

I have from the commencement of this course been honored and supported by the respectful attention of my auditors, so much that it might well seem at once unseemly and unthankful to request it on a particular occasion. But I may request you to

* NB. 25 adds: in our provincial rustic dialects⁽³⁾

† as opposed to?

‡ The report reads: a distinction that has perhaps almost already begun to carry an adjective to a substantive. NB. 25 supplies the correction and continues: Thus, common language gives a very different sense to the adjectives, fanciful and imaginative.

§ The report reads: imaginary.

|| NB. 25: and carries on the distinction into the substantives, fancy and imagination.

think with me,* to produce not a mere passive listening but an active concurrence for a few minutes while I define a few terms, which once thoroughly understood and then borne in mind, you will find little difficulty in following me or accompanying me through the present lecture. And here let me observe that the definitions of these terms are offered to you as verbal, not as real definitions, as explaining the *sense* in which certain terms are to be constantly employed, not as positively affirming the *truth* and *reality* of the sense so expressed.

I have named the pursuit of language entertaining as well as instructive; and in a great number of instances it really is so, but in all those subjects which require the mind to turn its attention inward upon its own operations, it cannot be done without thought; and thinking is an effort which habit only can render other than vain.† I proceed then to the definitions.⁽⁵⁾

First, that which appears by weight, or what in chemistry is called ponderable substance, is in philosophic language, *Body*.

Second, that which appears, but not by weight, or the imponderable substance, is *Matter*. (Thus sunshine we should not in common language call a body, though we might not hesitate to call it a material phaenomenon; but the painter alludes to a *body* of sunshine, because he alludes to the *PAINT* laid on to produce the resemblance.)

Thirdly, that which does not appear, which has no outwardness, but must be either known or inferred, but cannot be directly perceived, we call spirit or power.

Fourthly, in speaking of the world without us as distinguished from ourselves, the aggregate of phenomena ponderable and imponderable, is called nature in the passive sense,—in the language of the old schools, *natura* *NATURATA*—WHILE THE SUM OR AGGREGATE OF THE POWERS INFERRED AS THE SUFFICIENT‡ causes of the former (which by Aristotle and his followers were called the SUBSTANTIAL FORMS§) is nature in the active sense, or *natura naturans*.

Fifthly, on the other hand, when reflecting on ourselves as

* NB. 25: yet I will venture to entreat you not indeed to attend to me, but to think with me.

† NB. 25: make pleasurable.

‡ The reporter wrote "efficient".

§ The reporter wrote "actual fluid".

intelligences and therefore individualizing spirit OR power, that which affirms its own existence and whether mediately or immediately that of OTHER beings, we call Mind. I believe, if you ask yourselves, you will find that is the strict sense which you have been accustomed consciously or unconsciously to attach to the word.

Lastly, WHEN we contradistinguish the Mind or the percipient power from that which it perceives, the former has been (very conveniently, I think) entitled the subject and the latter the object.

Hence the mind may be defined as a subject which is its own object. And hence those who attribute a reality to bodies and to material phenomena, independent of the mind that perceives them, and yet assert equally an independent reality of the mind itself, namely those who believe in both immaterial and corporeal substances, or in the language of the day, in soul and body both, would define the body as merely AND PURELY OBJECTIVE; WHILE an idealist,* would declare the material and corporeal world to be wholly subjective, that is, to exist only as far as it is perceived. In other words, he, the idealist, (6) concedes a real existence to one of the two terms only—to the *natura naturans*, in Berkeley's language, to God, and to the finite minds on which it acts, THE NATURA NATURATA, or the bodily world, being the result, even as the tune between the wind and the Aeolian harp. I remember when I was yet young this fancy struck me wonderfully, and here are some verses I wrote on the subject:

"And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely framed
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual Breeze
At once the Soul of each and God of all." (7)

Now in and from this last view, that of the idealists I mean, arises the difficulty and perplexity of our metaphysical vocabulary. As long as the *subject*, that is the percipient, was opposed to the *object*, namely the thing perceived, all was clear. Again, in considering the finite MIND OR SOUL AS SELF-PERCIPIENT, OR A

* NB. 25: or what is called a Berkleian tho', as we have seen, the doctrine was taught & fully developed more than 2000 years before Bishop Berkley [sic] was born.

subject CAPABLE of becoming an immediate object to itself, but incapable of being an immediate object to any one other finite subject, there would be no great difficulty. A man's thoughts are known only to God and himself, as reduced, as a rule, to A GENERAL FORMULA—FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF REASONING—AS WE USE MARKS AND LETTERS IN ALGEBRA. But when not only the mind's self-consciousness, but all other things perceived by it, are regarded as modifications of itself, as disguised but actual modes of self-perception, then the whole ground of the difference between subject and object appears gone. All is subject, and the sole distinction is: first, between that which not only is, but is thought of by us as being such, and that which indeed truly *is* so no less than the former, but which we think of as being THE contrary. By way of illustration: man contemplates the image of his friend. Not only his recollection of the friend is in his mind, but he contemplates it as such; but when his friend is present, though according to the idealist that impression is as much in his mind as the former, he yet considers it to be external and independent of himself. Secondly, the distinction between that which all men are, by the common necessity, constrained so to imagine, and that which is accidental and individual—as for instance all men in a sane state are compelled to see the objects which all others at least see around them, as compared with the man who, in a fever or delirium, blends objects which no man else perceives—so that one of the elder idealists will state the subject according to his view of it, that when we are awake we have a dream in common, when asleep every man has a dream of his own; that is, when we are awake we have a world in common and when we are asleep every man has a world of his own—

We have only to reverse this order of thought, and we shall have the opposite result, that of the materialist. All HERE is merged in the objective, as the former in the subjective, and this reduced, as before, into the general and permanent and the particular AND transitory. The thought* of a TABLE†, according to the materialist differs from the TABLE itself, not by essential invisibility or by being essentially imponderable, but only because this portion of the brain is too thin and subtle to be perceptible of weight, and it is truly owing to the defect of our organs that we cannot

* NB. 25: "and image" was inserted here and then crossed out.

† The reporter wrote "tale" here and below.

weigh our thoughts or measure our perceptions. Henceforward THEREFORE "OBJECTIVE" ACQUIRED TWO MEANINGS, THE FIRST BEING THE REALITY OF ANY THING, OUTWARDLY CORRESPONDENT TO OUR PERCEPTION OR NOTION* thereof, independent of the perception itself, and the second, meaning the universality of the perception as arising out of inherent laws of human nature in opposition to the accidental state of any one individual percipient. That grass is green is an instance of the former; that it appears yellow to a man in the jaundice (if such be the fact) would be an instance of the latter.

Still, most serious difficulties started, and have been stated with incomparable clearness by Lord Bacon in his *Novum Organum*.⁽⁸⁾ It is thus: that the human understanding itself is but an individuality in nature, having its own peculiar organization,† and modifying all objects, even its own form of self-consciousness, no less than the forms seen as external, by its own peculiar appropriate perspective. In the language of our British Plato, there are not only Idols of the Den, the Theatre, and the Market Place—the Idols or delusions of our passions, of our imagination, and of custom and habit, but Idols of the RACE. And consequently the utmost that rational conviction can AMOUNT to is, not that this or that is true by any inherent necessity, but only that it is TRUE for man, that he is‡ compelled so to perceive and so to conceive, and the deductions thus drawn can be questioned only by those who admit themselves to be deranged—that is, not in the same order with their fellow-men. To what an extent this position has been carried by ancient and modern sceptics it will be sufficient that I remind you by one observation of Mr. Hume's in the *Essays* in the form in which they first appeared: namely, that if spiders had been theologians§ they would have been under the necessity of concluding that the world had been spun;⁽⁹⁾ and that—
 <BUT A PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURE WILL BE NO EXGUSE FOR RE-
 PEATING BLASPHEMY—AND I STOP>|| though a philosopher <said it>.

* The reporter wrote "motions".

† NB. 25: idiosyncrasy or peculiar organism

‡ NB. 25: by the very mechanism of his nature. (Coleridge obviously wished to avoid any misunderstanding that he was fighting on the enemy's side by using this phrase.)

§ The report reads: theologicians.

|| MS. Egerton 3057 gives substantially the same reading as the NB. and therefore I insert it, though there is no gap in the report.

One question would occur to every reflecting hearer. Pray would this THEOLOGICAL spider have the power of DOUBTING* its own perception and conclusion? If so, and if the spider be but a nickname for a rational Being, proposed† for misleading the fancy by a *verbal* association, and the spider means no more than a serious sober man arguing in defence of his Maker, must there not be some other faculty above this mechanism by which man is adapted to his present circumstances? Must there not be some power, call it with Lord Bacon the “LUMEN‡ SICCCUM”; or “the pure light”, with LORD HERBERT; CALL IT “REASON”, or call it the “Faith of Reason” <WITH KANT>,§ must there not be some power that stands in human nature but in some participation of the eternal and the universal by which man is enabled to question, nay to contradict, the irresistible|| impressions of his own senses, NAY, the necessary deductions of his own understanding—to CHALLENGE and disqualify them, as partial and INCOMPETENT?

Think you that the man who even first dared suggest to his own mind the thought that the sun did not really rise, did not really move through the heavens, but that this was the first prospect of his eye and his position only, think you that a man who, diseased, and beholding plainly before him such and such objects, dared say that these things are not so, was <not?> at the same time conscious of something nobler than his perceptions themselves? CAN a machine or any part of a machine pass out of itself? If it can, what becomes of the famous doctrine, that our ideas have no other pretence to truth except as they are generalizations or classifications and¶ impressions passively RECEIVED through the mechanisms of sense and sensation? But I need not inform you that a numerous class of modern philosophers assert no such faculty exists; (10) the notion is a mere abortion of pride engendered in the imagination. But still, though I call, not improperly, this class numerous, they yet appear numerous in consequence of their fewness,** of their contrariety of opinions to the feelings of mankind

* The report reads: fitting.

† NB. 25: imposed

‡ The reporter wrote “Roman”.

§ NB. 25 is again supported by MS. Egerton 3057.

|| In the notes, “necessary” was crossed out and “irresistible” substituted.

¶ of?

** NB. 25: paucity

in general, which makes me wonder so many would be found entertaining such doctrines.

Still, I say it must make us pause, that positions asserted to differ from noise only by the sounds being articulated, that positions which are affirmed to have no origin of any kind but delusion, and which traced to their source will be found to arise from sophisms of the mere imagination, that these absurd doctrines should have been held not only by the mass of mankind of all ages, but by the best and the wisest, even by those whom these very philosophers are obliged to place forward in their list whenever they have the occasion to enumerate the chief luminaries and benefactors of the race, that these absurd positions should be the groundwork of all law, so inwoven in all languages that we may scarcely find a materialist or an atheist to talk consistently with his own opinions any five minutes, and that they should be taken for granted in every thing that distinguishes man from the brute even in the degree in which he is so distinguished, for these philosophers are compelled by their own principles to deny any distinction between us and the brute in kind. However, be this as it may, the facts remain as I have stated, and if I have succeeded in rendering them intelligible, and comparatively short, they will explain the subjects of this lecture,* which is the object with which I have stated them.

I am so deeply impressed with the benefit which we all receive by the associations of love and honor with the names of great men in past times, how much they make up the historical feeling of a country and give to every individual who has cultivated his intellect a pride of heraldry far beyond that which a descendant of Julius Caesar would enjoy, if he contemplated his own family merely from himself, that I shrink from violating any genuine persuasion in favor of a man's greatness and never indeed approach to it, unless, where I can at the same moment offer him a substitute and feel at least in my own mind the belief that the pain he suffers at the moment will be more than compensated by the pleasure that follows. This I certainly feel more especially when I speak of Mr. Locke.⁽¹¹⁾ My conscience bears me witness

* NB. 25: & I shall be found to have economized my time even by the length of my introductory matter.

First, of Locke.

(The notes in the notebook came to an end here. There appear to have been some additional ones, now in MS. Egerton 2801. See footnotes below.)

that it is not from any neglect of studying his writings or of seeking for assistance from those who have professed to do so, but sincerity compels me to say that after all the study and all the assistance, I could never discover any one thing to account for that prodigious impression that seems to have been made, either in the novelty of the sentiments or in the system of those which are peculiar to him.

I verily believe myself that the case stood thus: we were becoming a commercial people; we were becoming a free people, in enjoyment, as we had always been in right. Mr. Locke's name, and his services, which of themselves would be sufficient to immortalize him, had connected his name with that of freedom, and that of the revolution from the natural attachment of old and established learned bodies to old and established political bodies which had been their protectors. It was not to be wondered that those who were supposed to teach the philosophy of past times were found mainly amongst those who supported the old forms of government; it was [*also to be expected*] and <stated> that the same great revolution was to go on in mind that had been going on in state affairs, and that as King William had completely done away with all the despotism of the Stuarts, so Mr. Locke had done away altogether with the nonsense of the Schoolmen and the universalists. In consequence of which, people read <him> who had never once examined the subject or thought about it, and found some monstrous absurdities that they themselves had never heard of before, and they found them most ably confuted.⁽¹²⁾ To those absurdities they attributed all they had connected in their own minds with the abuses and miseries of former ages, utterly neglecting the good at the time. They had considered this as a new light stepping into the world; and it is not once or two or three times that I have heard it stated, when I referred to the writers before William the Third, "Oh, you forget, there was no light till Locke". Milton, Shakespeare and so on were forgotten. They were poets! But it is clear the reign of good sense came in with Locke.

Now one of the followers of Locke, Hume, who has carried the premises to the natural consequences, has allowed that he did not completely understand the first book of Locke, what was understood and what overthrown; but I believe it may be traced historically nearer that Descartes was the first man who made nature utterly lifeless and godless, considered it as the subject

of merely mechanical laws.⁽¹³⁾ And having emptied it of all its life and all that made it nature in reality, he referred all the rest to what he called "spirit", consequently "the faculty of spirit" in relation to this "matter". What must be then the perception? What was it then to perceive? What was it not? For mechanical laws prevented his admission of that. (Not, as the old Platonists would have said, perceiving the things outward; physiology had advanced too far to render that attainable.) He therefore conceived what he called "material ideas". That is, he supposed that as there were in the soul causative powers which produced images for it, so there were in the brain certain modes that pre-existed in itself and which determined it to receive such and such impressions rather than others, and these he had called "material ideas". And in consequence of their origin being in the organization itself, he had named them "innate ideas", in both senses; first of all, the true ideas, or spiritual ones, he conceived as having their birth place in the mind; and secondly, those material ideas he considered innate, as having their birth place in the organization. But the Jesuit, Voetius,⁽¹⁴⁾* before Locke wrote, had attacked this on the ground that Locke proceeds on, but the answer Descartes (who was a truly great man) makes† is this: "I said innate not connate,‡ I spoke of the birthplace not the time. Do you suppose that either I or any man in his senses,⁽¹⁵⁾ nay, I will add, that any man out of his senses, could imagine such an absurdity as that men heard *before* they heard, that they had images *before* they saw? These things are too absurd to be attributed to any man in his senses, much more to a philosopher." But still admitting that, and taking Descartes without his material hypothesis at all, nothing can be more simple than what he says or more agreeable to common sense. And what indeed was not first stated by Descartes it would <not> be difficult to find anywhere among the Schoolmen⁽¹⁶⁾ in which you will§ find the

* MS. Egerton 2826, f. 286; the report reads "Grotius"; MS. Egerton 3057. Boetius.

† MS. Egerton 3057 inserts: to Mr. Locke's fancied refutation of his system and prove Locke not only to be the refuter but the absolute instigator & only possessor of any such ideas as he attempted to destroy.

‡ The report reads: quallate. The correct reading is found in MS. Egerton 2826, f. 286. "*innatus non connatus dixi, locum non tempus oriundi. . .*"

§ The "not" inserted above is deleted here. The reading is supported by *Notes Theological, &c.*, 264.

same things said, or among the ancient metaphysicians, which is simply this: that there must be a difference in the perceptions of a mouse and a man, but this difference cannot be in the object perceived but in the percipient; that therefore, says Descartes, we have reason to suppose that there are two sorts of ideas or thoughts. If, says he, two really be two, (these are Descartes' own words and I am now speaking logically and as a grammarian, not as a mathematician) if there are two, *they show these* differences. One is of those thoughts or images in which we are conscious of being passive; those which are impressed upon us whether we will or no, and those (as appearing to have their causes externally) we call external ideas. But, says he, there are others in which the mind is conscious of its own activity, and tracing its own operations, forms notions which from the place of their origin are all innate ideas. He then goes on with a definition which is noticeable (you may see it in his answer to Voetius*) by being word for word the same as Locke's definition of the ideas of reflection, so that in truth the man-of-straw that was to be thrown down never existed, but the real assertion to be opposed was not merely in substance but *totidem verbis* [identical with] the idea in Locke's "ideas of reflection."

The abuse of the word "idea" by Descartes and Locke⁽¹⁷⁾ I shall not further speak of, and therefore I simply say, and most happy should I be to stand corrected by any man who could give me better information, that if you only substitute for the phrase the ideas being *derived from* the senses, or *imprest upon* the mind, or in any way supposed to be brought in—for nothing can be more mechanical or pagan-like than the phrases used in the *Essay on the Human Understanding*—if for this you only substitute the word *elicit*(*ed*), namely that there are no conceptions of our mind relatively to external objects but what are *elicited* by their circumstances and by what are supposed to be correspondent to them, there would be nothing found in Locke but what is perfectly just. (But at the same time I must say, nothing but what is perfectly known, has been taught from the beginning of time to the end.) And with regard to the rest, the grammatical part, I think I took the fairest way of convincing myself that a man could. I took the abridgement of his work published at Cambridge for the use of the young men at the University, and having it interleaved, from

* MS. Egerton 2826, f.286. The report this time reads "Boetius".

Descartes and with no other guide, I wrote opposite to each paragraph the precise same thing written before, not by accident, not a sort of hint that has been given, but directly and connectedly the same. The question therefore amounts precisely to this: Mr. Locke's phrases seem to say that the sun, the rain, the manure, and so on, had made the wheat, had made the barley and so forth; but we cannot believe that a man who was certainly a very wise man in his generation could have meant this and that he was only misled in the expressions from his not being made apprehensive of the consequences to be deduced from them. If for this you substitute the assertion that a grain of wheat might remain for ever and be perfectly useless and to all purposes non-apparent, had it not been that the congenial sunshine and proper soil called it forth—everything in Locke would be perfectly rational.* I am only standing in amazement to know what is added to it, for never have I been able to learn from repeatedly questioning these Lockians what was done. The only answer has been, "Did he not overthrow innate ideas?"

Locke is no materialist. He teaches no doctrines of infidelity, whatever may be deduced from them. In his controversy with the Bishop of Worcester,⁽¹⁸⁾ speaking of substance, when the Bishop says substance can never be brought to an image, . . . that which stands under every possible image precluded this—what is Locke's answer? "I never denied the mind could form a just image of itself by reflection and deduction." So that, in truth, those who have drawn the doctrines of mere materialism from Locke certainly drew what he never intended to draw. And with regard to the rest, I remain as before. I have not yet been able to discover the ground, or any ground, why I should calumniate all the great men that went before him in compliment to any one idol, however deserving of praise in other respects, as to say that, because Locke told us, in defining words, we ought to have distinct images or conceptions, [*and therefore we ought to have an image or a conception of an idea*], which Cicero never heard of and which was a strange thing to Plato. But I can very easily understand that *<in>* men with far less merit than Locke, and even men who wrote more entertainingly. (For that is a great thing—when a book has once got a

* MS. Egerton 3057 continues: Indeed his terms throughout are mechanical and waggon-like. It may be shortly said he did not destroy the Innate Ideas he combatted.

character, if it should be so dull that nobody should read it afterwards, it saves the reputation for centuries; this we have had instances of in others.)

Many circumstances combined (*the names of Locke and Newton*) at the time. The first was that Descartes had had his physical prophecies and other parts of his mechanical system overthrown by Sir Isaac Newton⁽¹⁹⁾ but the [metaphysical parts, it was said, by Locke; though rather it was the case that his (Descartes') epistemological theory of innate ideas turned up in another form]* as Locke's ideas of reflection. Therefore one great man had overthrown the physical parts and another the metaphysical† parts and to that circumstance we owe entirely the custom of talking of "Locke and Newton", to that accident entirely.

The next thing was that Voltaire and others before him both in France and in Germany, had held up [*Maupertuis, and Leibnitz,*] a truly great man, but as a sort of rival to our Newton;⁽²⁰⁾ and any one who has read the literary and scientific history of that time well knows that nothing in politics would excite more fury than the controversy concerning the arithmetic, as to who was the inventor. This again interested the natural‡ feelings. But Leibnitz supposed [a *plenum*, a pre-established harmony, but he was a visionary, a fantastic fellow and was treated with bitterness and contempt by Newton's understrappers];§ and here again there was another connection made between Locke and Newton. He was opposed to Leibnitz, and the [*calculus of fluxions*] which had been invented by our Newton.

At that time, too, we know well the very great heats that there were between the high church and the low church, and at the same time the existence of a middle party who, while they kept to the church, yet still favored all the tolerant opinions and in general what was termed the most rational way of interpreting the religion. But Locke was . . . while the clergy at large and the religious people found that in an age when the philosophers were beginning to be notorious as infidels, there was a man of true piety who wrote very edifying comments (as they really are) on the Scriptures, and those won *that* party; while the infidels such as

* Adapted from MS. Egerton 3057 and MS. Egerton 2801, f.19.

† The report reads "mathematical". Corrected from MSS. referred to above.

‡ National?

§ MS. Egerton 2801, f.19, adapted.

Voltaire⁽²¹⁾ and others cried him up beyond all bounds. He was the true modest man. He had referred all things to the effects, to mind [as the result of sensation. It is interesting to compare the scepticism of another disciple, Hume,]* who, smiling at Mr. Locke's deductions, said they were merely amulets against priestcraft, take them in the lowest sense (which Locke did not intend).

If you doubt, just refer to the beginning of Hume's essay on *Cause and Effect*; you will find immediately the channels made on Locke's opinions. Everywhere it is *(argued)*, you have no real truth but what is derived from your senses. It is in vain to talk of your ideas of reflection, for what are they? They must have been originally in our senses or there is no ground for them. So many circumstances combined together as to make it a kind of national pride, in the first place, and secondly the interest of almost each of the parties to cry up Mr. Locke. And the effect is shewn more especially that the most ingenious, I think some of the finest works of philosophy for that period, those produced by the great Stillingfleet and others, were not merely put down at once as trash out of fashion, but it was said that Stillingfleet had died of a broken heart in consequence of his defeat by Locke; though wherein the man was to become defeated till we can find how Locke differed from others is for other considerations. I can, therefore, say this finally with regard to Locke, that it was at the beginning of a time when they felt one thing: that the great advantage was to convince mankind that the whole process of acting† upon their own thoughts or endeavouring to deduce any truth from them was mere presumption, and henceforward men were to be entirely under the guidance of their senses. This was most favourable to a country already busy‡ with politics, busy with commerce and in which yet there was a pride in human nature, so that a man would not like to remain ignorant of that which had been called the Queen of Sciences; which was supposed above all things to elevate§ the mind; which had produced a word which a man had overthrown, had [exploded one of the distinctions of rank and title],|| that of philosopher. What a delight to find it all nonsense! that

* MS. Egerton 2801, f. 19, adapted.

† The report reads: reacting.

‡ MS. Egerton 3057 reads: bustling.

§ The report reads: alleviate.

|| MS. Egerton 3057.

there was nothing but what a man in three hours might know as well as the Archbishop of Canterbury!*

This exactly suited the state of the nation, and I believe it was a symptom of that state of Providential government of the world, which observed the nearer union of the kingdoms of Europe to each other. What in a former time had been distinctions co-existing in each country were now to be a distinction of whole countries. Formerly we were to have the men who employed their senses chiefly, and those again who employed their brains and their spirits, all in one country. The time had come when, by a subdivision of labor, one country was to employ its brains, another its hands, and another its senses.⁽³²⁾ There was a subdivision among the countries which before had been made between the inhabitants of the several countries, and this was evident in Germany. Germany never had the advantages that this country has, never had that fulness of occupation by commerce, never that deep interest in the affairs of the whole which constitutes the pride, and is perpetually improving the faculties, of Englishmen, who still carry their country home to their fireside. But on the other hand it had many and great advantages of its own. It was the number of its universities, and the circumstance that the learned or studied men formed a sort of middle class of society correspondent to our middle class, and the very absence of nationality *<that>* gave to the Germans, as they became cosmopolites, as they are the only cosmographical people,† the only writers truly impartial in their accounts of other nations. If they err, it has been from want of information or wrong premises, but never from any national feeling whatsoever. And the same cause, rendering the outward world of less importance to them, rendered each man of more advantage to them, made them a thinking, metaphysical people. In other words, their defect, for in every nation and every individual put your hand upon the defect of a nation and you will find there its excellence, and upon its excellence you will find there its defect, so it is the defect of Germany to be for ever reasoning and thinking, and in other countries, perhaps happier, to have a great aversion to thinking at all.

* MS. Egerton 3057 after "nonsense": that a few hours could make us fit for the See of Canterbury or place us upon an equality with a life of Study.

† MS. Egerton 3057.

Now Leibnitz first opposed Lockean philosophy as then understood in the simplest manner in which it could be opposed. Mr. Locke's followers had repeated "there is nothing in the mind which was not before in the senses." Leibnitz⁽²³⁾ added [*"praeter ipsum intellectum"*]*—except the mind itself"; and he then proceeds, in his own language, to demonstrate in the most beautiful manner that all those puzzling laws which appeared, which Locke had in vain endeavoured to draw from external objects (while in truth the very first process presupposed the knowledge of the contrary, as for instance, the very first process to limit a space presupposes the want of limit: if I draw in my imagination a circle or a sphere I must have a preconception of the unlimited before I can examine the limit itself) he shewed that all the subjects at all in controversy were the operations of the intellect itself, that they were not indeed *things*, but they were *acts* of mind, or forms. And in a manner that was as elegant as in reality it was forcible in demonstration, he shewed that there were two points in which Mr. Locke's philosophy was altogether disorder; in that, first of all, which I have just now mentioned, that every one of those experiences to which he refers presupposed a certain something in the mind as the condition of that experience. And he admits, as Kant has afterwards done, that Locke was not unaware of this, that though it did not enter into his plan and though it was afterwards received by many of his followers, yet he speaks of "predisposing causes" in the mind, which would really amount to no more than this, the *acts* of the mind itself. The next point which he pressed on the Lockians is this: all we know of matter and the external world is transient, and to everything which refers to reality we attribute a something particular, the dependence upon particular time, particular space, whereas there are a whole class of truths which are distinguished by their universality, by their necessity. As for instance, I will take two truths of which every man that now hears me is as much convinced practically of one as of the other, namely: the first, the sun will rise tomorrow, and second that the two sides of a triangle continue greater than the third side. We are convinced of it, but we feel the diversity of the two propositions. There is no *absurdity*, however *wild*, if a man were to say, "It is my opinion that the sun will not rise tomorrow, that in the night the system will be destroyed", there is no *absurdity* in the thing. But should a

* *B.L.* (1817), I. 137.

man tell you that in a month or two the two sides of a triangle will be less than the third, then you know he is talking a language he does not understand, for madness could not conceive or attach a meaning to the words. Where is this to be derived from? The nature of the mind itself. What is this mind? Reduce it to a result of the organization of matter and it must inevitably partake of all that is transitory in this matter of which it is a property. Suppose it to be the mind itself, and not matter, then we ask what in the name of wonder can be the organs of a mind? What is the *mechanism* of the mind? What are these but vague words that can after all come to nothing more than what we express by the word "ideas"? What we know of our own mind we know by its thoughts. What are the thoughts? Are they, for instance, particles or corpuscles? We are too apt to use words derived from external objects, that I verily believe: that many a man, before he asked himself the question, would imagine his mind made of thoughts as a wall is of bricks, till he asks whether he ever separated a thought from a thought, whether there was a meaning in the word "thought", except as the mind thinking in such a situation, whether a notion of any plurality, or anything we can call construction, takes place in our experience. We are aware of no such thing. The mind passes on, and in vain would it be to distinguish thought from thought till we had reduced it to words and by distinction of pen or of printer we had made them visible. Then our eyes recognize the character, find out divisions, but the senses discover none. Such might be called the philosophy of Leibnitz in relation to Mr. Locke. A far higher ground is taken as he stands on his own system.⁽²⁴⁾

I have not felt myself allowed, from the limits which my lectures have placed round me, to enter particularly on Spinoza,⁽²⁵⁾ because the "substance" of his life, I could have said, I have been obliged to anticipate first in the account of the Eleatic school, the idealists of old, and secondly in the account of the new* Platonists. But great impressions has Spinoza made on the minds of the learned and an impression on the theologians. And the theologic hatred of his name is one of the most incomprehensible parts of philosophic researches. For Spinoza was originally a Jew, and he held the opinions of the most learned Jews, particularly the Cabalistic philosophers. Next he was of the most pure and

* neo-Platonists?

exemplary life and it has been said of him, if he did not think as a Christian, he felt and acted like one. Thirdly, so far from proselytizing, this man published not a system (it was a posthumous work published against his will) but what is still more strong, he was offered by a German prince a high salary with perfect permission to preach his doctrines without the least danger. Instead of accepting this he wrote to the prince to reprimand him for his neglect of his duty, and asked him what right he had, to abuse the confidence the Fathers of Germans had placed in him, opposite to their wish.⁽²⁶⁾ And if we come at last to the man's own professions and service, I have no doubt they were **<SEVERELY ORTHODOX>**.^{*} I have seen many questions [raised as to the compatibility of Spinozism with religion, natural and revealed, and now am persuaded][†] to believe that not only the immediate publishers[‡] of Spinoza's writings but that Spinoza *did* think that his system was identical **<not>** with atheism but **<with>** that of Christianity,⁽²⁷⁾ on so subtle a point that at least it was pantheism, but in the most religious form in which it could appear. For making the deity that which is independent, which is certain in and of itself and needs no argument, but which is implied in all other truth, and by making all other truths dependent upon that, beyond any other system of pantheism, it divided the deity from the creature. On the other hand I am far from hiding the inevitable consequences of pantheism in all cases, whether the pantheism of India⁽²⁸⁾ or the solitary cases **<like that>** of § Spinoza. He erred, however, where thousands had erred before him; in Christian charity, communicating his opinions to those only from whom he expected information. And to end all, the quiet family in which he lived, when he was too ill to attend services publicly, he still kept regularly to their duty, and when they came home, as regularly examined them and made them repeat the sermon and comment upon it according to their impressions. A character like that, so unlike an infidel, scarcely exists and I cannot understand the cause ["why then", as Lessing observes, "is no man to speak of Spinoza but"]|| as a dead dog".⁽²⁹⁾

* NB. 25.

† *B.L.* (1817), I. 144, adapted.

‡ Ludovicus Meyer, the editor. MS. Egerton 2801, f.3.

§ The report reads "classes of".

|| MS. Egerton 3057. Also in MS. Egerton 2801, f.2v.

At this time Leibnitz had the courage to say that Spinoza's *arguments* were inevitable, were it not that the *system* of [*Spinozism*] could not be defended. He had (that is Spinoza) affirmed there were [*particles of matter*] transitory as the waves of the sea, having no other qualities naturally but what arise externally from their relation to each other. Leibnitz taught* the system of Spinoza, namely that the deity, as the great Mind, not merely *modified into* thoughts as our minds do, but *gave* each thought a reality, and that the deity was really different from all creatures by that thing—[the pre-conception of things conceived].† His thoughts were more real than the effects of them, that therefore He gave a reality to those thoughts, and that whatever was possible became real, not merely as thoughts, nor yet by a participation of the reality, but by a communication of this reality to that which was so thought by the deity. And when he was called on to explain the nature of the body and its relation to the mind, he first of all joined with Spinoza in overthrowing the doctrine of Descartes. And here if you will permit me I will pause for a few moments on this the most interesting part of the subject as referring to the doctrine of materialism.

The only argument that I believe ever really disturbs men of sincere and sober minds is that which is derived from the seeming truth of a decay of the mind with the body. We see it, they say, grow with the body, with the organization; as the organization is affected, we see it affected, and when that decays, this decays. This is, however, a mere sophism of the fancy. For first it asserts universally what in any sense is true only partially; and certain faculties of memory may awaken into judgment and seem to increase. Again it asserts of all what holds good only of some. A man from the time he has the use of his will devotes it entirely to his bodily pleasure, or to his ambition, or power, or a desire of making money,⁽³⁰⁾ constantly, and thus he occupies his mind from youth till he is feeble; and do you wonder at last when the whole joke is discovered, when the pleasure is no longer pleasure, when the ambition has sickened, and when money is representative of the world with the folly of men, do you wonder that a mind, so naked of all that could remain and be permanent, felt at the same time a necessity of withdrawing all attention from

* The report reads "thought".

† MS. Egerton 3057.

the organs of outward perception which presented no symbols of aught that any longer interested it? But compare such a mind with Newton, with Leibnitz who died fainting away in the act of a great discovery. Or trace the history of the great Greek philosophers and poets; refer to Titian and Michael Angelo, and there see whether or no the picture of an old age, of manhood, and that which had been used to what was noble, praiseworthy, and permanent, does not present a different picture. Or go into humble life, take the true modest Christian who has passed a life of struggle with self-will, who has watched to love his neighbour as himself, and who entertains a constant faith that not merely the outward body and clothings but the greater part of our intellectual vanity will be as useless in the state into which he is passing as the thoughts of a grub which has passed three years in the mud would be to the butterfly when risen out of the stream, but who had passed the time, in what? In rendering the will productive, in giving the will a causative power and fitting it for a higher state. Take the [*flesh*] of which man is born, observe the glory with which it is conquered,* and then tell us that because the memory of some insignificant circumstance is weakened, or that the man can no longer talk so as to excite applauses, therefore the whole mind is gone! No, when we are most and best ourselves, all that remains and all that could decay is but the marks on the caterpillar's skin; it is the loss of the caterpillar faculty which the new life of society is beginning to do without.

But again it is the truth it presumes, a truth of materialism which yet, after the point allowed it, is more than a [*hysteron proteron*].† It is a begging of the question. It assumes the conclusion as the very ground upon which it is to begin. For suppose a fact that A and B live and decay together, surely it does not follow therefore that B is the cause of A! . . . if the mind or the power from within . . . nay all the analogy of nature is in favor . . . and in the other from without and so too it would be though A and B taken as the mind and the organization . . . the mind and body immediately by a miracle according to Descartes, or by some common thing between partaking of the nature both of body and soul, according to one Doctor Henry More. Now a phenomenon that admits of equal solution from four different hypotheses cannot in any

* crowned?

† Or, after *B.L.* (1817), I. 137, σόφισμα ἐτερο-ζήτησεως?

common sense be thought to prove the truth of any one of them.—Why then does it strike us?—The answer is simply this, because the impressions upon our senses are always more vivid—those* connected with sensation—than those connected with thought; and this all must be struck with who mistake vivid pictures for clear perceptions. The very circumstances of this bribery in favor of the doctrine, contrasted with the fact that the doctrine is held in abhorrence by mankind in general, is decisive of it, for we act against a bribe in our nature. This forms the last part of the Leibnitzian philosophy which, rejecting . . . this was however too opposite to common sense, and for Leibnitz to Kant, and Voltaire . . . was all that remained. The rest was falling apace into the Eclectic system [*which dismissing not only all system but all logical connection picked and chose whatever was most plausible and showy*][†] and from that [*developed a disease*][†] which, instead of being any philosophy at all, was a direct unmanning of the mind and rendering it incapable of any systematic thinking.

In this wretched state was (not only) Germany when Kant arose.⁽³¹⁾ His merits consisted in three things, mainly. The first was that he examined the faculties critically before he hazarded any opinions concerning the positions which such faculties had led men to establish. He entered into a real examination of the balance before he would suffer any weights to be put in the scale, and thus he did as alone could be done at that time upon the ground of reflection, taking the human mind only as far as it became an object of reflection. In this way he saw that there were two classes of truth received by men: the one, he observed, were truths of experience and were uncertain in conviction, and increased by accumulation, so that what was but faintly believed for the first month became more the second, and more the third, and perhaps many centuries passed before it came to full perception; and even here in England was susceptible of alteration and change. Other truths he perceived to be immediately susceptible to the conviction they produced the moment they were understood; they were as certain as they would be after 1000 years of attention. He perceived that the one were necessarily particular, the other universal; the one necessarily contingent, the others

* The report is confused. I have substituted "those" for "and" and after "struck with" (below) I have deleted "it".

† *B.L.* (1817), I. 281-2.

bearing in themselves the absurdity of their contrary.⁽³²⁾ And he affirmed therefore that here we had found a criterion of the acts of the mind, or the forms which arise out of the mechanism of the mind itself, and of this, if I may so call it, *substance* of reality which the sensations gave to us.

But still he carried this to a greater extent, for while he admitted that there was a power in the reason of producing ideas to which there were no actual correspondents in outward nature, and therefore they were only to be regarded as regulative, he was then asked or rather he asked himself, what would become of the ideas of God, of the free will, of immortality?⁽³³⁾ For these too were the offspring of the reason, and these, too, it would be said, were merely regulative forms to which no outward or real correspondent could be expected. Here, then, he disclosed what I may call the [p]roof of his Christianity, which rendered him truly deserving the name philosopher—and not the analysis of the mind. He says,⁽³⁴⁾ “In my [*Critique of the Pure Reason we have not entered*]* into the whole human being. There is yet another, and not only another but a far higher and nobler constituent of his being, his will, the practical reason, and this does not announce itself by arguing but by direct command and precept: thou shalt do to others as thou wouldst be done by: thou shalt act so that there shall be no contradiction in thy being.” And from this he deduced a direct moral necessity for the belief, or the faith of reason; and having first shewn that though the reason could bring nothing positively coercive in proof of religious truths, which if it could it would cease to be religion and become mathematical, yet he demonstrated nothing could be said with reason against them; and that on the other hand there was all the analogy, all the harmony of nature, all moral interests, and last of all there was a positive command which, if he disobeys, he is at once a traitor to his nature—nay, even to his common nature.

Such were I think the great merits of Kant. I have not mentioned a particular merit he had, namely that by first clearly shewing the nature of space and time, as† habits, not of thinking as Leibnitz supposed, but of‡ the perception, he secured it. . . the

* Adapted from MS. Egerton 3057. Or did Coleridge perhaps baffle the reporter by giving the title in German?

† The report reads “and”.

‡ The report reads “by”.

Platonist, of a pre-existent light, on the one hand, and the degrading notions of the materialists which considered it as chemistry, or an empirical proof. This was a great merit. But still greater was it that he determined the nature of religious truth and its connexion with the understanding and made it felt to the full that the reason itself, considered as merely intellectual, was but a subordinate part of our nature; that there was a higher part, the will and the conscience; and that if the intellect of man was the cherub that flew with wings* it flew after the flaming seraph and but followed its track; that to be good is, and ever will be not a mere consequence of being wise but a necessary condition of the process. In short, he determined the true meaning of philosophy, for all our knowledge may be well comprized in two terms. The one *<is>* philology, that is to say all the pursuits in which the intellect of man is concerned,⁽³⁶⁾ in which he has a desire of arriving at that which the Logos or intellectual power can communicate; the other is philosophy, or that which comprises the Logos, and including it, at the same time subordinates it to the Will, and thus combining *<with>* the other, is philosophy, the love of wisdom with the wisdom of love.

My time will not permit me to enter into any account of [Schelling]†⁽³⁶⁾ as I intended, but in truth I should be puzzled to give you a true account. For I might at one time refer you to Kant, and then I should say what [Schelling] appears at one time; another time to Spinoza, as applied to *<another aspect of>* his philosophy; and then again I should find him in the writings of Plotinus, and still more of Proclus, but most in the writings of a Jesuit⁽³⁷⁾ who opposed the Protestants, I think about the time of James the First, but got silenced for it. For *his* great object like that of [Schelling?] was to justify the worship of saints by endeavouring to convince the world that God consisted in the saints, an opinion which I believe so completely won . . .⁽³⁸⁾ heart that the last act of his life was a most extraordinary one; namely that this Roman Catholic pantheist, who with a rosary in one hand and the Bible *<of Spinoza>*‡ in the other, had received a call from . . . to Geneva, which is a Protestant town under Protestant government, and he accepted it under these conditions:

* MS. Egerton 3057. The report reads "man".

† MS. Egerton 3057.

‡ MS. Egerton 3057 inserts these words which seem to be needed.

that he was to have two professions, that of philosophy and that of theology, that a church should be given him to preach in the weekdays and all for the purpose of convincing the young men that their salvation was concerned in their becoming papists, and . . . ⁽³⁹⁾ has described well the old system. He says, "When I was young and used to see the ceremonies of the Catholics we used to go home, put on some shirts and act through the whole ceremonies with wonderful delight, and I find . . . and the new converts were doing the same thing, for they well knew if they held but a tenth part of what they thought, it must be a bad heretic indeed that would not believe without . . . any inquisition that it was mere mockery." Or as one of the [disciples of Schelling]* ⁽⁴⁰⁾ told me [in Rome after long argument,]* "You think only of one sort of religion, but you know in our country we distinguish sciences into two kinds. Every man has his 'bread science' and at the same time his ['Liebling']* science, his darling or hobby-horse. Now it is so with me," says he. "I am teaching religion. I . . . but my bread is . . . a Roman Catholic Church, and I prefer that to the other doctrines because it is more like the ancient pagans."

On Monday I deliver my last lecture and my last address to you and the public as a lecturer, with a review of all the preceding course and the application of it.

* MS. Egerton 3057.

LECTURE XIV

MARCH 29, 1819⁽¹⁾

THIS EVENING, MR. COLERIDGE'S LAST LECTURE, with a Review and Application of his preceding Labours as a Public Lecturer. Eight o'clock, Crown and Anchor, Strand.*

(a) From MS. Egerton 3057†.

We have, said Mr. C., passed through a long and wandering road, which has often appeared to turn back upon itself, and not without its chasms. I must now present you a simple map, and as place is said most to assist the memory I shall begin as I have before by laying before you the tents of Shem, the countries from Tyrus to Euphrates called the Semite nations. The language of a nation is its character, and their language is either mandatory or narrative, as—"I am the Lord thy God"—or in the historical

* *The Times*, March 29, 1819, and the *Morning Chronicle* and the *New Times*. The suspicion of a mildly dramatic intention in this announcement is confirmed by the *Courier* notices from March 10th onwards. On that date, after announcing the lecture of March 15th, the *Courier* (erroneously) states that "on Monday, 22nd March, the Philosophical Series will be concluded with a Review of the preceding Course and the Moral and Practical Application of the whole". On March 20, after announcing correctly the lecture for the 22nd, it says that "on Monday the 29th March, Mr. Coleridge WILL DELIVER HIS LAST ADDRESS AS A PUBLIC LECTURER, with a Review and Application of the whole preceding Course of Philosophical History". On the 24th the same paper announces, as well as "his last public Lecture" and the promised "review of his preceding labors", "a farewell address to his auditors". Another announcement of the "last lecture" appeared on March 27th. Though the capital letters in these announcements were the printer's, and the wording may owe something to the editors, the idea of announcing this as the last lecture he would ever give came from Coleridge himself. See the notebook version of this lecture, p. 395.

† As in the case of the Frere MS. I have made a few insignificant silent corrections and have introduced some punctuation.

books and psalms of the sacred writings; and therefore these sacred writings were more properly placed in their hands than where the growing intellect of man was in its progress perpetually stumbling. The descendants of Japhet, distinguished by their migratory lives, are the forefathers of European Nations, from one division of which the Greeks and Romans immediately proceeded. To the former our present considerations are chiefly drawn, and as we find religion in Medea so do we find philosophy in Greece, equally indigenous.

In Thales we have the commencement; he began the great search after cause by casting off all history and tradition and is at the head of the Ionic School. In Pythagoras, who is at the head of the Italian School, philosophy obtained its appropriate name and rose with its full face, for he combined morality with philosophy and taught that the adoration of the Deity contained the law of the mind and the success of the intellect, and led to that love of wisdom which is the union of our intellect and our will; and this Kepler afterwards supported.

Here philosophy appeared to have taken a certain & confident path, but the restless spirit of human nature arose in the Eleatic sect, and sophistry lent her aid & pandered to the worst passions & thus effected the overthrow not only of philosophy but of Greece herself. Socrates was followed by the Stoic bully and Cyrenaic sensualist.

The divine Plato and Aristotle now lead and divide philosophy; and next we see Christianity bringing religion to her assistance, and with this philosophy received at once its object & completion. But soon after came superstition, allied with magic and imposture. A pause, an interregnum now took place. Religion was next to exist without any philosophy at all, and persecution supported the separation.

The Schoolmen at length arose, moderated the Peripatetic philosophy and prepared the way for the overthrow of scepticism. They were the great agents, also, of modifying the languages of the north to the south.

— We next find Platonism brooding over the birth of genius and reviving with the restoration of literature and the fine arts—and this is the point where her pre-eminence over the cramped philosophy of Aristotle is most conspicuous: she shone forth in a Giotto and Michael Angelo, producing some of the highest possible effects.

But again the Materialists and Idealists arose with all that train of error which we have traced down to the French Revolution.

But the main object of this brief attempt is to induce you to ask yourselves whether God has not made you more than objects of sense, and whether there is not a something within you like the expression that pervades the intelligent countenance. Mr. C. here gave a beautiful description of the mind as distinct from the senses, illustrating the reason, which is the mind's eye, also as the attribute of the Deity. How greatly different is this from the late systems of French, and perhaps more general, philosophy—with the loss of the life and the spirit of Nature. This philosophy has, maybe, produced a few new mechanical inventions—certainly even those are not discoveries—and instead of human nature we have a French nature, which we may sum up as the *caput mortuum* of a French ferocity, audacity, frivolity, immorality and corruption. But we must learn to search and know our internal selves; and why, when we have this power of judging, should we take the assertion or belief of another? The poet Daniel says, "unless Man can [rise above]* himself how mean a thing is man".

Lorenzo the Magnificent & Cosmo the Benefactor of his country delighted in the study of human nature. Luther & Erasmus underwent the hardest campaign. Such men loved metaphysics and in the court of our own Elizabeth, Sir P. Sidney & others resorted to a philosopher. We are peculiarly called upon to this study. Are we, in the unceasing change of all sublunary things, to imagine that the soul, whose nature will not so far flatter us as to allow the hope of her one day being nothing, is alone in this world, and without a sympathizing feeling throughout Nature? If self-knowledge prevent this unmeaning blank, is not it a delightful, desirable object?

Mr. C. considers modern metaphysical philosophy as perfectly erroneous; the formation of ideas from outward objects will not be allowed by him to the extent some require—for if you rob me of my senses I have still my mind,* says Mr. C. (But this argument is very defective. He should take away the senses at the birth to make good his ground, and then describe that mind so divided. Its extent and capacity may be fairly doubted or denied.)

Again, if men do not acquire the habit of reflection or of

* In another hand.

tracing to each faculty of the mind all they see and hear, how useless must be our reading and our daily intercourse with the world & human nature! I have often admired, for instance, the beauty of Pope's description of a moonlight night, one part of which describes the north Pole as gilt with stars innumerable; this to one who had never left the southern hemisphere would be almost nonsense, but the elegance of the language & the thoughts have pleased me. Mr. C. strongly reprobated those works of modern times which, under the false arts of morality and virtue, appeal only to the lowest senses, often, 'tis true, disguised in language fair, deceiving and the more dangerous; while a Fielding is neglected whose genuine bursts of humour sweep away occasional grossness, (which by the pure mind is passed by, not because it is bad but offensive) and where the intellect is pre-eminently conspicuous instead of that sensual feeling so often pervading other much more admired works.⁽²⁾ But should you meet with a work where your understanding is appealed to through your senses, and your conscience through your feelings, then you will be grateful when you can bring reflection to your reading and you will feel as I do now, after my twofold lectures, that delightful harmony which ever will be found where philosophy is united with such poetry as <by> Milton and Shakespeare—or <by> those who have endeavoured to reconcile all the powers of our nature into one harmony and to gather that harmony round the cradle of moral will.

(b) From NB. 25. pp.160–6.

MONDAY, 29 MARCH, 1819.

Fourteenth of the Phil. Course and the Last (O pray Heaven, that it may indeed be the Last) of All. *Absit omen de morte secundā: de primā sufficiet, sit modo post obitum ἀναπαξία.*"

<As images of Place are the best helps of Recollection, next to a healthy state of the digestive functions, mental and bodily, I shall begin my brief recapitulation—of the great outstanding points of the History of Philosophy>* <I have> My address of this evening must consist of two parts / as the concluding Lecture <of the> on the History of Phil. <Course, I must place before

* <> Indicate that the words enclosed were crossed out in the original.

you the> its great outstanding Points, to and thro' which I have led you, league by league. I must place at once before you as in the simple Map of a *Sampler*—and as the last Lecture, I would fain impress those truths deducible from both my Courses, & the objects common to both—And first then of the first. As next to a healthy state of the digestive powers, mental and bodily, the best aids of the Memory are supplied, it is said, by *Images of Place*, I will end as my first Lecture began—and again put before your eyes the Country of the Patriarchs, from the Euphrates to the Hellespont (but specially the Coasts of Palestine and Syria) Land emphatically entitled in the eldest national Document, the Tents of Shem.

For here dwelt the <Semitic> Nations whose <Languages Tongues have> Languages as manifest Dialects of the same original Tongue, have been well & aptly entitled the Semitic Languages, as the Hebrew, Arabic, and Syro-Chaldaic, in order to distinguish them from the Tartar, Chinese, Hindostanic &c better than the far too vague and general term of Oriental Languages. Language of a race is its character. The Literature of the Semitic Nations were and to this day <are> is characterized by being—1. *imperative*, and <maintain> assertory (Thou shalt—thou shalt not—*I am*) or *narrative* in the simple form of Chronicles, as in the Hist. Books of the O.T.—or *cumulative*, as in the instance of the Proverbs and the more didactic Psalms. No where do we perceive any *connection* between sentence & sentence but that afforded by Imagination & Excitement—namely, the poetic connection. And such is the appropriate Language of Religion—assumed or imitated in all religious rites even by the nations of opposite character—and need I say, the most proper repository wherein to place Truths too awefully [*sic*] important & necessary to the Human Race to be trusted to the stumblings & alternate Pro- and Re-gression of the growing Intellect of Man. As early as these we hear from the same authority of another Race, the Descendants of Japhet—distinguished <mainly> not only by their migratory tendency but by their common direction *westwards*—one branch, <N.W.> more northerly—and the other S.W. more to South—& this latter branch splits again into the two names of Greeks & Romans—and in full understanding of the peculiar national traits that occasioned & justify the contrast of Jew and Greek—is the condition and the foundation-stone of all philosophical

Insight into the History of Philosophy, which was <only more> no less exclusively indigenous in Greece, in the Isles of the Gentiles, as Revelation was during the same period appropriate to the Tents of Shem.

We saw the <dawning> commencement in the Ionic School. The first and most important step was taken by Thales, in proposing the problem of the origin & constituent laws of the material World to be solved by the efforts & researches of the Understanding, without recourse to Tradition or Mythology—A further advance was made <by> the second Master of the same School⁽³⁾—he discovered that the solution of phaenomena could not be found in phaenomena, as the sol. would be part of the problem to be solved—and the third, in whom the Ionic Sect reached its summit,⁽⁴⁾ discovered that neither could any finite power by itself account for the appearances—for to account for a thing &c, &c—He therefore <attributed the> sought for it in certain abstractions, making all things proceed from the oppositions & reconciliations of the Finite & the Infinite—which he considered as real Powers, having an objective existence.

In the Italian School, & the Person of Pythagoras, Philosophy as it first obtained an appropriate name, so it here first ascended with a full face. He saw, that either the problem was insoluble [*sic*] not merely as of infinite solution from its complexity (for if only we were progressive, this would be well) but because it was impossible to determine the first step, if the solution was to be sought for from the senses or what are called facts of Outward Experience. In the mind or nowhere.

But yet not in the mind <generally> as individual. It was therefore to be assumed that a somewhat under that name was that was not individual—and in this, or the pure Reason, to be found if at all. But he saw that this could not be any fraction of our Nature—but moral as well as intellectual—that it must be not *philology* merely but philosophy including philology & that a moral previous discipline was indispensable.

On these premises he sought in the Ideas manifested in the Reason for the Laws of the World—and taught the adoration of the Deity as the common ground of both—and in the belief of Kepler who adopted the same principles the success was answerable.

But soon the party spirit of human nature appeared—

The Eleatic began by taking the Intellect exclusively—

The Corpuscular Philosophers the very contrary—

The Sceptics arose out of, and triumphed over, the contradictions & uncertainties of Both—

While the Sophists taking up the Philosophy of the latter made it the pander to the worst passions, and by mob flattery hastened the ruin of the State—

Socrates attempted a compromise by excluding all earnest investigations except into human nature.

The proper study of mankind is man—but by his own vacillating between the good and the useful, whether <crime> guilt was or was not more and other than an error in calculation, he gave rise to new schisms—the Stoic Bully and the Cyrenaic Sensualist—

Lastly, Philosophy seemed to <rest> fall into two great domains, & there to rest—those who grounded all hope of knowledge on observation, and the power of generalizing and classifying, arranged themselves under Mr. Aristotle—while those who remained faithful to the principles of Pythagoras, who sought for the only true science, & in it for Power and Prophecy in Laws, and Laws in the Ideas revealed thro' the pure Reason; marshalled under Plato—

This was the *ne plus ultra*—the Romans realized but did not invent—and Christianity brought Religion—defined as this morning—and Vice—Superstition—and the Decline of Philosophy—

The N.W. Branch of the Japetidae—

<Religion deprived of Philosophy>

The Schoolmen modified the Peripatetic Phil.—& excited a necessity for rational conviction, & organized the barbarous Languages with the connections of the Greeks—and thus by distinction without division accommodated it to the characteristics of Gothic & Indian.

The Platonist brooded over the Birth of Genius & the Fine Arts—and the very discoveries, owing to this, brought back the Materialism—of Democ. & Epicur.—the Sceptics, and the Sophists—in short all that tribe which had their Triumph in the French Revolution—

Then Lay Sermon^(*)

Then apply
the [prevailing?] of idolizing shewy men [showyness?] of the
Day— &c &c &c—

NOTES

LECTURE I

1. There was another review of this lecture, not at all in the nature of a report, in Thelwall's *Champion* for December 19, 1818. The review is uninformative, supercilious, and altogether without interest except as an indication of Thelwall's laborious self-importance.
2. *Elements of Chemical Philosophy*, by Coleridge's friend Sir Humphrey Davy had appeared in 1812. While Coleridge must have disapproved of the title, and had by this time to some extent parted intellectual company with Davy, he is here attacking mainly the troop of popularizers who flourished in Davy's wake. See Introduction §2, p. 24.

LECTURE II

1. The notes for this lecture, less systematic than for most, are on pp. 56-64 of NB.25.
2. A golden cicada was worn by the Athenians before Solon's time "as an emblem of their claim to being *αὐτοχθόνες* (for such was the supposed origin of the insects)". Liddell and Scott on Thucydides, I. 6.
3. For other applications of one of Coleridge's favourite principles, see Snyder, A. D., *The Critical Principle of the Reconciliation of Opposites as employed by Coleridge*. Ann Arbor, 1918.
4. Coleridge was quite clear that Homer was, however, poet first and historian only incidentally. Cf. *Misc. Crit.*, 12, 161, 170.
5. Herodotus, II. 51.
6. The notebook refers to Herodotus, II. 52.
7. *Temora, with Other Poems by 'Ossian'* was published by James Macpherson in 1763 as translations from the Celtic. An investigation after his death (1796) revealed the justice of the charges by Johnson and others, that it was largely a forgery. Public anger was still sufficient in 1819 to enable the publishers to announce in the *Courier* for Jan. 6, 1819, the fourth editions of *Hypocrisy Unveiled and Calumny Detected*, an exposure of Macpherson; Coleridge's reference would strike a responsive chord in his audience.
8. *Homeric authorship*. In *T.T.*, I. 128-9, H. N. Coleridge says that S. T. C. had not read Wolf, and in an article, "Coleridge, Dr. Prati and Vico" (*M. Philol.* Nov. 1943) it is clearly argued that he had not in 1818 read Vico, two likely sources for his views. Possibly he was indebted to H. N. C. Cf. also *Misc. Crit.*, 405, 410. Coleridge did read Vico, if not before 1818, later. See *T.L.*, 36, and there are references to his *Nuova Scienza* in the notebooks.
9. *Date and purpose of the Samothracian mysteries*. This was a problem which puzzled Coleridge for many years. See *Letters*, II. 738. A note headed "Conjecture" in B.M. Add.MS. 34,225 (f.155) adds nothing to the point

of view stated in the lecture, but shows a detailed working through of the arguments. Coleridge read widely on the subject in Iamblichus and Proclus, both in the Greek and in Taylor's translations. Faber, G. S., *Mysteries of the Cabiri*, 2 vols. Oxford, 1803, annotated by S. T. C., was sold in Green's Library. B.M. MS. Egerton 2801 shows Coleridge disagreeing with "the compiler of the New Cyclopædia" (Rees's) on the subject. He also read William Warburton (Bp.), *The Divine Legation of Moses*, Bk. II §4 of which is on "The Mysteries".

In assigning to the mysteries a post-Homeric date of origin, Coleridge is not supported by modern scholarship which is generally divided in tracing them (a) to Pelagic mythology, (b) to oriental influences. But if he is wrong as to the origins he seems to be right in suggesting that the important period of their influence is much later than Homer. He is with Warburton at an important point where Faber is in opposition, i.e. in the belief that the mysteries taught "the unity of the true God introduced for the purpose of superseding the vulgar polytheism." (Cf. Faber, G. S., *The Origin of Pagan Idolatry*, London, 1816. III. 108.) And it is clear that in this lecture Coleridge is treating the mysteries and the controversies over them as indicative of the deep roots of opposition between monotheistic and pantheistic views.

Possibly a more detailed account of early Greek religions was given in the first lecture. See the *Assistant*, p. 71.

10. In this and the preceding sentences the reference appears to be to the thirteenth satire of Juvenal. Cf. also Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, I. 101.
11. Cf. *Assistant*, p. 71.
12. Derwent Coleridge wrote in the margin of the MS. "a very long note is wanted here".

Coleridge two pages further on quotes Stanley, and the language here suggests his *History of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. 1687, 5. The phrase "all night and chaos" is quoted from Hesiod (via Plutarch) and Stanley then continues: "This opinion they borrowed from the Phœnicians . . . the divinity of the Phœnicians asserts the principle of this world to be a dark spiritual Air, or the spirit of dark Air, and Chaos troubled and involved in darkness; that this was Infinite, and a long time had no bound; but (they say) the Spirit being moved with the love of his own Principles, there was made a mixtion, [sic] which nexure was called Love; this was the beginning of the production of all things; but the Spirit itself had no generation, and from this connexion of the Spirit was begotten Môr, which some call Slime, others corruption of watery mistion, [sic] and of this was made the seed of all Creatures, and the generation of all things."

13. See Lecture I as reported.
14. Stanley, *op. cit.*, 5-12.
15. The British Institution was founded in 1805, to encourage young artists with money and exhibitions; it was a rival to the Academy. The *Annals of the Fine Arts* was its supporting periodical, and is full of the controversies between the two, especially from 1816-1819. There is no evidence that Coleridge took sides, and his friends exhibited in both places.
16. Tennemann, I. 60-61, quotes the relevant passages in Aristotle, Plutarch

and Cicero. Stanley, *op. cit.*, quotes the first two and uses language similar to Coleridge's.

17. Tennemann, I. 56, refers to the theory, and Stanley, *op. cit.*, 3, refers to Iamblichus's life of Porphyry as an authority.
18. *Contra* Tennemann, I. 62, and in agreement with Stanley, *op. cit.*, 6, who quotes Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, I. and *De Leg.*, 2.
19. *Linnaeus, Carolus* (1707-1778). For Coleridge on his contribution to natural history, see *Essay on Method*, 22-24, and the *Friend*, III. 166-171.
20. Hunter, John, (1728-1793). For Coleridge on his contribution to physiology, see *Essay on Method*, 21, 81-82, and the *Friend*, III. 179-180, 213 f.n.
21. A reference to the contemporary controversy between mechanists and vitalists. See Lect. XII and note 36.
22. Tennemann, I. 87, gives the information in this sentence, except for the mariners. They are Coleridgian.
23. Tennemann, I. 88, holds the same view and mentions the same names.
24. Selden, John, *De Diis Syris*, Lypsize, MDCLXXII, Synt. II. Cap. I., 210-11. Modern scholars tend to accept the view that Pythagoras travelled widely.
25. Coleridge's presentation of Pythagorean cosmology is the same as Tennemann's, but his marginalia on Tennemann oppose him. Possibly they were written at a later date. Cf. "I have sometimes fancied it possible, that the Pythagorean astronomy was a symbolic Alchemy or Theology. This ἀντιθετον appears so very wanton a figment and so easily supplied by the comets: if indeed the only motive was to make up a decad. But we do not know even what Pyth. meant by ten—assuredly, not the mere number, 10, as in ten guineas or ten Houses." MS. note on Tennemann, I. 111-12. And see also Lect. III, note 8.
26. Michael Symes, Esq., Lieutenant-Colonel in His Majesty's 76th Regiment, wrote an account of his travels to which Coleridge refers. *Embassy to Ava*; Sent by the Governor-General of India in the year 1795. London, 1800. For Coleridge on the beans taboo and Pythagoras, and a story against Poole and De Quincey, see *T.T.*, xlii-xlvii.
27. There is no reference by Diogenes Laertius, in his work on Pythagoras, to eclipses. Aristotle gives the Pythagorean explanation of them in *De Coelo*, II. 13, a passage quoted by Tennemann, I. 112-113 f.n.
28. Derwent Coleridge comments: "It will appear I think a very bold assumption to infer from such slender premises that the establishment of Castes in India was posterior to the time of Pythagoras." Again Coleridge is wrong in his chronology, (the beginnings of the caste system being lost in antiquity) but right, roughly, in his social theory, connecting caste originally with conquest and subordination.
29. Herodotus. II. 104 and 164.
30. Derwent Coleridge writes in the margin: "On such points it is difficult to generalize, the priests in England were sufficiently powerful before the conquest—the proposition as it stands seems exclusive."
31. In agreement with Tennemann, I. 91, as is the first half of the next paragraph.

32. An echo of contemporary political discussion? Coleridge's opposition later to the Reform Bill of 1832 was based on better reasoning. See R. J. White, *The Political Thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, London, 1938, 227-33, where his various statements have been usefully brought together.
33. Close to Tennemann, I. 94-95. Iamblichus, and perhaps Aristotle, was responsible for the theory of exoteric and esoteric elements in Pythagoras's teaching. See Minar, E. L., *Early Pythagorean Politics*, 32 and f.n.
34. Tennemann, I. 95-97.
35. *Later Platonists who wrote against Christianity*. Among others, Celsus, Iamblichus, Porphyry and especially Proclus.
36. *Mesmer*. . . *Animal Magnetism*. See *Introd.* §3, and *Lect. VII.* note 16. What is meant by "the text book of all the authors in Europe" (referred to below) is uncertain. Is it Kluge's work (*Lect. VII.* note 16) or is it the *Jahrbücher der Medezin als Wissenschaft*, ed. Marcus & Schelling, Tübingen? Coleridge knew this work and the 8th volume (1807) is referred to by Kluge as containing relevant material. Or is it the 1814 edition of *Mesmerismus* by F. A. Mesmer, ed. K. C. Wolfart?
37. *And have been in the charmed sleep there* is a Coleridgian addition to the proverb, a reflection of personal experience and possibly a telescoping of Pausanias, IX. xxxix, §2 and xl. §3. Coleridge annotated the *Archeologia Graeca* of John Potter which contains a section, "Of the Oracle of Trophonius".
38. *Philodemus*. An epicurean philosopher of the first century B.C.
39. *The power of the imagination*. Coleridge tears himself away from the central point he wishes to make, not only about Pythagoras, but about all true philosophy, i.e. that powers of mind not strictly rational, whether recognized or not, are assumed. Cf. *Lect. XI.* note 25.
40. *Dreams*. Pythagoras must have been a very good Coleridgian. See *A.P.*, 55, and *B.L.*, I. 225-6. In a note on Tennemann, II. 77, dreams are defined as "a shifting current in the shoreless Chaos of the Fancy in which the streamy *Continuum* of passive Association is broken into *zig-zag* by Sensations from within or without—ex.-gr. distension from wind in the stomach or a knot in the bed-clothes: the Judgment being suspended, alike in both its functions, that of affirming and that of denying the reality of the Images presented to the Mind". See also *Lect. XI.* p. 319.
41. *Trichotomy* is Coleridge's usual term for the principle he is explaining. Cf. Snyder, A. D., *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 126-7, where it is again connected with Pythagoras and his symbols. It was one of Coleridge's services to English thought at this time, in opposition to the popular Associationism, to assert the importance of the active and creative powers of the mind.
42. *Materialism*. See the report of *Lect. I* and *Lect. XII passim*.
43. *Self-love and love of self*. The mental leap from atomism to love-of-self is not a long one for Coleridge, but the audience might easily be excused for not making it. Cf. *A Lay Sermon*, 1817, 69-71 f.n.

Atomism from the ontological, and selfishness from the ethical, side are for Coleridge both forms of mechanical empiricism, based on analysis rather than synthesis, separation rather than unification, concentration

on the parts rather than on the whole, in short on a *concept* of a mechanism rather than on an *idea* of an organism. He is thinking of Hobbes's materialism.

44. *Platonist and Aristotelian*. For other references to the famous division, cf. *T.T.*, July 2, 1830; *L.R.*, III. 18-57; *A.P.*, 17, 151-2; *B.L.*, I. 162-3; *S.M.*, Appendix E. xlvii. There is a long marginal note on Tennemann, VIII, i. 130 in which it is elaborated. See Intro. §3. pp. 52-5, and Lect. V. note 20, also note 46 below.
45. *The constitutive character of ideas*. Again a description in which there is perhaps more of Coleridge than of Pythagoras. But whether the description of the Idea fits the Pythagorean number or not, Coleridge sees in Pythagoras the first hint of that central tenet of his idealism, the extra-rational nature of the idea itself. Ideas are "those truths namely (supposing such to exist) the knowledge and acknowledgment of which requires the whole Man, the free Will, no less than the intellect, and which are therefore not merely speculative, nor yet merely practical; but both in one. . . . An Idea is equidistant from Sensation, Image, Fact and Notion: . . . it is the antithesis not the synonym of *εἰδωλον*." *M.S. Egerton* 2826, ff.393-4. Cf. the *Friend*, III. 210-13, also Intro. §3. pp. 52-3.
46. *Pythagorean numbers*. Cf. note 41 above. The marginal notes on Tennemann are profuse on this point.

On I. 107-8: The Writer carries his Kantianism into all his views and censures. Why should the Pythagoreans have been ignorant of the distinction between the abstract and the concrete in their use of the term, Number, any more than we in our use of the term Quantity? There exist in all things constituent and governing powers, the characters and efficiencies of which are represented to us by Numbers, as by symbolic Names, symbolic, namely, not allegorical or arbitrary, a Symbol being an essential Part of that, the whole of which it represents. This is the Pythag. Doctrine, which is not to be put off by the mere ipse dixit of an opposite System, viz. that which admits of no Ideas but the regulative ones. A profounder view would have delighted in observing, at how early a period the great fundamental Question of all Philosophy was started, and divided men according to the solution into the two genera generalisma [*sic*] of Philosophizing, even unto this day. As Aristotle : Plato : : Kant : Schelling.

On Tennemann, I. 108-10 : + and -. The + O = Being:

1 &c. = Exist: + una. 1 is not a number of itself. Space is the sensuous representative of the + O. + O - X is Time: Eternity = the Identity of both. Such appears to have been the dogmata of the great Samian, who instead of being, as Tennemann asserts, a *Notionalist*, was eminently an *Idea-ist*. The same Fate has befallen Plato, and will befall [I] every *symbolic* Philosophy.

On Tennemann, I. 120: The arithmoi of Pyth. were evidently the very same as the *Ideas* of Plato. The antichthon possibly meant the *Spiritual Man*, next to the Sun (= God) and hidden partly by

its proximity, partly [by] its constant opposition to the flesh[ly] Man.

47. *Eureka*. Derwent Coleridge rightly objects, "This story I believe belongs to Archimedes and the problem of Hiero's Crown," i.e. the story of the discovery that the volume of water displaced by a submerged body is equal to the volume of the body submerged. Plutarch, *Moralia*, 1094.
48. *It must be*. Cf. Bradley's, "What is possible and necessary, that must be real."
49. Derwent Coleridge writes in the margin: "this requires a note". Certainly Coleridge is not clear and I have been unable to track his reading at this point. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers is considerably clouded by conflicting and misty accounts but it appears that One, or Unity, represented God; and as Ueberweg says, (I, 47) "The scale of created objects was symbolized by the series of numbers, the numbers four and ten playing an especially prominent part."
50. *Philosophy divided from science*. Attributed in Lect. XII. p. 344 to Descartes.
51. Pythagoras taught the motion of the earth and the counter-earth round a central fire. Aristotle, *De Coelo*, II. 13; *Metaph.*, I. 5.
52. *Contra* Tennemann, I. 128, 130, who states that in Pythagorean doctrine the godhead is the sun.
53. *Some of our modern contenders for Indian wisdom*. See in Lect. III. pp. 127-9, the quotation from Wilkins' translation of the *Bhagavadgita*. Coleridge here probably refers to Wilkins, or to Warren Hastings who introduced that work, and possibly to Sir William Jones, the distinguished orientalist and comparative philologist. Cf. Muirhead, J. H., *Coleridge as Philosopher*, 283-4.
Coleridge's copy of Dubois, J. A., *Description of the People of India*, containing his autograph notes, is in the British Museum.
54. Cf. "The highly civilized, though fearfully uncultivated, inhabitants of ancient India." *A.R.*, 10. Introductory Aphorism XVIII.
55. The Rosetta stone was discovered in 1798, but the hieroglyphic writing on it was not deciphered until four years after this lecture. Coleridge shares the ignorance of his times in matters of Egyptian antiquities, though the antipathy expressed here strikes one as un-Coleridgean. He shares Schelling's fear of the use made (by Voltaire and others) of Egyptian history to discredit the importance of the Hebrew contribution to civilization. I wonder if his views were coloured from Cambridge days by those of a Fellow of his own college, Gilbert Wakfield, who in 1784 read a paper on "The Origin of Alphabetical Characters", in which views similar to Coleridge's were expressed. See *Memoirs . . . of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society*, II. 278 foll.
56. *Carrington Bowles's*. A print shop in St. Paul's Churchyard.
57. Different forms of the word "soul" are represented by various birds in various postures.
58. *P.W.*, I. 412. "Psyche".

LECTURE III

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB.25, pp. 66-79.
2. *Calorific* was first used, according to the N.E.D. in 1682. Coleridge's

distinction crops up in modern realist discussions, e.g. cf. G. E. Moore's blue and sensation-of blue. See also *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 117.

3. *Radii colorati* &c. The reference to the *Optics* here is possibly to Bk. I, Pt. II, Prop. VIII, Prob. III. But the *Optics*, read to the Royal Society, was written in English. Coleridge may have been associating the "violet-making", "indigo-making," "green-making" rays of the section referred to above, with recollections of the *Lectiones Opticae*, Newton's Cambridge lectures, which were, of course, in Latin. In Part II (*De Colorum Origine*), phrases for coloured rays and colour-making rays, e.g. '*diversicolores radii*' and '*radii generantes Rubidinem*' are used and the distinction discussed (§1).

Coleridge's copy of Newton's *Optics*, 3rd ed. (1721), was sold in Green's library. As early as 1796 he was quoting "the end of the last edition of his *Optics*" (See *P.W.*, II. 1112-13) and his continued interest in theories of light and colour is attested to by many passages in the notebooks. Is there a link between the reference to Newton's optical theories and Goethe's study of colour? See Lect.V. note 20; and see the next note below this one.

4. The "old philosophy" is that of Plotinus and his followers, e.g. in the IV Ennead, Bk.v.4, and in the V Ennead, Bk.v.7. The same point is made by Goethe in the *Entwurf zur Farbenlehre*. See Lect.V. note 20, and VII. note 21.
5. Another example of Coleridge's pre-Freudian insights. The notebooks contain many observations on touch, double touch, and vision. e.g. *A.P.*, 180-1 (NB.22). Cf. Lect.VII. note 16.
6. Pythagorean number and the Platonic idea are equated in a marginal note on Tennemann. (See also Lect.II, notes 45 and 46.) The Cabalistic numbers and letters of the alphabet are elements of the divine world and are the basis of the world-soul, in fact of the whole creation. They are described in Part I of the Cabala, the *Jezirah*. In Part II, the Sohar, the unknowability of God is taught, and the doctrine of emanations. The connexions with Neo-platonism and Alexandrine Judaism were not likely to be missed by Coleridge.
7. *Tennemann, W. G.* For Coleridge's use of his *Geschichte der Philosophie* (1798-1819) see the Introduction §1. This is the first explicit reference to Tennemann in the lectures. The limits of the compliment are obvious enough; Coleridge in the *Assistant* had deplored, as well he might, the dearth of histories of philosophy in English.
8. *Three kinds of philosophers*. The contradiction here with Lecture II, p. 107, is more apparent than real. Coleridge usually classes the first two together, their error being of the same kind, logically, i.e. a failure to distinguish between subject and object. This is his criticism of Berkeley on the one hand and of Spinoza and Hobbes on the other. Cf. Muirhead, *op. cit.*, 76-7.
9. Presumably Timaeus Locrus, a Pythagorean whose work is not now considered authentic but only an abstract of Plato's *Timaeus*.
10. Ocellus Lucanus, *De Rerum Natura*, 8.
11. Tennemann, I. 76-7. Coleridge's real objection to accepting Ocellus Lucanus as a Pythagorean is clearest at the end of the f.n. above, p.117. His work *De Rerum Natura* is now considered spurious.

12. Tennemann, I. 141 foll.
 13. *Past*. Pestalozzi? See note 37.
 14. From here to the end of the next paragraph the facts come from Tennemann, I. 150-3.
 15. Diogenes Laertius' life of Pythagoras is referred to but not quoted by Tennemann, I. 151. Coleridge either remembered it very minutely, or had it in front of him. "The verses *quoted* by Diogenes", he says in a marginal note, "do not contain the *name* of Pythagoras, tho' probably the preceding Lines might."
 16. See Lecture II. pp. 90-91 and notes.
 17. Cf. *A.P.*, 143-4, and Lecture II. p. 90. Coleridge sees in early civilizations many tendencies toward later thinking. E.g. the Sophists are described in the *Friend* as upholding "the Latitudinarian system in its first birth-place in Greece". *Friend*, III. 111.
 18. Coleridge's marginal note to Tennemann, I. 184, indicates what is in his mind. "But §V in which Melissus is paraphrased does not assert the reality of Space. It is merely an *argumentum ad oppositum*. 'Your own Doctrine of Space involves the necessity of my Position. For it is either filled or not filled. The latter is incompatible with the *totum in omne parte*, without which God cannot be conceived, and the former is preclusive of all Motion'. Doubtless Melissus held Space for a mere Form of finite and subjective Thinking. The existence of Unrealities, *ex gratia*, of Subject and Finite, is the true unsurmountable contradiction in all these schemes of Spinosism. A[nte] et P[ost] Spinosam."
 19. Coleridge's marginal comments on Tennemann's account of Zeno's conundrums are very engaging but too long to include here. A briefer note, directly related to these, appears in NB.27, and indicates how superior in terseness are his private compared with his public utterances at times.
- NB.27: Zeno's demonstrations of the non-existence of Motion—I am astonished to find them held valid or even ingenious by Tennemann and others—the whole Sophism lies 1. in making a false assertion, that Space is divisible into infinite partings [?], each infinitely divisible. Now space has no parts, & so far from being infinitely partible is *not* partible at all—2. in assuming the actuality of an Impossibility under the cover of an If—3. In supposing separate & comparative magnitudes where they do not exist, and abstracting them where they do—So in Achilles & Tortoise—Achilles' stride has here no appropriate magnitude. 4. That if Things in Space are real, Space must be so; but Sp. is not, ergo, Things are not, i.e. if the Table I see, be a Thing out of me, my *Seeing* of it must be out of me. Space is a mode of Seeing—N.B. There are visualities of negation—positions of negation. A man in a Balloon (supposing him not to look at his Balloon) with his eyes open has a visuality tho' he see no thing, no image, very distinct from the same man in pitch darkness or with his eyes shut—this requires to be explained—it is like the appendages of Images, as A taller than B—&c which is neither in A or B—but

rises out of both, like Tartini's thud sounds. When I express my wonder at the reverence shown to the conundrums of Zeno, and their elevation in Antinomies of Reason!! I do so the more, because the Object to be attained (= the non-existence of a corporeal *Object* as an Object only, and separate from the subject, *cui obijcitur seu objectum est*,) might be and so often has been, so easily proved by analysis of what is meant by it, namely, color, and the sensation of being repelled &c &c.

See the *Friend*, 1850 ed., III. 88 fn., for De Quincey's comment on Coleridge on Zeno's conundrums. Sara Coleridge (see *ibid.*) gives priority on the point to Leibnitz.

20. Possibly Coleridge refers to Descartes' answer to an objection he attributed to Gassendi, that from the Cartesian position, existence could be inferred from walking.
21. In his marginalia on Tennemann's section on Sextus Empiricus Coleridge refers to "his impossible Doubts and lying pretences to doubting"; the violence of his attack is partly accounted for by the partiality of Tennemann's exposition and defence.
22. Coleridge, against Tennemann, hotly supports Heraclitus (I. 216 foll.) as being probably not pantheistic, and certainly, in his view, not atomistic nor atheistic. He writes, among other notes, one on the back board of Vol. I:

The Censures with which Tennemann concludes his chapter on Heraclitus, were inevitable from his point of view, and his unacquaintedness with the doctrine of Symbols. Like all the Theists of his Time, he passes lightly by the *Almacht*, the Nature, the substance (*οὐσία*) of Deity—and takes "*den höchsten Gedanken*", the supreme *Thoughtage*, for the living God: and as a good orthodox Kantian especially, can look down *ganz vornehm* on the old religions, i.e. Realists, in the complacent possession of his own newly acquired *Vernunft-glaube*, i.e. belief of a God, under an acknowledged incapability of attaching to the word a single notion not demonstrably absurd, a *Vernunft-glaube*, for which the Believer professes himself unable to advance *ein einziges vernünftiges Wort!!*

23. *God is the ultimate Subject, the World the ultimate Object.* A reconciliation of, as well as a distinction between these, in some kind of organically constructed whole, was Coleridge's constant interest. Of Heraclitus on the subject Coleridge says (again a marginal note on Tennemann), "The Divine Nature of Heraclitus is neither an Aggregate, as in the Panhylists (= Corpuscular Materialists) nor a result, as with the Hylozoists, nor an *All-Being* that exists only in Particulars, without self, as in Spinoza. Now what is neither of these three is not Atheism." And earlier in the same note he has said, "Whatever is excellent in the *Natur-philosophie* of Schelling and his Disciples and offshoots, is anticipated therein, [Heraclitus's system] without the aberrations of the German School;" which helps to explain the importance Coleridge attaches to this point for "the intelligibility of philosophy hereafter". See also Lecture II. note 46.

24. Chubb, Thomas (d.1747) and Morgan, Thomas (d.1743), two deists who rationalized away the supernatural elements in Christianity and reduced religion to ethics.
25. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, I. 22. Simonides was asked by the despot Hiero to explain the nature and attributes of God. Each time the answer was requested, Simonides doubled the length of time he required for it.
26. Cf. Muirhead, *op. cit.*, 283-4, for a comment on this work, from the Huntington MS. of chapters of the *Opus Maximum*. On a loose leaf between ff. 264-5 of this MS., copied in J. H. Green's hand, is a part of the quotation used here by Coleridge.
27. *Democritus*. See also Lecture XII. pp. 345 foll. Coleridge's interpretation agrees in general with that of Lange, F. A., *History of Materialism*, and Bailey, C., *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*.
28. *Materialism vs. Spinosism, sense perception vs. abstraction (Zeno)*. Coleridge's point is of interest here in view of his defence of Spinoza, e.g. *vs. Hobbes*. See Lecture XIII. pp. 364 foll. and note 25; and Lecture XII on materialism. "Post Spinosam", Coleridge preferred Spinosistic "pantheism" to materialistic "atheism".
29. *Wisdom of Solomon*, II. i-xii.
30. *Socrates*. See also Lecture IV. pp. 148-154; *Misc. Crit.*, 311. For an interesting passage on the Socratic-sophistic method of arguing, to compare with what follows, see *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 58-9.
31. In his account of the Socratic daemon Coleridge is following Tennemann fairly closely (Tenn., II. 32 & f.n.). He comments more critically three years later:

As little am I satisfied with Tennemann's explanation of the Daemon or Daimonion of Socrates, p. 33. Grant, that it was no more than a peculiarly energetic Habit or Faculty of Presentiment developed at an unusually early period of Life, that which the Magnetists and Tennemann himself call *Ahnungsvermögen*: this does but shift the problem. Meanwhile the exceedingly contingent and accidental nature of the occasions, on which it was called forth, renders the solution of this Faculty from indistinct recollection of past minute, and perhaps at the time unconscious, experiences very far from unsatisfactory. At all events, the explanation can be regarded as insufficient only where such an extent and importance are given to the term unconscious, in its combination with experiences, notices, and the like, as would amount to the assumption of an interior Man exercising higher power than the Self-conscious Man or what each man calls *I*, is endued with. But if so, what is this less than a Daimonion (*Divisium quid*) or θεὸς οἰκεῖος, domestic God, or Divine Familiar—in short, what Socrates believed it to be? S. T. Coleridge 1822.

32. Thucydides, son of Melesias, is referred to in Plato, *Theages*. 130 B, but Coleridge has confused with him, Aristides, discussed in the same passage. The story belongs to him.

33. Derwent Coleridge wanted a note here. The expression is recurrent with Coleridge. Cf. *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 141-2.
34. In a notebook memorandum Coleridge suggests that Kant, and still more Fichte, has failed to distinguish clearly the kinds of Happiness. Cf. *A.R.*, 38-43; *A.R.*, 38-41; and a marginal note on Tennemann's section on Socratic ethics (II. 50-55):

It strikes me, that the larger part of the difficulties here brought forward is of Tennemann's own making, and the consequences, first, of his arbitrary rendering the Socratic *εὐπραξία* and Godlikeness by Glück-seligkeit, i.e. Happiness, tho' by contradicting his *Eupraxy* from *εὐτυχία*, i.e. from all Gluck, all *Hap*, in short from all that is *passive*, Socrates manifestly sought to preclude such an imputation; and 2nd, by persisting in *dividing* what Socrates had declared one and indivisible. Bliss, not Happiness, is the true *Summum Bonum*, he asserted: but Bliss, or perfect *Well-being* is one and the same with *well-doing*, and *Eupraxia* accurately expresses this identity, as contemplated by a Moral Being in whom the Passive and consequently a Duality of the Moral and the Sensual still exist.

Almost equally groundless is Tennemann's objection on the score of its inapplicability to the Human Race in its existing state. For neither Socrates nor Christ, who prescribed the same ultimate end to our *Aim* (Be ye perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect) asserted its absolute realizability in this life. *Ἐγγύτατον εἶναι τοῦ Θεοῦ*, to continue approaching to the God-like, is what both require practically. And however comparatively inferior the directions as to particular duties in the Socratic Discourses may be to those of Christ, yet no competent Person will deny their general striking coincidence. S. T. C. . . . A spirit made perfect is a self-ponent act, in which (or whom) the Difference of Being and Doing ceases.

See also Muirhead, *op. cit.*, 148-151.

35. The importance of words. See also Lects. V. pp. 173-4; VI. pp. 198-201; XIII. pp. 368-70. See also Intro. §3. Part of Coleridge's aims in conducting the course was to educate his public to be critical of language and aware of its power. See an important and clear statement in *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 126-7.

"Hobbes' maxim" referred to is probably the sentence Coleridge quoted at the beginning of Essay 3, *On the Principles of Genial Criticism*, B.L., II.228. "*Animadvertē, quam sit ab improprietate verborum pronom hominibus prolabi in errores circa res.*" *Exam. et Emend. Hod-Math.*

36. A repetition of a mistake made in Lect. II. p. 108, note 47.
37. ΠΕΤΑΖΖΙ = PSTLZZI = Pestalozzi, J. H. (1746-1827). Mr. Edmund Blunden, with his eye for Coleridge's Christ's Hospital tricks with Greek letters and his unparalleled knowledge of the period, has cleared up what was for long a mystery. Pestalozzi practised new methods of education directed towards quickening the mind and developing the whole personality instead of towards the accumulation of stores of facts. Cf. *Coleridge on Logic*

- and Learning*, 45-6. Pestalozzi's work and writings attracted wide attention.
38. In *A Lay Sermon*, 1817, 69-71 f.n., Coleridge criticized Paley for upholding the theory that prudence and virtue are both forms of self-love. "The fallacious sophistry of the grounding principle in this whole system has been detected by Descartes and Bishop Butler: and of late years with ability and originality by Mr. W. Hazlitt." *A.P.*, 301 refers to Paley, Rochefoucauld and Helvetius as of this sophistical school. The disinterestedness of the human mind was one of Hazlitt's favourite themes.

LECTURE IV

1. The notes are in NB.25, pp. 84-91. E. H. Coleridge transcribed and emended this lecture conjecturally, without using them.
2. *Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism*. See Lecture II. pp. 101-09 and notes, and Lecture III. pp. 114-16 and notes.
3. *The Eleatic under Zeno*. See Lecture III. pp. 121-4, 130, and notes.
4. *The Corpuscular under Democritus*. See Lecture III. pp. 130-3, and notes.
5. Coleridge's presentation of Anaxagoras, his dualism, his attempt to explain individuality from mechanical causes, and his use of "divine" reason as a last resort, is impassioned from his having Locke in mind probably as much as Anaxagoras. Cf. Lecture XIII on Locke, pp. 374-80 and notes. Tennemann, I. 319, 329, quotes the relevant passages from Plato (*Phaedo*, C.4) and Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, I.4) referred to by Coleridge.
6. *The Sophists*. Coleridge adopts the scolding tone of the prevailing contemporary attitude towards the Sophists, and does not (with Hegel) grant them a possible philosophical position. Cf. the *Friend*, III, 112-26.
7. *Socrates*. See Lecture III. pp. 136-41 foll. and notes, And cf. VI. p. 220 and note 38 where Coleridge states clearly another criticism of Socrates, i.e. that his system tended towards pantheism.
8. *Socrates quoted*: In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* Socrates says that the good and the useful are the same thing. Possibly Coleridge paraphrases here the Socrates of the *Phaedo*. He may be thinking of this difference in the interpretation of Xenophon and Plato in *T.T.*, Jan. 4. 1823; May 8, 1824.
9. The syntactical difficulties of this sentence perhaps arise from the emotion behind it? This is a restrained public reference to a personal experience frequently analysed in the notebooks more fully, and sometimes with extraordinary acuteness.
10. The two pocket books L and Y are lost, or else their labels have disappeared. The writing on the covers of some of the notebooks is now illegible. There are several memoranda on this subject which Coleridge might have used here, but none in which the conversation at Keswick, referred to below, is identifiable. Cf. Lecture III. pp. 140-3 and notes, for another discussion of Eudaimonism.
11. Hazlitt? See Introduction §2. In addition to Hazlitt's attacks on Coleridge referred to there, his reviews of the *Biographia Literaria* and the *Lay Sermons* in the *Edinburgh Review* were more defamatory than critical.
12. *An Indian philosopher Calanus*. He is mentioned in the same passage, but Coleridge is thinking of Dandamis (in Plutarch's *Alexander*, LXV.) who

"was gentler and . . . after hearing fully about Socrates, Pythagoras and Diogenes, he remarked that the men appeared . . . to have passed their lives in too much awe of the laws".

13. *Socrates and Cynicism*. The connexion is made also by recent scholars. Cf. Gomperz, Heinrich, in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1924.
14. *A French philosopher*—Lametrie? Helvetius? One wonders if Coleridge really used the singular.
15. *vs.* Tennemann, II. 86–7.
16. The two dialogues referred to may be the *Apology* and the *Crito*, though work on the chronology of the Platonic dialogues was in a very early stage in 1818.

Tennemann, II. 190 foll. provides the biographical facts. Coleridge's "wide-wasting Peloponnesian war" is his vivid translation of Tennemann's "zu Anfange des verheerenden Peloponnesischen Krieges".

17. *Plato was a poet*. A commonplace of English criticism from Sidney to Shelley which had special force in Coleridge's thinking. See also the *Friend*, III. 176; *Method*, 37–47, and a note on Gray's *Platonicon* in *Misc. Crit.*, 308–9.
18. *Sir Humphrey Davy* (1778–1829). Davy was not at the lectures, being on the continent at this time. He had stood behind Coleridge in his course of lectures at the Royal Institution in 1808 and befriended him in many ways, though their early intimacy waned. Is there an oblique personal reference here? See Introduction §2.
19. *Euclid of Megara*. Not Euclid the geometrician, as Coleridge points out. *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 63–4.
20. Coleridge credits the authenticity of the fragments of *Timaeus* whereas Tennemann, II. 197, does not. See also Lecture III. p. 117 f.n., and note 9.
21. Tennemann, II. 197, f.n., gives the reference to Horace, Ode I. 28.
22. Tennemann, II. 197, f.n., gives a summary of Plato's words in the *Timaeus*, 9. 286, from which Coleridge has selected some phrases.
23. Tennemann, II. 198.
24. The view that Socrates taught esoterically is still held by some modern scholars. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Socrates*. Coleridge makes the point also in his comments on Tennemann.
25. *Friend*, I. 65 foll.
26. The passage that follows is from Floyer Sydenham's *A Synopsis or General View of the Works of Plato*, London. Printed by S. Richardson, MDCCLIX. Price One Shilling. It was a pamphlet prefixed to a translation of *Plato's Works*, 1759, 6–12.
27. See note 17 above, to this lecture. Also *T.T.*, April 21, 1811 and Oct. 23, 1833; *B.L.*, I. 12, 26; *Misc. Crit.*, 306–11. A comment on Tennemann, VI. 43, runs, "It is worthy notice how differently Tennemann, our poet Gray and others talk of Plato generally from their own whether Kantian or Lockian accounts of his system".
28. *His juvenile works, the Phaedrus*. Coleridge appears to accept Schleiermacher's dating of the Platonic writings, in which the *Phaedrus* is the earliest. Schleiermacher's translations of the dialogues appeared from 1804.
29. *Plotinus*. See Lecture VII. pp. 241 foll. and note 20.
30. *Iamblichus, Porphyry, Proclus*. See Lecture VII, pp. 238 foll.

31. *Plato and the Idea of God*. See *T.T.*, Sept. 24, 1830.
32. *Platonism and the Fine Arts*. See *Misc. Crit.*, 204–212, Lecture XIII of March 10, 1818, in which Coleridge's Platonic *vs.* Aristotelian views are developed.
33. *The Triumph of Death*, a fresco, one of the *Quattor Novissima* of the Campo Santo in Pisa. It is the work of an unknown fourteenth century artist, but Coleridge usually spoke of it as probably by Giotto. Cf. *Letters*, 499 f.n.
34. *Music*. See the passage on Cimarosa, Lecture X. pp. 305–6. Coleridge's favourite composers appear to have been Beethoven, Purcell, Mozart, "the elder Italians, as Palestrina and Carissimi". See *T.T.*, Oct. 5, 1830 and July 6, 1833 and f.n. "Some music is above me; most music is beneath me," he said.

The connecting of joy with the creative impulse here is interesting, e.g. in relation to the *Dejection* ode, and is important in Coleridge's theory of the creative imagination.

LECTURE V

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB.25, pp. 91–9.
2. Following Tennemann, III.4 and f.n. and Cicero, *Acad. Quaest.*, I.12. In fact the discussion of Plato's pupils that follows is largely based on Tennemann, III.1–17.
3. *Brutus*. "He reminded Volumnius of their philosophical studies and discipline, and urged him to put his hand to his sword and help him in the thrust. He refused; so did the others; one said they must fly. Brutus said, 'Certainly we must fly, yet not with the feet, but with the hands'. He shook hands with them cheerfully and made a short speech, saying he considered himself happier than the conquerors in leaving behind him a reputation for virtue. He entreated them to save themselves, and going off a little committed suicide." Plutarch, *Brutus*, c.52.
4. *Obliged and compelled*. Cf. *B.L.*, I.64.f.n. As Shawcross and Sara Coleridge point out, Hobbes did not use the word nor admit the idea of 'obligation'. See *B.L.*, 1847, I.83–4. f.n.

I wonder if Coleridge has transferred the blame here, from Paley (by easy association) to Hobbes. Paley, in his *Moral and Political Philosophy*, says, "A man is said to be 'obliged' when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another", and further, that *moral* obligation is, like all other, "inducement of sufficient strength".

For Coleridge on the importance of distinguishing meanings of words, see also an important statement in *A.P.*, 204. The subject is discussed in the Introduction §3.

5. Tennemann's use of the word 'encyclopaedia' probably led Coleridge to the reserved compliment to the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*. He had by this time made his last contribution to it, though seven weeks earlier (Dec. 1, 1818) he had offered an article on Animal Magnetism to the editor. See Snyder, *Method*, Introd. pp. xv–xvi. He had reason to wish the *Encyclopaedia* well "on account of its scheme". He drew up the scheme. Time must have mellowed his attitude to the *Encyclopaedia*, however, since the day he

threatened publicly to disclaim all connexion with the work. See *U.L.*, II. 225-7.

6. The eagle flew in at the lecture and was not in the notebook. Cf. Deuteronomy, xxxii. 11. Coleridge often uses the simile, and it was soon to be used of him, "a hooded eagle among blinking owls", in Shelley's *Defense of Poetry*.
7. The N.E.D. gives Coleridge as authority for a revived use of the word, but suggests it had been so used from about 1610.
8. *The Literary Gazette*, Oct. 10, 1818, advertised a work of 18 pages by one Zachariah Jackson called *A Few Concise Examples of Seven Hundred Errors in Shakespeare's Plays, now corrected and elucidated &c.*
For Coleridge on carping and condescending critics, cf. *Method*, 34; on Bentley's Milton, *ibid.*, 32. See also *Sh. Crit.*, II. 163-6.
9. The Michelangelo-Titian anecdote is given in Vasari's *Life of Titian* (*Lives &c.*, transl. G. de Vere, ix-171); also in Reynold's *Discourses on Art*, No. IV. The Michelangelo-Raphael anecdote is not in Vasari's *Lives*, nor have I been able to trace it.
10. *Genius, joy, "a participation in a common spirit"*. Cf. Lect. IV. p. 168 and note 34. Coleridge's treatment of Shakespeare provides the concrete instance for this general position. Shakespeare "projected his mind out of his own particular being", (*Sh. Crit.*, I. 212); "passes into all the forms of human character and passion", "becomes all things" (*B.L.*, II. 20); "kept ever in the high road of life"; and this by an "energy of thought" which is for Coleridge associated with joy.
11. It is at this point Coleridge "turn[s] to the blank leaves of Tennemann". (See f.n. p. 178 above.) His comment written there fills out the generalities of the lecture:

I have at times almost ventured to suspect, that Plato saw early in Aristotle's mind an unsuitness for certain more spiritual parts of his system, and therefore in consistence with his principles withheld them. We must not suppose that he made two sweeping divisions of his Hearers, public and private, so that all were included in the second as one class who were not excluded as belonging to the first. I doubt not, there were beside the esoteric, *οἱ ἐνὶ ἐσώτεροις*, while the *ἐσώτατοι* was perhaps entrusted to Speusippus alone.

Tennemann was in the same grade as Aristotle; but from a reverence for Plato, which does honor to his moral sense, he unjustly charges the Stagyrte with misrepresentation, or rather with a direct falsification of Plato's Doctrine in the very outset, which is incredible. He must have understood that Plato had meant *something* higher and other than *regulative*. Of this something he could make nothing out to his own mind but a sort of Gods and Goddesses. This he naturally rejected as mere fancy-work and substituted the regulative. How else could his System have been received as a diverse System in his own times, and controverted as such by the immediate Successors of Plato? The poor trick attributed to Aristotle (that of stealing his Master's

black Horse, and then swearing it could not be his Master's Horse because *that* was piebald) succeeded, I own, in the instance of Locke versus Aristotle and Descartes, and of Horne Tooke versus the Dutch Etymologists, but under a conflict of accidental aidances, from factions in Church and State and from a general aversion to Speculative Philosophy, which cannot be supposed in Athens at the period in which the Peripatetic School was founded.

12. *Contra* Tennemann, III. 27.
13. The facts of Aristotle's life here and on pp. 182-8 come largely from Tennemann, III. 21 foll.
14. *Gibbon*. See Lecture VII. pp. 229 foll. and notes, where he is discussed more fully.
15. *Hume*. Coleridge admired Hume as having an acute and logical mind, and often defended him against misunderstanding. See Lecture VI. pp. 202-3; *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 91-4, 123-4. But the attack on Hume's *History* in the *Statesman's Manual* is more violent. Here in the lecture he is thinking primarily of *The Natural History of Religion*, 1757, in which Hume argued that polytheism is tolerant, monotheism intolerant. In the lecture on *The Prometheus of Aeschylus*, 1825, Coleridge says, "With a bitter smile would an Aeschylus or a Plato in the shades, listen to a Gibbon or a Hume vaunting the mild and tolerant spirit of the state religions of ancient Greece or Rome". And in the present lecture his treatment of Socrates (pp. 182-3) may be intended in part as an answer to Hume's view of him as anti-theistic, in revolt against the popular theism, a parallel for eighteenth century deistic and sceptical developments. Did Coleridge, like Warburton, take Hume to be one of a long line of deists?
16. Hookham Frere was making a translation of *The Birds* of Aristophanes and had sent it to Coleridge for criticism. Coleridge copied some of it into the notebook he was using for the lectures. Later Frere presented him with the MS. The reference to Aristophanes was perhaps intended as a kind of compliment to Frere, who was in the audience and had hired the reporter. See *U.L.*, II. 246, and *B.L.*, I. 55, 223.
17. See also *L.R.* I., 312. The paragraph appears to be anti-Voltaire and perhaps also anti-Hazlitt. Voltaire's *Treatise on Tolerance*, translated by D. Williams, 1779, was annotated by Coleridge. His copy was sold with Green's library. Hazlitt had praised Voltaire in his 1818 lectures. See next note.
18. *Abstraction and generalization*. Coleridge is maintaining, with Berkeley and Hume and against Locke and Hazlitt, that an abstract image is an absurdity, and that abstract and general ideas are different. Locke said, (*Essay on the Human Understanding*, Bk. I. Chap. II, 15), "The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet: and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language." Every syllable of this would be anathema to Coleridge. Hazlitt, in "An Account

of the Discourses of Sir Joshua Reynolds" in the *Annals of the Fine Arts* for Jan. 1819, attacked Reynolds for not seeing that the general "is tantamount to abstract". (Incidentally, the same number of that periodical contained: an article on Michelangelo in which the anecdote about Titian (pp. 178-9, note 9 of this lecture) was recounted; an announcement that Hazlitt's lectures on the *English Comic Writers* were in the press; and a poem by Lamb. Associations of memory and feeling are closely linked here. See note 31 below.)

19. On Tennemann, III. 26-7, appears this comment:

Here the sturdy Kantian comes into play. That Aristotle did not, and as a mere, tho' most eminent Philologist could not behold the *Ideas* of the Divine Philosopher, is most true; but that he should so grossly misunderstand his *words*, as to have persisted in taking as constitutive what Plato had taught as only regulative—this is little less than impossible. Would not the other Scholars of Plato have at once exclaimed against such a perversion?

20. *Plato and Aristotle*: Cf. Lect. II. p. 107, note 44 and Introduction §3, pp. 52-5. Two days before this fifth lecture Coleridge wrote Green (*Letters* II. 699); he was anxious to borrow his copy of Goethe's *Zur Farbenlehre* "for a passage in the preface in which he compares Plato with Aristotle, etc., as far as I recollect, in a spirited manner". But there is in the Preface no comparison of Plato and Aristotle to answer Coleridge's description. In the historical section, Goethe does deal with them in the way I have described in the Introduction.

The preface to the *Farbenlehre* makes many points with which Coleridge must have agreed, e.g. criticism of Newtonians like Paley for their contempt of the pre-Newtonian investigations in Optics, or reference to illustrations and plates as "hieroglyphic modes of communication which by degrees assume the place of the phenomena and of Nature herself and thus rather hinder than promote true knowledge". Here, too, Goethe refers to the doctrine of Plotinus (Cf. Lect. III. and note 4) that the eye shares the light-quality of the sun; otherwise, since like is known only by like, we should not see light. See also Lect. VII. note 21 and IX. note 31.

21. MS. Egerton 2826, ff. 381-2 reads:

The former [form, as contrasted with shape] is the same with the Leibnitzian monad and the Entelechie of Aristotle which the famous Poet, Scholar, Statesman and Patriarch Hermolaus Barbarus raised the devil to find the meaning of. This was the first time that the devil served the purpose of a philosophical dictionary though some two centuries afterwards Voltaire and his friends proved how aptly and effectually a philosophical dictionary might serve the purpose of the devil.

22. Cf. *A.R.*, 244 f.n. on Aristotle as providing the intellectual loophole for pantheism, by a system in which "God is confounded with the universe". Coleridge's favourite religious pantheists were Plotinus, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Schelling.

23. In *B.L.*, I. 71-4, almost the same statement is elaborated.
24. Tennemann, III. 28-33. Here the connexion with Tennemann seems, for this lecture, to be ended.
25. On the relation between connectives in language and in society, see the beginning of Lect. X and note 3. In an interesting unpublished note on punctuation, Coleridge refers to the "asthmatic" style of contemporary French writing. And cf. the *Friend*, I. 25. His anti-Gallicism went to absurd lengths, as he himself at times seems to have suspected, but it should be remembered that all his life he was subject to attack for his first youthful enthusiasm for the French Revolution, because antagonistic reviewers who wished to condemn his books often resurrected this among other personal charges. The accusation of being pro-French was the more galling to one who thought he had been on Napoleon's blacklist; and also because of Hazlitt's publicly-avowed Buonapartism. This was another source of contention between Hazlitt and Coleridge.

In Coleridge's view, materialism, epicureanism, scepticism, utilitarianism, were the predominant schools of French thinking since Louis XIV, and were indigenous in a people remarkable for cleverness, talent, and wit, but not for genius, sense or humour; they should be noted for the invention of theories, for the "tendency to individualize, embody, insulate", as compared with the German tendency by Ideas to anticipate law, to work towards totality, and the English propensity towards the discovery of law, or "the contemplation of ideas objectively as existing powers". German thought is characterized by distinctness, English by clearness, and French by palpability. See the *Friend*, III. 84-92. Mental powers linked with the mere understanding and antithetical to the exercise of Reason or imagination would never, to Coleridge's way of thinking, produce either poetry or the best prose. The synthetic quality is lacking.

When the restrictive prejudices are eliminated, Coleridge's theories about the relations between a society and its speech are seen to be in the van of contemporary thinking. I have found no evidence that Coleridge read Herder on the origin of language, and K. W. von Humboldt's work appeared two years after Coleridge's death. But Coleridge had met him and discussed Schlegel on Shakespeare with him in Rome; possibly his views owe something to both Humboldt and Schlegel.

26. Pan-ethics? (The reporter's word might read 'parethics') The word is not in the N.E.D. nor have I found it in Aristotle or in any translation. Kant uses the term "pansophie"—meaning history and rational knowledge without limits. Coleridge is perhaps following suit and coining "panethics".
27. The reference is perhaps to Burke's *Conciliation with America*, Works, Beaconsfield ed., II. 170, or to *The Duration of Parliaments*, *ibid.*, VII. 73.
28. *The great Capella*—Martianus Minneus Felix Capella, of Carthage, fl. before A.D. 439. Bk. VII of his *De Nuptiis Philologicae et Mercurii* contains a discussion of the ten numbers; Bk. VIII deals with astronomy and Bk. IX with music. Pythagoras comes into all three.
29. Coleridge had referred to the work of artists represented in the Campo Santo in Pisa (in the first lecture of the 1818 series, Jan. 27), as work in which "complexity, variety, and symbolical character are evident and are more

fully developed in the mightier works of Michel Angelo and Raphael". *Misc. Crit.*, 7. Giotto is not actually represented in the group. Coleridge always associated the great fresco there, *The Triumph of Death*, with his name. *Misc. Crit.*, 10. See also Lect. IV. pp. 167-8, note 33.

30. *A.P.*, 100-1, 125-6, 187.
31. Zeuxis, who tried to depict the compound beautiful woman, provided a stock example of mechanical *vs.* imitative art. The example as used by Reynolds in his *Discourses* was strenuously objected to by Hazlitt in his article in the *Annals of the Fine Arts*, XII. Jan. 1819. See note 18 above.
32. *Cf. Statesman's Manual*, App. B., and note 25, above.

LECTURE VI

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB.25. pp. 100-113. Squeezed in at the top of p. 106 Coleridge wrote: *HERE BEGIN*. Fuller than usual, the notes are used right through the lecture for all but the last nine pages of it; but they are not systematically followed, and are not in good lecturing order.
2. The names given in the lecture may or may not have been those in Coleridge's notes which, except for the insertion of Philon and the omission of Stilpo's son, follow Tennemann, I.137. Tennemann was also used for the dates, the reference to Timon and the quotation of his words.
3. *Dr. Franklin's character of the Edinburgh Alumni*. In his *Autobiography* Franklin wrote, "We sometimes disputed, and very fond we were of argument, and very desirous of confuting one another, which disputatious turn, by the way, is apt to become a very bad habit, making people often extremely disagreeable in company by the contradiction that is necessary to bring it into practice; and thence, besides souring and spoiling the conversation, is productive of disgusts and, perhaps enmities where you may have occasion for friendship. . . . Persons of good sense, I have since observed, seldom fall into it, except lawyers, university men, and men of all sorts that have been bred at Edinburgh." Smyth, A. H., *Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, N.Y., 1905, I. 240. I am indebted to Miss G. D. Hess, Assistant Librarian of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, for the reference.
4. I can discover no such reference to Eubulides in Plutarch. Did Coleridge refer to what Diog. Laert., II. 109, says of Eubulides? Tennemann quotes the passage, II.135, f.n.4. Or was Coleridge thinking of what Plutarch says not of Eubulides but of Chrysippus? It may not be irrelevant to notice that Cicero says of Chrysippus (*Acad. Quaest.* II.xxx) practically what Coleridge says Plutarch says of Eubulides. It is possible that the "hooks and eyes of memory" became tangled.
5. *Double meanings*. *Cf.* NB.17 (*A.P.*, 155), "the instinctive passion in the mind for a *one word* to express *one act* of feeling". And see *A.P.*, 204-5.
6. On bulls and their relation to mob feeling see *S.M.*, 21-2; and *A.P.*, 156. The reference here appears to be to the encyclopædists and the French Revolution.
7. *Diodorus Cronus*. The first sentence of this paragraph is suggested by

- Tennemann, II. 147, who quotes Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, xi, 12. But the development is entirely Coleridgean.
8. *English Synonyms Discriminated*, by William Taylor, 1813. The author was a friend of Southey.
 9. Cf. Lecture V, and note 4.
 10. In the *Pseudodoxia Epidemica*, Bk. VI. Ch. V, Browne confutes the theory of the earth rotating round the sun. The reflection on the absurdities of philosophers, however, seems to belong elsewhere. Descartes (*De Methodo*, Pt. II.) made the thrust, and Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.*, I. 3). In his *Origines Sacrae*, (1675) 393, which Coleridge annotated, Stillingfleet quotes and translates Cicero's *Nihil tam absurdum quod non dixerit aliquis Philosophorum*, "No absurdity so great but it found a Philosopher to vouch it". Coleridge may have had Stillingfleet much in mind during the lectures, especially for the opposition he sets up between philosophy and Christianity, and possibly it is of this reference Coleridge is thinking.
 11. A point made in the controversy with Wordsworth over "rustic" language. *B.L.*, II. 31, 40.
 12. Tennemann, II. 166-7, gives the substance of this sentence and the next one on Pyrrho.
 13. *Attacks on Hume*. Cf. Coleridge on *Logic and Learning*, 124. Hume was attacked in the following works: Priestley, Joseph, *Examination of Scottish Philosophy*, 1774; Oswald, James, *Appeal to Common Sense on Behalf of Religion*, 1776; Beattie, James, *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*, 1770.
 14. The "compleat Lockians" are writers like Priestley, Oswald, and Beattie, already referred to, and many others also influenced by Locke to believe that knowledge was derived from sense impressions, in Coleridge's view a denial of the activity of the mind in favour of its passivity to matter. See Lecture XII, *passim*, "The pith of my system is to make the senses out of the mind—not the mind out of the senses, as Locke did". *T.T.*, July 25, 1832.
 15. Coleridge refers to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, I. iii. §xiv.
 16. Tennemann (II. 187 f.n.) quotes Sextus Empiricus who quotes Timon; but Coleridge is stating rather the general sceptic position, outlined by Tennemann, II. 183-7. His sympathetic treatment of scepticism is best understood in relation to the sceptical onslaughts on the dogmatic naturalism of Epicureans and Stoics.
- The reference to Voltaire makes Coleridge one of the earliest of many quoters of the last speech in *Candide*: *il faut cultiver notre jardin*.
17. Coleridge deals with the sceptics in Lectures VIII and X. But he had intended to deal with Pyrrho here, as the notes with the biographical details for Pyrrho show. Instead, he repeated himself (Lecture V.) on the intolerance of the ancients and went back to notes unused in Lecture V on the Cyrenaics.
 18. On Aristippus Coleridge follows Tennemann, II. 104, and also on his successors, Tennemann, II. 105-112.
 19. Cicero, *Academica*, II. 142. The Loeb ed. gives *judici*. Tennemann (II. 112 f.n.) gives Coleridge's reading.
 20. Cf. with this a similar passage in *On the Principles of Genial Criticism*, *B.L.*,

II. 225-6, over which there has already been considerable discussion. Shawcross thought the writer on taste referred to was Jeffrey: a letter to the *T.L.S.* of Dec. 29, 1932, from J. T. M. Stewart connects him with Chesterfield and Lessing. The last supposition may be true for the passage in the essay, but neither Jeffrey nor Chesterfield wrote the "elaborate work on taste" of the lecture. The reference here is clearly to Knight, R.P., *An Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste*. Coleridge's copy of the 1806 edition is in the Huntington Library in California. He quotes from it in a lecture of 1808. See *Sh. Crit.*, I. 180 foll. Part I of Knight's *Inquiry* is "Of Sensation" and deals with the sense organs and the tastes deriving from them, and Part II is "Of the Association of Ideas", under which Imagination is treated as involuntary association, and discussed in mechanical terms. Cf. also *S.M.*, Appendix E, xxxvii. Allsop reports Coleridge as saying (italics mine), "Some men—Jeffrey is one—refer taste to palate". Allsop, I. 137.

21. *Self-love* cf. *Self-gratification*. Is the "subtler point" Kant's distinction between selfishness and self-realization? Cf. Muirhead, *op. cit.*, 144. See also this lecture below, pp. 215-16.
22. The discussion of the reputed atheism of Theodorus and his school follows Tennemann, II. 126-128.
23. It is difficult to know to which "one sentence" Coleridge refers. I *Corinthians* 2, 11? "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." Or *Romans* 11, 33-4? Or *Hebrews* 11?
24. *The Acts of the Apostles*, Ch. 17.
25. The sentences on Hegesias that follow are based on Tennemann, II. 128-9.
26. The poem first appeared on *Sibylline Leaves*, 268. The reporter may have copied the quotation from print for it is punctuated. In line 19, Dykes Campbell prints 'each other' in the Globe edition. Coleridge's quotation here corroborates E. H. Coleridge's reading, *P.W.*, I. 425-6.
27. *Hegesias silenced and banished by Ptolemy*. Cicero (*Tusc. Disput.*, I. 34) and Valerius Maximus (IX. §3-Ext.3) both say that Ptolemy stopped Hegesias lecturing because many of his hearers committed suicide.
28. Cf. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, 87, "Pessimism is the last but also the annihilating consequence of eudaemonism, its immanent criticism."
29. The details of the biography of Epicurus are those given by Tennemann, III. 348 foll.
30. The incident helps to account for Coleridge's antipathy to Erasmus Darwin. Cf. *Coleridge the Talker*, 211-12; "Coleridge said Dr. Darwin was a great plagiarist. 'He was like a pigeon picking up peas and afterwards voiding them with excremental additions'." See also *B.L.*, I. 11-12.
31. The "old proverb" is to be found in mediaeval Latin: *Aegrogat Daemon monachus tunc esse volebat: Daemon convaluit Daemon ut ante fuit*. Rabelais has it, Bk. IV. Ch. xxiv, and in the English version it appears in John Ray's *Compleat Collection of English Proverbs*, 1742.
32. *Self-love*. See note 21 above. See Lecture II and note 43, and Lecture III and notes 34 and 38.
33. The first statement is in Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, V. 797-815, quoted

- by Tennemann, III. 373-85. The "analogy" of the old hens appears to be a Coleridian one; the nearest thing to it in Lucretius appears to be (V. 826-7), "But because she the Earth must have some limit to her bearing, she ceased, like a woman worn out by old age".
34. "The interest of Epicurus in his natural philosophy turns essentially on the disproof of theological explanations and the establishment of the naturalistic principle. . . ." Ueberweg, *op. cit.*, I. 208.
 35. *Zeno*. The biographical details and the account of the Stoics, are based closely on Tennemann, IV. 4-94.
 36. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu*. Aristotle, *De Anima*. See *L.R.*, IV. 148. In a MS. note on Baxter's *Life* in his *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, 1696, now in the British Museum, Coleridge says that Boyer of Christ's Hospital used to recite the Latin and then translate: "You must flog a boy before you can make him understand," or, "You must lay it in at the tail before you can get it into the head." *Eng. Div.*, II. 113.
 37. Plutarch did attack the Stoics, in his *Moralia*.
 38. *The grand error of Socrates*. Cf. with this statement Coleridge's discussion in Lecture III and a marginal note on Tennemann, reproduced in note 34 to Lecture III. Coleridge is consistent with himself. He thinks of Socrates as one of the religious pantheists (like Spinoza), and his pantheism jeopardizes his ethics. See also Lecture IV. pp. 148-9.
 39. *Commanders bowing before Jupiter*. See e.g. Livy IV. 20, and XLI. 28, where Cossus and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus are recorded as paying tribute to Jupiter.
 40. *The plough of Lucullus*. Coleridge has confused two stories. *L. L. Lucullus* (c.114-57 B.C.) general and statesman, after successful campaigns, lived in great luxury in Rome where he collected a famous library. *L. Q. Cincinnatus* (c.500-450 B.C.) left the plough for sixteen days to be dictator and then returned to it.
 41. *God the ideal of the moral law*. A good instance of Coleridge feeling his way towards this idea is to be found in a notebook (unnumbered):

"An idea has just occurred to me—it seems important. Is not Sin, or Guilt, the first thing that makes the idea of a God necessary, instead of τὸ Θεῖον—therefore is not the incarnation a beautiful consequence and revelation of the τὸ Θεῖον first revealing itself as ὁ Θεός? The idea escapes from me as I write it; but purify the mind by humility and self-consciousness wholly *retrospective*, & again try to retrace it. To see the Gospel in a new light again & again read Spinoza—to think vices mere necessitated movements, relative only as stench or roughness, we know to be false—but take it in the Kantian idea, as the ante-type of the moral Law—suppose it like *Cohesion*—as that simply causing coherence, so this essentially demanding *morality*—and what becomes of Sinners? I feel the Clouds yet saw there is something there [date uncertain]."
 42. The illustration, used more than once in Coleridge's MSS., has when viewed in the light of many confessional passages in the notebooks, a certain autobiographical poignancy. Cf. *U.L.*, II. 108-9. Out of his own

experience he has grasped a psychological truth very slow o common acceptance even today.

43. *Prayer*. Cf. a passage in NB. 13 (date c.1808):

The *habit* of psychological analysis makes additionally difficult the act of true Prayer. Yet as being a good Gift of God it may be employed as a guard against Self-delusion, tho' used *creaturely* it is too often the means of Self-delusion. But I am not speaking now of what my Understanding may suggest but of that which the *Fact* reveals to & for *me*—it does make Prayer, the sole instrument of regeneration, very very difficult. Those who speak of Prayer, of deep, inward, sincere prayer, as sweet and and easy, if they have the Right to speak thus, O how enviable* is their lot! Language itself confesses the depravity of our nature! In many instances, even to express a high degree of innocent feeling we borrow words from the phraseology of our worst vices.

* Envious! i.e. exceedingly desirable, and possessed by another—without the wish to rid the other of it or any part of it.

44. NB. 5: Socinianism, moonlight—methodism a stove. O for some sun to unite heat and light! (*A.P.*, 26). The image is used in *S.M.*, 60.

LECTURE VII

1. This is the lecture postponed from February 1. Possibly illness was the reason for the scantiness of the notes. There are none in NB.25, and only some sketchy ones on loose sheets numbered 1, 2, 3, by Coleridge (MS. Egerton 2801, ff.226, 33, 32, respectively). They are not used consecutively.
2. Coleridge appears to be following Tennemann, V. 40, yet a similar comment on Aenesidimus, Photius, and Sextus Empiricus, occurs in a note on Thomas Browne's *Vulgar Errors*, 1658 (*L.R.*, II. 398) and is dated 1808. Could H. N. Coleridge have read 1808 for 1818? I have been unable to see this annotation.
3. Ahasuerus and Mordecai, *Esther*, 8. 2-15.
4. *Gibbon*. NB.18 contains several passages on Gibbon, for the most part severe strictures against his weighing only "external evidence, or rather, out-of-law testimonies . . . yet with all these faults he is still our greatest historian". NB.18, 220-221. Cf. McCloy, S. T., *Gibbon's Antagonism to Christianity*, London, 1933, whose statement (250 foll.) of Coleridge's views needs modification.

See also Lecture V. note 15; *T.T.*, Aug. 15, 1833, provides more comprehensive criticism:

I protest I do not remember a single philosophical attempt made throughout the work to fathom the ultimate causes of the decline or fall of that empire. How miserably deficient is the important reign of Justinian! And that poor scepticism, which Gibbon mistook for Socratic philosophy, has led him to misstate and mistake the character and influence of Christianity in a way which even an avowed infidel or atheist would not and could not have done. Gibbon was a man of immense reading; but he had

no philosophy; . . . The true key to the declension of the Roman Empire—which is not to be found in all Gibbon's immense work—may be stated in two words:—the *imperial* character overlaying and finally destroying the *national* character.

5. *Brothers*, Richard, 1757–1824, made many predictions, fulfilled and unfulfilled. The prophecy of St. Matthew referred to is in Ch. XXIII and XXIV, and the words of St. Peter paraphrased are from I Peter, Ch. IV and II Peter, Ch. III.
6. Coleridge frequently commented on the moral ill-consequences of military government, after his observation of the effects of French military occupation in Germany and again in Italy. Cf. e.g. *Friend*, II. 268–70.
7. The notes in MS. Egerton 2801, f.32, refer to "Lactantius, p. 31. Vol. 5," (the page reference is to Tennemann) and are of some interest:

Even the Buffoonery of the Cynics, who united the Epicurean contempt for all superstition with the proud morals of the Stoics, even these Jack-Puddings of Philosophers were doubly serviceable—by the force of their arguments and the depravity of their own lives.

Query. Whether the intimate union which now took place between the Platonic and Pythagorean schools was a greater advantage or obstacle to Christianity?

The eclectic syncretistic character, that everywhere became predominant, itself a reflex from Xtnty. Like an (apery)* mimicry of Nature to make a Gospel by its own powers—it was a striving to do what Christianity had already done—as some of the Rabbins' fables, that Nature with the remnant of (divine)* derived power had formed the Ape. in vain rivalry of the great work from which she had been excluded.

Fine passage in Lactantius p.31, Vol.5. And after he had effected this what would it prove but that whatever was true & good in the writings of the Philosophers already was- (formed)* found united in Christ? and possessed a real existence no where else—any more than Helen of Zeuxis composed from the different beauties of Greece could be said to exist except in the picture—or Homo Microcosmus—and this too only by means of the higher copula, found no where but in him.

* [()]* words crossed out.]

There follow the notes used at the very beginning of the lecture, on Aenesidimus &c.

On Christianity as the unifier of all truth, see references to Leibnitz, *B.L.*, Chap. XII.

8. *Seneca said*. Coleridge's dramatization of *De Clementia* I. 24. 1. ?
9. *Cosmopolitism not ex- but in-clusive of patriotism*. This appears to be an instance of something omitted by the reporter without indication of omission. In the Hunterian Oration for 1819, delivered a week later on February 15th, John Abernethy quoted Coleridge's phrase and referred it to his lectures. See *Intro.* §2, p. 24 and p. 28.
10. Coleridge appears to be contending against two extreme views as to the

introduction of Christianity and the Christian Sunday. (1) He agrees with Heylyn in his *History of the Sabbath* (Coleridge read and annotated it) "that the Sabbath was not instituted at the beginning of the world"; and (2) he attacks Gibbon's view in Ch. III of the *Decline and Fall*, that Christianity first undermined and then destroyed the old pagan religions of Rome. Gibbon emphasizes the social disruption and the intolerance and persecutions attendant on early Christianity (Ch. XV and XVI).

11. Coleridge is here telescoping three passages in Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, (1) xiii.10.6; (2) xiii.5.9; (3) xviii.1.3, where he says the Sadducees (1) are few and rich, (2) emphasize personal moral responsibility (though Josephus points out they deny fate whereas the Essenes believe in it) and (3) refuse belief in any spiritual as distinct from material existence—immortality.
12. Tennemann (VI. 91 foll.) accepts the tradition that Ammonius Saccus (175–250 A.D.) was the founder of Neoplatonism. He was the teacher of Plotinus, Origen, Longinus and Erennius. See also Lecture VIII. p. 248.
13. Tennemann, V, *Einleitung*, and VI *passim*.
14. Coleridge's diffidence on the subject of evolution leads him into vagueness. The connexion between what follows on the theories of biological evolution and of animal magnetism is not very clear, but the main point in the making seems to be that the "intellectual instinct" in man is relatively unknown and unexplored. Does Coleridge mean that mesmerism is no more incredible than the evolutionary hypothesis, and that both rest on the same ultimate mystery, the nature of the mental and its relation to the physical?

Cf. a statement from MS. Egerton 2801 reproduced by A. D. Snyder in "Coleridge on Giordano Bruno", *M.L.N.*, xliii, No. 7, where he appears strongly to oppose theories of the evolution of the human race. Miss Snyder interestingly points out ("Coleridge's Cosmogony", *Proc. British Academy*, 1915–16, 625) that Coleridge's scheme was not actually a time scheme at all.

15. *Philo Judaeus* (fl.c.A.D.39), an Alexandrine, wrote a commentary on the Old Testament in which he suggested it was the source of the principal doctrines of Plato and Aristotle.
16. *Facts . . . lately brought forward on the continent*. Cf. Lecture II. pp. 104–5 and note 36. The reference is possibly to Kluge, C. A., *Versuch einer Darstellung des animalischen Magnetismus*, Berlin, 1815, which Coleridge annotated heavily. Or possibly it was to Wolfart, K. C., *Mesmerismus*, Berlin, 1814, (also annotated by Coleridge), in the introduction to which there is a reference to the Franklin report, referred to below. On a flyleaf at the beginning of Vol. 2 of the *Mesmerismus* Coleridge writes:

"It is amusing to observe the neither very honest nor very ingenious efforts of Dr. Wolfart [*sic*] . . . to distill the dreggy Materialism of Mesmer into the hyper-alcoholic Spirit of Schellingianism, but alas! it will not do even for a child's *Picture-book* to the System der Naturphilosophie. It is however no sound objection to the facts of Animal Magnetism, that it's most successful Professors have been men of weak Judgement. For the

prevention of distraction of mind, and earnestness of Volition are ex hypothesi the conditions of concentrating and emitting the influence, even as Anger, and the energy of self-defence are the conditions of the Gymnotus accumulating its galvanism—but this devotion of thought, freedom from disturbing Doubts, and even from the activity of philosophic Inference, in short, Faith (as a unifying energy) are most likely to exist in weak & credulous but sincere, sensitive and warm-hearted Men.—Just such a man is Dr. Wolfart, as I have been assured by one of his most intimate friends.—That friend, who admitted him to be a man of no vigor of intellect, and bodily too ein schwacher Kränzlicher Mensch (feeble and sickly) spoke in the highest terms of his veracity, his disinterestedness—in short, as a man incapable of guile—and this friend likewise (Ludwig Tieck, the celebrated Poet and Critic) attested the fact of Wolfart's power of fixing the needle in the Mariners' Compass by pointing his finger on it (See p. 92) attested it as a frequent Eyc-witncss—Has likewise attested in answer to the same question—(What have you yourself seen?) the powers of Magnetism in each of the six Grades, with exception of the last or the *extatic*—Of this, however, he had no doubt: so many instances had been related to him by Physicians of eminence, men on whose honor and veracity he placed entire reliance, who had themselves been to Magnetisers. I think it probable, that An. Magnetism will be found connected with a Warmth-Sense: & will confirm my long long ago theory of Volition as a mode of *double Touch*."

Mesmer's death in 1815 precipitated a flood of books, and discussions of hypnotism and related matters, in the first quarter of the century. There is an article by Coleridge on Animal Magnetism, possibly intended for the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*, still in MS. in the British Museum (Add. MS. 36,532). It is in Green's hand with corrections by Coleridge, and is dated July 8th, 1817.

Coleridge's marginalia on Southey's *Life of Wesley*, 1807, contain many references to the subject. (See f.n. to *T.T.* for April 30, 1830.) Coleridge's interest in it was early and persistent; see Professor Lane Cooper's article "The Power of the Eye in Coleridge" in *Studies in . . . Honour of J. N. Hart*, N.Y. 1910. An earlier reference than any he mentions is to be found in the *Friend*, No. 4, Sept. 7, 1809.

See also the Introduction §3, pp. 45-7, above.

17. *Franklin's report*. In 1784 the king of France appointed a commission of doctors and scientists, of whom Franklin was one, to investigate the theories and practices of Mesmer (1733-1815). Their report admitted his facts and contested his theory. Mesmer alarmed the medical profession by his popularity, was widely denounced as an impostor, and finally escaped to Switzerland. The report of Franklin and his colleagues is referred to by Wolfart, K. C. in his *Mesmerismus*, Berlin, 1815, xv. See note above.
18. *Apollonius of Tyana*. A wandering Pythagorean mystic whose biography

by Philostratus gave rise to a controversy between the Pythagoreans and the Christians. Coleridge is following Tennemann, V. 199–208.

19. Coleridge frequently emphasized Plato's theism and its similarity to the Christian; the fullest statement is in a footnote to *A.R.*, 26 (Introduct. Aphorisms XXXI).
20. *Plotinus*. Cf. Lecture IV. p. 165, and *A.P.*, 48–9, *B.L.*, I. 166 foll. Two long marginalia on Plato and Plotinus etc. seem worth quoting here, as being among the most interesting of the comments on Tennemann, differing somewhat from the lecture, and useful in supplementing the little we have of Coleridge on these crucial positions. On Vol. VI. 45 (written on blank leaves at back of volume):

In part this assertion rests on confounding *Reason* with *Reasoning*, ideas with abstracta, nomina generalia, and other products of the Understanding; and in part, on the Kantian supposed Antinomies of Reason, which are themselves founded, on a similar substitution and on Kant's *πρωτόφρωνος*, the derivation of *Ideas* from the Speculative Reason *entirely*, for the behoof indeed of the practical Reason and Active Principle, but not by means thereof, or in conjunction therewith: which latter is nevertheless the true and platonic theory of *Ideas*. Kant supposed the *Ideas* to be the *Oscillations* of the same Imagination, which working determinately produces the Mathematical Intuitions, line, circle &c.—a sort of total impression made by successive constructions, each denied or negatived as soon as made—and yet the constructive power still beginning anew—Whereas according to the true platonic view, the Reason and Will are the Parents (to ask which is Father and which the Mother would be to turn a Metaphor into a matter of fact) and the *Idea* itself the transcendent Analagon of the Imagination or die spirituelle Anschauung—spiritual Intuition. S.T.C.

Yet how am I to think it possible, that Tennemann could have read with attention the *De Legibus*, *de Republica*, not to mention the *Phædrus* of Plato, and yet find the *divisive* difference between the Platonic Philosophy (even supposing it contained or intended to be more than prepared for, in his known writings,) and that of Plotinus in this—that the latter grounded his system on the assertion of intellectual intuitions—or *immediate* Beholding of supersensuous Objects,—a *fancy*, of which Plato, forsooth, nothing knew! Plato arrived or thought of arriving at all his transcendencies by mere purification of Conceptions, (*Begriffe*) by processes of Abstraction and Negation, extracting Sunshine from Cucumbers by a wilful forgetting of the Rind, Flesh, Pips and Juice of the latter, and the idea of eternal Mind from the Human Head by simply abstracting from (leaving out) the Skull and the Brains.—As if the supernatural *Derivation* of *Ideas* in the Platonic Scheme (“diese hyper-physiche Ableitung der Ideen abgerechnet”) p. 44—which and not the *Ideas* themselves or any difference in kind or quality, distinguished them from

Conceptions (Verstandbegriffe),—as if the whole doctrine of Reminiscence—did not suppose the reality of intellectual intuition, as an *attribute* of the Soul, and its *actual* existence under certain conditions, and that it exists *potentially* even during the *eclipse* of the opaque Body! Now if this opacity relative to the Soul could not be diminished, to what purpose Plato's various *δοκητικά καὶ καθαρτικά*, and if diminished, then a proportional increase of Transparency in the Body, as the intercepting obstacle between the Seeing Soul and the ever present Object! It seems to me plain enough, that the Ground of the Plotinian Philosophy (N.B. I do not speak of the deductions and inferences which Plotinus, and still less of those which his Successors made from this ground) is a *clear* and *positive* exposition of *Ideas*. The doctrine rather hinted by Plato in his *writings* than set forth. Plato's principal object was to insinuate on every opportunity the insufficiency and alien nature of Conceptions formed by the Reflection (=Verstand, Understanding, λόγος φιλόσοφος) (Vernunft, Reason, Νοῦς) in relation to the proper objects of Philosophy (ἢ Philology) viz. The Soul, Moral Freedom, God)—and this he effected by deducing contradictory results or absurdities from premises logically (ὡς κατὰ λόγον) undeniable. If then neither the Conceptions formed by the Understanding from materials furnished by Sense, nor the Notions formed by the U. by reflection on its own processes were the proper Organs for the knowledge of supersensuous Truths, either such knowledge is impossible for men or there must exist other and higher Organs or Media. Plato assumed the latter and named these media *Ideas*—but gave little more than their *negative* character—i.e. what they were *not*.—Plotinus proposed to display their *positive* Being.—It does, however, surprise me that Tennemann should have so utterly misunderstood Plato's Matter or Μὴ ὂν—and pronounced him a Dualist in consequence. Matter in Plato is = Finiteness by Negation, the organ of which was the ἀρρητον, not to be disclosed save in the inmost recesses of Academus—to the elect and prepared Few.—The Negative alone (as in the doctrine of Ideas) he dared make public—viz. that it did *not* originate in God, and that it was one with the principle of Moral Evil. S. T. C.

P.S. The distressful perturbations of War and domestic calamity so affectingly stated by Tennemann in the preface to this volume more than sufficiently excuse, but can alone account for, the temporary alienation of philosophic mind, in which so sound a Thinker could attribute to *Plato* the belief of an eternal Somewhat, with the single attribute of Extension—i.e. a substance wholly superficial!—and this the Rival of the Eternal Mind!

But for the circumstances above mentioned I should not have been able to suppress an emotion of indignant contempt at the obtuseness and schoolmasterly tone with which Tennemann

¹ [Coleridge's symbol for 'as opposed to.']

maltreats so evident a Genius as Plotinus—or rather at once berates and berates, the wooden Image which he mistakes for Plotinus. Compared with the praise he bestows on Sextus Empiricus, and the interest, with which he details and retails his miserable sophisms and quirks of mock-logic, this Critique is really quite awful!—so solemnly does Tennemann wave the plume and Sceptre of literal Kantism! The *Role* of a Parrot caged in the Study of that great Modern.

Another note on Neoplatonism and Plotinus appears on Tennemann, Vol. VI. on 2, 3 and 4 of the blank leaves at front of volume:

How strongly Kantianism, in letter rather than spirit, influenced Tennemann is evident from his inconsistencies with regard to Plato—and his utter inattention to the fragment from Speusippus, which he himself quotes. And yet he speaks of the triune Ground, or three Principles = 1. as a late corruption of Platonism—see p. 52. This vehement prejudice has rendered this (work)* volume of little value, not sufficiently minute or learned to be a store-house of facts—and for the rest, he saw nothing but in the light of its agreement or disagreement with the Kantian *Mechanique*!—This is painfully true in his account of the Eclectic Philosophy. From the date of the Volume it is evident, that Tennemann had two objects in view, first to shew the identity of the Neo-Platonic System, especially as exhibited by Plotinus and Proclus, with the Natur-Philosophie of Schelling and his School. —2nd to confute the latter under the name of the former. See p. 297, last three lines. “Daher &c. to the end of the §.—Again, p. 299, 1, the question is not fairly stated; but *contra* the falsehood of the assumption that there exist Ideas in which the identity of Subjective and Objective is, is assumed in order to be confuted. Assuredly, the Neo-Platonists have the faith and commonsense of Mankind on their side in opposition to the universal subjectivity of the Kantians. And Tennemann could not but know, that Schelling commenced with the denial of the Kantian *extension* of the difference between logical and real verity beyond the demonstrative faculties into the Intuitive. He says, and justly says, what is affirmed to be intuitive, cannot be expected to be demonstrated: for the Truths are supposed to be those, *de quibus alia monstrantur*. But I can demonstrate the hollowness of any demonstration to the contrary—I can prove, that a System of Philosophy can be raised on no other ground; but whether *on this*, the experiment must show.—By their fruits ye shall know them.—Add, that so it must be, if Philosophy is more or other than formal Logic or Mathematics—You Followers of the dead Letter of your immortal Master Em. Kant, cannot give even a tenable definition of the word Philosophy. I need not inform you, my dear Sir! that I am no Schellingian; but I am intolerant of unfair dealing, from or against whomever it

* [crossed out.]

proceeds—Tennemann's method of arguing should have been to prove, that Schelling's privilege of Ideas, true or false, did not apply to his *Absolute*, it being no Idea, but a pure Abstraction

S. T. Coleridge

But the most extraordinary thing and I fear to be accounted for only by personal or sectarian hostility to Schelling, is Tennemann's frank and cordial eulogies of so many other Founders or Revivers of the different Schools, and his ready acknowledgment of their philosophic Genius, tho' no one of them fits the Procrustean Bed of the Kantian Formalism—his assertion of the *essential* diversity from Plato and consequently of the originality of the fundamental idea of the Alexandrine School—and yet cold, praiseless, fault-finding spirit, with which he quotes passage after passage from Plotinus, which (*granting* their untenable transcendency) state in the most beautiful language the only possible Form of a Philosophic Realism, and demonstrate its conditional necessity by one of the most masterly pieces of exhaustive Logic, found in ancient or modern writings. All known or conceivable suppositions are successfully weighed and proved wanting—They do not answer their purpose, even if they were conceivable in themselves—and they are contrary to our clearest conceptions. Now there is yet one position remaining and only one and this is not *contrary* to conception because it is above all conception and *above* all conception it must be, if it be true—for conception is itself a part of the Problem, which it is to solve. Now this Position, if granted, is liable to none of the objections, that have been found fatal to all former First Principles. It is surely then worth the Trial, whether Philosophy may be founded on it, before we take up our gloomy rest in the only Alternative—that Philosophy itself, as a scientific Possession of Objective Truths, not phaenomenal, is a Hope too high for human ambition. Let the attempt of Plotinus have ended in a failure—yet who could see the courage and skill with which he seizes the reins, and vaults into the Chariot of the Sun, with what elegance he curbs and turns the ethereal steeds, without sharing in his enthusiasm—and taking honor to the human mind even to have fallen from such magnificent Daring! The beatific Vision of Philosophy on its Death-bed! the last rich Warble of the Dying Swan!

See Murhead on Coleridge and Plotinus, *op cit*, 105–117.

- 21 John Penn (1760–1834), miscellaneous writer. His *Critical, Poetical and Dramatic Works*, 2 vols. 1796–8, do not provide the anecdote. Coleridge may have had it in conversation or by hearsay.

But in the reference to not being able to talk to the blind about colours, do John Penn and Goethe meet? Goethe uses this analogy in the *Farbenlehre* referred to in Lecture III, notes 3 and 4, Lecture V, note 20, and Introduction §III pp 53–5

- 22 *The story of Porphyry of him. Plotinus Vita*, Ch. 10, (quoted by Tennemann,

- VI. 39); "four times Plotinus had been united with the deity" &c., *ibid.*, Ch. 23. Tennemann, VI. 39, says it was the 68th year and does not refer to day or month.
23. The fable of the Rabbins is not one of the three Coleridge translated in the *Friend*, nor is it in Hurwitz's *Hebrew Tales*, 1828, where they were reprinted; my search ended with these. Coleridge's knowledge of Hebrew dated from Christ's Hospital days, but was greatly stimulated by Hyman Hurwitz, a Jewish physician in Highgate, an admirer of Coleridge and probably one of the audience for the lectures.
24. Cf. T. S. Eliot's lectures on *The Idea of a Christian Society*, London, 1939, much of which Coleridge would have endorsed fervently. It is interesting that in explaining what he means by the use of 'Idea' in his title, Mr. Eliot (*op. cit.*, 67) quotes Coleridge's *Church and State*; and, in fact, the whole work is full of Coleridgean turns of thought.

LECTURE VIII

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB.25, pp. 115-119. They begin:
HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
FIRST & INTRODUCTORY LECTURE.

There appear to be some notes in MS. Egerton 2801, f.26r-27r and in NB.21½, and NB.[29].

2. *Four Classes of Gods*—Sallust so divided them. See *On the Gods and the World* etc., transl. Thos. Taylor, London, 1793, 29. "Jupiter, Neptune, and Vulcan, fabricate the world; Ceres, Juno, and Diana, animate it; Mercury, Venus, and Apollo, harmonize it; and lastly, Vesta, Minerva, and Mars, preside over it with a guardian power."

Proclus, in his *Elements of Theology*, Bks. VI and VII, similarly and more fully describes the gods. Both works, in Thomas Taylor's translation, were annotated by Coleridge.

3. Coleridge is on the defensive against Tennemann, VI. 358, who charges the Eclectics with insincerity; he writes in the margin, "It is a matter of serious regret with me that Tennemann has said so little of the *Theurgie*". What he is trying to do at the beginning of this lecture is made clearer by a note in NB.21½:

To shew the best means of leading the mind to science, that is, to its true object, there are two ways—the one strictly scientific, and therefore requiring a degree of attention not to be expected in a numerous audience, and a frequent recurrence to precedent proofs, in aid of the memory, which is not possible except in private—this is, the proof from an analysis of the human mind in itself, in its component forms and faculties—the other, not less efficacious, and more suited to the present occasion, is from History. What *has been* the Ladder, what have been the various Rounds by which what may be called the continuously successive portions of the Human Race, has ascended to the present Height. From this we may abstract perhaps, and certainly in this we may exemplify, the principles, by which we may arrive at the desired

end—namely that of preparing the mind of the Individual for the acquirement of Truth, and in that of course for the Progress of Knowledge in general, as effected by the effects of Individuals. If, I thought, I can point out how it pleased Providence to educate the earliest period of the Human Race, then its Youth and lastly if not its Manhood yet the preparation for its Manhood, I shall derive a lesson applicable to particular states and even to Individuals—for as the Instincts by which Providence works, so are the correspondent Objects and Results—The Butterfly is not led in vain for a purpose unknown to itself & unconnected with any existing desire or want, to lay its eggs on the particular sort of Leaf that is fitted to sustain the Caterpillar—and is it in Men, the sole magnificent Temple in the world of visible Existence, and is it in the Holy of Holies of this Temple, that is, in the moral & rational part of Humanity, that Nature tells her first and only lie—impossible!

4. *East Indian hung up by hooks*. Recounted by Dubois, *Description of the People of India*, 1817, 414. Coleridge annotated this work. See also *A.R.*, Aphorism XVIII, 305-9.
5. *De Providentia et Fato*: also translated by Thos. Taylor, 1816, and bound with the other works of Proclus referred to in note 2 above. It was preserved in Latin and printed by Fabricius in his *Bibliotheca Graeca*. Coleridge's reference to "8 Vol." may refer to some edition of the *Bibliotheca Graeca*.
6. *The decline of philosophy in Germany, 1818*. J. H. Green, Ludwig Tieck, and H. Crabb Robinson were Coleridge's chief informants. See the note on Tennemann, Lecture VII, note 20 above.
7. *Damascius*. Coleridge is more sympathetic than Tennemann, VI. 361-376, and comments that Tennemann has "grossly misunderstood" him.
8. Mitford, William, *History of Greece*, 2nd Edition, London, 1818, V. 6 (Chap. XLIII, §1).
9. *Thales advising representative government*—In MS. Egerton 2801, f.23.v. the same point is made, and a reference given to Herodotus, Bk. I.
10. *Coleridge's theory of racial migrations*. See Lecture II of the Jan.-March 1818 series in *Misc. Crit.*, 6, 11; Raysor refers the theory to Schlegel, *Werke* V. 14.; cf. *T.T.*, Feb. 24, 1827, in which Coleridge shows familiarity with the racial theories of Kant and Blumenbach.
11. *Celtic nations*. In the *T.T.* ref. above, the southwestern descendants of Japheth are denoted as Italians, Greeks, &c. See also *Misc. Crit.*, 11.
12. E.g. by Gibbon. See Lecture VII. p. 229 foll.
13. *Italian and German parties in Rome*. Cf. *Misc. Crit.*, 8.
14. Theodoric (455-526), notable for his conquest of Italy by violence and his long and esteemed rule (493-526), was often referred to by Coleridge as a symbol of the triumph of Christianity over the ancient world. See *Misc. Crit.*, 11-13. In NB.24 he refers to "the incomparable superiority of a grand Gothic cathedral to the Pantheon and priests' Temples of Greece or Rome". "The principle of the Gothic architecture," he said (*T.T.*, June 29, 1833), "is Infinity made imaginable".
15. *Emperor's kneeling before Popes*. Had Coleridge seen at Padua the fresco of

- Bellini, added to and completed by Titian, in which "Frederick Barbarossa is kneeling at the door of the Church of S. Marco before Pope Alexander IV. who places his foot on Barbarossa's neck"? Vasari, *Life of Titian*, transl. G. de Vere, London, 1912-15, IX. 162.
16. John Tulloch, *Movements of Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Chap. 1. "This idea of the church as the mother of philosophy, and arts and learning, as well as the nurse of faith and piety was unknown" (in Coleridge's day).
 17. The notes are interesting, showing that the emphasis at this point was to have been on the medical profession, natural enough on the date of the Hunterian Oration. (See Introd. §2.) For some reason it shifted—and the interpolation overburdened the sentence—to the Jewish physicians. This reference, the one to the fable of the Rabbins in the preceding lecture, pp. 224-5, note 23, and the attention given to Reuchlin in Lecture X together with the many general references to Hebrew culture, suggest that the subject of Jewish contributions to Western thought was much in Coleridge's mind at this time. See also *T.T.*, April 14, 1830.
 18. The emendations are inferred from the context rather than from any published source, though cf. Crabb Robinson's report of a lecture of 1808 in *Sh. Crit.*, II. 15, and the description of Lectures II and III of the 1812-13 course, *ibid.*, 246. T. M. Raysor suggests that for the latter Coleridge was drawing on Herder's *Kalligone*. Coleridge's copy, containing very antagonistic annotations, is in the British Museum; they are printed as Appendix I in *Herder and His Times* by H. Nevins, 1884.
 19. The second of the second part, according to the revised plan of dividing the course into two sections. See Introd. §2. p. 29.
 20. *No true religion without philosophy*. This central Coleridgean principle governs the *Friend*, *Statesman's Manual*, *Aids to Reflection*, *Church and State*, and in fact all Coleridge's prose works. Misunderstanding of it has worked injustice on his reputation as a philosopher. See Introd. §3 and Muirhead, *op. cit.*, Chs. III and VIII, and his essay "Metaphysician or Mystic" in *Coleridge, Studies by Several Hands*, ed. E. Blunden and E. L. Griggs, 1934.
 21. *Frederick Wilhelm II?* The reading is puzzling, but it looks as if Coleridge (or the reporter) had made a slip, judging by what precedes it. He probably referred not to Frederick the Great, but to Frederick II., till whose death in 1797 Kant abstained from writing on religious subjects. In the *Friend* Coleridge referred to him as "that strange compound of lawless debauchery and priest-ridden superstition".

LECTURE IX

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB. 25, pp. 120-133.
2. Coleridge overlooks here the wave of enthusiasm for a return to pagan cults in Rome in the early Christian era. Yet Cf. Lecture VI, p. 221 foll.
3. See Lecture VIII, p. 248 foll. and p. 264.
4. Coleridge's division of periods at the end of the eleventh century is supported by some modern historians (e.g. W. P. Ker, *The Dark Ages*, 5), though the reasons vary.

5. "Will the Latin grammar save an immortal soul?" "What profit is there in the record of pagan gods or pagan sages, the labours of Hercules or of Socrates?" Sulpicius Severus, quoted by W. P. Ker, *op. cit.*, 24, who adds: "This is a quotation from Sulpicius Severus (A.D.400), but the same sort of argument is used in the time of Gregory the Great, and later."
6. *Alcuin* (730-804). Tennemann, VIII. 48.f.n., refers to the incident, but in milder terms and he does not include Seneca in Alcuin's proscription. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with what is known of Alcuin as the founder of the "Cloister schools" where the seven liberal arts were taught. It is suggested by O. F. Long in an article on "The Attitude of Alcuin toward Vergil" in *Studies in Honor of B. L. Gildersleeve*, Baltimore, 1902, that "his inconsistency is merely a reflex of his age".
7. Coleridge had read Tertullian, who, early in the third century contended that all existence was corporeal, including the soul. And the linking of paganism and Roman Catholicism at this point was a frequent theme, especially after the Malta-Italy journey. Cf. *A.P.*, 277-9.
8. On Alfred, see *Misc. Crit.*, 14. The idea of social order depending on moral self-government of the individual is common in Alfred's works, e.g. in the poem, "An sceppend is". For Coleridge's own views on the same subject, see White, R. J., *op. cit.*, Introduction, and 54, 195.
9. Milton, "On the Detraction which followed upon my writing certain Treatises", Sonnet XII.

. hogs
 That bawl for freedom in their senseless mood
 And still revolt when Truth would set them free.
 License they mean when they cry Liberty;
 For who loves that must first be wise and good:

Coleridge is quoting casually from memory, or the reporter has been inaccurate. The metrical dislocation suggests the latter.

10. From 1530, when the Spaniards were driven out, Algiers was the chief stronghold of the Barbary pirates. In 1816 the city was bombarded by a British squadron, but the pirates were not finally subdued till 1830, by the French.
11. *Charlemagne* (742-814). See Coleridge on Charlemagne in the *Friend*, I. 133-148.
12. Alfred's alleged founding of schools at Oxford is a fable, which historians in Coleridge's day still accepted, e.g. Hallam. But more interesting is Coleridge's interpretation of the rôle of universities as being a check on political absolutism.
13. The historian is Tennemann (VIII. 67). Coleridge seems to have been ignorant of the antiquity of Irish learning and culture.
14. For these and other biographical data concerning J. Scotus Erigena, Coleridge is following Tennemann, VIII. 66 foll. Tennemann casts doubt on the penknives, and in fact the story is equally unfounded with the reports of his work in Oxford.
15. Coleridge confuses J. S. Erigena with Scotus the son of Patricius, a Spaniard who translated the *Secreta Secretorum*, attributed in the Middle Ages to Aristotle. Coleridge is using Tennemann, VIII. 70, who quotes Anthony

- Wood who quotes Roger Bacon as authority for the erroneous statement.
16. *Election and Reprobation*. If Coleridge's dismissal of Calvinistic doctrines from beyond the pale of Protestantism seems rather cavalier, it is not irrelevant to note that he complains of an overdose of them in the summer of 1818. He was staying with J. H. Green, and writes Mrs. Gillman, "The clergyman, a young man, is lost in a gloomy vulgar Calvinism, will read no book but the Bible, converse on nothing but the state of the soul, or rather he will not converse at all. . . . On being invited to dine with us, the sad and modest youth returned for answer, that if Mr. Green & I should be here when he visited the house, he should have no objection to enter into the state of our souls with us, and if in the meantime we desired any instruction from him, we might attend at his daily evening lecture! Election, Reprobation, Children of the Devil, and all such flowers of rhetoric, and the flour of brimstone, form his discourses both in church and parlour. But my folly in not filling the snuff canister is a subject of far more serious and awful regret with me. . . ." *Letters*, II. 691. See Lecture XI, the announcement and note 2.
17. *Erigena, Joannes Scotus* (c.800-c.877). Coleridge appears to use Tennemann, VIII. 70-77 for details. His own annotated copy of *De Divisione Naturae*, 1681, contains some interesting unpublished comments of which I give three.

1. On the *Dedication*, 2 :

How is it to be explained that S. Erigena with so many other Christian Divines and Philosophers should not have perceived that pious words and scriptural phrases may disguise but cannot transubstantiate Pantheism—a handsome Mask that does not alter a single feature of the ugly Face it hides? How is it to be explained that so comprehensive and subtle an Intellect as Scotus Erigena, should not have seen, that his "Deus omnia et omnia Deus" was incompatible with moral responsibility, and subverted all essential Difference of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong?—I can suggest no other solution, but the Innocence of his Heart and the Purity of his Life—for the same reason, that so many young men in the unresisted Buoyance of their Freedom embrace without scruple the doctrines of Necessity and only at a later and less genial Period learn, and learn to value, their free-agency by its struggles to maintain itself against the increasing encroachments of Nature and Society. It is a great Mercy of God that a good Heart is often so effective an antidote to the heresies of the Head.*I could name more than one learned, godly and religious Clergyman, who is a Pantheist thro' his zeal for the Trinity—without suspecting what nevertheless is demonstrably true, that Pantheism is but a painted Atheism and that the Doctrine of the Trinity is the great and only sure Bulwark against it. But these good men take up the venomous thing, and it hurteth them not. S.T.C. (*Gf. A.P.*, 58.)

2. On a fly leaf:

The whole tremendous difficulty of a Creation e Nihilo—and if ex aliquo, how could it be Creation?—and not in all propriety of language—Formation or Construction? This difficulty, I say, which appeared so gigantic to our Milton that he asserted the eternity of Matter to escape from it, and then to get rid of the offensive consequences reduces this matter to an Attribute of God, and plunges head over heels into Spinosism—this difficulty I repeat for the third time (the sad necessity of all Philo-parenthesists!) arises wholly out of that Slavery of the Mind to the Eye and the visual Imagination or Fancy under the influence of which the Reasoner must have a *picture* and mistakes surface for substance. Such men, and their name is *Legion*—consequently demand a *Matter* as a *Datum*. As soon as this gross Prejudice is cured by the appropriate discipline, and the Mind is familiarized to the contemplation of Matter as a *product* in time, the resulting Phænomenon of the equilibrium of the two antagonist Forces, Attraction and Repulsion, *that* the Negative and *this* the Positive Pole of **I** gravity (or the Power of Depth), the difficulty disappears—and the Idea of *Creation* alone remains. For to will causatively with foreknowledge is to *create*, in respect of all finite products. An absolute and co-eternal Product (improperly so called) is either an Offspring, and the productive Act a *Begetting*, or a Procession. The *Word* begotten, the Spirit proceeding. S. T. Coleridge.

I Centrality, or vis centrifuga would be the preferable term. It is the same with the Mosaic Darkness, in Hebrew, the withholder or Holder-in. In hibitor—X(Light, as the distinctive *exhibitive* Power.

3. On *Liber Quintus*. 285 :

In the next page, 285, we find the Original of the Moral philosophy so finely set to the Music of Verse in Pope's Essay on Man—tho' probably Pope received it from nearer Rills. The Sophistry by which moral acts, i.e. vitia which have their several *forms* or *names* from excess or defect, and their proper essence in the state of the Will, are here turned into *things*, transformable into other *things* (in virtutes mutavi possunt); and the inference, that there must therefore be something *Good* in *Vice*—just as if by *Vices* the writer had been thinking of sundry Bronze Images or Icons of the Vices, that had been melted down and forged anew into the Icons or bronze statues of the correspondent Virtues—& pronounced the Image (fine)* good; when he meant only that the Bronze was good—~~this~~ is to me highly interesting. It instances the first stage in the true cycle of the famous controversy of the Realists and Nominalists. First, the *Avatars* included in but hidden and overlayed by Idolism.

Such was the Realism of the Ante-Scholastic Thinkers, and of the first Schoolmen. 2. The Nominalists detected the errors, and

* [crossed out.]

having succeeded in resolving the larger number of these supposed Realities into Nomina, seu Entia Logica, presumed the same of all: and lost the *Δυνάμεις* or denied their existence. 3. Lastly, came Ockham who carrying Nominalism into all its consequences was on the very brink of converting the Nomina into *Numina Rerum*—& thus prepared the way for the true i.e. the Dynamic Realism which reducing the *Idolas Sensas* to the Nomina Rerum finds the res ipsas, the entia vere realia, in the *Δυνάμεις*, the *Νόμοι*, the *Ἰδεαι ἐνέργητοι*. But alas! this third epoch is but in the Dawn. S.T.C.

18. *Berengarius* (c.999–1088). He followed Scotus Erigena in his nominalism and rationalistic tendencies, e.g. in his view of the elements of the Eucharist as signs and tokens of the Body of Christ.
19. *Abelard*. See p. 278 of this lecture and note 36.
20. *John of Salisbury* (c.1115–1180). Tennemann, VIII. 1.55–61.
21. *Julian of Toledo, Archbishop* 680–690. Tennemann, VIII. 1.61.
22. *Eusebius*, of Caesarea, the great historian and apologist of Christianity (c.260–340). As Julian died c.690, and John of Salisbury in 1180, Coleridge must mean, not that Eusebius was a contemporary of either of them, but that he was great in his own age, and that his work was an influence for moderation in later times.
23. Eusebius's failure to stem controversy left the doors wide open to the disputes of the Schoolmen. Coleridge realized the importance of these men as clarifiers of thought and language. See notes below, especially 28, 34, 39.
24. On this passage and what follows MS. Egerton 3057 is less a report than a comment:

Mr. C. compared the wanderings & errings of the Mind to the falls of a child first walking—and as a further illustration traced the various works of nature in her wanderings or rather in her progressive improvements from the smallest insect—to the fish, the bird—the four-footed animal & Man in a truly interesting & commanding Style—the originality of his ideas and the happy application of his subject greatly added to the delight—that must at any rate have followed the masterly style in which he delineated & expressed those ideas.

Is it possible that Coleridge owes an illustration here to an enemy? Cf. Paley, *Nat. Theol.*, IV. 359 (1819 ed.). "The young of all animals appear to me to receive pleasure simply from the exercise of their limbs and bodily faculties, without reference to any end obtained. . . ." On the other hand Coleridge's writings are full of analogies from nature based simply on observation. It is interesting to compare *T.L.*, 75 with this paragraph.

25. *Anselm* (c.1033–1109). The notes follow Tennemann, VIII. 115.
26. *Hildebert, Archbishop of Tours* (c.1055–1133). Tennemann, VIII. 105–6.
27. Tennemann, VIII. 106. f.n. gives the epitaph on Berengarius:

Cujus cura sequi naturam, legibus uti.
Et mentem vitiiis, ora negare dolis,

Virtutes opibus, verum præponere falso,
 Nil vacuum sensu dicere, nil facere—
 Livor enim deflet, quem carperat antea, nec tam
 Carpsit et odit eum, quam modo laudat, amat.—
 Post obitum vivam secum, secum requiescam,
 Nec fiat melior sors mea sorte sua.

Cf. Coleridge's "Lines suggested by the last words of Berengarius", *P.W.*, I. 460-1.

28. *The Schoolmen*. See Introd. §3; and *T.T.*, April 20, 1811, April 30, 1830, May 7, 1833. Coleridge followed Selden (See *S.M.*, Appendix E) in his admiration of the Schoolmen, and was in 1818-19 one of the few to defend them against earlier attacks, e.g. by Locke. See *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 114. He has more to say about them, having read many of them (see e.g. *Letters*, I.358), than Hallam; and Enfield in his abridgement of Brücker re-iterates the old complaints of uselessness, triviality, etc. Condemnations in the 18th century were usually Protestant, or Deistic. Hence Coleridge's remarks (*T.T.*, May 6, 1833) about many Schoolmen being Protestant. The marginal notes on Tennemann's *Vols. VIII and IX* are detailed on certain points, defensive, and critical. They deal chiefly with Hugo de St. Victor, Duns Scotus, Scotus Erigena, Occam, Gerson, Raymond de Sabunde, and refer in the highest terms to these and to Aquinas and Gabriel Biel.

In NB.24 there is a note which shows Coleridge attacking Tennemann in the Christ's Hospital-Boyer manner:

Good effects Tennemann, Vol. 8, Th. 1, concedes to the Scholastic Philosophy; aber die nächste Folge war doch die Bildung eines subtilen Grübelgeistes—What does this mean? A philosophic Historian should not patronize vague terms of abuse—as Jacobin, Tory &c—Is this Grübeln a specific aberration of the Intellect? or is it vicious only by *degree*, by faulty excess of the good in kind? Or by the wrong choice of its Objects? What A sees as einereley, one distinguishable as a pure fluid, B distinguishes into two or more—So far, compared with A, he subtilizes. Now are his distinctions founded in the truth of things relative to the Mind? If so, why *grübeln*? Mr. Phillips or Luke Howard's analysis of the medicinal preparations or the shades of oxydization in Mercury, may not be of equal value, certainly not, of equal splendor, with Sir H. Davy's analysis of the Alkalies. But are they therefore Grübeleien? Poring-eyed Hair splitting? But if false—what name is necessary but that of falsehood?

29. Quoted in Tennemann, VIII. 45. f.n.1. *
30. *existential vs logical truths*. The N.E.D. attributes the first use of the word as applied to logical propositions to Sir William Hamilton (see Introd. §3), a use in which essence is not, however, opposed to existence in the way in which Coleridge opposes them here.
31. With what follows it is interesting to compare Coleridge's marginal objections to Tennemann's position, Vol. VIII. 138-9:

Still I cannot in Tennemann's Detection of the illusion (*Schein*) in Anselm's Proof find more than a *Counter*-assertion, Anselm admitting and laying out the difference between Thinking (*Denken*) and Knowing (*Erkennen*) yet contends that in Ideas, but especially in the Idea of God, this difference does not exist: in other words, that God is to be contemplated *in* his Idea, not *by* our Conceptions. Now what does Tennemann do? Simply—re-assert the difference.

Corollary. Without faith in the only begotten Son of God no rational conviction of reality in any subject is possible.

P.S. The Monk, Gunillo's [*sic*] Answer to Anselm is particularly worth your attentive perusal. No where have I found a stronger confirmation of my theory respecting the *born* Ans. and *born* Pals. Every where the indifference of Idea and Conception, and the perfect Synonymity of the two terms, are presumed—taken for granted as by one, to whom the suspicion of any difference had never occurred. Ex.gr. The case of the Unknown *most* happy Island. No where a *stronger* confirmation? Nay, that *Tennemann* should cite the arguments with perfect assent and triumph after the study of Plotinus and the perusal at least of Schelling's Tracts, so as still to ignore the assumption of the difference between Idea and Conception by others, this is perhaps stronger still. S.T.C.

There is also a long commentary, too long for a note, on Anselm's proof of the existence of God from the Idea, and a statement of the Kantian objections to it which Coleridge tentatively and with qualifications supports, admitting the "heavy difficulties that weigh on the doctrine of Ideas, or Knowledges that are supersensuous and yet truly objective".

32. Quoted in Tennemann, VIII. 117. f.n.

33. The name Tennemann (VIII. 139) gives is Gaunilo, but Coleridge had not written *is* in his notes and had perhaps forgotten it. He did use it, however, in his marginal comment on Tennemann at this point. See preceding note.

34. *Nominalist-Realist controversy*. See note 32 above. Nominalist-Realist is a form of the Aristotelian-Platonist division. See Lecture V, note 20, Lecture II, note 44, and Intro. §3. Cf. *T.T.*, April 30, 1830.

35. *Roscellin, John* (c.1050-c.1112); Tennemann, VIII. 1. 156-163.

36. *Abelard, Peter* (1079-1142); Tennemann, VIII. 1. 176-82.

37. *Thomas Aquinas* (c.1225-1274). Coleridge considered him a great Aristotelian (see references in note 28 above) and accused Hume of borrowing "without acknowledgment a much more correct statement of the laws of association from Aquinas' commentaries on the 'parva Naturalia' of Aristotle", a more correct statement than those by the "writers deemed classical on this subject". *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, (92-3). There is one reference to Aquinas in the comments on Tennemann, on Vol. IX. 20:

This whole introduction savors sadly of compilation; and is far too vague and declamatory. Add too, that many passages ex.gr. of the "heaven-wide" difference of the Scholastic from the

Aristotelean Aristotelism, is scarcely, if at all reconcilable with various assertions and facts of the preceding Volume. At all events, Tennemann ought to have given some instances in proof, from the commentaries and included Version[s] of the ablest School-Philosophers. I have *looked* into Thom Aquinas's Commentaries and the Translation which is *swaddled* on them, and found nothing to confirm so harsh a charge.

In 1829, Lamb, hearing that Coleridge was ill wrote to Mr Gillman

"A little school-divinity, well-applied, may be healing. I send him honest Tom of Aquin, that was always an obscure great idea to me. I never thought or dreamed to see him in the flesh, but t'other day I rescued him from a stall in Barbican and brought him off in triumph. He comes to greet Coleridge's acceptance, for his shoe-latchets I am unworthy to unloose. Well, do not break your lay brains, nor I neither, with these curious nothings. They are nuts to our dear friend."

But the Aquinas folios may have been too much even for Coleridge, and he left no markings on them. It was the 1660 Paris edition, Vols XI, XVI, XVIII, XIX and XX of the Lamb-Coleridge copy are now in the library of Victoria College, University of Toronto.

- 38 *Duns Scotus* (c 1274-1308). It is rather surprising that Coleridge does not discuss more fully one whom he admired as the most robust of the Realists and a critical thinker with whom he found himself in agreement on many points, i.e. his opposition to the theory of innate ideas, the importance of intuition and the activity vs the passivity of the mind, and his opposition to Thomistic determinism. See *Letters*, I 353 and *English Divines*, II 21, where Coleridge complains that he could find at Durham only one work of Duns Scotus, the *De Sententiis*. There is a long note on Tennemann, VIII 765, in part as follows:

I have my doubts, whether Tennemann clearly understood the Idea, out of which Scotus's Conclusion is evolved.

Now whether the objectivity given to the Idea belongs to it in its own right as an Idea, or is superinduced by Moral Faith, is really little more than a dispute in terms, depending on the Definition of Idea. It is enough for Scotus's purpose that the Objectivity is and must be admitted, and what more cogent proof can we have, than that a man must contradict his whole human Being in order to deny it. What should we think of a Physiologist who should deny the objective truth of the Circulation of the Blood, because it could not be shewn by the arteries alone without the veins? And yet the Kantians argue not much unlike this when in the Idea they separate the Reason from the Reason in the Will, or the theoretic from the practical Man. Anselm's and Descartes' error lay in not distinguishing the Idea in the Reason from the exposition of the Idea by the Reason.

(D) Scotus defended or excused: 1. A Lecturer without time to re-write and digest his Disputations. 2. The Hæcceitates &c—Signs which the algebraists have found it necessary to invent—

counter and temporary labels. Just to bear in mind a distinction just distinguished. 3. In the like manner, the barbarous words to keep the strained mind *tense* in the same directions, by as little as possible altering the sound of the term: Quid sit, cum plane aliquid est? Unde quidditatem recipit—when a Ciceronian paraphrase would by the law of association have perhaps scattered the thoughts into 20 splinters. But the very same thing cannot but produce the contrary effect, of confusion, to a reader, not worked up into the keenness of the analytic Hunt: 4. But take the *Results*, arrange the *Game*, in the Larder and by these judge the Genius, the deep, aye and the *sound good* sense of Scotus, and you will not hesitate in thinking him the greatest of the proper Schoolmen; taking Peter Lombard as the first.) I may have, hereafter, an opportunity of shewing, that the Critical Philosophy by no means supplies a satisfying answer to the objections of D. Scotus respecting the mere *subjectivity* of Genera and Species. How can that be denied to be true, the contrary of which would destroy all meaning and intelligible purpose of that (the Subjective Understanding) by which the Truth is to be denied? . . .

I feel assured that there is a latent Sophism in the Kantian argument,—and then when I say, X is necessary in order to the possibility of the existence of W I do not mean merely that X is necessary to the *cogitability* of W by my Machine for cogitation. . . .

N.B. Scotus's Subtleties are most often in confutation of subtle objections to the more natural and rational opinions in which he himself settles. He was a *great Man*.

39. *William of Occam* (d.1349). See references above in note 28. In MS. Egerton 2801, ff.100-101, Coleridge quotes Occam and then says:

It was of incalculable moment to Philosophy and the best interests of Man, that Occam and his Followers disclosed the unproductive nature of Conceptions and Notions, and the dependence of the Understanding on the Sense and Sensibility, in the broadest light. It was of the greatest importance in order to the regeneration of Realism, and its second triumphant Coming in its genuine form.

And in a note on Tennemann, Vol. VIII, on a blank page at the back, he makes a very clear and interesting statement:

That Occam was a truly great man and worthy of his title, Venerabilis Inceptor, there can be no doubt; that had he paused before the Light that was more than once dawning on his Soul concerning Ideas, he would have made an Epoch and have been a Father of Ages, is highly probable; and as it was, that while his Antagonists confined themselves to the Discursive Intellect, (Logos ἐπιδηματικός) and to the Reason only, as the Source of Universal Principles, he and the Nominalist Scheme should have gained the victory over the Realists, is matter of course. But I feel myself bound to honour him, in that his clear and acute Reasoning *against* Realism has given, or rather occasioned me a

more distinct and lively sense of its Truth than I ever had before. Indeed it is by rebuilding the Doctrine of Realism on sure foundations that I hope to effect what Raymond of Sabunde so nobly attempted.

See also the Introd. §3 where another note on Tennemann is quoted in which Occam is described as "the true transitional Mind".

40. The importance of the sense of touch from babyhood on is generally recognized in modern psychology. Coleridge is not sentimental here; he is anticipating Freud and others by a hundred years or more. See also Lecture VII. note 16 on touch and double touch, and Lecture III. p. 115 and note 5. See also *A.P.*, 273, 13.

41. *Alchemists*. Cf. Lect. II. p. 104 f.n. and Lect. X, pp. 303-5. Coleridge's view that magic and alchemy were forerunners of experimental chemistry, an unusual one for his time, is supported by modern scholars, e.g. Fraser, *The Golden Bough*, and Thorndike, L., *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*. Professor Barker Fairley reminds me that there is a close parallel between Coleridge's views and Faust's speeches at the beginning of *Faust*.

Early in his acquaintance with Davy, Coleridge wrote him that "(with Dr. Beddoes leave) chemistry can never possess the same kind of certainty with mathematics". (1801.) And he strongly objected to the confusion of chemistry, or any science, with philosophy. See Lecture I. note 2, and *Letters*, II. 448. The passage here in the lecture, while meant primarily to praise the past, has for his contemporaries a slight sting in the tail.

42. "The child is father of the man", Wordsworth. From the last lines of, "My heart leaps up when I behold a rainbow in the sky".

43. *Aix la Chapelle*. See the *Friend*, II. 269.

44. Coleridge appears to mean that while individuals of modern times may be compared favourably with corresponding individuals in the Middle Ages, the general social tenor in the nineteenth century is less admirable, showing an increasing secularization and a weakening of moral and religious restraints on social evils.

45. The passage that follows on the "cotton children" is related to two scarce works of Coleridge that deserve reprinting: *Remarks on the Objections which have been urged Against the Principle of Sir Robert Peel's Bill*, (April 18, 1818) and *The Grounds of Sir Robert Peel's Bill Vindicated* (April 24, 1818). These pamphlets, written at Peel's urging, were circulated among the M.P.'s and were thought by him to have exerted considerable influence on the favourable vote for his Factory Act of 1818. They are to be found as Appendices in *Coleridge at Highgate* by L. E. Watson.

Coleridge's reasons for launching frequent attacks on the complacency of his age become clearer from the pamphlets. In a trenchant passage, answering the argument "that the reform of all these grievances may be safely trusted in these enlightened times, to the good sense and humanity of the masters themselves," he says :

This is doubtless highly flattering to the present age, and still more so to that which is to follow. It is, however, sufficient for us to have proved, that it remains a mere assertion, and that up

to this very hour the asserted increase of humane feeling and enlightened self-interest has produced no such effects as are here so confidently promised, have exerted no adequate counteraction to the keen stimulants of immediate profit, and the benumbing influences of custom and example. Nay, it is notorious that within the last twenty years the time and quantum of the labour extorted from the children has been increasing. The growth of the sciences among the few, and the consequent increase of the conveniences of life among the people at large, are, however, far from necessarily implying an *enlightened* age in that sense which alone applies to the case in question. . . . Something else is wanted here, the warmth to impel, and not the knowledge to guide. The age had been complimented with the epithets of enlightened, humane, &c, years before the abolition of the Slave Trade. And was that Trade abolished at last by the increasing humanity, the enlightened self-interest, of the slave owners? . . .

Coleridge may have been taken to task for expressing these sentiments.

In NB.24, three days after the lecture, we find him making this note:

Feb^r 25, 1819. Highgate: After reperusal of my inefficient yet not feeble efforts in behalf of the poor little white slaves in the Cotton Factories—

But still—are we not better than the other Nations of Christendom? Yes—perhaps—I don't know—I dare not affirm it. Better than the French, Certainly! Mammon vs Moloch and Belial. But Sweden, Norway, Germany, the *Tyrol*?—No.

See also *U.L.*, II. 233-6; and Watson, *L.*, *Coleridge at Highgate*, 77, 171-187.

46. But *free* Labour!—in what sense, not utterly sophistical, can the labour of children, extorted from the wants of their parents, “their poverty, but not their will, consenting”, be called *free*? . . . It is one's duty to declare aloud, that if the labour were indeed free, the employer would purchase, and the labourer sell, what the former had no right to buy, and the latter no right to dispose of; namely, the labourer's health, life, and well-being. *Remarks . . . on Sir Robert Peel's Bill*, 1818, 20-1.

LECTURE X

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB.25, pp. 133-7. There is no evidence of Tennemann having been used; Coleridge's use of his *Geschichte der Philosophie* seems to have stopped with the previous lecture and the marginal notes indicate that he was very much disgusted with Tennemann's Vol. IX.
2. *belinked*: the N.E.D. does not give it. Is Coleridge instituting the German prefixes he so much admired? (See *A.P.*, 187).
3. Coleridge often attacked what he considered an atomic use of language, e.g. “the epigrammatic unconnected periods of the fashionable Anglo-Gallican taste”. See the *Friend*, I. 25. It is his familiar opposition of the mechanical to the vital or “dynamic”, here applied to language.
4. “Who can read with pleasure more than a hundred lines or so of *Hudibras*

at one time? Each couplet or quatrain is so whole in itself, that you can't connect them. There is no fusion,—just as it is in Seneca." (*T.T.*, July 3, 1833.) The whole conversation is an interesting one on styles of writing.

5. *Nominalism-Realism*. See Lecture IX and note 34.
6. *Romantic*. The N.E.D. gives no such early use of the English word, involving the ideas of Gothic, the primitive, genius, the imaginary, the supernatural, which Coleridge fuses here. The question of the origin and variety of meanings attached to the word is too long for a note, but cf. Lovejoy, A. O., "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms", *P.M.L.A.*, xxxix. 229 foll. June 1924. According to Lovejoy the Germans invented the term in the 1790's and applied it to themselves; Coleridge's use is more German than English. His whole treatment, from the beginning of this lecture, of classical and romantic art, should be read with Schiller's æsthetic in mind, especially *Über Naive und Sentimentalische Dichtung*, and also Schlegel's lectures on *Dramatische Kunst und Litteratur*. Cf. Raysor, *Sh. Crit.*, xxvii-xxviii.
7. *Imitation or Copy*. The distinction is important in Coleridge's criticism, and frequently made. Cf. *B.L.*, II. 30,56,185-8,255-60; *Misc. Crit.*, 49, 207; *T.T.*, July 3, 1833. That Coleridge was indebted to Schelling for the distinction was pointed out bad-temperedly by Ferrier and more justly by Sara Coleridge in her edition of the *B.L.*, 1844. He used it in the lectures of 1811-12, (*Sh. Crit.*, I. 80,117,159) and again in the early 1818 series, (*Misc. Crit.*, 207). Here, as Raysor points out, he appeared to be using Schelling's *Philosophische Schriften*, 1809. But as Raysor says in the *Sh. Crit.*, I. 200, f.n., the distinction is a common one and at least as old as Aristotle. Bearing all this in mind, as well as the warning Coleridge gives in this very lecture (p. 297, see note 18) against too-ready attributions of plagiarism, it is of some interest to notice a possible connexion here with Petrarch.

Coleridge borrowed Sotheby's copy of Petrarch's works and left it at Keswick when he went off to Malta and Italy. In a letter to Boccaccio about John of Ravenna (see note 9 below), Petrarch has much to say about legitimate and illegitimate imitation, similarity and difference, the imaginative imitation of poets and the mechanical imitation of apes, quoting Seneca's metaphor about writers transmuting the source material as bees make honey out of nectar. In one of Coleridge's notebooks of the Malta period (1804) there is the earliest reference I can find in Coleridge to the copy-imitation distinction. (*A.P.* 87). While I am not trying to make out a case for Petrarch as the source, as opposed to Schelling, but rather to repeat Coleridge's own warning, it is perhaps useful to point out, since there are striking and detailed resemblances to Schelling, that Coleridge is given to using the 'ape' as a type of mechanical copyist, e.g. Fancy is described as "the ape of memory", *B.L.*, II. 208. It should be noticed that Coleridge makes the imitation-copy distinction here in connexion with Italian writers.

8. *Dante* (1265-1321). In the earlier literary course, Jan.-March 1818, Coleridge dealt more fully with Dante. (*Misc. Crit.*, 145 foll.) He there refers to him as "the living link between religion and philosophy; he philosophized the religion and christianized the philosophy of Italy . . .".

H. F. Cary in the Preface to the second edition of his translation of *The Divine Comedy*, says that the call for a second edition was "owing chiefly to the prompt and strenuous exertions" of Coleridge.

9. *Petrarch* (1304-1374). Coleridge lectured on Petrarch in the Jan.-March course of 1818. See *Misc. Crit.*, 24-6, where are reprinted Coleridge's marginalia on an edition of Petrarch's poems [?], works [?]. Whether or not it was the Vol. I of Petrarch's *Opera* sold with Green's library (Coleridge's initials) Basilæ, 1554, is not known. (And was this originally Sotheby's copy? See note 7.) Possibly this edition, which I have not been able to see, contained a life from which Coleridge got the biographical information he gives. *De Vita Solitaria* is quoted and discussed in NB.20, and a quotation from it (Latin version) is used at the end of the 1808 *Prospectus* of the *Friend*. See also the *Friend*, *passim*, for mottoes from Petrarch; *L.R.*, 79-83; *A.P.*, 262-3; the *Friend*, I. 118-20. Coleridge recommended to booksellers an anthology of English translations from Petrarch's Latin works.

It would be natural for Coleridge to be interested in one so like-minded and so similar in habits: both poets, both torn continually by conflict between this-worldly and other-worldly interests, both sufferers from unfulfilled love, both given to self-analysis and confession (especially of the sin of *acedia*), both aware of the limitations of language, both admirers of Plato above Aristotle, both annotators of books.

10. *Facts*. Coleridge is again attacking Hobbes, Locke, and the empiricists. Hobbes, *Works*, III. 368, "history . . . the only proof of matter of fact"; Locke, *Essay*, II. 1, Section 10, ". . . he that would not deceive himself ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact"; Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*, I. 122, "no argument so convincing as Matter of Fact". Cf. *A.P.*, 75, 148; *T.T.*, Dec. 27, 1831.
11. *John of Ravenna*. "Petrarch . . . undertook the education of a young scholar from Ravenna whose sudden disappearance from his household caused him the deepest grief. This youth has been identified, on insufficient grounds, with that Giovanni Malpaghini of Ravenna who was destined to form an important link between Petrarch and the humanists of the next age . . .". *Encyc. Brit.* With the f.n. p. 294, "He lectured!", cf. *B.L.*, I. 149-51.
12. *The Eclectics* —in Lectures VII and VIII.
13. *Plotinus and Porphyry* "uniting" with the Deity. Cf. Lecture VII. p. 243, and note 22.
14. Thomas Taylor's translation of Iamblichus on the Mysteries, 1821, I have used for textual purposes. Coleridge of course had read Iamblichus in the Greek, in Christ's Hospital days according to Lamb's testimony.
15. "As difficult as to separate two dew-drops blended together on a bosom of a new-blown rose." *A.P.*, 6.
16. *Natural magic nothing but a want of experimental philosophy*. Cf. Lecture IX and note 41.
17. *Joe Miller's Jests: or the Wit's Vade Mecum*, was compiled in 1739 by John Mottley for the benefit of the family of Joe Miller, a low comedian (1684-1739), known ironically as the Father of Jests. Coleridge read and annotated Flügel, C. F., *Geschichte der komischen Litteratur*, 4 Bde, Liegnitz &

- Leipzig, 1784. The marginalia were published by H. Buxton Forman in *Cosmopolis*, IX and X, London, New York, 1898. One of them is dated 1813.
18. Coleridge is probably referring to *Cowper's Milton* in four volumes, Chichester, 1810, edited by W. Hayley, and also to Hayley's *Conjectures on the Origin of Paradise Lost*. Hayley suggests that Milton used Andreini's *Adamo* and Soranzo's *Adamo*. It is hard to say whether Coleridge despised more the sentiments or the style of Hayley's introductions and dedications. Cf. his marginalia on Hayley's *Life of Milton* in which some of the same points are discussed. See *Misc. Crit.*, 165-169.
 19. Coleridge does not, of course, intend to give Wycliffe to Germany; his loose lecturing style makes him ambiguous.
 20. *Reuchlin, John* (1454-1521). His two publications most pertinent here are *De Verbo Mirifico*, 1494, and *De Arte Cabbalistica*, 1517. Reuchlin also compiled a Hebrew dictionary and grammar, and is credited with having been instrumental in saving and restoring, at the cost of much vilification and persecution, the study of the Hebrew language and traditions in Europe. An Augustinian monk, he nevertheless hoped to find in the Cabala defences for Christianity. A critical study of Reuchlin, who could be named with Erasmus as one of the restorers of learning, is what Coleridge would have called "a desideratum". Hallam does not appear to have heard of him.
 21. *Cabala*. Tennemann suggested it was first known in the middle ages, but Coleridge's theory of its antiquity is supported by modern scholarship. On Tennemann, IX. 170, he comments:

The Cabbala. Grant that the present can be traced no higher than to the second century, yet the undoubted existence of the Apocalypse at an earlier period, combined with the writings of Paul & of Philo (not to speak of Nehemiah) prove the existence of a System fundamentally the same at the Christian Æra, and before the composition of the New Testament Books—and this is all, I want.

- Its Pythagorean-like use of number, its generally Neo-platonic character and especially its idea of the *Logos*, all appealed to him as an indication of the possibility of the fusion of Hebrew and Greek ways of thinking. With its emphasis on the inward individual experience, on feeling, on piety rather than on the rationalism of the Scholastics, it was supported later by men like Pico de Mirandola, Reuchlin, Agrippa, Paracelsus, and Robert Fludd. Warburton, *The Divine Legation of Moses*, Pt. II. v. 1, attacked it as "crude nonsense".
22. *Agrippa, Henry Cornelius* (1486-1535). His main works are the *Occult Philosophy*, 1510, and the *Vanity of the Arts and Sciences*. In the former he defended the Cabala and occultism generally. The latter is a witty attack on all those who would fetter free enquiry. Coleridge appears to have read both works.

The *Vanity of the Arts and Sciences*, in which Agrippa attacks, not art and science, but chiefly "the blind Aristotelians" who under cover of discussing them, suppressed them, and in which there are sharp thrusts at the pomps of the church, image and relic worship, the mendicant friars and monastic immorality, is referred to by Coleridge in the notebooks.

25. Morley, *op. cit.*, 38 f.n., giving Ep. 10. Lib. i as authority for this adventure says:

It is very remarkable that this most striking narrative, coherent in every part, giving names of places and people . . . should have been neglected by all writers. . . . To this day, nobody, in speaking of Agrippa, has referred to these adventures beyond saying that he "went to Spain" and adding, or not adding, that he was engaged there in efforts to make gold.

This note has the dual interest of showing yet another instance of Coleridge's unique knowledge, and also, if Morley is correct, that he must have read Agrippa's letters themselves and did not rely on secondary sources.

24. "Natural Magic is the force above human reason which is the active principle in nature." Morley, *op. cit.*, II. 170; Agrippa, *Vanity of the Arts and Sciences*, cap. xli-xliv.
25. See Lecture IX, note 41.
26. Luther. Coleridge's main discussion on Luther is in the *Friend*, I. 227-43. And see *T.T.*, June 16, 1833: "The only fit commentator on Paul was Luther—not by any means such a gentleman as the Apostle, but almost as great a genius."
27. Erasmus *cf. Voltaire*, in the *Friend*; see I. 217-26 for the quotation that follows in the text.

Erasmus (1466-1536). A volume (6 vols.?) of Erasmus bearing Coleridge's initials was sold in Green's library. *De Conscribendi Epistolis*, Amst. 1670. In *T.T.* Coleridge describes the *Praise of Folly* as "the most pleasant book of Erasmus", and "his paraphrase of the New Testament is clear and explanatory; but you cannot expect anything very deep from Erasmus". (June 15, 1833).

Voltaire (1694-1778). See Lect. V. note 17.

28. A difficult statement to understand in view of Coleridge's opinion of his own age. In a notebook jotting he severely criticizes Humphrey Davy for "moulding himself" upon the times. See also *Letters*, II. 455.
29. Coleridge is again quoting from the *Friend*, continuing the passage above, using it to the end of the discussion on Luther. Such a passage provides good evidence of the accuracy of the reporter, though he may have checked with or copied from the printed work.
30. *Henry V*, IV. 7.
31. Rousseau, *J. J.* (1712-1778). See the *Friend*, I. 217-26, for a comparison of Rousseau and Luther. Coleridge's comments bear the marks of the contradictory elements in Rousseau himself, but he seems to have been sympathetic towards him as a person, and to have valued him for his "almost superstitious hatred of superstition", and "turbulent prejudice against prejudices".
32. The disrespectful "first-writings" are referred to in the *Friend*, *loc. cit.* as "his circular letter to the princes".
33. *Friend*, I. 237.
34. *On Luther's Bible*, see *B.L.*, I. 140-1.
35. *On Descartes*, and Hobbes, below, see Lecture XII, pp. 348 foll. and notes 14, 19, 26.

LECTURE XI

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB.25, pp. 139-42.
2. *The influence of the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy*. How did this phrase get into the announcement in the *New Times*? Coleridge apparently intended to deal with the subject, perhaps on the urging of J. H. Green. I suspect that a fragment of a letter, now pasted into a copy of Kant's *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* which Coleridge annotated, may have some reference to this lecture and this subject. The volume of Kant, now in the British Museum was sold in Green's library, and the letter may well have been written to Green with whom Coleridge often discussed Calvinism (see Lecture IX. note (16) and with whom he most probably discussed what appears to be the second subject of the letter, the possible cutting down of "the proposed Course from 14 to 6 or 7 Lectures" with a view—I hazard a guess from the incomplete letter—to writing out the lectures in full for future publication. Does the letter suggest that Green—or whoever was the recipient—was urging a course of philosophical lectures with a definite theological slant—these to be published as a contribution to contemporary theological discussion—and that Coleridge rejected the plan? Yet see the end of note 26 below.

What survives of this letter is printed by Nidecker in the *Revue de Littérature Comparée*, VII, 142-4. I give what appears to be the relevant part of it, from the MS. with some variations from Nidecker's reading:

The two weightiest objections are these: First, I have found by experience that the interest of an Audience (such namely as I can alone collect and in truth am most likely to benefit) and with that the spirit of the Lecturer flag under any but a very short and occasional Narration, or detail of connected facts—however interesting and even amusing the very same Auditors would have found it in a Book.—The heaviest Lecture, the characters and biographical anecdotes (or rather *ecdotes* of H. Corn. Agrippa, Reuchlin, and the Tuscan Platonists), would probably be the most entertaining when published—However, by reducing the proposed Course from 14 to 6 or 7 Lectures this might perhaps be in good measure obviated.

The second—Must I not have to walking [have to walk? or, have been walking?] over glowing embers? There are (subjects) * convictions on which I may innocently be silent but could not innocently disguise, ex.gr. I am walking with a Friend or Patron, who (I know) has an utter aversion to another Friend of mine which I lament but cannot overcome. I know that if I walk on the London Road, we must meet him. Surely I may innocently take the Hampstead Road; but having taken his London Road not without duplicity and baseness pass by him*unnoticed.) Now on the subject proposed I must of *moral* necessity deliver opinions, that would bring down a swarm from opposite Hives. The so-called moderate Grotian and Paleyan Divines and *the almost all who will hear me* who have formed their notions of Christian Evidence from the Writers of this School I must offend by the

* [Crossed out.]

proof that the Church of England and the great Founders of the Reformation held these opinions as scarcely less than heretical pravity; as halfway between Popery and Pelagianism and even Socinianism—and that I am decisively and earnestly of this same opinion.

The modern Calvinists I should offend bitterly by proving that Calvin would have cried: Fire and Faggot, before he had read 100 pages of Dr. Williams's *Modern Calvinism*—and by declaring my conviction that it would be difficult to say which stand at the greatest Distance from Luther, Calvin, our Whittaker, Field, &c., the *hodiernal Evangelicals or their Antagonists with Mr. Mant* at their head. Above all, the Missionary Society—how would they recoil from the assertion, that Go ye unto all nations, &c. means nothing more, than Preach the Gospel indifferently to Jews and Gentiles. . . .”

Coleridge's clearest statement on Calvinism is possibly the long note on Southey's *Life of Wesley*, printed in Vol. I, 270-1 of Fitzgerald's edition, Oxford, 1925.

3. “The great maxim of Legislation, intellectual or Political is *Subordinate not exclude*. Nature in her ascent leaves nothing behind: but at each step subordinates & glorifies Mass, Crystal, Organ, sensation, sentience, reflection.” MS. note on Baxter's *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, London, MDCXCVI, 80 (Printed in *L.R.*, IV. 92). On the British Museum copy (Ashley 4772) the notes are not in Coleridge's hand, but copied by another (Sara Hutchinson?).
4. “The Memorandum Book” is NB. 18. The notes on Teresa are on pp. 113-123 and begin:

I must not be too indolent to transcribe the note I have written, in the first blank leaf of the *Life of St. Teresa*. On opening the second volume casually I met with a curious advice to her friend, Lorenzo . . .

A second note begins:

Monday, June 25th, 1810, Keswick—Began to read the deeply interesting *Life & Works of St. Teresa*.

Cf. L.R., IV. 65-71, for Coleridge's marginalia on *The Works of the Holy Mother St. Teresa of Jesus Foundress of the Reformation of the Discalced Carmelites*. Translated into English. MDCLXXXV. Coleridge read and annotated Southey's copy. It was sold with Southey's library.

It is interesting to compare with Coleridge's conventional Protestant interpretation of Teresa (1515-1582), V. Sackville-West's description of her in *The Eagle and the Dove*, London, 1943, as “a sane, vigorous, intelligent, humorous Spaniard”. *The Complete Works of St. Teresa* are now translated and edited by Professor E. Allison Peers.

5. “Inward confusion”, “sudden aridity”, “under whispers”—these are the Coleridgean phrases for what Teresa calls “Satan”.
6. Coleridge was very much aware of the value of physical activity in psychotherapy. The notebooks contain many references to it, some pathetically personal.

7. *Oroondates*. The reference is to the hero of La Calprenède's *Cassandre*, which was translated into English in 1652 and again in 1703, and appeared in reprints till nearly the middle of the eighteenth century. The historian of taste will be interested in Coleridge's casual reference to *Oroondates* in a public lecture as late as 1819; but the mention of Don Quixote a minute earlier, as well as the context, suggests that Mrs. Lennox's *The Female Quixote* (1752) may have intervened. (Coleridge's acquaintance, Mrs. Barbauld, wrote an introductory essay for an edition of *The Female Quixote* in the *British Novelists* series in 1810.) *Oroondates* figures largely in the first twelve chapters of that work, a satire on the old romances. According to the female Quixote, Lady Bella, "*Oroondates, to punish himself for his presumption, in daring to tell the admirable Statira that he loved her, resolved to die, to expiate his crime; and, doubtless, would have done so, if his fair mistress, at the entreaty of her brother, had not commanded him to live*"; gentlemen of his ilk did not possess their happiness "till after numberless misfortunes, infinite services, and many dangerous adventures, in which their fidelity was put to the strongest trials imaginable". (Chap. XII). In short, *Oroondates* was a lover of such lustre as no mortal man (like Lady Bella's Glanville) could hope to achieve, and I suspect it was Charlotte Lennox's caricature of him that Coleridge—and his audience—had in mind.
8. Coleridge's marginalia on Teresa read: "Frightened at her Uncle's by reading to him Dante's books of Hell and Judgment", (*L.R.*, IV. 69). Though the *L.R.* is not reliable in its transcriptions, Coleridge perhaps did write the one version, and in the lecture suppressed the Dante reference, especially after the phrase "books of the most gloomy kind". Cary was probably in the audience, and the second edition of his translation of Dante was to come out in a few months. See Lecture X, note 8.
9. Coleridge is quoting from Richard Crashaw's *The Flaming Heart, upon the Book and Picture of the Seraphical Saint Teresa, as she is usually expressed with a Seraphim beside her*.

By all the eagle in thee, all the dove,
 By all thy lives and deaths of love,
 By thy large draughts of intellectual day,
 And by thy thirst of love more large than they;
10. *The vasty deep*. Cf. Milton, *P.L.*, I. 177, "through the vast and boundless Deep".
11. *Baxter, Richard* (1615–1691). There was a connexion in Coleridge's mind with Teresa, perhaps more than one.
 Baxter says he was "extremely bewitched with a Love of Romance, Fables and old Tales, which corrupted my Affections and lost my Time", and Coleridge notes in the margin, "There is a child like simplicity in this account of the sins of his Childhood which is very pleasing." *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, 1696, 6. See note 3 above.
12. *Reuchlin, John*. See also Lecture X. pp. 298–300 and note 20. In his notes for this paragraph Coleridge refers to two works, *De Verbo Mirifico* and *De Arte Cabbalistica*.
13. The stories of Dion and the Spirit, and of Caesar's ghost, are both in

- Plutarch. 'Dion', Chap. LV, and 'Brutus', Chs. XXXVI and XLVIII.
4. Coleridge read and commented on, in NB.22, *The Wonders of the Invisible World*, "being an account of the Tryals of Several Witches lately executed in New England" . . . by Cotton Mather, 1693.
 15. Coleridge read and annotated John Webster's *The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft*, London, 1677, in which there is much delightful reporting on witches and the bewitched. The avowed purpose was to prove that disbelief in witchcraft, i.e. the works of the devil, does not need to imply disbelief in miracles, the works of God. Webster is controverting eminent divines and teachers like Henry More, Casaubon, Glanvill, and Cudworth. Agrippa and Wierus, (see Lecture X. pp. 300 foll. and notes 22-4, and note 17 below), opposed the persecution of supposed witches.
 - John Wesley, as late as 1768 wrote that "the giving up witchcraft is, in effect, giving up the Bible". Wesley's *Journal*, May 25, 1768.
 16. Friederich von Spee, a Jesuit priest, confessor to the Bishop of Wurzburg, wrote in 1631, *Cautio Criminalis*, a strong protest, based on many personal observations, against witch-hunting and witch trials. The anecdote appears to fit him.
 17. Wierus, Johann, author of *De Præstigiis Dæmonum*, 1563, pupil and defender of H. C. Agrippa (see Lecture X. notes 22-4) was a Protestant, who did not disbelieve in dæmonic powers, but said both agents and victims were often deluded and more in need of medical attention than of theological and social abuse.
 18. See Introd. §3, pp. 42-3.
 19. Agricola, Georg, a brilliant mineralogist, 1494-1555, was the author of a remarkable work on mining, *De Re Metallica*, Basle, 1556, for nearly 200 years the standard text on mining and metallurgy. Printed with it in some editions is the small work *De Animantibus Subterraneis*, to which Coleridge appears to refer. It deals with underground animals, cave-dwellers, burrowers, reptiles, etc. and, in the last paragraph, with gnomes, "which the Germans as well as the Greeks call *cobalos* because they mimic men. They appear to laugh with glee and pretend to do much, but really do nothing. They are called little miners, because of their dwarfish stature, which is about two feet. They are venerable looking and are clothed like miners in a filleted garment with a leather apron about their loins. . . . Because they generally appear benign to men the Germans call them *guteli*. Those called *trulli*, which take the form of women as well as men, actually enter the service of some people, especially the *Suions*. The mining gnomes are especially active in the workings where metal has already been found, or where there are hopes of discovering it, because of which they do not discourage the miners, but on the contrary stimulate them and cause them to labour more vigorously." (Hoover transl. 1912).

Agricola may well have been in Coleridge's thoughts as yet another example of the acute mind in which a high degree of scientific scepticism can co-exist with a naïve and superstitious credulity.

In view of what follows in the lecture it is interesting to note that

Agricola, in the paragraph preceding the one quoted above, referred to Psellus on dæmonology. See next note.

20. Having searched Paley's works thoroughly, though incredulously, without finding this reference, I suggest an unconscious joke on the part of the reporter against the author of the *Natural Theology* in the attribution of these "obscure divinities" to him, that Coleridge really said "Psellus", and that the reporter's mistake is not the more usual one of mis-hearing, but one of transliteration. It is the Michael Psellus of the gloss on *The Ancient Mariner*, who "may be consulted" about "the invisible inhabitants of this planet". The reference is to the *De Dæmonibus*, on Coleridge's list of which, see Lowes, J. L., *The Road to Xanadu*, 2nd ed., 1931, 234-6.
21. The whole confused passage contains the germ of one of Coleridge's most interesting shorter works, *On the Prometheus of Aeschylus*, 1825. The Prometheus myth is, he says, an allegory of the "generation of the *νοῦς* or pure reason in man":

1. It was superadded, or infused to mark that it was no mere evolution of the animal basis; that it could not have grown out of the other faculties of man. . . . 2. The *νοῦς*, or fire, was 'stolen'—to mark its *hetero*—or rather its allo-geneity, that is its diversity, its difference in kind from the faculties which are common to man with the nobler animals: 3. And stolen from Heaven to mark its superiority in kind, as well as its essential diversity. 4. And it was a 'spark'—to mark that it is not subject to any modifying reaction, . . . 5. and lastly, (in order to imply the homogeneity of the donor and of the gift) it was stolen by 'a god', and a god of the race before the dynasty of Jove . . . but likewise by a god of the same race & essence with Jove. . . . *L.R.*, II. 336-7.

22. *Giordano Bruno* (1548-1600). Coleridge's interest in Bruno was lifelong, drawn originally, perhaps, from some of his favourite "Platonizing divines", e.g. John Toland, or W. Morehead, who translated Bruno's *De Specchio* in 1713. Most of Coleridge's references to Bruno have been collected in an article, "Coleridge on Giordano Bruno", A. D. Snyder, *M.L.N.*, XLII, 427-436. See especially, *A.P.*, 16-17, 71-3, 151-2; *B.L.*, ch. IX. In defending Bruno, Coleridge is perhaps consciously countering Bayle and the *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique* (1697) in which Bruno and Spinoza were castigated as atheists.

Brücker, the historian of philosophy, was favourable to, and more accurate than any of his predecessors in his treatment of Bruno; but it was Jacobi and Schelling, on the continent, especially the former in his *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza*, 1785, who really restored Bruno (and Spinoza) to serious consideration; it was Coleridge in England. Coleridge intended to write his biography. Cf. *Friend*, I. 196, f.n.

23. Coleridge's strong protest against Tennemann's attitude towards Bruno shows how he himself regarded Bruno's historical position. On Vol. IX. he comments:

It grieves me to say, that this Volume is a mere Bookseller's Order executed in the true book-making style. In short, with the exception of the account of Pomponatius, it is a poor compilation

from common books, and the article of Giordano Bruno especially heartless and superficial—a mere *skim* from one or two only of Bruno's writings—while his interesting attempts in Logic and Mnemonic are passed over altogether—tho' they would have thrown a light on his whole philosophy. O for a real life of Bruno, and analysis of his Writings! Experience sanctions but faint expectation of any weighty Benefits from literary Corporations, or Confederacies—and yet in respect both of Church History and the Critical History of Philosophy, I cannot help wishing that it were possible for some twelve or more Men of Learning and enamored of Metaphysics, to divide the periods among themselves, or in some cases, for instance, the Scholastic Philosophy, and the philosophy from after Occam to Bacon or Hobbes and Descartes, to take each one or more Authors. Thus, the one article of Giordano Bruno would occupy the same man who had before taken R. Lully. Doubtless, the Kantian System must be the regulative Line of all; but not, as in Tennemann, as a Line of Truth but as a Line of clear Exposition, a true equatorial. In fact, it would be a valuable Appendix to a Hist. of Philosophy to class all the schemes according to the views of the several Philosophers respecting the Transcendent, the Constitutive or merely regulative Idea, the *Transcendental*, the dogmatic Reason, and lastly, the Understanding and the Senses.

24. *The Latin Ode* was quoted in its Latin original in Coleridge's article on "Magnanimity" in Southey's *Omniana*, 1812, I. 241-2. If Coleridge's translation exists, E. H. Coleridge did not include it in the *Poetical Works*. Coleridge wrote out the poem in NB.21, c. April, 1801, or rather the seven stanzas which are usual. The Cambridge University Library copy of the *De Monade, Numero, &c.*, 1591, in which the poem appears, gives an eighth stanza.

Dædalias vacuis plumas nectere humeris
Concupiant alii, aut vi suspendi nubium
Alis, ventorumve oppetant remigium;
Aut orbitæ flammantis raptari alveo;
Bellerophontisve alitem.

Nos vero illo donati sumus Genio
(Ut fatum intrepidi objectasque umbras cernimus)
Ne cæci ad lumen solis, ad perspicuas
Naturæ voces surdi, ad Divum munera
Ingrato adsimus pectore.

Non curamus stultivum quid opinio
De nobis ferat, aut queis dignetur sedibus!
Alis ascendimus sursum melioribus!
Quid nubes ultra, ventorum ultra est semita
Vidimus, quantum satis est.

Illuc conscendent plurimi, nobis ducibus,
 Per scalam proprio erectam et firmam in pectore,
 Quam Deus, et vegeti Sors dabit Ingeni,
 Non manes, pluma, ignis, ventus, nubes, spiritus,
 Divinantum phantasmata!

Non sensus vegetans, non me ratio arguet,
 Non indoles exculti clara Ingenii;
 Sed perfidi Sycophantæ supercilium
 Absque Lance, Staterâ, Trutinâ, Oculo,
 Miraculum armati segete.

Versificantis Grammatistæ encomium
 Buglossæ Græcissantum, et Epistolia
 Lectorem libri salutantum a limine,
 Latrantum adversum Zoilos, Momos, Mastiges,
 Hinc absint Testimonia.

Procedat nudus quem non ornant Nubilæ
 Sol! Non conveniunt Quadrupedum phaleræ
 Humano Dorso! Porro Veri species
 Quæsita, inventa, et patefacta me efferat!
 Etsi nullus intelligat,
 Si cum Naturâ sapio et sub Numine
 Id vere plusquam satis est.

The memorandum in NB.21 makes it clear that in expounding Bruno's views as he does in the next paragraph, Coleridge is referring especially to the *De Innumerabilibus Immenso*, Books II-VII. This work is bound with the *De Monade* in the rare edition of 1591, of which there is no copy in the British Museum.

25. *Behmen*, 1575-1624. See Coleridge's defence of him in *L.R.*, IV. 90, against Baxter's criticisms. And "more in sorrow than in anger" he appears to have written, countering Tennemann, Vol. X. 183-197:

The imaginative power (a multiform power, which acting with its permeative modifying unifying might on the Thought and Images specificates the Poet, the swimming Crimson of eve in mountain Lake, River, Vale, Village and Village Church, the flashing or sleeping Moonshine in Nature's Poesy—and which exercising the same power in moral intuitions and the representations of worth or baseness in action is the essential constituent of what is called a *Good heart*—this power cannot be given or bought. It is always an *Indigena* of the Soil. Therefore I ought not to wonder—and yet from the sincere respect and *goodliking* I bear to Tennemann I cannot help wondering—that he could give even the meagre and gritty account, that he has given, of poor Böhmen without some sympathy with the

strivings and ferment of a genius so compressed and distorted by strait circumstances and the want of all the aids and organs of Speculative Thought, as that of the Visionary Sutor, or some admiration of the occasional Auroras and Streaming Lights in his dark Heaven. But no! I used the metaphor of a Ferment—and truly Tennemann, without looking deep enough to ascertain of what liquor, noticed only the Scum, the Yeasty Froth and the Tossing on the Surface. The single conception of the sameness of the strangling anguish or Bitter Source in the dark Ground of Nature with the triumph and stringency of the Joy in the Light, and its self-retractings, as the condition of Consciousness, after its out-sallyings, is physiologically worth a Cart-load of Tennemann's favorites, the Pyrrhonists and Sceptics—As to Böhmen's ideas of the Horology or innate Time in all creatures, or the continued existence and operation of a Miracle by the Word in counteracting the influence of the Longitude and Latitude on human Language, which would otherwise have been a foreign Tongue every half degree N. or S.—these were out of sight and hearing for our Critic. But I can forgive all—only not the “verstellte Demuth”—this is the bitterness of a Proud Priest, sneering at the virtues of a Sufferer for Conscience-sake. This was unworthy of you, friend Tennemann!

26. This passage down to “William Law” on p. 329 is a piece of self-plagiarism from the *B.L.*, I. 95–98. Parts of it, as Coleridge states in the *B.L.*, are translated from “a contemporary writer of the continent”. Sara Coleridge pointed out that it was from Schelling's *Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Natur-Philosophie zu der verbesserten Fichte'schen Lehre*. Those who are interested in questions of plagiarism may make what they like of Coleridge's use of this material in the lecture. Shawcross, in an excellent note on the point (*B.L.*, I. 243), seems to me to take the most sensible view of the matter.

The notes in the NB. are very sketchy:

 ☛ BEHMEN & Biographia Lit.

 Then Lord Bacon—

 Then the controversy between the Arminians & Calvinists.

27. “Snails of intellect who wear their eyes at the tips of their feelers”? *Omniana*, I. 243.
28. Coleridge's copy of *The Works of Jacob Behmen, the Teutonic Theosopher, with Figures illustrating his principles*, left by the Reverend William Law, M.A., 4 vols., London, MDCCLXIV, is heavily annotated. Some of the notes suggest a reading in the summer of 1818. His interest in Behmen is shown, however, much earlier. In the Gutch Memorandum Book (c. 1795–8) in the British Museum, of a list of projected works number 4 is: “Jacob Behmen”.
29. The argument for coupling the names of Behmen and Newton is more fully given in *A.R.*, 226–7, f.n.
30. Bacon, Francis (1561–1626). The whole discussion is close to the *Friend*, III. 204–16, from which the emendations are made. See Lect. XIII and note 8, also *A.P.*, 151, 298.

In a letter to Basil Montagu who was at the time (May 1827) editing Bacon, Coleridge writes,

In one of Goethe's least known Works and in a *Note* too, there is (I distinctly recollect) an elaborate Character of Lord Bacon—and in some one of my manifold Many-Scraps or Many-Scrips in my own manuscript, alias Manuscrawl, there are sundry additamenta, judicia emendata, and overruling of the Goethian dicta—& a comparison of Plato and Bacon. Altogether if I could afford the time, there might be framed out of it a highly polished character of Lord Bacon, as Man, Statesman, and Philosopher.

Now positively the time and concentration of Mind more than equal to a Poem of the same length, which must be given to it if it should be what I should wish to render it, the Gem of all my Compositions, to which I should refer as the Proof and Specimen of my powers in Style and Substance, would—if the Money were to come from forth of the Bookseller's Till—(authorize)* sanction me as an honest man having a tender conscience for his own interests, in asking the *Sir Walter Scott* Price of £50 for it . . . God bless you, S. T. Coleridge.

From the MS. letter in Cambridge University Library.

* [crossed out.]

In an (unpublished) note on Schelling's *Philosophische Schriften*, 1809, he says that he believes "the three greatest works since the introduction of Christianity" are "Bacon, *Novum Organon*, . . . Spinoza, *Ethics*, . . . and Kant's *Critique of the Pure Reason*."

31. *Kepler, John*, 1571–1630, successor to Tycho Brahe as astronomer at Prague, in the Pythagorean and Platonic tradition. For Coleridge on, see the *Friend*, III. 200 foll. ; and *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 36.
32. *A late ingenious French writer*. J.-J. Rousseau? The "bold but happy phrase . . . the homme particulière as contrasted with l'homme générale", in fact a passage close to this one, occurs in the *Friend*, III. 208. In the same work (I. 338) attention is called to Rousseau's distinction between "volonté de tous" and "volonté générale"; and it is attributed to him. At this point in the lecture, possibly Coleridge wished to avoid the intrusive and conflicting associations that would have been called up by Rousseau's name, and equally, perhaps, his own long parenthetical explanation to dissipate them.
33. Bacon. In the *Friend*, Coleridge refers this passage to the *Novum Organon*, xxiii and xxvi.
34. *Hooke, Dr. Robert* (d.1702). Coleridge says he refers to his *Posthumous Works*, pub. under the Royal Society, 22–42. *Friend*, III. 196–8, f.n.
35. *Calvinists and Arminians*. See note 2 above. Coleridge appears to have felt pushed by his own announced intentions, and perhaps by someone in the audience, to mention the subject; from the letter quoted in note 2 one suspects he was not sorry that the lecture was already long enough without launching forth on this controversy.

LECTURE XII

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB.25, pp. 143-49. The announcement is identical with that in the *Courier* of Monday, March 15th.
2. The beginning of this lecture to p. 344 is almost word for word the same as *T.L.*, 28-32, and is very like the "Monologue No.II., The Science and System of Logic" printed in *Fraser's Magazine*, December, 1835, 622-26.
 The *Theory of Life* in 1819 was still in MS., and was not published until it was edited by Seth B. Watson, in 1848. We here have proof that at least some of it was composed before 1823, the date Nidecker suggests for it, and an indication that E. H. Coleridge's conjecture of the autumn of 1816 is closer. If the *T.L.*, was a "joint production" of Coleridge and Gillman, as Watson suggested in his postscript to it (*T.L.*, 95), the lectures appear to establish at least this part of the work as Coleridge's.
3. *Aureity*. The earliest use of this word, according to the N.E.D. was in 1825 by Coleridge in the *Aids to Reflection*.
4. *Bacon*. See Lecture XI, p. 331, and note 30.
5. *Gilbert, William* (1540-1603). His great work, *De Magnete*, London, 1600, was "the first great physical book published in England" (D.N.B.). From his studies, "accumulative", "experimental", "etymological", etc., he concluded that the earth should be considered a spherical magnet.
6. *Harriot, Thomas* (1560-1621), mathematician and astronomer, the English rival to Descartes for priority in establishing the principles of modern algebra.
7. *Descartes, René* (1596-1650). See notes 14, 25, below.
8. *Newton, Sir Isaac* (1642-1727). See Lecture III, note 3; also *U.L.*, II. 201; cf. *Letters*, I. 350-354 with *U.L.*, I. 292.
9. *Forge, Louis de la* (17th cent.), physiologist and physician. He published nothing under the title Coleridge gives, but his best known work, *Tractatus de Menta Humana*, 1669, contains the two engravings referred to (see *T.L.*, 31); "Monologue II" of Coleridge, as reported in *Fraser's Magazine*, December, 1835, appears to refer to the same work.
10. *Kepler, Johann* (1571-1630) See Lecture XI, note 31.
11. *Gilbert* (See note 5 above) was the first to experiment with electricity, Volta the first to produce it in 1798. Coleridge was interested in the experiments with electricity as offering evidence of the law of polarity. See the *Friend*, III. 186-8.
12. *Black, Joseph* (1728-1799), Edinburgh University, chemist, physician, and teacher. He introduced pneumatic chemistry, and discovered "latent heat", important for Watt's improvement of the steam engine. Lavoisier counted himself a disciple of Black.
13. *Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent* (1743-1794), Paris, discovered oxygen, and worked on the nature of air, water and various acids.
14. "*nec tamen . . . reperirem*", Descartes, *De Methodo*, III.
15. Lecture III. Cf. with it the three paragraphs that follow.
16. *Gassendi, Pierre* (1592-1655), French philosopher and astronomer, prolific writer on mathematical and metaphysical subjects, was put by Coleridge in one category with other philosophical ancestors of Locke. Like Descartes

and Bacon, Gassendi opposed the Scholastics, but his grounds being naturalistic rather than Platonic he also had violent controversies with his anti-scholastic allies.

17. *Hobbes, Thomas*, 1588–1679. Cf. Lect. X. p. 311.
18. *Diog. Laertius*, IX. 44; Aristotle, *De Anima*, A.2. 405a 5. Loeb ed.
19. *Hobbes: Materialism ancient and modern*. Nowhere does Coleridge honour Hobbes with anything like systematic criticism. He “burned him”—along with Locke and Hume—“under Duns Scotus’s nose” (*Letters*, 358) in 1801, and after that he usually mentions him to attack him for his materialism, associationism, atheistic tendencies, or his political absolutism. See *E.O.T.* III. 929–30, or White. R. J., *op. cit.*, 109–112. But cf. *Assistant*, p. 72, f.n.
20. From here to the end of this paragraph there is a close resemblance to *B.L.* Cf. ch. V. (I. 71–2).
21. *Hobbes . . . billiard balls*. Shawcross in his note to the passage points out that “there is no mention of billiard balls in Hobbes’ discussion of the subject (*Human Nature*, Chs. ii, iii)”. See also Lecture III, p. 131. Hume uses the billiard balls in the *Treatise*, *ed. cit.*, 164.
22. Coleridge means Descartes. Cf. *T.L.*, 31.
23. *Hollow tubes*. In *B.L.*, ch. V. (I. 71) Coleridge attributes this theory to Hartley. But Hartley, in his *Observations on Man*, I. 17–18, expressly rejects the theory, attributing it to Boerhaave. Priestley, in his *Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind*, viii, says the notion was generally accepted till Newton. Abernethy in his *Introductory Lectures*, 1815, 68, attributes it to Haller of Göttingen.
24. See p. 352 and note 37 below.
25. The passage that follows is almost *verbatim* from *B.L.*, ch. VIII. (I. 88–90).
26. Descartes, *Principia*, Pt. I. 8, Pt. II. 1–2; *Meditations*, especially II. and VI.
27. *P.L.*, V. 469–488. Quoted at the beginning of the thirteenth chapter of *B.L.* in association with a quotation from Leibnitz.
28. “The denial of all other properties to matter but that of extension . . . has long been exploded.” By Leibnitz. See *Oeuvres*, Erdmann, I. 113. In her notes to this passage (*B.L.*, 1847, I. 131 foll.), Sara Coleridge points out the resemblances to Schelling. See Schelling’s *Werke* (1856–8), I. i. 343 and I. iii. 406–7.
29. A favourite illustration, used e.g. in a comment on Tennemann, and in another on John Petvin’s *Letters concerning Mind*. See *Notes Theological, &c.*, 263.
30. *Animal machines: De Methodo*, V. (Haldane & Ross, *op. cit.*, 115–16). Cf. Sara Coleridge, *B.L.*, (1847) I. 132. The connexion with Spinoza is, as she points out, “recondite”.
31. Sara Coleridge has a note at this point, *B.L.*, (1874) I. 133–4, showing a close connexion with Schelling’s *Transc. Idealismus* (*ed. cit.*) 112–14. It is interesting to notice that the lectures do not follow Schelling quite so closely as does *B.L.*
32. Sara Coleridge, *B.L.*, (1847) I. 135–6, refers this passage to Schelling, *Philosophische Schriften*, Landshut, 1809, and what follows in the paragraph to his *Transc. Idealismus*, (*ed. cit.*) 149–50, and *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, Landshut, 1803. *Einleitung*, 22.
33. Cf. Cowley’s “All Over Love”.

"But, like a God, by powerful art,
 'Twas all in all, and all in every part."

34. Priestley, Joseph (1733-1804), and Price, Richard (1723-1791), two intimate friends, both Unitarians, published in 1778 a correspondence on the subject of materialism and necessity. See also, Price, *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*; and Priestley, *Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit*. Coleridge was an admirer of Price, who anticipated Kant at some points, and who opposed his own Arianism to Priestley's Socinianism.
35. Here begins again the use of the material later published as the *Theory of Life*. See also note 2. The contemporary theory of the dependence of function upon structure, which Coleridge refers to, is that of William Lawrence, expounded in his second introductory lecture before the Royal College of Surgeons, March 25, 1816, and published as *An Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology*, London, 1816. "'Mind is the result of structure' says Mr Lawrence" (NB.27).
36. With the next paragraph in the lecture, cf. *T.L.*, 21-2.
 For a discussion of the heated controversy out of which these remarks arose, see *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 16-23. Coleridge's views are shoulder to shoulder with Abernethy's in the *Hunterian Oration* for 1819, delivered on Feb. 15th, (see Lecture VII and note 9; Lecture VIII, note 17); they as steadily oppose those of Lawrence's *Introductory Lectures* of 1816.
37. *Jewellers' scale of science . . . way-bridge of common opinion*. The metaphor is developed in detail in MS. Logic, Egerton 2826, ff.129-30. Kant used it in *Träume eines Geistersehers*, Ch. 2. There are some other correspondences. Kant also discusses here the theory of 'life'; refers to the Egyptian symbol for the soul (see Lecture II, p. 111); quotes the conclusion of *Candidate* (see Lecture V, note 16); and refers to Stahl (see note 40 below).
38. *Fable of the Lamiae*. I can find no story that matches exactly. There was one Lamia who could take her eyes out and put them in again. And in later times there were Lamiae who were a sort of vampire. But the sisters called The Graeae (two or three) had only one eye (and one tooth) in common.
 Whether one or other of these creatures got into *Christabel* is another question.
39. Bichat, Marie-Francois-Xavier (1771-1802), famous French doctor and anatomist. His *Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort*, 1800, had run to three editions at the time of Coleridge's lectures.
40. "The truly great man" is Stahl, G. E., German physician (1660-1734) who in his *Theoria medica vera*, 1707, upheld an animistic theory in opposition to Boerhaave and Hofmann, and to whom the above definition of life is attributed by Lawrence in his *Introductory Lectures* of 1816, 129.
41. *A subtile fluid*. Newton referred to the aether as a subtile fluid, in the last edition of the *Optics*. See also Lecture III, note 3. In the *T.T.* (June 29, 1833) Coleridge says it is not a "legitimate hypothesis", but "a mere suffiction", "pure gratuitous assumption". In the *T.L.*, 66, he suggests that Abernethy's use of the phrase is "an image", "a diagram on his slate" for "the vital principle".
42. *Theory, hypothesis, law*. Coleridge more than once makes and uses these

- distinctions. An hypothesis is an assumption based on fact, a theory is "a collected view", as far as possible, of all the facts; it "helps investigation" and "cannot invent or discover". These are achieved by the understanding; the law, or indwelling idea, the governing principle, is arrived at by the Reason. Cf. *T.T.*, June 29, 1833. Coleridge's definition of the first two is close to Abernethy's in his Introductory Lecture for 1815, *op. cit.*
43. *Beddoes, Dr. Thomas* (1760-1808), physician, philanthropist, patron of Humphrey Davy, father of the poet Thos. Lovell Beddoes. See *T.L.*, 23-4; *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 123-4.
 44. *Newton, Sir Isaac* (1642-1727). See note 8 above. Coleridge, like Goethe in the *Farbenlehre*, reserved his admiration for Newton the mathematician, and thought his philosophical influence, e.g. in the direction of associationism, insidious.
 45. La Place (and Volta) were still living; both died in 1827.
 46. Coleridge is attacking the nominalists, and Locke, chiefly. Is there a suggestion here of an argument also against his nephew, John Taylor Coleridge, whose Oxford prize essay, *Etymology*, was published in 1814? It was thoroughly Lockian, and Coleridge must surely have protested. Was he in the audience? John Taylor Coleridge was later Judge and first Baron.
 47. *Assassin and dagger*. In the *Friend*, I. 180, this "treason against human nature" is said to be committed by "one of the late followers of Hobbes and Hartley".
 48. *Hobbes told Dr. Wallis*. Cf. the *Friend*, I. 46-7. The reference is to a controversy, famous for its duration, intensity and perversity, which began between Hobbes and the academic mathematicians with the publication of Hobbes's *De Corpore* in 1655, and ended only with Hobbes's last work, *Decameron physiologicum*, in his 91st year.
 49. *Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de* (1715-1780), friend of Rousseau, exponent of Locke and opponent of Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza. His influence in England was wide and important, especially in psychology, his best known work being his *Traité des sensations*.
 50. *Condillac's Logic*: Coleridge's knowledge of French was admittedly imperfect, but it is hard to understand how he could have so far misread the passage referred to.

"Ce sont les actions de l'âme qui déterminent celles du corps; et d'après celles-ci, qu'on voit, on juge de celles-là, qu'on ne voit pas . . .

Les idées morales paroissent échapper aux sens: elles échappent du moins à ceux de ces philosophes qui nient que nos connoissances viennent de sensations. Ils demanderoient volontiers de quelle couleur est la vertu, de quelle couleur est le vice. Je réponds que la vertu consiste dans l'habitude des bonnes actions, comme le vice consiste dans l'habitude des mauvaises. Or ces habitudes et ses actions sont visibles." Condillac, *Oeuvres Complètes*, XII, 1798, 55-6.

Coleridge made a similar criticism in the MS. *Logic*, Egerton 2826, f.393 v. See also *T.L.*, 61, f.n. Coleridge elsewhere refers scornfully to

Condillac's *Logic*, "his logic which he basely purloined from Hartley". *B.E.*, I. 272.

51. Kant, I. (1724-1804). The reference appears to be to the *Einleitung* to the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, and possibly there are recollections of the *Träume eines Geistesehers*, ch. 2, (in *Vermischte Schriften* (Halle, 1799) II. 280 foll.) Coleridge annotated both works. See note 37 above and Lecture XIII, notes 32-4.

Coleridge's reading of Kant is impressive in quantity, and also for the quality of his marginal comments. A list of works annotated by him follows.

Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, 8°, Riga, 1787.

Die Religion Innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 8°, Königsberg, 1794.

Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 8°, Königsberg, 1797.

Critik der practischen Vernunft, 8°, Riga, 1797.

Critik der reinen Vernunft, Leipzig, 8°, 1799.

Critik der Urtheilskraft, 8°, Berlin, 1799.

Vermischte Schriften, Bde I and II, 8°, Halle, 1799.

Ibid. Another copy, Bde II-IV, 8°, Halle, 1799-1807. The four volumes contain fifty-three minor works.

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefasst, 8°, Königsberg, 1800.

Logik, 8° Königsberg, 1800.

Sammlung einiger bisher unbekannt gebliebener kleiner Schriften, 8°, Königsberg, 1800.

52. *Worth vs. value*. Intrinsic vs. contingent value? Parallel to the categorical vs. the hypothetical imperative?

55. *Critik der Practischen Vernunft*, Part I, Bk. II, §§ VIII and IX, contains the matter of this discussion, but if this is a translation, I have been unable to find the passage. Some of Coleridge's marginalia on Kant, edited by H. Nidecker, were printed in the *Revue de littérature comparée*, 1927, Vol. VII, 135-146; 226-348; 521-30; much remains unpublished. The notes are full of signs of struggle: "Confessio ignorantiae", "Doubts felt during a first perusal, i.e. struggles felt, not arguments objected" (unfortunately not dated); "Had I possessed courage enough to have seen this at first, I might have spared all my notes—written at so many different and distant times." (That was on the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*.) "I have seldom been so much at a loss to discover whether a passage has baffled my comprehension from my own obtuseness or from the infinitesimal quantum of the meaning itself, as in this *Erster Fall*. After twice seven readings, I might say spellings . . . &c", this is the tone of many of the notes on Kant. I doubt if he read any other philosopher's work so thoroughly and so often.

For Coleridge's opinions about Kant, see *Intro.* §3, and, e.g. *B.L.*, I. 99-100; *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 120. *The Friend*, the MS. "Logic" (largely unpublished) and the *Aids to Reflection*, embody most of Coleridge's own Kantianism.

Mr. R. Wellek, in *Kant in England*, gives more space to Coleridge than to any other writer, as is fitting. Muirhead, in "Metaphysician or Mystic?" *op. cit.*, disagrees with some of Wellek's conclusions, see, e.g. 180-3. The

best treatment of Coleridge and Kant is found in Miss Elisabeth Winkelmann's *Coleridge und die Kantische Philosophie*, Leipsig, 1933. But all Coleridge's marginalia and other comments on Kant and the Kantians need to be collected and assessed by a competent specialist. They leave little doubt that he knew more about these philosophers than anyone in England in the period, and they increase one's respect for his mind and methods.

LECTURE XIII

1. The notes for this lecture are in NB.25, pp. 150-159, and begin with the heading: LOCKE, LEIBNITZ, KANT, SCHELLING.
2. *Desynonymizing*. See Lecture V, note 4; VI, note 5. And for similar passages, see *B.L.*, I. 61 f.n.; *Misc. Crit.*, 207.
3. 'Mestur', 'mester' and 'meeaster' are given in Wright, *Dialect Dictionary*, as variants found in Lancashire and Yorkshire, where Coleridge probably heard them.
4. *Fancy and Imagination*. The report appears to be incomplete: the philosopher proceeds from the particular cases described by the adjectives, "and establishes the same meaning", or extends it to a general application in the substantives. Something of the sort is what Coleridge means. The famous distinction is found in *B.L.*, I. 58-64, and in several other places in Coleridge's works. See Willey, Basil, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 32, 1946, for an interesting lecture on the subject.
5. *Definitions: Body, Matter, Spirit or Power, Nature (Active and Passive), Mind, Subject and Object*. Cf. the list of terms which "include all the difficulties which the human mind can propose for solution", in *B.L.*, Ch. XII; it is the same list, with the addition of "space, time, cause and effect, consciousness, perception, memory and habit".
In NB.12, Coleridge complains that "Locke and the stupid adorers of that Fetisch Earth-clod, take all these for granted". See notes 11, 12, below.
6. *The idealist* means for Coleridge the subjective idealist. Cf. *Introd.* §3, pp. 60-1.
7. From "The Eolian Harp", *P.W.*, I. 102.
8. *Francis Bacon*. Cf. *Nov. Org.* XXIII, XXVI. See Lecture XI and note 30. Coleridge's translation and interpretation of Bacon's terms is not quite usual; the idols of the cave, the theatre, the forum (market-place), the tribe, are generally thought of as false notions from anthropomorphic thinking, the first from personal errors, the second from custom, the third from language and the fourth from confusing final with efficient causes. It is of the last one, or chiefly the use made of it by Hobbes and Hume, that Coleridge is critical; he does not appear to have noticed in it an anticipation of Kant's first *Critik*.
9. *If spiders had been theologians*. The reference is to Hume, *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, Pt. VII, in which Hume is objecting to arguments from design. Coleridge's meaning here (did the reporter omit something?) is made clearer by a note on a fly-leaf of Tennemann, II:

Arguments in support of an opinion from the consequences

of its opposite do not stand high in my good graces. It ought, however, to have some weight with the Admirers of Proofs a posteriori for the existence of a God, that they cannot reject the difference between Reason and Understanding without putting it in the power of the Spinosists and Atheists to lay the Ax at the very Root of their Logic by demonstrating the incompatibility of Attributes, that *imply*, are *conditioned*, and in part even *constituted* by, finiteness, dependence and imperfection or *negation*, with an infinite, independent, impatible and all-perfect Being. The Sneer of Hume, that by the same Logic, Spiders would conclude, that Houses &c were spun out of Men's Bellies, would have but too much force. What if a man should assert that Mills were made by Corn-grinding, and shortly after declare that both the Grinding and the Ground Corn were the proper and Immediate Effects or Results of the Mills? And yet Paley in his Natural Theology, first, assumes Intelligence (meaning the power and exercise of Understanding) as the Cause of Organization—and shortly after, states Organization as the Cause of Understanding—i.e. that Understanding or Intelligence is the Property or Result of its own Effects. The Grandfather being his own Grandchild!

In short the case stands thus. Anthropomorphism may be used in two senses. It may simply signify a somewhat, of which our Humankind partake indeed, but which is not among the generic characters or marks that contra-distinguish the Human from the Super-human—a fortiori, nor of those which distinguish one Individual from an other, and which therefore, as a separate Integer, distinguishable in the same manner as a knife or a watch may be distinguished from other Knives or Watches, for larger or smaller, better or worse, each Individual calls his own. Or it may be used in reference to these marks and proprieties. Now *with* Anthropomorphism in this latter sense we may have an *Idol*, or a Jupiter or a Thor, but not a necessary self-grounded Being. And *without* Anthropomorphism in the former sense, we may have a Fate, a necessary *Ground* of the World contained in the Idea of the World, and only by an arbitrary Abstraction conceived separately from the World, but not a *God*. To *this* sense belongs the Anthromorphism, or rather the Theanthropy, of *Reason*. To the other the Anthropomorphism of the *Understanding*. "My Thoughts are not as your Thoughts, saith the Lord: nor my Ways your Ways." Now the human Understanding is a Thing of Thoughts, Ways and Means. The Reason is Anthropomorph, partaking of the Divine: the Understanding an Anthromorth, *partaken* of by inferior animals—vide Huber on Bees: and *Ditto* on Ants.

10. *No such faculty* (Coleridge uses the word loosely in the sense of ability, the notion of 'faculties' was already suspect with him), meaning that by which man is "conscious of something nobler than his perceptions them-

selves". "The numerous class of modern philosophers" refers to the associationists.

11. *John Locke* (1692-1704). Crabb Robinson describes a conversation in which Locke was similarly treated. (Diary . . . of H. Crabb Robinson, ed. Sadler, I. 200, Dec. 23, 1810). See also *T.T.*, April 20, 1811; *U.L.*, I. 173. In the *S.M.* (1816) S. T. C. ". . . begs leave to observe that he had read Locke, and read him all through, more than once, some twenty-five years ago".
12. The "monstrous absurdities", it is clear, are Locke's "innate ideas".
13. Descartes, *Principia*, ii. 1. Cf. *B.L.*, I. 88 foll.
14. *The Jesuit Voetius*. In spite of the reporter's mistake, the name is clear from other similar statements: MS. Egerton 2826, f.286-7, *Notes Theological &c.* 263. Voetius was not a Jesuit, but a Calvinistic Scholastic, Rector of the University of Utrecht, 1641-2. He led violent campaigns against Descartes (some of which had political repercussions), and as Descartes was under fire from the Jesuits at the same time Coleridge has jumped to a wrong conclusion. The reply to Voetius is in *Answer to Objections*, VII, Question 2. See *Philosophical Works of Descartes*, transl. Haldane and Ross, Vol. II. 271 foll.
15. Cf. MS. Egerton 2826, f.286-7.
 "... *innatus non connatus dixi, locum non tempus oriundi, &c.*
 And in the same place Descartes apologises for the barbarous use of the term Idea on the ground of his having employed it metaphorically. At the same time he observes that strictly speaking all Ideas were necessarily innate, that is, had their immediate birthplace as Images, conceptions &c in the mind, and that the distinction was merely logical, not metaphysical."
16. Cf. *T.T.*, April 20, 1811; *Letters*, I. 351; *Notes Theological &c.* 264. There is an interesting article on Coleridge and Descartes in the *P.M.L.A.*, XLIX. 1. (March 1934) 184 foll., which gives Coleridge's annotations on the *Opera Philosophica*, Amstelodami, 1685. They are on the *De Methodo*, on the § "De Passionibus".
17. *The abuse of 'idea'*. Coleridge says in a note on Petvin's *Letter Concerning Mind*, that Locke's ideas and Plato's were no more alike than "a Syllogism and an Apple-Dumpling", (Miss R. F. Brinkley's transcription). With the whole paragraph that follows, cf. *Notes Theological &c.* 263. On the word 'Idea', see *B.L.*, I. 69 f.n.
18. *The Bishop of Worcester* is Stillingfleet, Edward (1635-1699). Locke's controversy with him began in 1696 when Stillingfleet criticized Locke's *Essay*, as inconsistent with Christianity and sceptical in tendency. There were at least three letters each way, till 1698. Stillingfleet's objections are very like Coleridge's: objections to Locke's theory of knowledge from sensation and reflection, to his definition of substance, to his view of human personality, and to his naturalism as being generally sceptical. On many other issues Coleridge disagrees fundamentally with Stillingfleet, especially on the relation of philosophy to religion. In his insistence throughout the lectures on the necessity of a philosophy to a sound religion, Coleridge may have been more or less consciously opposing Stillingfleet, among others.

- Coleridge annotated Stillingfleet's *Origines Sacrae*, 1675 (Poole's copy) now in the British Museum. The notes were published by R. Garnett in the *Athenaeum*, March 27, 1875.
19. Newton's theory of gravitation corrected the Cartesian theory of matter as moved and movable only by pressure and impact from without.
 20. *Calculus of fluxions invented by Newton*. The controversy between Newton and Leibnitz as to priority of discovery is settled by modern scholarship generally by giving both men credit for independent work.
 21. "Voltaire in that jumble of Ignorance, wickedness & Folly, which with his usual Impudence he entitled a Philosophical Dictionary, made it epidemic with all the no-thinking Free-thinkers throughout Europe, to consider Locke's Essay as a modest common-sense system, which taught but little indeed— & yet taught all that could be known & held up in opposition to the dreams of the philosophy of Leibnitz." MS. Egerton 2801, f.19.
 22. Brains, Germany; hands, England; senses, France. Cf. the *Friend*, III. 84-92.
 23. Leibnitz, G. W. von (1646-1716), answered Locke in *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain* (1765). What follows in this lecture is perhaps Coleridge's longest discussion of Leibnitz. One would have expected him to have had more to say about a Platonist anti-Lockian defender of mental activity in the knowing process and of universals. But his remarks elsewhere, though enthusiastic, are brief: *A.P.*, 147, 151, 152; *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, 121.
 24. Coleridge refers perhaps to the *Theodicee* (1710).
 25. *Spinosas*, Baruch de (1632-1677). Coleridge's critical discrimination is well demonstrated in his admiration for Spinoza as a thinker and as a man, in the face of wide disagreement with the pantheistic implications of his system. Coleridge's annotations on the Paulus edition of Spinoza's *Works*, 2 vols., were published by W. Hale White in the *Athenaeum* for May 22, 1897. See also *Letters . . . to D. Stuart*, 229-30.
 26. The Prince was the Elector Palatine, who invited Spinoza to Heidelberg in 1673, to allow him to philosophize freely, and to avoid the distractions of public controversy.
 27. *Spinoza on Christ*. In letter LXXIII (old numbering XXI) he writes, "It is not entirely necessary to salvation to know Christ according to the flesh; but we must think far otherwise of the eternal son of God, that is, the eternal wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all things, more especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus. For without this wisdom no one can attain to a state of blessedness, inasmuch as it alone teaches what is true and what is false, what is good and what is evil. And since, as I have said, this wisdom was most manifest through Jesus Christ, his disciples, in so far as he had revealed it to them, preached it, and showed that they were able above others to glory in that Spirit of Christ. For the rest, as to the doctrine which certain Churches add to these, namely, that God assumed human

nature, I expressly warned them that I do not understand what they say. Indeed, to confess the truth, they seem to me to speak no less absurdly than if some one were to tell me that a circle assumed the nature of a square."

Cf. also, Letter LXXV, and *Ethics*, IV, Prop. LXVIII.

28. *Poem of India*. See Lecture III. pp. 127-9.
29. *Lessing on Spinoza*. In a conversation reported by F. Jacobi in his *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza*. The Breslau edition of 1789 was annotated by Coleridge.
30. *pleasure, ambition, money*. Cf. Spinoza, *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, 227 foll. (Everyman ed.)

"For the things which most often happen in life and are esteemed as the greatest good of all, as may be gathered from their works, can be reduced to these three headings: to wit, Riches (divitiæ), Fame (honor), and Pleasure (libido) . . ."

31. *Kant I*. See Lecture XII, notes 50, 51.
32. Kant's *Logik*, 1800. Coleridge's copy p. 3, opposite Kant's "nothwendig oder zufällig", bears his query, "Would not the Terms universal and occasional be better?"
33. *Ideas of God, free will, immortality*. *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, I. II. v.
34. Coleridge is paraphrasing in this paragraph and exact references are made the more uncertain by the freedom of his translation. He may be referring to *Der Einzige Mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes*, 1763. (*Vermischte Schriften*, Bd. II. 1799). See also a marginal note printed by Nidecker, *op.cit.*, VII. 343-4.
35. *Philology*. Coleridge adopts the German usage.
36. *Schelling, F. W. J. von (1775-1854)*. It is very regrettable both that the time left was so short, and that the reporting just here was so unsuccessful. See, on the first point, the *Introd.* §3, pp. 61-4.

There are some interesting notes in Crabb Robinson's *Diary* that throw light on what follows in the lecture. See Morley, E., *Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Lamb*, etc., 1932, 31, 70-3, 83; and in the *Diary* . . . ed. Sadler, 1869, Vol. II. 115, there is a record by Crabb Robinson that Schelling told him (Aug. 28, 1829) that he had not become a Roman Catholic. If Crabb Robinson thought Schelling a Roman Catholic, it is likely that Coleridge shared the opinion. And if he learned it from Tick in the summer of 1817, just when he was beginning to re-read Schelling to discuss his work with J. H. Green, his Protestant prejudices may easily have led him to see Schelling in a different light from the one in which he appears in the *B.L.*

For Coleridge on Schelling, see especially *B.L.*, Ch. IX. (I. 102 foll.) and Shawcross's notes thereto. See also Wellek, *op. cit.*, 96 foll.; Muirhead, *op. cit.*, 52-8; 201-4; and, for the most informative criticism of all, Winkelman, *op. cit.*, 121-9, 226-9. Some of the Schelling marginalia have been published by Nidecker, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, but much remains unpublished. The notes on the *Denkmal* are very antagonistic to his assumed superiority over Kant and Jacobi.

A list of Schelling's works known to have been annotated by Coleridge is as follows:

- System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, 8°, Tübingen, 1800.
- Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik*, 8°, 2 Bde, Jena und Leipzig, 1800-1.
- Naturgeschichte*, 2 Bde in 1, Freyberg, 1801. (n.t.p.)
- Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, 8°, Landshut, 1803.
- Philosophie und Religion*, 8°, Tübingen, 1804.
- Jahrbücher der Medicin* (with A. F. Marcus), 3 Bde, 8°, Tübingen, 1806, 1807, 1808.
- Philosophische Schriften*, Bde I, 8°, Landshut, 1809. This contains:
Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, 1795.
Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus, 1795.
Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre, 1796-7.
Über das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zu der Natur, 1807.
Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, 1809.
- Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen . . . des Herrn F. H. Jacobi*, 8°, Tübingen, 1812.
- Ueber die Gottheiten von Samothrace*, 8°, Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1815.
37. A Jesuit who opposed the Protestants about the time of James the First &c. It might be Athanasius Kircher, S.J. (1601-1680). Kircher's dates and his combination of scientific, philological and theological activities fit the specification. He was the founder of the *Museum Kircherianum* in Rome, visited by all such travellers as Coleridge, and like Coleridge he had spent some time in Malta. He published a scientific work for the order of the Knights of Malta whose library Coleridge used. In fact, Coleridge owned one of his early works: Athanasii Kircheri, *Podromus, coptus sive Aegypticus Romae*, Typis S. Cong. de propag. Fide: 1636.
38. Not Schelling I think. The anecdote that follows is not supported by the biographical facts.
39. Could this be J. Fr. Fries, *privat dozent* at Jena 1801-5, while Crabb Robinson was there? He wrote against Schelling, but I have not had access to anything containing a passage like the one Coleridge quotes. Nor have I seen "Coleridge und Fries", an article in the *Preuss. Jahrb.* Bd. 147, Berlin, 1912, referred to by Elisabeth Winkelmann, *op. cit.*, 129-30.
40. Ludwig Tieck? (1773-1853). Coleridge met him in Rome, but according to Crabb Robinson, did not then know he was a poet. He had a very wide knowledge of English and other literatures, and shared the enthusiasms of the Schlegels for mediæval art, folklore, and drama. He visited England and saw much of Coleridge in 1817. He was a liberal Roman Catholic. See Morley, E., *op. cit.*, 31; 70, "he [Coleridge] lamented the Romanism of the Schlegels and Tieck"; 72, Tieck "did talk & abt. religion. He professed Catholicism, but it was of a harmless kind . . .".

LECTURE XIV

1. The summary of the course appears to have been systematic and condensed; no new material appears to have been introduced. The notes from NB.25

for this lecture are given as they stand, the casual punctuation of private memoranda being unedited.

2. E.g. by Richardson? Cf. *T.T.*, July 5, 1834, "And how charming, how wholesome, Fielding always is! To take him up after Richardson, is like emerging from a sick room heated by stoves, into an open lawn, on a breezy day in May."
3. Probably Coleridge referred to Anaximander. See Lect. II, p. 22, f.n.
4. Anaximenes?
5. *Lay Sermon*, Appendix E, (1816), xlv-xlv?

APPENDIX A.

From the *Morning Chronicle*, December 29, 1818.

MR. COLERIDGE

In an account of Mr. Coleridge's Lectures which appeared in the *Courier* some days ago, it is said—

“Mr. Coleridge with becoming zeal asserted his claim, as the first person who taught the undoubted truth, that the judgment of Shakespeare was, in all his writings, equally, if not more conspicuous, than his genius. This doctrine has since been maintained by eminent critics, both abroad and at home; but, as far as our knowledge qualifies us to speak, we believe Mr. Coleridge's claim to priority of discovery cannot be denied.”

As Mr. Coleridge seems to attach great importance to this discovery, let us see how the fact really stands with respect to it.

William Schlegel is evidently one of the foreign critics here alluded to. In his *Dramatic Lectures*, which were delivered in 1808 but not published till 1809 and 1811, doctrines respecting Shakespeare, similar to those of Mr. Coleridge, are to be found. Now Mr. Coleridge contends that as early as 1806, he delivered ~~to~~ various audiences the substance of his present Lectures, and that as Schlegel's Lectures were not delivered till 1808, the priority in this discovery is due to himself.

In Schlegel's Lectures it is said,

“In an Essay on *Romeo and Juliet*, written a number of years ago, I went through the whole of the scenes in their order, and demonstrated the inward necessity of each with reference to the whole; I shewed why such a particular circle of characters and relations was placed around the two lovers; I explained the signification of the mirth here and there

scattered, and justified the use of the occasional heightening given to the poetical colours.—From all this it seemed to follow unquestionably, that with the exception of a few plays of wit, now become unintelligible or foreign to the present day (imitations of the tone of society of that day), nothing could be taken away, nothing added, nothing otherwise arranged, without mutilating and disfiguring the perfect work.”

The Essay here described appeared in the first volume of *Charakteristiken und Kritiken*, published by William and Frederick Schlegel at Königsberg in 1801.

Thus it appears that M. Schlegel, so early as 1801, threw down the gauntlet in defence of the judgment displayed by Shakespeare in the composition of his works. He confined his examination to one play, indeed, but the principles on which he conducted that examination are the same with those which run through his Lectures, and which Mr. Coleridge says were discovered by himself. Though Mr. Coleridge was long in Germany, and is well acquainted with German Literature, it does not follow that he is indebted to Schlegel for any part of his ideas; but unless he can shew that in Lectures or publications of so early a date as 1801, he advocated the judgment displayed by Shakespeare in the composition of his works, it will be somewhat difficult for him to establish the claim to the title of a *discoverer*.

APPENDIX B.

THE PORTRAIT

Two portraits of Coleridge were painted by Thomas Phillips, R.A. (1770-1845) during the first weeks of 1819 when the lectures were still being delivered. The portraits are sufficiently alike to leave no doubt that they were painted at the same time or that one was done largely from the other. One of these, owned by Mr. John Murray, was engraved as the frontispiece of the *Table Talk* in the 1836 and 1851 editions, and was again reproduced in the third volume of E. H. Coleridge's edition of Byron's *Poetical Works*. The other is owned by Lady Cave to whom I am indebted for permission to publish it here. So far as we know, this portrait has not been reproduced elsewhere.

While he was still sitting to Phillips, Coleridge wrote,
". . . I can form no judgment. In its present state the eyes appear too large, too globose, and their colour must be made lighter, and I thought that the face, exclusive of the forehead, was stronger, more energetic than mine seems to be when I catch it in the glass, and therefore the forehead and brow less so—not in themselves, but in consequence of the proportion. But of course I can form no notion of what my face and look may be when I am animated in friendly conversation."

Six years later when he went to see "our Bishop's portrait"—William Hart Coleridge's—he said,

"My own by the same artist is very much better, though even in this the smile is exaggerated. But Fanny and your mother were in raptures with it. . ."

Some small differences from the other portrait are to be seen about the mouth, the smile here being slightly less "exaggerated".

Was this, then, the second portrait, the copy, and was the artist responsive to suggestions from his subject? However that may be, this is the portrait declared by the Lord Chief Justice Coleridge to be "the best presentation of the outward man".

Everything about it makes it clearly a portrait of Coleridge the lecturer: the attitude, the formal dress, the animated speaker's face, the notebook in the hand not closely regarded by the rolling eye. The notebook, in fact, looks very like the brown leather-covered memorandum book containing the notes for the philosophical course.

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